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INTRODUCTION 
The 12th Annual Conference of the Finland Futures Research Centre (FFRC) and the Finland Futures 
Academy was held 3–4 June 2010 in  Turku, Finland. The conference was titled “Security in Futures – 
Security in Change”. Five internationally recognized keynote lecturers, more than 40 workshop presen-
tations in8 parallel workshops and more than 100 participants from all over the world brought new 
viewpoints and novel ideas. 
By developing images of alternative futures, the goal of the conference was to give new viewpoints 
and novel ideas to decision-makers to assist them towards more feasible decisions to construct the world 
a better place. Security means that something is safe and protected – the absence of threats. Empirically, 
that is not possible and in consequence security is always a relative concept. Security is something that 
guarantees our lives to continue without fear of termination in physical and mental domains under a 
shield provided by the society. 
Security, in general terms, can be understood as a political and analytical concept related to such 
policy fields as social, or domestic or internal security of a state or a society. In the context of external 
security, security is conventionally linked to the protection of the integrity of the society against external 
threats. Traditional conceptions of external security are primarily linked to the state, or a coalition of 
states, and, in most cases, military means are seen as the primary instruments of security building. How-
ever, this traditional understanding invited substantial criticism already during the Cold War when ex-
ternal military threat was considered the ultimate threat to the safety and integrity of a society. Alarmed 
by the prospects of the escalation of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, proposals 
for new security thinking were presented in the context of 'common security' in the 1980s. During the 
1990s, 'comprehensive security' and 'preventive security' were attempts to respond to the emerging secu-
rity threats and challenges such as climate change, large scale poverty, human rights violations, and or-
ganized crime. 
Security means that something is safe, sure and protected. Security is something that guarantees 
our lives to continue without any fear of partial or total termination in physical and mental domains 
under a shield provided by trusted community. Security analysis aims to delve deeply inside the inevi-
table change of security issues’ revelation in a changing world compared to the immemorial human need 
to feel secure. Human activities and circulation are spreading more and more into the global production 
and business networks, information networks and ideological networks thus partly departing from the 
traditional nationally controlled context. Novel thinking and solutions are required to fulfil the imme-
morial human need to feel secure. The expansion of the reachable space, either physical or virtual, sim-
ultaneously with the feeling of the compression of perceived temporal axis, has led to a situation, where 
completely new kind of perceptions and activity patterns are combined with traditionally experienced 
phenomena. This new, mixed and broader world brings much more information into our vicinity about 
real and potential catastrophes, new kinds of technologies and new ways to encounter unknown people 
and their thinking and their ways to live. It also enables groups and individuals to demonstrate their 
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worldviews, aims and thoughts much more freely without social and legal restrains than it has been pos-
sible in traditionally organized physical world. 
The traditionally experienced way of existence in the world will face new challenges. This changed 
situation might feel obscure, fuzzy and even weird or frightening, thus increasing and changing the reve-
lation of the security demands towards community. At the same time, familiarity of traditionally experi-
enced ways to interact with the world are gradually fainting away from own control. Assuring security 
gets new forms via the agony of inevitable change of the multi-actor, global interaction environment. To 
decrease the feeling and further on the realization of insecurity, the foreseen changes and the states of 
the futures shall be brought into the context with novel and innovative ideas of making the future more 
feasible. Bringing this information into publicity, security in the changing world will increase in the fu-
ture while disagreements, wrong fears and empty wishes will settle outside the realistically reachable 
world of the future. 
The conference aimed to look deeply into the inevitable changes of security issues. The traditional 
way we experience our existence in the world faces new challenges. The situation may feel obscure, fuzzy 
and even weird or frightening. Thus, it will increase and change the quality and quantity of security we 
demand from our communities. At the same time, awareness of the ways of interacting with the world is 
gradually slipping away from our own control. To decrease the feeling and, further on, the realization of 
insecurity, the foreseen changes and the states of the futures shall be brought closer to our everyday by 
introducing novel and innovative ideas of making the future more feasible. Novel thinking and solutions 
are required to fulfil the human need to feel secure and to build more reasonable security solutions for 
futures’ world. 
Joint sessions included the following keynote speeches: “The Future Role of the EU in European Se-
curity Politics” by Dr Teija Tiilikainen, Director of The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland; 
“The Changing Futures of Social Security” by Professor Joakim Palme, Director of the Institute for Fu-
tures Studies, Sweden; “Emerging Technologies and Evolving Security Challenges in the Coming Dec-
ades” by Dr Yair Sharan, Director of  The Interdisciplinary Center for Technology Analysis  & Forecast-
ing, Tel-Aviv University, Israel; “Climate Change, Resource Conflicts and Sustainable Peace: Addressing 
Future Security Challenges”, by Propfessor Jürgen Scheffran, University of Hamburg, Germany; “Tam-
ing the Dragon: Risk, Chaos and the Loss of Security in the Age of Bifurcation” by Professor Markku 
Wilenius, Allianz Group, Germany & Finland Futures   Research Centre, University of Turku, Finland. 
Furthermore, a panel discussion with Dr Teija Tiilikainen, Professor Joakim Palme, Professor Elina Pir-
jetanniemi (Åbo Academy University Turku), Professor Veikko  Rouhiainen (VTT Tampere), and Profes-
sor Rauno Kuusisto (Finlande’s Armed Forces, Riihimäki/Finland) was led by Dr Burkhard Auffermann, 
Senoir Researech Fellow, FFRC. 
Workshops on the following aspects of security and safety were organized: 
 International and Political Security (incl. Arms Races and Disarmament) 
 Military and Defence (incl. Terrorism and Crime)  
 Environment, Energy and Climate Change  
 Security and Development  
 Technology and ICT  
 Business  
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 Culture (incl. Control and Surveillance)  
 Theory and Methodology of Futures Studies  (not only security-related). 
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THE COLLABORATION OF SECURITY ACTORS  
– ASPECTS FOR FUTURES RESEARCH 
Vesa Valtonen 
Major G.S. (PhD student) 
Finnish Defence Forces 
 
ABSTRACT - This article presents aspects for futures research in security actors’ collaboration. These 
aspects are based on recent research 0F1 dealing with the success factors in security actors’ collaboration 
at the operational-tactical (collaboration practice) level. Along with the fundamentals of security ac-
tors’ collaboration, a number of future implications were also discussed, which led to this article. The 
primary conclusion is that there is a clear need for comprehensive futures research at the operational-
tactical scale regarding collaboration in security issues. In addition, certain constraints keep us fo-
cused on the present, our “comfort zone”. This paper addresses these future aspects and presents a 
number of ideas for security- and collaboration-oriented futures research to come. 
Introduction 
The changes in the overall security environment require ever-greater collaboration among security ac-
tors. The general requirement of keeping society secure and functional is hard to fulfil when the opera-
tional systems become more sophisticated, complex and interdependent. Only few actors can consider to 
be independent, e.g. in case of power failure. The need for reliable partners has also awakened an inter-
est in the fundamentals of collaboration in security contexts. The primary question is: “What are the key 
elements for successful collaboration in general and in special contexts, such as the security environ-
ment?” In seeking a basis for daily ongoing collaboration, we may realize that the contexts, actors and 
even the united labour (Elliot 2007) itself are developing and changing rapidly in ways that are hard to 
foresee. When we are trying to create modern and robust security collaboration processes, we mainly 
react, which means that our actions are late. The collaboration processes should be thought through at 
least one step ahead. This requires Futures Research to observe the trends and signals and to be involved 
in shaping the possible futures. 
This article approaches the possibilities of Futures Research to study security collaboration at the 
operational-tactical level, i.e. at the lowest echelon in practical collaboration in time-sensitive security 
situations, where a failure may lead to loss of human lives. For example, fire fighters, emergency units, 
                                                             
 
1 Valtonen 2010, dissertation: The Collaboration of Security Actors, Turvallisuustoimijoiden yhteistyö, manuscript, 
under review. 
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police, military, and some other security actors operate in such conditions on a daily basis. At the other 
end, the operational level has to deal with challenges in leadership, information management, logistics 
and other support elements. A common feature is that you have to act fast, basing your actions on “good 
enough” knowledge to achieve your primary target (in the military, this means winning the battle, while 
in everyday life it usually means saving people’s lives). 1F2  Collaboration in these environments most often 
involves voluntary organizations and private sector actors whose actions should be united for a common 
purpose. This is the short description of the operational environment that should be considered in the 
futures evaluations.  
The referred research showed that collaboration among security actors has certain special features. 
Security collaboration requires trust, relevant capabilities and collaboration skills. In order to begin col-
laboration, a security partner has to show that it is reliable and has the necessary resources and certified 
capabilities. One example of an actual reliable capability is being able to demonstrate that you can han-
dle secret information properly. Security information is often secret and only available to reliable part-
ners. For this reason, it is difficult to use security information as a reference in the context of scientific 
research, where all publications should be public. 
There are also other challenges in research on security collaboration. The most fundamental chal-
lenge is the definition of the terms, roles and actors themselves. In most cases, a terminological consen-
sus has to be reached before addressing the subject. The terms security and collaboration have many 
meanings. In the Finnish language, the most fundamental dilemma is the two major roles and features 
of security. In English, there is a clear difference in the terms security and safety, but in Finnish they are 
combined in one word, “turvallisuus”. Security, which refers to the more societal aspects of “turval-
lisuus”, is mostly used and understood correctly, but some misunderstandings and difficulties still arise 
when safety matters are mixed with operational security level issues. That is only the tip of the iceberg of 
misunderstandings. 
In collaboration, we might face problems that are quite similar yet not the same. Collaboration is not 
the only term describing united labour, even in English. In many security collaboration contexts, it is 
important to define the meaning of collaboration in detail (e.g. security information, administrative as-
pects, etc.). One way of approaching the terminological differences is to examine the aspects distinguish-
ing the terms networking, coordination, cooperation and collaboration. Himmelman (1994, 2002) de-
scribes the common differences of definitions by comparing the interdependence of information and 
resources. From his point of view, the term collaboration is quite well suited to security collaboration. 2F3  
In some cases, the structure and the responsibilities in a collaboration context are so clear that pro-
ceeding to the subject does not require moderation phases (e.g. emergent daily situations). In rarer ad 
hoc situations, the whole operational system should be evaluated in a short period of time in order to 
enhance the collaboration of relevant actors. 
Even when we share the common view of the environmental and terminological aspects, we may still 
have very different perspectives and objectives from the cultural point 3F4 of view. These constraints will 
                                                             
 
2 Working hypothesis for paradigm of tactics (Valtonen 2008). 
3 In Himmelman’s comparison, collaboration involves the highest degree of increased reliability and sharing of in-
formation and resources. 
4 This may include individual, organizational, ethical, etc. aspects. 
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mostly fade away in emergent time-sensitive situations, but if there is enough time to explore the fun-
damentals of collaboration, the features of power, profit, etc. will gain greater meaning. Successful col-
laboration between security actors at the operational-tactical level involves recognizing environmental 
(community) and human factor (individuals) aspects. That makes it a challenging target for futures re-
search. 
Material and Methods 
The analyses in this article are based on the material that was produced by means of a Delphi Survey in 
the dissertation mentioned above (Valtonen 2010). In the dissertation, the main goal was to determine 
conceptual definitions and to find out the success factors within an operational-tactical collaboration 
context. In addition to the Delphi survey, the process included a discussion of future trends and aspects. 
In this article, the material on future-oriented answers was re-evaluated more profoundly in order to 
reveal possibilities for futures research concerning the collaboration of security actors. 
The Delphi Method could be described in short as a structured information gathering and evaluation 
process, enabling experts to express their opinions anonymously (Turoff 2002, Linturi 2007). The meth-
od is very popular in futures research and numerous variants of the method have been used in different 
surveys. In Valtonen’s Delphi survey, 21 experts (panellists) from different security branches (10 from 
public administration, 6 from voluntary services and 5 from business) took part in the process. Their 
expertise was verified before the survey in several exercises and interviews. Besides their expertise, the 
orientation and interests of the panellists were also discussed. The inquiry revealed that both pragmatic 
and future-oriented thinking are represented in their opinions. The Delphi process as a whole also 
turned out to be a learning process for both the participants and the researcher. 
The re-evaluated, future-oriented Delphi results were discussed with reference to some recent do-
mestic and international articles and writings. Operational-tactical level (practice) futures research on 
security collaboration has not been performed, especially in Finnish contexts (Kuusisto 2010). 
Results 
The main goal of the referred constitutive collaboration research was to determine conceptual defini-
tions and to find out the success factors within an operational collaboration context. The research results 
were based on the analysis of the Delphi survey and action research findings from several security exer-
cises and projects. The results were analyzed separately and jointly by triangulation. The conclusions 
proved that successful collaboration is based on functional interagency collaboration supported by com-
pact-sized operational environments. All relevant actors will be involved and increase value through col-
laboration if they fulfil the security-related requirements (such as trust and professionalism). The major 
pitfalls in collaboration were recognized in information exchange and common situational awareness. 
The Delphi survey was conducted in three iterative rounds. The future estimations were presented in 
the last round, so the only reflection was (in the sense of the Delphi technique) from the final call for 
comments on the analyzed results. In that phase, the panellists did not express any major disagreements 
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concerning the analysis. In summary, one can say that the futures estimation was conducted as a one-
round Delphi survey. 
The security experts’ views on future development were quite moderate mainly because the actual 
study focused on the present. The mainstream viewpoint was that societal changes as a whole had the 
strongest influence on changes in security collaboration. 
Six arguments reflecting future estimations were gathered from the first and second Delphi rounds. 
They are presented with the third-round estimations of their importance in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Estimations about Future Arguments. 
 
 
The panellists mostly agreed with the presented arguments, yet there were many interpretations and 
reflections that may be seen as weak signals. The first arguments present mostly environmental aspects 
of possible futures. The panellists were most unanimous concerning the claim that Need for collabora-
tion increases. They argued that the main causes are the evolving changes in the security environment 
and lack of resources. The second argument, Security is an increasingly important success factor in 
business, reflects the growing role played by the private sector in comprehensive security environments. 
On the other hand, it arises from a current phenomenon, as the agents have noticed that extensive secu-
rity is required for profitable business. Some disagreements emphasized the difference in agencies and 
their environments – all business is not (at least not yet) security driven. 
From the human factor point of view, the next arguments – importance of dialog, interaction skills 
grows and future generations are more agile in networking – were seen as a natural outcomes of hu-
man development and behaviour. The discussion dealt mostly with nuances of terms and their interpre-
tations.  
Although there was a degree of consensus on Collaboration itself is improving towards a more func-
tional, cross-domain direction, only three experts were in full agreement. The panellists argued that cy-
clical development occurs over a longer time scale, which may be seen in forecasting as well. The pur-
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Market forces will regulate
future security collaboration
Collaboration itself is improving towards a 
more functional, cross-domain direction
Future generations are more
agile in networking
Importance of dialog
and interaction skills grows
Security is an increasingly important
success factor in business
Need for collaboration increases
Totally disagreeMostly disagreeCan not answerMostly agreeTotally agree
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pose of collaboration was also discussed in terms of whether the efficiency and quality of collaboration 
should be increased constantly or it is enough that it works.  
The responses to the last argument, Market forces will regulate future security collaboration, were 
the most interesting from the researchers’ perspective. The opinions of the panellists were scattered and 
the discussion raised the most interesting comments. Besides the terminological discussion, some weak 
signals were detected. The present world order – with its laws, order and authorities – was defended 
fervently. At the same time, the agile business world will shift its focus from quarterly performance to-
wards ever-faster management, which has severe impacts for interagency and other security actor col-
laboration. The role of the authorities and both private and voluntary security actors will undergo 
changes in the future, yet the panellists considered that the traditional control of security by authorities 
will have significance. The private sector was seen as a growing actor in the comprehensive security area. 
Additionally, the panellists were asked about their opinions on the most important trends in terms of 
comprehensive security. Their answers were quite moderately in line with the previous arguments. The 
main reason for this was the small role of the futures estimations in the whole Delphi process. Conse-
quently, three trends were picked from the analysis of the Delphi results in the research report for this 
article. They were re-evaluated as follows: 
 
Table 2.  Trends from security actors’ collaboration research and interpretations. 
Rising Future Trends What is it? What produces it? 
Need for collaboration rises Complex systems and fewer 
actors have to collaborate 
Joint services, authorities, pro-
cesses, etc. (international) 
Importance of security rises Complex systems are vulnera-
ble 
Security attitude and culture 
develops  
Individual influence rises People may take part in securi-
ty systems 
Security knowledge increases, 
new innovation, thinking, etc. 
 
The trends and their interpretations presented in Table 2 reflect the attitude and thinking of security 
actors. “What is it?” and “what produces it?” are quite optimistic and the light they shed is only one-
sided. Those with a pragmatic mindset, which is quite common among security actors according to the 
research, would primarily view these trends as threats. The changes underlying the trends are due to in-
creasing complexity (Rantapelkonen 2002, Keskinen 2004, Sivonen 2004). This raises the demand for 
collaboration and security when the systems are dependent on experts and specialists. The need for inte-
grated services and changes in security thinking and attitudes reflects the present stage and development 
of the operational-tactical environment. Demographically people get older and fewer people live in a vast 
geographic area, which leads to a lack of security actors in large areas. The problem is that necessity-
based integration proceeds slowly. The old administrative structures and other rudiments decrease the 
demand for flexible and more dynamic solutions. From the individual point of view, we may see positive 
development in participation in security discussions that may improve comprehensive security thinking. 
On the other hand, ill-minded people might have access to sensitive security information, and this must 
not be ruled out even in the most positive futures. 
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In the research, some weak signals were also discussed. They were summarized in two concepts: 
moulding of security attitudes and impacts of general securitization. Both of these are controversial phe-
nomena and may have both negative and positive features. Security attitudes and efforts to ensure that 
everything is secure may once again result in an image of an Orwellian society, as the panellists stated. 
They might not be true weak signals, because some discussion has already taken place, mostly in blog 
writings (e.g. Virta 2008, Järvinen 2008).  Beyond those presented, the re-evaluation of the Delphi an-
swers revealed some other ideas that could be introduced as weak signals: 
Hierarchy tends to steer thinking. For this reason, it is also important to separate different level 
phenomena in certain security issues. For the most part, the learned truths passed down from the top 
have a major influence on comprehending the real functions of systems. The political demand for gener-
alizing security strategies may oversimplify practical level challenges within collaboration. 
Trust is the key element for successful collaboration between security actors. It has two sides. Firstly, 
trust is the basis for mutual collaboration and sharing the most delicate security information. Secondly, 
the other element, which is here called the hidden truth, concerns the requirement of publishing re-
search for public use. The most delicate, secret information may not be shared openly and therefore aca-
demic public research does not have the possibility to engage in scientific discussion on such issues. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Futures security-related research has focused mostly on large-scale studies (strategic level environmen-
tal scanning). Global and continental security trends (e.g. DefMin 2007, Keskinen and Kuusisto 2007, 
Coker 2004) are also an important framework for operational-tactical level futures research, yet they 
tend to be quite general for small-scale (Robson 2005) futures studies. Technological forecasting (Kari et 
al. 2008a, 2008b) and mostly marginal security issues studies (e.g. Lintonen 2009, Rantapelkonen 
2002) in one sense represent operational-tactical level futures research. Past futures research has yield-
ed correct estimations in certain technological prognoses that have later proven to be guiding factors for 
even broader development (Haikara 1970, Toward the Year 2018, 1970). Nevertheless, the lack of com-
prehensive operational-tactical level futures studies is axiomatic.  
It might be also relevant to raise the question whether level-based thinking is too limiting for futures 
studies. Does development progress through ever increasing levels, which may influence security inte-
gration? (Ahvenainen 2004) On the other hand, precision-targeted futures research might give some 
concrete ideas for system and process development. Along with collaboration integration level discus-
sion, it is important to evaluate regional aspects that involve strongly cultural and environmental aspects 
(Nelson 2007). 
The human factor is one crucial element for actual security collaboration. The development of collec-
tiveness may be technologically driven. For example, network-based interaction develops rapidly. Net-
working may be seen to be quite random if the participants may act as anonymously, even as unpersons. 
This is not possible in collaboration between security actors. On the other hand, task-oriented security 
actors may develop unofficial networks, even with the opposite side, if the primary goal is achieved 
(Hyytiäinen 2010). Collectiveness may also result in the adoption of old-fashioned traditional processes 
that may be more robust when ultimate performance is required. 
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It is interesting that in the referred research the Delphi panellists were most unanimous about envi-
ronmental and pedagogical development. Differences of opinion emerged when it was time to discuss 
competition for territories, finance, and power. Due to their focus on the present, the panellists favoured 
moderate and “sure” solutions. Futures thinking requires time and a certain attitude that liberates the 
person from present stage attitudes in order to seek future possibilities. That is why the presented one-
round Delphi did not produce any such results that could be considered significant.   
The research on security actors’ collaboration at the operational-tactical level revealed fundamentals 
for successful collaboration and some ideas about the futures. The suggestions for futures studies in se-
curity actors’ collaboration are presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3.   Suggestions for security actors’ collaboration future studies. 
Community  Individual 
operational-tactical level environmental scan-
ning – threat evaluation 
individual scale scanning – threats in the sense of 
safety and security 
future integration forms meaning of networks and collaboration 
SSM in collaboration and security normative acting 
 
Threats should not be excluded from any futures studies of security collaboration. They should be 
evaluated in terms of the community and from individual points of view. Both the terms and their mean-
ings in the context of focusing on the common objects of futures study should be studied at the same 
time (Heinonen 2004). For example, safety and security matters ought to be specified, i.e. whether the 
focus is on tumbling on a slippery sidewalk or dealing with terrorists.  
The common trend of integration in our societal scenarios is one important factor that should be 
evaluated at both the individual and community levels. Is integration creating new systems between se-
curity communities with their networks and active individuals? 
Community-oriented future security collaboration issues are time and again facing discussion about 
who is the customer, actor, etc. One recommendable method for outlining the futures studies baselines is 
the Soft System Methodology (CATWOE, Rubin 2002; Checkland & Scholes 1999).  
Comprehensive security collaboration in futures studies requires a cross-scientific approach to re-
search. No expert can master all the methodologies of all disciplines (Nordlund 2004). Neither can we 
comprehend all the threats facing our systems and their interdependence. We tend to see collaboration 
as a tool for ongoing multidimensional challenges and engage in it only when it becomes unavoidable. 
Comprehensive futures study needs the participation of operational-tactical level experts who have a 
suitable knowledge on the matter. That may be understood as knowledge on threats, security processes, 
and practical possibilities without strong political orientation. Comprehensiveness means that systems 
work together and develop both independently and jointly towards the future we create for communities 
and individuals. At the operational-tactical level, a “good enough” approach might create a foundation 
for “secure enough”. 
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THE FUTURE OF RESEARCH ON SAFETY AND SECU-
RITY IN GERMANY - RESULTS FROM AN EXPLORATIVE 
DELPHI STUDY  
Dr. Lars Gerhold 
Freie Universität Berlin, Research Forum on Public Safety and Security 
 
ABSTRACT - This contribution presents the results of a qualitative, exploratively set up Delphi study. 
The achieved results supply an image of German research on safety and security from the perspective 
of all relevant disciplines as well as of its future challenges in the next 20 years. Based on developments 
relevant for safety and security and exemplary research topics, challenges are defined for the future of 
research on safety and security. In this context, this contribution will deal with the question of using 
different definitions of the term, alignment of research for different recipients and use of different re-
search strategies and methods. 
Introduction and Background 
Under the current conditions, safety and security as a personal value seems to be more endangered than 
ever. The effects and possible dangers of technological and natural developments can hardly be assessed, 
and terrorist attacks cannot be foreseen. To make safety and security possible never¬theless, research on 
safety and security has the task of finding and analysing vulnerabilities of society, and, in a best case 
scenario, to perform research for the protection of society (cf. Thoma, Drees & Leismann 2010, p.13 4F5 ).  
German research on safety and security is extremely heterogeneous and anchored in social sciences, 
humanities, technologies and natural sciences. At this point, only the beginnings of a comprehensive 
collection of different research lines and projects exist (cf. http://www.security researchmap.de). Nor 
does a summarising observation of current and future research questions exist. Inter- and transdiscipli-
nary communication between the disciplinary approaches and actors only takes place rudimentarily (cf. 
Reichenbach et al. 2008). The research forum on public safety and security, founded in 2009 at the Uni-
versity Freie Universität Berlin, work on the challenge of combining interdisciplinary approaches from a 
scientific point of view by making the future of research on safety and security the object of research it-
self. The project therefore focuses on both aspects of the German term “Sicherheit”: security and safety. 
Safety means unintentional risks such as technical safety of a system like a nuclear power plant. Security 
means the protection of external threats like a terrorist attack (vgl. Beyerer et al. 2010, p.50). 
                                                             
 
5 All citations were translated by the author. 
 22 
The research project’s task is examining developments of public safety and security from a scientific 
point of view and to offer a summarising evaluation, to synthesise the knowledge collected by interdisci-
plinary research under common questions, identifying research topics that will be relevant in future and 
contributing to structuring the field of research for answering these questions. The exploration study 
presented here was implemented to reach a first preliminary structure of the field of research on safety 
and security and its actors. It also serves as a basis for discussion for the starting workshop of the re-
search project. The central questions of the study are: 
 Which are the requirements, risks and dangers of the future from an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive of the security research in Germany (to the year 2030)? 
 In which problem areas is there a special need for research and to whom is this need explicitly 
addressed? 
Material and Methods 
The qualitative exploration study represents the first methodical step of a long-term overall study. The 
aim is to develop the field of subjects from the point of view of German research on safety and security 
experts. The exploration study is accompanied by two other comprehensive studies. At the same time, 
scientists and politicians will answer questions on their assessment of the previous results in semi-
structured expert interviews. Concurrently, a comprehensive Delphi study is to be performed. Its experts 
will include scientists from the area safety/security/uncertainty/risk as well as politicians as decision 
makers, police and rescue forces and a representative sample of the population as persons involved (cf. 
figure 1). In the end, all of the results are to be combined in a scenario process “Safety and security 
2030”. 
 
Figure 1. Overall Study Concept. 
Exploration study 
Semi-structured 
expert interviews 
15 Scientists, N Politicians 
Politicians Scientists 
Delphistudy 
Actors Society 
Scenarioprocess 
1st round: 
Online Poll  
2nd round:  
Discussion  
t 
02/2010 04/2010 06/2010 ………06/2011 06/2012 
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The study presented here is methodically structured as an open exploration. A conscious decision 
was made to not embed the study theoretically, e.g. in probabilistic or formal-analytic or social-
constructivist theory concepts (cf. Gerhold 2009a, p.21 et seq., Taylor-Gooby & Zinn 2005, p.3 et seq.) to 
avoid narrowing the perspective of the observer.  
The study is intended to be a two-round Delphi study 5F6 . The first round was a qualitative online sur-
vey, the second a group discussion during a workshop, in which participants from the online survey took 
part. The target of the first Delphi round was identifying future developments particularly important for 
research on safety and security in Germany. At the same time, the research topics that will be of interest 
during the next 20 years were to be determined. These two aspects formed the basis for the second 
round, in which the results from the first round were taken up again as basis for a discussion on the 
question of which implications this had for future German research on safety and security. According to 
the so-called classification type 1 of Häder (cf. 2009, p.36), the present study is a Delphi procedure for 
aggregation of ideas, characterised by open questions with the target of collecting ideas for the observa-
tion of problems. The criterion for success of the study according to the targets of aggregation of ideas is 
the number of ideas offered by the experts asked (cf. Häder 2009, p.31). 
The experts asked should have as wide an expertise basis as possible. The experts selected are under-
stood as function carriers and representatives of their organisational and institutional contexts rather 
than a person with subjective orientations and attitudes (cf. Meuser & Nagel 2002, p.72). Their technical 
expertise was verified when the participants were selected and confirmed later during the survey by way 
of self-assessment (so-called “subjective competence question”, cf. Häder 2009, p.26). In total, 51 ex-
perts from the area of research on safety and security were invited to participate in the study; 27 experts 
from different disciplines of natural and social sciences, who perform research and work in the areas of 
safety and security, risk and danger, participated in the first round (response rate 53%) 6F7 . Participants 
were recruited based on their confirmation of participation in the starting workshop of the research fo-
rum on public safety and security, where the results of the first Delphi round were presented and dis-
cussed. Most of the persons asked were scientists (20 participants), 5 participants came from safety and 
security organisations, 2 participants are working for companies. All experts asked stated that their own 
competence in the area of (research on) safety and security was rather high or very high, and their aver-
age experience was 14.5 years.  The experts’ ages range from 30 to 69 years and the experts come from 
different disciplines (technology, natural sciences, law, social sciences, humanities, cultural sciences).  
The results from the first Delphi round were introduced in a joint workshop with all persons partici-
pating in the survey and additional experts by way of an anonymised presentation of results. The discus-
sion of the results regarding the research questions characterises the second round of the Delphi study 
with N=60. The experts’ discussion was led, recorded and transcribed by the author.  
                                                             
 
6 A Delphi study is a multi-stage process used for assessing future events and developments (cf. Cuhls 2009, p. 207et 
seq.; Häder 2009, p. 19et seq.). 
7 Since the study was a first exploration, it was not important to achieve a concrete number of participants (high N). 
For qualitative understanding, test persons are not selected according to criteria of statistical representativeness but 
according to whether or not they are suitable to expand knowledge of the object to be examined  (cf. Glaser/Strauss 
1967, p.45).   
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Analysis 
The online survey data (1st round) and the group discussion (2nd round) were evaluated with the 
MAXQDA software in a structured content analysis according to Mayring (2000). Mayring personally 
describes the target of content structuring as “filtering certain topics, contents, aspects from the material 
and summarising them” (Mayring 2000, p.89).  
After selection of the data material (all statements from the online survey and transcription of the 
group discussion), main categories where first determined deductively (see Results). In the course of the 
coding process7F8 , the main categories were expanded inductively. Extraction of contents and assignment to 
categories from the text material is already an interpretative step characterised by the researcher (cf. Gläser 
& Laudel, p.201). The excerpts taken from the text are prepared, summarised and checked for redundan-
cies and contradictions. This way, the text material is structured according to inductively developed catego-
ries: “The result of the analysis is a structured information basis summarising the empiric information on 
the cases to be reconstructed” (Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p.202). Main categories I and II are the main ob-
jects of the first round, main category III was subsumed from the two rounds (cf. Results). 
Results 
The analysis led to three main categories (cf. figure 2) to structure the data material. First, safety- and 
security-relevant developments from the points of view of the experts for the next 20 years were deter-
mined (I). The experts named different content-categories for future developments in different fields, 
such as health, society or technology. Based on this, examinations determined which research topics are 
going to become important in the next 20 years (II). The future developments were taken up to suggest 
exemplary research areas and topics such as technology development in the area of detection of hazard-
ous substances or examination of self-help-capabilities of the population. The last area of results uses 
categories I and II as a starting point for debating the  question of which factors will mainly characterise 
the future of German research on safety and security (III). 
 
                                                             
 
8 Concretely, the coding process means that individual text sections, i.e. single sentences or whole paragraphs, are 
assigned to categories from the category system or new categories derived from the material (cf. Gerhold 2009a, p. 
124). This procedure was described by Strauss und Corbin as ”taking an observation, a sentence of a paragraph and 
assigning names to every single incident, any idea or any event included in it – for anything standing for a phenom-
enon or representing it“ (Strauss & Corbin 1996, p. 45). According to this, codes or categories practically are point-
ers towards certain subjects in the text (cf. Kuckartz 2005, p. 64). 
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Figure 2. Categories of results of the exploration study. 
I  Identified Safety- and Security-Relevant Developments of the Next 20 
Years 
The category shows the safety- and security-relevant developments (i.P. of uncertainties, risks, threats, 
dangers, hazards) that will be important for the German research on safety and security over the next 20 
years. This perspective is used to develop an orientation of the future that may present a range of possi-
bilities for developments in the areas of society, political and environmental issues. However, this cannot 
be used to derive the probability of the described developments actually taking place or that the aspects 
named here all determine the future. Much rather, this is a section of the perspective of experts in re-
search on safety and security 8F9 .  
Figure 3 shows the presentation of results in a classified system of the answers of participants in the 
survey. The starting points for the categorical system are the themes for which contents are named; they 
are connected to each category as coded text excerpts. Therefore the classified system on the question of 
safety and security-relevant developments up to 2030 is based on the text material.  
All in all, eight subject areas could be extracted from the data material; some were structured in sub-
categories again: 1.Governance/Politics/Globalisation, 2.Terrorism/Organised Crime, 
3.Weather/Environmental Development, 4.Critical Infrastructures, 5.Health/Pandemic, 6.Economy, 
7.Society and 8.Technology. 
 
                                                             
 
9 However, it cannot be excluded that other safety- and security-relevant aspects that are not named here will de-
termine future development. But according to the experts included in this study, it can still be assumed that the top-
ics presented in the following will be of importance, even though these assessements require additional empiric and 
theoretic foundations. 
II  Research topics of the next 20 years 
I  Safety- and security-relevant developments of the next 20 years 
III  Challenges for the future of research on safety and security in Germany 
Result categories 
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Figure 3. Systematic presentation of identified safety- and security-relevant developments over 
the next 20 years. 
1. Governance/Politics/Globalisation 
The category of governance/politics/globalisation combines political processes such as risks that 
may result from globalisation processes, e.g. interlinking global developments, which, due to 
their growing complexity, may lead to political inability of act. This may lead nationally in 
alignment problems between the Federal republic and its states when dealing with major inci-
dents or internationally in the coordination of procedures in crisis management. The data mate-
rial also brought up the question of proportionality of national and European politics as a securi-
ty-relevant topic of the future. Connected to this is the basic question of the state’s ability to 
overcome future challenges.  
2. Terrorism/Organised Crime 
The subject area of terrorism is mainly characterised by descriptions of the topic in the data ma-
terial (e.g. terrorism in the sense of bombs, poison, etc.) and emphasis on connected effects, 
such as threats to national and international societies and their large cities. It was also men-
tioned that reaction to terrorist acts requires new strategies, e.g. regarding the treatment of in-
jured persons or retention of resources to be deployed. Furthermore not only terrorism, but also 
organised crime is named as safety- and security-relevant for the next 20 years. 
3. Weather/Environmental Development 
This category has two central aspects. On the one hand, climate change in general and its possi-
ble effects, e.g. on migration, biodiversity and agriculture, were named. The second important 
aspect is related to the first and refers to extreme weather events and natural disasters (such as 
floods, earthquakes). A participant in the survey expressly indicates the danger of different pro-
jections of local, national and international events. Risk assessments may turn out to be too 
“mild” and the events appearing as being more intense than expected. On the other hand, a peri-
od with few events is also possible, which would make political adjustment measures more diffi-
cult.  
4. Critical Infrastructures 
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The vulnerability of critical infrastructures is another category of developments important for 
the future with many facets as determined by the experts. Among others, this includes questions 
of power supply as well as general dependency of every individual on critical infrastructures. 
Both are closely linked to interconnections resulting in a great impact of outages. Increased vul-
nerability is also seen in the reduction of supply redundancies, which also refers to monopolisa-
tion of certain infrastructures. 
5. Health/Pandemic 
The category of health/pandemic combines pandemics and the connected health hazards, as well 
as food safety, as future safety- and security-relevant topics. 
6. Economy 
The (global) development and the connected “non-universalisability" of the Western growth and 
wealth model is described by this category. Riots are named as a possible result of risky devel-
opments in the financial markets.  
7. Society 
Social developments relevant for research on safety and security were particularly differentiated. 
First, some indications of the participants in the survey cover the area of migration; in the text 
material, this refers to possible aspects such as general conflicts, depopulated and uneducated 
zones, as well as accelerated mobility. Furthermore, religion is named as a potential conflict 
without any more differentiated information being given. The participants in the survey also as-
sign education as a facet of social development both to the question of safety and children’s 
rights in education systems, as well as to the change of the traditional educational institutions by 
learning based on communication technologies. The subcategory of economic insecurity mainly 
focuses on distribution conflicts, precarious economic situations and the widening gap between 
poor and rich, as well as possible consequences such as riots. The aspect of social risks includes a 
wide range of problems. Social processes such as social exclusion and progressing individualisa-
tion, loss of trust and a lack of perspective in the population, changes in identity formation pro-
cesses, erosion of social security systems and the importance of subjective perception processes 
are named as safety- and security-relevant topics for the future.  
8. Technology 
The subject field technology is divided into two central areas. On the one hand, dangers resulting 
from developments in the areas of biologic, chemistry and nuclear technologies (including, e.g. 
the consequences of genetic engineering) are named. On the other hand, internet and commu-
nications technologies and computer technologies are dealt with. The second aspect refers to the 
increasing penetration of different areas of life by information and communications technologies 
and the connected questions of data security, espionage (e.g. movement and consumer profiles) 
and sabotage as future topics. 
 
All in all, developments relevant for research on safety and security (and therefore for society, poli-
tics and economy) are to be expected in different subject areas during the next 20 years. Focusing on 
singular subjects in scientific research or the political debate therefore does not seem suitable, in par-
ticular since many different cross-links – which are not examined or presented here – may exist between 
the subjects. At the same time, many “typical” or “expected” subjects are named, which also can be found 
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in the area of scientific (cf. e.g. Lange, Ohly, Reichertz 2009; Gerhold 2009b) as well as political (cf. 
Reichenbach et al. 2008) and social discourse (cf. R+V 2007). This includes terrorism and organised 
crime, climate and environmental development, technology and health issues. This may be considered 
proof that consulted experts agree with and confirm the socially, politically and scientifically discussed 
subject areas. Apart from this, however, social questions also make it possible to find “newer” differenti-
ations, which were previously given little consideration in the debate of safety and security. These in-
clude topics such as social exclusion, lack of perspectives, subjective fiction of safety and security or edu-
cation system issues. While these are also dealt with and discussed by science, they are, however, not 
always included in the area of research on safety and security. 
II  Important Research Topics during the next 20 Years 
After dealing with the issue of future developments, the question of which research subjects and fields 
would result for research on safety and security during the next 20 years from the developments named 
was analysed. The indicated research subjects mainly were found in the subject areas of the first ques-
tion, but also added by the subject of risk/crisis management/ communication.  
In the scope of this contribution, only some thinkable research topics can be named as examples: 
Regarding the aspect of governance and politics, possible future research topics that were named in-
clude, for example, flexibility of the political security architecture in case of spontaneous incidents and 
threats situations, and a better linking of safety- and security-relevant facilities. For the subject field of 
technology, research subjects e.g. in the areas of detection of hazardous substances or consequences of 
comprehensive networking of information and communications technologies are focussed on. In the ar-
ea of critical infrastructures, ideas are phrased that focus on securing and warranting the function of 
critical infrastructures (prevention, downtime precautions, logistics, actors), e.g. using research for en-
suring power supply or development research on evacuation plans in traffic networks. In the area of en-
vironmental research, suggestions are made for the examination of extreme weather events; in the area 
of biology, the expansion of research on epidemics and other biological threats were named. In particu-
lar regarding the subject area of “society”, the data material gives a lot of research subjects. The starting 
point is a general vote for prioritising social-scientific research in the context of safety and security re-
search, e.g. using topics such as social developments, economisation and security of society. Here, the 
data material includes the question of development and creation of a culture of risk and security in a so-
ciety. The question of self-help capability and -willingness is also asked and ways for facilitating this to 
turn the population into an “actor” in cases of crisis or disaster are considered. Other ideas are targeted 
on research on subjective wishes and ideal conceptions on the safety and security of the population.  
In addition to the previous topics, the data material also indicates that the research area of risk and 
crisis management (including the connected communications processes) as a transectional theme has to 
accompany and/or complement the research projects.  
Until now, the survey’s results show a very heterogeneous image of possible research topics (category 
II). Together with the listing of developments that will be relevant in future (category I), the question of 
what this heterogeneity of requirements of future developments and possible research subjects means 
for the future of research on safety and security in Germany must be addressed now. How does research 
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on safety and security have to be positioned to comply with the general developments while also effec-
tively dealing with the named research subjects?  
III  Challenges for the Future of Research on Safety and Security in Germany 
The above presented results were discussed with the experts in a workshop event. Including the data 
from the online survey, the content analysis of the discourse returned four aspects particularly relevant 
for future research on safety and security in its conceptual alignment: 
 
 
Figure 4.  Challenges of Future Research on Safety and Security in Germany. 
1. Conceptual Approach 
The “conceptual approach” category brings out two different approaches for research on safety 
and security. Firstly, the experts suggested a problem-oriented approach for future research. It is 
aligned with concrete vital problem situations relevant for public safety and security. The start-
ing point for research would, in this case, be an explicit object or theme, such as protecting criti-
cal infrastructures. However, this approach presents a hierarchy problem. Which questions are 
particularly urgent, on which things can the different actors in science and politics agree? 
The second conceptual approach is looking for a more epistemological approach in which the 
terms relating to security are to be determined first. The differences of terminology conceptions 
of the term “security” must be taken up and discussed comprehensively. Regarding this, experts 
speak of a subject range of security as “coping with uncertainty and risk” on the one hand and 
security as “maximising security and safety” on the other hand.  The first understanding refers to 
the conceptualisation of security as a “wicked problem”. Where security is understood as a wick-
ed problem (cf. Conklin 2005, p.7f.), it is understood to be indefinable, complex, linked and non-
linear, so that the problem is impossible or, in the very least, highly difficult to solve. This under-
standing is along the lines of the social-scientific approaches (cf. e.g. Bechmann 1993, Bonß 
1995) of not seeing security as the single target dimension, but rather as learning to deal with 
unavoidable, indefinable or unpredictable uncertainties. Furthermore, different references in the 
data material emphasise the subjectivity of perspective that, e.g., security and uncertainty are 
social constructs and security means a subject’s ability to act even in spite of danger and threats. 
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This confirms that research on safety and security must also to be understood as research on un-
certainty, which in turn is a special challenge for the interdisciplinary exchange between re-
searchers. 
The second understanding refers to security as an order problem (cf. Bonß 1996, p.169f.).  This 
understanding defines clear criteria that can be determined and would enable, e.g., quantifying 
the problem areas. In this understanding the presence of security is understood in the sense of 
“objective” absence of risks and danger (cf. e.g. Grünbuch 2008; Thoma, Drees & Leismann 
2010). According to this, technological, political and social developments follow after the para-
digm of establishing security. This also includes the concept of “protection”. The protection as-
pect can be inherent to the preceding understanding of absence of danger, but this is no prereq-
uisite, since the absence of risk and danger does not have to be due to protective mechanisms.  
Both understandings are not mutually exclusive, but lead to different manners of thinking and 
action both from a political and a research point of view; therefore, they need to be discussed be-
fore performing studies or funding schemes. 
2. Stakeholders 
The category of stakeholder poses a challenge for research on safety and security regarding ad-
dressees, users and actors. Future research on safety and security must be aware of the different 
perspectives of political and social actors, know them and use them in research if research is to 
be accepted by these actors. This is aligned with the wish of designing knowledge transfer ac-
cording to these groups and to work out knowledge accordingly. Therefore, the actual complexity 
may have to be reduced to make it possible to communicate research results. 
3. Research Strategies 
The text material repeatedly describes holistic strategies such as interdisciplinary and trans-
disciplinary strategies as an idealised form of research. Interdisciplinary research is, e.g. illus-
trated in the combination of research in natural science, social science and law or the combina-
tion of social sciences and technology research strategies. Transdisciplinary approaches may be 
pursued via cooperation of public and private actors in the area of safety and security (regional, 
national, international). In general, the content suggestions show that the different disciplinary 
approaches do, in fact, overlap, but that the overlapping is too few to cover the future needs.  
4. Methodologies 
In addition to general research strategies, the data material clearly shows that future research on 
safety and security must make use of a comprehensive range of methods. Apart from the rather 
quantitative methods such as modelling, morphology and prognostics, qualitative procedures 
such as group discussions and projection methods are named. A combination of methods or the-
ories seems to be particularly important here (cf. Flick 1999). A possible model for exemplary 
implementation would be principally combining technically-oriented research with ac-
com¬panying social-science research. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In the light of the categories discussed here, the perspective of the experts in this survey comes to the 
following image for the future of German research on safety and security: 
Safety- and security-relevant developments are to be expected in many different political, social and 
economic areas. However, they cannot be determined in advance in a way that we could tell now which 
subject areas, such as terrorism, technological developments, pandemics or social risks, will be particu-
larly most important in future. Therefore, there is no singular important safety and security topic of the 
future. Research on safety and security is extremely heterogeneous and will continue to draw on the 
whole range of disciplines of science and to be implemented in different research topics. This also means 
that there cannot be one homogenous research strategy on safety and security. This is combined with the 
fact that research on safety and security needs to open up to a terminology discourse that will be able to 
productively link and expand the difference between the perspectives of “research on safety and security” 
in the sense of absence of danger and in the sense of coping with uncertainty. Research on safety and 
security also needs to be designed as research on uncertainty. 
Future research on safety and security also needs to be intensely inter- and transdisciplinary to meet 
the requirements of complex problem situations. For this, all actors need to be linked and included in 
research. Social questions in particular will gain importance in future, e.g. in exchange with technical 
questions, and need to be dealt with under consideration of the respective methods or method combina-
tions.  
The insights of this exploration study can only serve to phrase the conceptual framework for future 
research on safety and security in Germany. It also does not yet include the scientific dialogue regarding 
research on safety and security that takes place within the disciplines. Nevertheless, it draws an image of 
the requirements of current and future research on safety and security as it was phrased by the experts 
themselves. This image is the starting point for other, concrete questions that are to be discussed in fur-
ther studies: 
Which conditions need to be met for successfully combining different disciplinary approaches for the 
research on safety and security and how can the disciplines learn from each other? How does an ex-
change between politics, science, economy and society have to be organised for targeted and successful 
results? How does the different understanding of terms influence the scientific discourse and the dis-
course between science, politics and public? Which methods and which combinations of methods will 
lead to the target in which contexts and for which research questions? 
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ABSTRACT – The project STRAW (Security Technology Active Watch) believes one of the greatest 
challenges of the Security environment will be the need for detecting, accessing and controlling rele-
vant information (especially threats and possible countermeasures). Therefore it proposes a proof-of-
concept of a European Technology Watch based on the active participation of the security community 
and the usage of semantic and Web2.0 tools. 
Introduction and Background 
Most definitions of Technology Watch describe it as a set of activities or processes to systematically cap-
ture, analyze, disseminate and exploit useful technical information. Active Technology Watch (ATW) is 
incorporating a number of mechanisms (automation, dynamicity) in these activities, both on collection 
and on delivery side, in order to make scientific or technical innovation susceptible to emerging and fu-
ture opportunities or threats and to detect, at an early stage, and prospectively shape, scientific or tech-
nological breakthroughs.  
It is however closely related to trends and events of potential socio-economic importance, which may 
require action at decision-making level and in this sense it is sometimes confused with similar actions 
and processes such as Competitive Intelligence, Commercial Watch, Competition Watch, Surrounding 
Watch or Technology Foresight. However, although there might be some overlapping, there are many 
differences between them: for example, ATW focuses on the search and capturing of relevant infor-
mation to make decisions, while Competitive Intelligence has also emphasis on creating new infor-
mation.  
The area of Technology Foresight and its methodology and mechanisms are also rather different: 
they focus on the projection of plausible prospective evolution of technologies or even technology mar-
kets in a short, medium or long term future. The target group is another differentiating factor: future 
visions are mainly used as support for identifying strategic research directions and therefore targets stra-
tegic decision makers, while ATW offers an important complement to these studies and targets more 
tactical and operational decision-making levels. 
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Active, yet Trustworthy 
Everybody would agree that we can hardly trust a single vendor when s/he speaks about her/his magnif-
icent products. But can we trust industry analyst or online search engines to deliver only fair and objec-
tive results for ATW? Since they update their results and reports frequently it seems like a good source of 
fresh information to feed ATW. Sometimes we take it for granted that they offer unbiased information, 
although we know there is an issue of paid placement or advertising links that appear in most search re-
sults these days and most industry analyst reports.  
Another source of information for Active Research Watch is expert’s opinion. The larger a group of 
uncorrelated expert from different communities is, the more unbiased the information theoretically will 
it be. However, it is both more complex and more costly to implement, especially when it comes to cross-
country expert communities and information collection. Automated questionnaire processing certainly 
helps, but there are various problems, such as expertise limitations, that can lead to complete disagree-
ment when it comes to information inclusion in ATW. In the story of the blind men and an elephant that 
originated in India, a group of blind men touch an elephant to learn what it is like. Each one touches a 
different part, but only one part, such as the side or the leg. They then compare notes on what they felt, 
and learn they are in complete disagreement. In a similar way, different communities or groups of ex-
perts may view same technology differently depending upon their perspective, suggesting that we often 
have to deal with half-truths. 
Our experience with Lookout service in Atos Origin (Atos Origin 2010) shows that end-users have of-
ten more divergent and nuanced views than the analysts. However, an aggregate of perceptions in differ-
ent communities (user, provider, consultants, research…) is very interesting. ATW within a particular 
cross-cutting segment of several markets such as security is particularly difficult. There are several at-
tempts to design new analyst business models (Information Week 2006) based on blogs, open source 
licensing concepts, loosely federated analysts, social networking etc, but this does not eliminate the pos-
sibility of relationship or correlation between analysts, vendors and information providers, such as in the 
case of paid bloggers. Other open questions, both for ATW and analysts are including balance between 
qualitative vs. quantitative information research, survey transparency, technology expertise versus geo-
graphical coverage, etc 
Even though it is not new, an additional point that is gaining strength is the dual use of technology. 
This concept refers to tools or techniques, developed originally for military or related purposes, which 
are capable of civil application. In spite of the inevitable controversy about the real motivation for this 
technology transfer, it is also true that the benefits can be countless. Therefore an ATW can help identi-
fying synergies and establishing suitable communication channels between both fields. 
STRAW (Security Active Technology Watch) is a coordination and support action project funded un-
der the Security Research theme (FP7-SEC-2007-7.0-01 “Technology Watch”) that aims at providing a 
European Service of Technology Watch on Security Technologies. Potentially, it will serve various com-
munities from European end users to technology providers and system integrators. Although it can be 
used to alert European companies to possible emerging threats from disruptive technologies, STRAW 
sustainability will be driven, but also constrained, by a number of specific factors that are covered in this 
paper. Before we focus on these drivers and constraints, we will briefly present STRAW technology 
watch phases and main achievements. 
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Material and Methods 
Information Gathering 
The Information Gathering tasks represents the first step of the STRAW activity. Roughly speaking, it 
comprised the following actions: 
1. the exploration of the Security concept and its associated elements; 
2. the review of the existing taxonomies and classifications of the Security domain, including: 
a. the 2006 European Security Research Advisory Board report (ESRAB 2006); 
b. the European Security Research and Innovation Forum working group structure (ESRIF 
2010); 
c. the STAkeholders platform for supply Chain mapping, market Condition Analysis and 
Technologies Opportunities (STACCATO) taxonomy (ASD-Project STACCATO 2006); 
d. the U.S. National Strategy Homeland Security (White House 2010) 
3. the adoption of a taxonomy of Security missions for STRAW (Project STRAW 2008) 
 
The mission capabilities to include in STRAW were identified as a subset of the STACCATO taxono-
my. The selection of missions reflected the interest and expertise of partner organisations and the pro-
fessional profiles of the STRAW experts’ panel members. The main rational of this choice was based on 
the fact that the STACCATO taxonomy provides a classification of the whole Security field, a detailed and 
up-to-date classification of missions and technology, being sufficiently extendable and flexible to allow 
for future changes in the Security areas. As well, the challenge in this phase is the compromise between 
an in-depth analysis of each mission and a broad coverage of the multi-faceted Security outlook. 
Generally speaking, in information gathering phase, STRAW is combining “hard” methods such as 
literature study etc, with “soft” methods, such as interviews, expert panels, questionnaires, workshops 
etc. The outcome is a broad input of varying precision and bias.  
STRAW also adopted STACCATO recommendations for a Technology Watch at European level 
(ASD-Project STACCATO 2006) in terms of: 
 heterogeneity of the stakeholders involved (per category, country, Security field); 
 maximisation of the participation; 
 built on existing networks. 
 product life cycle assessment; 
 technological progress and maturity monitoring; 
 threats assessment; 
 interaction between Users and the other Security players; 
 evaluation of the matching of the Security priorities identified by three categories of Security 
players: academia, industry (technology providers) and end users (including administration 
and also public at general); 
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The information collection activity represents the “front end” of the project. The involvement of Se-
curity actors in STRAW can be affected by several barriers, mainly related with the strategic importance 
of information (especially when related with underpinning technologies and new products), whose dis-
closure and sharing is likely to be critical. The effort produced by STRAW was therefore aimed at creat-
ing an attractive and easily joinable environment to bring together the different security groups and 
communities and to promote their participation. It is worth to mention that STRAW does not aspire at 
creating another security community, but recognizes the need for a model of one security community 
driven by high endorsement. In this sense, STRAW is a tool that allows the exchange of information and 
contributes to strengthen the security network in general. 
In virtue of their permanent nature, both the tangible (automated online interface) and intangible 
(theoretical framework) assets are probably to be considered as the main achievements of the infor-
mation gathering process. Together with the “back end” tools designed in the framework of the other 
tasks, those assets are meant to sustain the STRAW extent even beyond its temporal boundaries. 
Knowledge discovery and representation 
The objective of this second phase is to update a structured representation of the security concepts un-
derlying the contents of the large and very rapidly increasing set of documents that represent knowledge 
in the technical domains related to security research. The purpose of the representation, in the form of 
taxonomy and ontology, is to be able to use natural language processing tools to perform computer-
aided identification and classification of existing documents concerned with security research. 
Significantly different terminologies were developed by different communities to describe the same 
aspects of security research. The terminologies became entrenched through usage at annual conferences, 
in books, journals, research reports, standards, industrial handbooks and manuals, patents, etc. In many 
cases the definitions themselves have multiple versions that depend on a given author’s preference.  
The use of several synonyms or near-synonyms that lack well-defined distinctions is a source of con-
tinuing confusion that leads to re-inventions and plagiarism, impairs the transfer of research results to 
practical use and blocks the recognition of related documents. The current security research in Europe 
requires that past and current work as well as new technology have to be classified on the basis of a sin-
gle ontology and thus made accessible to the technology watch processes such as analysis or packaging. 
Today the purely manual process of ontology building for security research concepts is reaching its 
limits. The complementary solution is to augment the human effort by the use of automatic natural lan-
guage processing tools that have been developed by computer linguists. Therefore STRAW considered 
computer-aided building of consensus ontology. Much progress has been made in the development of 
computer tools for human language processing. Such tools have been developed for the extraction of 
term candidates from a corpus (set of texts). A thesaurus (list of important terms with related terms for 
each entry) is constructed from the candidates. The ontology for a given domain is a data model that rep-
resents those terms and their relationships. Automatic indexation of the texts is carried out using the 
thesaurus, followed by clustering analysis using statistical and linguistic techniques. A measure of simi-
larity between texts is computed that serves as a basis for automatic classification. 
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Taxonomy mix 
Terminology extraction (TE) plays an important role in building lexical resources and is currently ap-
plied widely in many fields. There are several approaches for terminology extraction: linguistic, statistic 
and hybrid (Pennacchiotti 2005). Terminology extraction systems based on linguistic approaches have a 
higher than 70% coverage in term extraction. Statistical term extraction approaches, when given a big 
annotated training corpus, can perform almost as well. 
The streams of documents from a variety of sources are pre-processed filtering information based on 
its level of interest according to criteria to be defined at the start of the task. 
Once filtered, the information is processed to: 
 Index and classify all documents and relevant information, 
 Extract pertinent concepts and 
 Arrange this information in a document base. 
In STRAW the information is processed by a structured repository (Taxonomy Mix Output) combin-
ing classification nomenclature, classification criteria and extracted concepts according to the three de-
fined categories of Security stakeholders (academia, industry and administration).This configuration is 
constructed taking into account the final use of the information, expressed by use cases of end users of 
the application. 
Different indices and labels link documents and stored information to an operational repository, 
thus enabling experts to access information (based on nomenclature classification and knowledge base 
concepts). The documentary base will contain every document acquired from external site. All docu-
ments and information from every source will be processed automatically for abstraction, indexing, cat-
egorization and extraction. 
Ultimately STRAW administrators will be able to employ various analysis tools for work on docu-
ments or structured data. They will be able to expand the operational knowledge base by adding either 
new concepts or new documents. A nomenclature tree has been defined for classification according to 
headings and for use by any automatic categorization function. Classification is representative of a 
theme or a concept. 
The nomenclature classification structure is independent of the structure of the knowledge base, 
thus making it possible to adapt nomenclature to specific groups of user (user targeting or information 
packaging) and their needs.  
Depending on the relevance of terms with respect to the security research domain we discovered 
several different levels of granularity. Leaf mapping, for example, means to map single terms to single 
concept in the ontology. This can be considered as a one-to-one mapping. In addition we identified the 
following kinds of mappings: manually introduced synonyms, ontology enrichment etc 
Ontology structuring 
Two steps are composing the Ontology structuring: 
1. Ontology structuring (classes & subclasses definition): it defines the first elements of the Ontol-
ogy: classes and subclasses. 
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2. Ontology structuring (named relations definition/directions/inferences): it defines relations 
among classes and subclasses. The pertinence of the map is validated by trying to answer the 
use cases following the structure of the ontology that has been defined. 
 
In the example: “What issues and needs are most relevant for the administration in a given security 
area?”, we need to check that there are direct relations between “users” and “Security area”; “Issues and 
needs” and “Security area” and finally between “Users” and “Issues and needs”. 
Settlement of the ontology 
Once the structure of the ontology is set, it is possible to settle or fill the ontology with an integrated de-
velopment environment (IDE) editor. 
The additional settlement of the ontology is based on three sources of information: 
 End users/research stakeholders/technology providers questionnaires. This is so far the main 
input to the STRAW system. Defined in the framework of the Information Collection activity, 
questionnaires try to combine a bottom-up approach (from technologies to security areas) with 
a top-down approach (from needs to technologies) according to the perspectives of the three 
categories of participants: academia, providers and end users. 
A top-down approach in STRAW is essentially breaking down EU security research priorities, 
capabilities etc. to gain insight into concepts, technology readiness levels and other issues. In a 
top-down approach an overview of the mission or capability is first formulated, specifying but 
not detailing any sublevels, which is usually done in sequence. A bottom-up approach in 
STRAW is bringing together researchers opinion about trends, sources, gaps etc to enhance ini-
tial assumptions. 
 Outcomes of a crawling process in a subset of ICT-related security webpages. As a proof-of-
concept, the goal of this task was to prove its feasibility. Therefore a limited scope was covered. 
 State of the art documents submitted by experts. 
 
It is important to notice that while in project SeNTRE (Foundation pour la recherché stratégique) a 
Mission and Scenario Analysis is consisting of an Initial Mission Analysis, Definition, Taxonomy and 
Standards and a Final Mission Analysis, the STACCATO final report (ASD-Project STACCATO 2006) 
proposes a methodology for European Technology Watch (ETW) aiming at both helping clarify the Eu-
ropean Security Industry Structure, and identifying market growth potentials and deficient industry fac-
tor. This was also taken into account in the ontology settlement. Furthermore, the ontology settlement 
reflects the selected mission capabilities mentioned in the former chapter as means to outline the focus 
area of the technology watch for each mission. It is the project’s belief that the inclusion of these criteria 
will improve the strength of the technology watch and consequently its impact. 
Processing and packaging 
The processing tools characterize and index information that can be extracted with a search engine. With 
these two components, a packaging process extracts information, pre-segments and customizes it for 
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each segment. Organizing ATW outputs is not a trivial task. With the increasing number of documents, it 
is becoming crucial to automate processes such as packaging and delivery of specific document to specif-
ic target groups. Clustering is a solution for organizing large amount of documents and it represents a 
quick way to acquire relevant document sets. For a particular document, search results would be docu-
ments from the same cluster that the given document belongs to. 
A major delivery of the project will be the concept development for a Web2.0 (Wikipedia 2010) 
based information repository and online network for the security community. For this the STRAW con-
sortium consciously follows the community approach, as laid out by the various Web2.0 applications 
that emerged in the last couple of years. 
STRAW will develop a prototype external information repository based on the ever more popular 
Wiki technology (MediaWiki 2010), enabling community actors, such as researchers, technology provid-
ers and users of security technology, to actively come together and share information. The external in-
formation repository will be STRAW’s major interface for the external stakeholders and the STRAW 
community to interact with the consortium and among each other.  
The main objective for the external information repository will be the efficient and effective provi-
sion of information on security technologies. The wiki’s advantage is the possibility of a continuous up-
dating of information by users, so that ideally, the information displayed is always up-to-date. An active 
community, however, is the most important prerequisite for this advantage to manifest. STRAW will 
contribute to the foundation of a constant exchange between the security environment actors by pointing 
out major principles, which have to be considered in this very special environment. The project’s concept 
for an active community will contribute to an increased interlinking of individual actors, an increased 
exchange of information and a more efficient allocation of resources. 
Results 
The result of the previous activity is a proof of concept of an active technology tool to monitor what is 
relevant in the Security domain in terms of knowledge, experience and stakeholders, and to deliver this 
information to the right audience at the right time. This is supported by a search engine and an own wiki 
(STRAWiki) that are available online at the project webpage (http://www.straw-project.eu/). This tool 
not only eases the information exchange, but also promotes the involvement of the different Security 
communities. In fact it is the Security community (or communities) who can make this solution active by 
taking up the STRAW results. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Possible future directions 
Although the sustainability of STRAW service is guaranteed at the moment (Project STRAW 2010), we 
envisage that STRAW has to continuously evolve and expand. In this chapter we briefly mention two 
ideas for the future work. 
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 Technology Watch and Disruptive. InnovationTechnology innovations can be thought either as 
evolutionary or as revolutionary. Evolutionary innovation is critical to sustaining and enhanc-
ing shares of mainstream security markets, and focuses on improving existing products and 
services to meet ever more demanding customer requirements. Because evolutionary innova-
tions maintain the existing and mainstream markets and improve the performance of products 
and services in directions that customer’s desire, the uncertainty is relatively low. Technology 
Watch of revolutionary innovation is much more difficult, as it is often not easy to identify. The 
term ‘disruptive innovation’ has been used to describe innovation that is of highly revolutionary 
or discontinuous nature, in which customers are provided with products or services which were 
not available to them before. A disruptive innovation methodology, such as DISRUPT-IT from 
Atos Origin (Information Society Technologies 2001) represents one way to identify offering 
that can displace some or all of an established market. We argue that the next generation of Ac-
tive technology Watch, based on tools such as opinion mining and collective intelligence, would 
and should be included in disruptive innovation methodology. 
 Technology Watch and Network Analysis. For the assessment of emerging and existing net-
works and research communities as well as participants within the community, network analy-
sis methodology is needed. Science, research and technological development for security are 
capability-driven, and although experience from the military domain provides a good starting 
point in capability-based research, it is necessary to adapt it significantly to address the speci-
ficity of the security sector and related communities. The different capabilities (tools, processes, 
skills, and behaviours) will often need to be implemented across many areas, in dynamically 
changing context and across Europe. These also span before mentioned technology lifecycle, 
but also supply chain, change management etc. 
Conclusions 
STRAW approach to active technology watch is based on a collaborative process across various cross-
country communities which strength its independence and transparency. STRAW is therefore emphasis-
ing the need to make technology watch a collaborative and unbiased process. This includes involvement 
of a large heterogeneous group of contributors and interested parties as well as fast, flexible and practi-
cal procedures.  
Inputs from previous security research are highly welcomed, but they are not sufficient. Product de-
velopment and engineering leads to innovation and competitively of European security industry, and is 
therefore equally important for technology watch. Here, the main problems arise with confidentiality of 
product development and research plans. We tried to address this problem with a mix of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches. This strategy can be described as a "seed" model, whereby individual experts or 
research communities propose topics that later can grow in complexity and completeness, hopefully at-
tracting attention of product development teams. STRAW mix of top-down and bottom-up approaches 
for security research knowledge ordering is therefore one of the most important project strengths. 
Technology watch is a sensitive business and market actors might oppose the conclusions of STRAW. 
In addition, the Security Technology market is very hard to delineate and we can expect criticism or dis-
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agreements. Besides segmentation and positioning, we also expect conflicts related to the technology 
readiness and maturity. However, the prime objective of sustainable STRAW active technology watch 
service has to be trustworthiness and independence, both in regards to limiting possible biases in its 
findings, and in the comprehensiveness of its results. Only if those criteria are met can it be expected 
that the objectives have been achieved.  
Management of expert’s feedback and overall take up is crucial for the STRAW sustainability. A fu-
ture development might consider mechanism needed to monitor the adoption and use of STRAW as well 
as its evolution.   
Disruptive technologies can grow rapidly, replacing less efficient precursors, and can create new ser-
vices and markets. However, it is also essential to identify what new weaknesses/security gaps these 
technologies may introduce into society, in order to be able take action as soon as possible to mitigate 
possible dangers. The future extensions of ATW could include or should link to information on the na-
ture of risk, threats, impact etc. Although this is currently not part of STRAW, the service such as as-
sessment on contextual technology investments, or risk assessments for innovative technologies, could 
be also provided. The related challenges are EU-wide stimulation of the research in specific directions, 
detecting priorities, establishing competitiveness maps etc. 
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ABSTRACT – Complexity is one of the most emerging threats to critical infrastructure. This growing 
complexity brings about more and more problems and vulnerabilities to the systems that have at the 
same time become a part of our daily lives. These systems are many times beyond the comprehension 
of the very people who are supposed to maintain them. Finding suitable methods and tools for manag-
ing this complexity and discovering the hidden dependencies and vulnerabilities is of utmost im-
portance. The traditional methods for studying these systems are not suitable in the future for manag-
ing the rapidly increasing complexity. Thus a new approach more akin to the empirical study of the 
laws of physics and nature than to the engineering driven methods of today is needed. This means that 
we should more try to study the problems in information systems as phenomena to be understood ra-
ther than singular problems to be solved with yet another tweak in some of the underlying protocols, 
software or devices. This would in our opinion lead into a better future development of devices, soft-
ware and technology in general. 
Introduction 
The 21st century has brought about the rapid growth of information systems. This growth has been very 
notable in the developed countries and nowadays almost everyone needs information systems and the 
services of the Internet daily. The pervasiveness of these systems has become an increasingly difficult 
problem from security perspective as can be seen from the rise of cybercrime, malicious programs and 
from the growing impact that failures in the network and information systems cause to individuals, or-
ganizations and even societies. 
One of the main issues affecting the security and functioning of modern information systems is the 
complexity of the networks, communications and software that enable the functionality that many rely 
on. This complexity has made it virtually impossible to have a thorough understanding of the network of 
information systems. Even when some parts of the system are very well understood and documented, 
the interaction of that system with other systems might be misunderstood or forgotten.  
Especially the use of these systems in critical infrastructure has brought these issues into surface. As 
the name suggests, critical infrastructure consist of the services, facilities and goods, which are essential 
to the functioning of some organization or government. The question at the heart of this discussion is 
how we can manage the growing complexity in the future. Will the growing complexity lead to a situation 
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where the systems actually do more harm than good or will the positive effects always outweigh the neg-
atives? In this paper, we will try to show some scenarios and the ramifications of these scenarios.  
We will also describe some of the methods that we have found effective in tackling some parts of the 
problem of complexity. These methods approach the problems in information systems more like scien-
tific phenomena to be understood and explained than the conventional engineering approach of finding 
a problem and fixing it. Our testing methods use some ideas from genetics and other natural sciences in 
order to better tackle the problems. We also use a method for finding hidden dependencies in order to 
quickly gain a visual and more thorough understanding of the phenomenon under scrutiny.  
The paper is organized in the following way. The second section defines the key concepts and the re-
search topic in detail. In the third section, we describe four scenarios of growing complexity and its ef-
fects. In the fourth section we discuss some of the existing methods for tackling the complexity and their 
effectiveness in the proposed scenarios. We conclude with sections for discussion and conclusions, 
where we take another look at the future and propose some research topics.  
Complexity and information systems 
In order to have a meaningful discussion on the topic we need to define some basic concepts. First of all 
by an information system we mean any system, which contains information and which is accessed by 
either other information systems or individuals. Thus our view of an information system is quite large. 
Of course the main focus of our research and discussion is on the modern information systems. Howev-
er, even a system with stone blocks and runes inscribed on them can be considered as an information 
system.  
One notoriously ambiguous term often used is complexity. Complexity is usually a property of a sys-
tem that is so complicated that its functionality can not be merely described as the functions of its parts. 
Also in computer science complexity is usually used to describe computational complexity, i.e., the 
amount of simple, atomical computational steps it takes to complete a run of some algorithm. We would 
like to add to this by also considering the usability complexity, especially in the context of information 
systems and processes. This complexity does not necessarily grow as the complexity of a system grows. A 
good example of this phenomenon is the library. Only a few decades back the index of books available for 
the customers of libraries were only available as paper cards that were filed in a (usually enormous) cab-
inet by some order (alphabetical, Dewey decimal etc.). The only way to use this information system to 
find the books one wanted to obtain was to go to the library and go through the index cards. Nowadays, 
most libraries have even more books available than before, but the usability of the indexing system has 
improved enormously. The database containing the information on the books is in digital form and usu-
ally even accessible from the Internet. This has lead to a decrease in the usability complexity as the cus-
tomers can now access library databases from their own computers and search the database with a mul-
titude of search terms.  
Information systems are nowadays almost ubiquitous as computers and the internet have become 
the tools through which many people work, do business and spend their leisure time with. This has lead 
also to the situation, where the understanding of these systems or the great systems, which contain all 
these different information systems has become almost impossible. It is certainly not enough to know 
the inner workings of a single part of these systems be it a single microprocessor, computer or even a 
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large network of computers. Thus problems in any (even a small) part of this system can have ramifica-
tions on the system as a whole.  
This pervasive nature of information systems in our society has lead to the description of our current 
society as the information society (or knowledge society (Mettler, 2005)). The emerging trends in this 
type of society are the increase in less tangible goods and services such as virtual realities and games. 
This also means that new information and new ways to utilize, disseminate and analyze information 
have the most value in this type of society. The role of information systems is very central in this society 
whereas before these systems were merely tools for the manufacturing industries. The nature of infor-
mation society has lead to the situation where almost the whole infrastructure is somehow dependent on 
well-functioning information systems. This is also true for critical infrastructure.  
Information systems are much more than just the sum of the individual parts. This also means that 
these are much more complex than the parts as the interactive nature of modern information society 
means that the different parts and systems interact with each other. This growing complexity of infor-
mation systems causes problems in many ways. Whenever the information system malfunctions, finding 
the cause of the problem is also difficult and sometimes impossible. Maintaining and administering a 
complex information system is hard and time consuming and every time a new part (service, a piece of 
hardware, an user interface, etc.) is added to the system the overall complexity grows more than the 
complexity of the new part. Complex systems also tend to be more vulnerable to attacks as they may con-
tain functionality and dependencies, which are unknown and/or undocumented. These may lead to nas-
ty surprises and the systems may exhibit chaotic behavior, which can be hard to understand (Gordon, 
2008). 
Probable scenarios 
In this section we describe four scenarios for the future development of information systems. We identi-
fy two directions of complexity growth and use these to develop our scenarios.  
We have identified two major directions in which the complexity of modern information systems is 
increasing. First direction is the spreading of information systems in such a way that they cover more 
areas of the society as a whole as well as more areas of each individual’s life. It is worth noting that the 
old Internet addressing scheme IPv4 (RFC 791) has already basically run out of distinct addresses for 
each device and/or individual in the network. This problem is to be tackled with the new IPv6 scheme 
(RFC 2460), which supports an enormous amount of possible unique addresses for network devices. 
However, the new system has been very slowly adopted as the technology of the internet usually requires 
a lot of backward compatibility. In any case, there will be more and more devices joining the network 
and communicating with other devices and/or individuals.  
The other direction of growing complexity is depth by which we mean that the information systems 
are a part of and control more and more the critical parts of societies and individuals lives. Online bank-
ing is a very good example in the individual perspective as nowadays almost all banking services are 
available to customers online. Societies are dependent on the fast and accurate transmission of data be-
tween different government agencies and especially the availability of information systems is very criti-
cal.  
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In the scenarios we have a few underlying assumptions. First of all, as is common in futurology, we 
leave out the possibility of a global disaster that effectively shatters the modern society. Secondly, and 
more particular to our paper, we assume that the amount of new information (and links between the ex-
isting information) grows at an increasing rate. We will also refrain from considering the role of artificial 
intelligence in our scenarios. This is because the development and effects of AI are very unpredictable. In 
the light of historical development, we find these assumptions quite reasonable. 
 
Table 1.  The four scenarios 
 Spreading 
Contained Uncontained 
D
e
p
t
h 
Contained 
Harmonious 
growth 
Wild spreading 
Uncon-
tained 
Deepening impact 
Complexity explo-
sion 
 
The first scenario is labeled harmonious growth. This means that even though information systems 
continue to spread and to dig deeper into the society, there are regulations, mechanisms and techniques 
which help to contain, understand and cope with the issues. There would still be incidents on critical 
infrastructure, but these would be exceptions. Furthermore, the impact of these incidents could be 
dampened and the normal routines of society would not be much disrupted. Also the individuals could 
enjoy the level of privacy that they choose to exhibit. The growth of information could be effectively uti-
lized and it would not become just noisy chatter where one is hard pressed to find relevant and meaning-
ful information. Thus, innovation and advances in science and technology could become easier and pro-
gress could be made a lot faster in many key areas of science and technology.  
The second scenario is wild spreading. This means that the spreading of information systems con-
tinues and there are very few mechanisms to limit it and to cope with the complexity that this brings to 
the society. In an extreme case this means that every toaster, milk carton and piece of clothing is some-
how constantly communicating via different channels with other devices. The benefits of remotely con-
trolling some household appliances are already today well understood. On the other hand, this wild 
spreading causes an enormous toll on the communication and information infrastructure. If this con-
stant chatter of mostly irrelevant (to the society as a whole) information can not be distinguished from 
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the useful information, the increase in information does not lead into useful actions as people and devic-
es alike struggle to find the needle of relevant information among the haystack of all information. How-
ever, the deepening effects of complexity in information systems have been either limited or techniques 
for handling and understanding the effects of this have been formed. Thus, the effects on the physical 
routines of the society and to the most important parts of individuals' lives are limited. The spreading of 
information systems will make it ever harder and harder to find relevant information and this may lead 
to the situation where organizations and governments wish to limit the information systems in such a 
way that the amount becomes manageable. Thus, the internet would be partitioned into different do-
mains with little interaction between them.  
In the third scenario, deepening impact, the spreading of information systems can be contained and 
coped with by new methods, regulations and techniques. However, the information systems penetrate 
ever deeper into the lives of individuals and into the fabric of society. This deepening leads into trouble, 
when these information systems are compromised or when they fail. Even though these incidents may be 
relatively infrequent in nature, the damage done to individual people, organizations, companies and 
governments grows all the time. On the other hand, the society requires its participants to use these sys-
tems as these have become the norm in commerce and interaction. It may also lead to oppressive behav-
ior from governments and organizations towards the individual. The systems that have a deep impact in 
the lives of individuals could e under constant monitoring and thus privacy could be lost.  
The final scenario we propose is called complexity explosion. In this scenario, complexity continues 
to spread and also reaches more deeply into the critical infrastructure and everyday life of ordinary peo-
ple. Also the mechanisms and techniques of coping with this growth fail to provide more safeguards and 
more effective measures to prevent and recover from failures of the information systems. This means 
that the failures in information systems become more frequent and disrupt the everyday routines of the 
society. Because the deep effect of these failures there might be loss of life and economic disturbances. 
Also civil unrest may ensue. It is very likely that criminals and other unscrupulous individuals and or-
ganizations would take advantage of this state of affairs and try to use the vulnerable nature of the in-
formation systems and society to their own purposes. In addition, this complexity explosion could even-
tually lead into situation where adding more devices and services to the information system actually 
makes it very likely less useful for the users. This very negative consequence could lead into a stagnant 
state, where innovation in the information systems stops altogether.  
As can be seen, these four scenarios are not a complete list of possible future development on infor-
mation society and information systems. As the world at large is not a homogenous entity we might ex-
pect some or all of these scenarios in different parts of the world and/or at different times. Table 1 
demonstrates the relationship between our directions of complexity and the scenarios we presented 
above. 
Methodology for tackling complexity 
In this section we describe two methods that we have utilized to tackle some of the problems arising 
from the complexity of information systems. One of our methods is a software testing method that infers 
a model for the input data from one or several sources and applies this model and some mutations in 
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order to generate test data. The other method we have applied is an information gathering and visualiza-
tion tool that can be used to provide insight on information systems.  
In all the possible scenarios presented in the previous section complexity of information systems 
grows, in one way or another. Since the growth is inevitable we must develop new methods for handling 
the situation. Complexity of information systems is already a significant problem. Even if we look at a 
single program it is very complex in the sense that it depends on multiple protocols, file formats, exter-
nal libraries, etc. The role of software in information systems has been increasing with the same rate as 
its complexity. A good example of this is vulnerability research. Vulnerability research is a discipline of 
finding faults in computer programs. In the old days, a vulnerability researcher could read the specifica-
tion of a protocol that the system under test used and generate test cases based on that information. To-
day this kind of approach is still feasible but it is becoming more and more costly. New protocol specifi-
cations tend to be long and labyrinthine, e.g., ISO/IEC 29500:2008 Part 1 consists of 5560 pages (ISO 
29500, 2008).  
One approach to address this situation is to use some sort of model to find faults. We can build a 
model based on partial knowledge. For example we can use the behavior of the system, on the data the 
system handles, etc., as the basis for testing. In the PROTOS GENOME project we have developed meth-
ods of generating useful test cases based on some sample data. So instead of trying to understand the 
protocol in use completely, we observe some network traffic and use that knowledge as the basis of test-
ing. Thus we employ the idea that we should study to understand instead of studying to solve some spe-
cific problem.  
On a larger scale in computer networks protocol dependencies are causing a number of problems. 
Protocols can contain other protocols that can contain other protocols and so on. This matryoshka prin-
ciple of protocols yields a situation where protocols are highly dependent of each other. These interde-
pendencies have caused serious problems in the past (OUSPG, 2002). These dependencies in most cases 
are not obvious as Eronen and Laakso have pointed out (Eronen & Laakso, 2005). Thus material has to 
be collected from multiple sources and to map the dependencies in this collected material in some visual 
way. In our MATINE method, we gather information on dependencies on a certain subject and enter it to 
a database. We use a Graphingwiki tool introduced by Eronen & Röning (Eronen & Röning, 2006) to 
draw graphs to gain more insight on the dependencies.  
Both of the above examples demonstrate how we can cope with growing complexity. Of course the 
understanding every detail of the whole system would give us a better result but in these cases it would 
be so time consuming that it is not possible. The world of information systems is in a state where we 
need to form better theories of how these systems behave. It might even be possible to aspire for a uni-
fied theory as the physicists do in physics.  
In general as information systems get more complex the amount information we need to possess in 
order to understand the inner workings of the system grows dramatically. In physics in most cases, we 
do not need to understand all details of a physical phenomenon to understand it. For example if we con-
sider a small weight attached to a spring we can calculate how high the spring will bounce even if we do 
not take to account the atomic properties of the metal that the spring is made of. The same goes for in-
formation systems. If we want to understand a complex system, we must take a step back and try to un-
derstand the whole instead of the individual parts.  
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Conclusions and Future Work 
All in all future will bring us more complex information systems. Whether or not the society can cope 
with this growing complexity and its implications will define many aspects of future development. Be-
cause the directions in which complexity may grow are not mutually exclusive we have to be able to take 
into account many variables when trying to understand modern information systems. However, this is in 
our opinion the only way to succeed in this task as by focusing on only singular events or parts of the sys-
tem will not result in a desirable outcome. This does not mean that there should be no efforts to improve 
the hardware, software and protocols, which are the building blocks of our information systems. Never-
theless, in order to make the most out of these improvements it is necessary to understand the whole of 
information systems and information society. Especially in critical infrastructure this understanding 
should span all the levels of the organizations that form the infrastructure.  
As we have stated in this paper understanding the complexity and its implications is crucial for the 
further development of the information society. We have developed some methods that can be utilized in 
a small scale to provide more thorough understanding and to test the robustness of modern information 
systems. Unfortunately, even our methods are not comprehensive enough. The model based fuzzing 
techniques can not find all the flaws in software and there is no time for one to test all protocols and 
software and different combinations of these. Thus the advances should be made in the design phase and 
this requires a shift in the mental model of software, hardware and protocol developers. This is a very 
slow process and it needs lots of support from different actors to be successful. Our method for finding 
hidden dependencies works fairly well and can be applied at many different levels of abstraction. How-
ever, combining the information in all these levels of abstraction can be a very difficult task and trying to 
filter only the relevant information from each level has been a very difficult task. Furthermore, this be-
come quite computationally intensive as the size of the system under scrutiny grows and we still lack 
some of the tools needed to automate many of the more laborious phases of the method. 
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ABSTRACT – Voice over Internet became popular in recent years, shifting the classical telephony 
system towards the Internet age. At the same time this shift poses new challenges in several areas, one 
of them found in security. A Session Boarder Controller is acting as a gatekeeper at the borders of 
trust. We were evaluating such a device for covert channels. Such covert channels were found them in 
the control and the media exchange protocol implementations. All of the channels have a considerable 
bandwidth, making their exploitation rewarding for any culprit. 
Introduction and Background 
In the past, the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) was used primarily for the transmission of 
voice, with the transport of data accounting only for a fraction of the volume. During the last ten years 
we have seen data traffic growing at a fast rate. In 1999, there was an equal amount of voice and data 
traffic and by 2002 the volume of data traffic was a magnitude higher. Internet operators were looking 
for new markets and found Internet telephony. Internet telephony is also known as Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP). Traditionally, the PSTN was under close scrutiny by regulatory bodies, whereas the 
same regulations have not been applied to VoIP. Initially research was conducted in the area of im-
proved quality and new services. Security was not an overriding issue. Due to frequently found vulnera-
bilities – for example described in (Wieser & Laakso & Schulzrinne 2004) and (Wieser Christian & Tak-
enen & Röning 2006) – and their exploitation, security has become more relevant. 
VoIP transmissions, which utilize standardized protocols, establish two logical channels: the control 
channel and the media exchange channel, each reflected by its own set of standards. Describing the con-
trol channel is for example: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) (IETF 2001), H.323 (ITU 2006) and MGCP 
(IETF 2000). The actual transmission of encoded voice and/or video is then done on the media ex-
change channel implemented typically via the Protocol for Real-Time Applications (RTP) (IETF 2003). 
One functional element to improve security in VoIP systems is the Session Boarder Controller. Such 
an SBC could be considered a session policing controller, an element that provides a multitude of func-
tions, including an application layer firewall. SBCs are located at trust boundaries. 
The term covert channel was introduced by Butler Lampson (Lampson 1973). It is a channel that ex-
ists parasitic in a legitimate channel and is generally hard to prevent. The goal of this paper is to describe 
software and tests to demonstrate the existence of these covert channels in VoIP systems and answers 
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the question if an SBC detects and counters the utilization of such a channel to transmit arbitrary binary 
data. 
The layout of this paper is as follows: In the next section, we reference relevant previous work, after 
which we describe the test setup. Then the test cases and their results are presented. An analysis of the 
results and their discussion finish this paper. 
This work profits from earlier work done in the area of VoIP security and covert channel detection. 
Thermos and Takanen (Thermos & Takanen 2007) wrote the reference literature on VoIP security. Their 
work describes threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures in a comprehensive manner. The SIP RFC 
proposes a generic threat model and gives recommendations for a safe deployment of SIP. Neither work 
included covert channels. These are described for example in the DoD’s “The Orange Book” (Department 
of Defence 1985). Such covert channels in VoIP are described by W. Mazurczyk and Lubacz (Mazurczyk 
& Lubacz 2008) and Takahashi and Lee (Takahashi & Lee 2007). Their work concentrates on establish-
ing and detecting VoIP covert channels. 
Test Setup 
The test network for the following experiments is depicted in Figure 1. The SBC is acting as application 
layer firewall between the public Internet and a private network. In each network, one computer is act-
ing as endpoint. A management network connects all parts to a single host, from which the experiment is 
conducted. All parts are connected by a 100 MBit/s IEEE 802.3 network, with a measured upper speed 
of 11 MBytes/s. 
We have tested a SIP SBC with the latest firmware and configured it to work as expected. The user 
agents are registered with valid user accounts at the SBC. We do not reveal the SBC’s vendor, because we 
have not communicated the results with them, because we did not test any other SBC, singling them out 
should be considered unethically. 
 
Figure 1.  The test network setup. 
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Test Program 
We adapted the Shtoom (Divmod 2003) SIP user agent for our purpose. The reason we used this specific 
program had been: The license permitted us to utilize it, the program worked satisfactorily and the pro-
gram structure allowed us an easy adaption. We used UDP as transport protocol for SIP and RTP. 
Test cases 
We have separated our test cases into two groups: We try to find and assess hidden channels in the SIP 
control channel. Later, we evaluate the media exchange channel RTP.  
The correctness of any communication in a covert channel was ascertained with an MD5 checksum 
of the transmitted data. All reported test cases have matching checksums.  
Covert channels in SIP 
We tried to find covert channels by forging SIP header fields. Initial tests used the From and To display 
name fields. Binary data was MIME encoding and passed the SBC unaltered. In a next step, we found out 
the maximum header field size of the From and To display name fields listed them in Table 1. By contin-
uously calling, we also found the maximum throughput of the channel. 
 
Table 1.  Maximum SIP header field length and throughput 
Field Size Throughput 
Fom display name 546 bytes 2150 bytes/s 
To display name 518 bytes 1768 bytes/s 
 
Because we kept the SIP-URIs constant, the call was directed to the desired callee.  
Covert channels in RTP 
During the successive tests, a call was established again through the SBC and the RTP media exchange 
was carrying the covert channel. On the control channel we announced the usage of the G.711 codec. I 
accordance to the AV Profile (IETF 1996), the default interval should be 20 ms, which leads to a RTP 
payload of 160 bytes. 
Ascertain maximum RTP payload size 
 At first, we tried to see if the SBC checked the RTP payload. We send random data in the RTP payload, 
which the SBC passed. We then changed the payload length and adapted the RTP header fields accord-
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ingly.  We achieved a maximum payload size of 1456 bytes, which is together with the header fields of 
RTP, UDP, IP and Ethernet the maximum size of an Ethernet frame. Split UDP packets were silently 
dropped by the SBC. 
RTP packets send faster than interval time 
The default interval time of PCMU is according to the profile is 20ms. We tested, if the SBC checked any 
of the RTP timing. The results are found in Table 2. We utilized the maximum payload length found in 
the previous experiment. 
 
Table 2  RTP interval time and throughput 
RTP sending Interval Throughput 
20 ms 71935 bytes/s 
15 ms 93929 bytes/s 
10 ms 13882 bytes/s 
RTP header nonobservance 
In the final test, we wanted to find if the SBC checks for any of the RTP header fields and simply send 
random data on the previously agreed media channel. The SBC allowed the data stream to pass. With no 
delay between send packets and the maximum Ethernet packet length we achieved a constant through-
put of 569 Kbytes/s. 
Analysis of the test results 
The goal of this test setup was to detect covert channels in VoIP network with an SBC. In this test setup 
such were found in the SIP and RTP implementation. The SBC was not successfully evaluating packets 
for covert channels. Notably the RTP test cases showed the existence of a high bandwidth channel. It 
seems the firewall is merely opening a connection between the networks, routing the packets and is not 
checking the content of the passing RTP packet. The SBC did not log any anomalous condition. The 
bandwidth of any channel is considered high by “The Orange Book”, as it is over 100 bits/s. 
Discussion and further work 
With the above results, we try to give context to them. One limitation of your work: we could test only 
one SBC. We aim to extend our work to include a more complete picture of several different SBCs. Our 
expectation nevertheless is, that we find covert channels in all further SBCs. Reason being that voice and 
video has a natural variance, and so has data send in the control channel.  
Even if the throughput by advanced detection (as proposed for example in (Takahasi Takahiro & Lee 
Wenke 2007)) might be reduced, we have a wide range of choices to adapt the channel encoding: using 
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steganographic methods, or switch to a timing based covert channel. Another limitation of this attack is: 
we have to manipulate the locally running VoIP software.  
Can we estimate the relevance? Today, our web browsers allow us to connect to a plethora of infor-
mation sources. Why are then such covert channels of any relevance? We can think of obvious reasons: 
stealthy and bidirectional communication and network neutrality. We could open communication with-
out the notice of the SBC and transferred data in both directions. Due to the implicit end-to-end charac-
ter of any telephone conversation, a successful attacker is able to initiate data transfers on any side of the 
SBC. By comparison, we typically do not allow users to run their own web servers on their local comput-
ers for good reasons.  Covert channels might be increasingly relevant in a non net neutral setup, in which 
specific network traffic is discriminated. If a VoIP call receives better quality of service, these techniques 
will become popular. 
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ABSTRACT - The increased complexity in the networks, measured by the number of connected devic-
es, offered services, and the variations in access options, has made even the basic network planning a 
challenge without suitable tools. The same trend makes the security evaluation of the chosen infra-
structure and policies a significant challenge. Modelling any real systems security properties requires 
scalability, efficiency and ease of application to be practical. Based on a method introduced earlier, 
Key-Challenge Petri Net (KCPN), a hierarchical model of complex systems can be constructed for eval-
uation of information security. In this paper we describe a novel application of simulating the KCPN 
model with a case study of a realistic network and discuss about the experiences from preliminary 
simulations. 
Introduction 
Administrators of complex computer networks would get a lot more insight to their work if they had a 
reliable model of the security properties in hand. The model could be used e.g. in testing different strate-
gies for protecting the network and visualizing the results. In order to accomplish this, the model should 
be complete and realistic, and there should be good tools to simulate it. 
Modelling information security properties on the communication networks can be done on many ab-
straction levels. On a detailed level, one can for example create a detailed attack graph regarding the tar-
get system which provides accurate view to the present state against all known attacks. On this detailed 
level, modelling any larger part of networked system becomes easily too complex to be analyzed or visu-
alized (Sheyner et al. 2002, 273). On a more abstract level, information security can be viewed as an ac-
cess control system. This approach can be too general and abstract to provide any real value. 
The Key-Challenge Petri Net (KCPN) model, as introduced by Kiviharju et al. in (Kiviharju et al. 
2009, 190-206) provides possibility to choose the practical abstraction level suitable to the purpose by 
having multiple hierarchy levels. With the KCPN model it is possible to have a simple network topology 
view on top modelling the whole network behaviour under attack, but still at the same time the model is 
capable of simulating even the internal details of a single workstation, such as a web browser or a device 
driver. The KCPN model is also planned to be flexible enough to be able to model the modern social en-
gineering attacks like Phishing, or attacks using USB drives, which have been hard to incorporate in the 
traditional models.   
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The KCPN model does not yet have support from the available simulator tools. In this paper we ad-
dress that by describing the application of simulating the KCPN model in a Stochastic Activity Network 
(SAN) simulator. The implementation approach is discussed and the details are narrated with the help of 
a use case.  
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Next two sections introduce the KCPN model and dis-
cuss the related work in information security simulation. Description of the simulation environment 
introduces the simulator tool we chose for implementation. In the following two sections an example use 
case is discussed along with details how the KCPN model is implemented on top of the simulator. Before 
conclusions, there is a chapter for preliminary results, in which we describe how the model behaved in 
our initial simulations. 
KCPN model 
The Key-Challenge Petri Net (KCPN) model introduced in (Kiviharju et al. 2009, 190-206) was specifi-
cally built for modelling network security. It was based on case of generalization of stochastic Petri nets, 
called Hierarchical Coloured Stochastic Activity Networks (HCSAN) (Azgomi & Movaghar 2004, 297-
308), defined originally for the modelling and analysis of distributed real-time systems. The concept of 
key challenges was adapted from Key-Challenge Graphs (Chinchani et al. 2005, 108-117). 
The KCPN model has many good features needed for comprehensive network security modelling and 
simulation. It uses variable abstraction level, which is powerful in expressing even complex networks, 
and in the same time reasonable for simulation. The model uses hierarchy for scalability for simulation 
and precision, and to give the researcher straightforward views to different abstraction levels. Built into 
the model there is also a way of monitoring the basic security attributes - confidentiality, integrity and 
availability - for all needed entities. 
 
 
Figure 1.  A KCPN graph consisting of two places. 
Figure 1 shows simplified version of a KCPN graph. Entities with information or capability that can 
be acquired are presented as places on the graph, like u and v on this graph. A place can be, for example 
on a network topology level (TL), a database server or a computer system. On the TL, one place can rep-
resent a large number of computers with identical characteristics of the device, running software and 
reachability. Using this method the complexity of the model can be reduced significantly (Ingols et al. 
2006, 121-130).  
Each place can also have a colour and security attributes. The colour denotes the ownership of the 
place i.e. whether it is originally at an attacker’s possession, a neutral place or owned by the defender. 
The security attributes are Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). The colours and security at-
tributes are used in making rules for monitoring the state of an attack. For example, an attacker success-
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fully entering the defender’s place with an availability attribute set and monitored, is equivalent of a suc-
cessful Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. 
Each piece of information or capability that is in the place is presented as a key. A key could be, for 
example, a password stored on a computer or the knowledge of the local network structure. The edge 
between the places presents the channel of access between the entities. The security measure that pro-
tects the access represented by the edge is denoted by a combination of an input gate, an activity and an 
output gate.  
The input gate, IGuv in Figure 1, has a logical expression involving mandatory keys for entering the 
activity. If the attacker has the needed keys, his token can pass the challenge with minimal cost of re-
sources, which can be for example time or computing power. Having the required keys equals the situa-
tion where attacker has for example knowledge of server software version, suitable configuration and 
working security exploit. If the key requirement is not met, the cost of entering is significant, equalling 
brute forcing a security measure or waiting if a suitable exploit is found. 
Activity, IA in Figure 1, fires the token(s) to the next place in the graph as it has passed the input 
gate. Activities can have more than one input, and more than one alternate output. Output gate, OGuv in 
Figure 1, holds the keys of next place v that the attacker receives after successfully entering. The gates 
and the activity are defined as macros in KCPN, following the HCSAN definition. 
Each of the abstraction level has similar structure as the main graph, including places, activities, in-
put and output gates. The lower abstraction level graphs are fully contained within the places of its par-
ent abstraction level. As an example, the more detailed abstraction level of a place denoting a server clus-
ter of TL is usually a graph incorporating the major attack categories and their phases to this particular 
server type. On this abstraction level, a place can be an intermediate step in attacking the system, for 
example the act of scanning the local network for vulnerable software versions. These layers of lower 
abstraction are called Attack Action Levels (AAL) within the KCPN.  
Definitive description and formal structure of KCPN is presented in (Kiviharju et al. 2009, 190-206). 
Simulation of the Information Security Models 
Information security modelling and simulation has been performed from a number of viewpoints (Saun-
ders 2002). The most popular approach is to generate an attack graph in which attacker's actions, net-
work states, and vulnerabilities are represented with nodes and arcs.  The most relevant work for our 
simulation are the previously presented KCPN model (Kiviharju et al. 2009, 190-206) and simulation 
scenarios of a network in the area of information security.   
Simulation tools for modelling cyber attacks to a network have been developed a lot because there 
are various positive arguments for using a simulator instead of performing tests in the real world. Build-
ing the model in the simulator is often more affordable and the results are produced faster. The down-
sides are that the results are not as accurate, and modelling of human behaviour is difficult with the net-
work tools. 
Simulation of information security in networks has various approaches. Some tools like Opnet 
(Opnet 2010) are designed for analyzing the safety of the network. This kind of software is also good also 
for performance testing of the network but they do not necessarily include verified and validated attack-
ing models. 
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Simulation can be also approached from a distributed point of view where the simulator such as 
NetSim (McGrath et al. 2002) can be used to organize security exercises. These events provide reliable 
results for certain attack types and they are a good practice to test the defence methods in reality. Unfor-
tunately, this kind of software usually lacks modelling capabilities. 
Another type of network security simulator is a client-server based solution. One example of the type 
is MAADNET (Carver et al. 2002), which is a network simulator for educational purposes. The idea is 
that the user creates a network architecture and sends it to the server for evaluation. The server analyzes 
the network and evaluates it with attributes like preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
The success of the attack depends on attributes such as the type of the attack and the skill level of the 
attacker. Still the problem for almost all of modelling and simulation types is that there is only a limited 
number of attributes related to human behaviour. 
Description of Simulation environment 
A tool named Möbius (Möbius 2010) was chosen for simulating the KCPN model. Möbius is a software 
tool for modelling the behaviour of complex systems. It was originally developed for studying the relia-
bility, availability, and performance of computer and network systems. In addition to the original appli-
cations, it is now used for a broad range of discrete-event systems, from biochemical reactions within 
genes to the effects of malicious attackers on secure computer systems.  
Möbius is a versatile tool for modelling Petri nets and it's variations like hierarchical and stochastic 
Petri nets. The only significant limitation is that pure coloured (CPN) and timed Petri nets (TPN) are not 
supported. Different Petri nets are implemented through stochastic activity network (SAN) models 
(Sanders 2009) which use an extended notation of the standard Petri net. Besides the standard Petri net 
objects the SAN model includes input and output gates and extended places. Extended places are places 
which are not constricted to count tokens but can be extended with customized variables and structures. 
Möbius doesn't support CPN but extended places can be used to compensate colouring in the model. For 
this reason it is possible to implement the KCPN model with Möbius despite the lack of CPN support. 
Möbius has a highly modular structure. The researcher can create function libraries and use them in 
Möbius. The application programming interface (API) of the function library has full support for C++ 
programming language. The source code of the library needs to be compiled with a separate compiler, 
after which the header and the object file are linked to Möbius. This freedom of expansion gives almost 
unlimited possibilities to implement more features to the model at hand.  
The graphical user interface of the Möbius is straightforward. It consists of multiple windows and 
each window represents one graphical layout of a SAN graph with simulator-related controls. The main 
controls are used for linking several SAN models to each other and managing the simulation. The Möbi-
us has also good possibilities for compilation of statistics (called Reward in Möbius) because it is possi-
ble to add as many variables as required, by defining them in separate code. There are not any special 
built in tools for the analysis of the results except the calculation of mean and mean's confidence interval 
of the added variable. However with the API calls, the user can print out to the log file the marking of a 
place during the simulation and analyze results afterwards with external tools. 
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Möbius runs well on modern PC hardware. Supported operating systems are Windows, Mac OSX, 
and Ubuntu Linux (Sanders 2009). Möbius has an ability to distribute calculations of simulation over 
the network to other computers which can be useful in cases when the size of the model is significant. 
Function libraries can also be ported between different platforms by compiling them again in the new 
system.  
Case study 
As a case study, an imaginary moderate size company network was drawn for modelling purposes. The 
network (Figure 2) has two subnets: demilitarized zone (DMZ) and inner private network (Intranet) 
both of which are separated from the Internet and each other by a firewall. There is a cluster of extranet 
servers in the DMZ. In the intranet there are a number of workstations which are able to connect to the 
intranet web server but not directly to the project database server. The access to the Project Database is 
possible only through the company Intranet Web pages.  The company firewall has been set up with a 
policy of blocking all inbound connections from the Internet. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The example network of our case study. 
In our simulated case, each device of the network is intentionally associated with several exploitable 
vulnerabilities in order to enable multiple non-trivial attack scenarios.  
The attacker's goal is first to break into the intranet and then gain access to confidential information 
of company's profit report on the database server. One possible sequence of action to reach these goals 
would go as follows (Figure 3); Attacker scans all the visible computers that are visible from the Internet 
and he finds out the extranet servers and their configuration. Exploiting an unpatched vulnerability in 
the web server he gains login access to it, and with a local privilege escalation exploit he gains full access 
to the server. From the server databases the attacker finds contact and login information of some of the 
company employers. Using this knowledge he sends infected PDF files to a number of employers. When 
unsuspecting employer opens the malicious email attachment, the attacker gains remote control of one 
of the workstations. The attacker has now reached his first goal of breaking in the company intranet, and 
immediately begins scanning the internal network topology. Within, he uses similar techniques to first 
gain control of the intranet web server, and eventually of the protected database server. 
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Figure 3.  An example attack scenario. 
Modelling the example network, its security policy and vulnerabilities revolves around choosing how 
the properties and attacker knowledge is projected to the keys, and how they are placed within the net-
work. In this case there are, for example, following keys; Knowledge of the extranet server vulnerability 
is a key, which is acquired when the company network is scanned. Knowledge of how to exploit that vul-
nerability is another key, which the attacker has in his knowledge or not. Further on, knowledge of a 
company employer email address is a key, and possession of knowledge how to infect and use the PDF 
files for the attack is another, and so on. Without these last two keys, the attacker would have to use 
some brute force attack to the company firewall, or do further research to gain knowledge of the email 
attacks, both of the activities which would consume lots of time and other resources. 
The result of this modelling work is the KCPN model of the network. Further details of the structure 
of the model and how it is implemented with Möbius is given on the next chapter.  
Implementation of KCPN Model 
As mentioned earlier Möbius has support for many Petri net formats. For implementing the KCPN mod-
el, the SAN file format is used. In the notation of SAN, Möbius is using an extended representation of 
Petri net. In practice this means that in addition to places, transitions and edges, the input and output 
gates are defined. The input and output gates are placed on both sides of a transition on graphical layout 
of SAN file.  
The input and output gates have a key role in the implementation process. In the KCPN model the 
attacker’s keys are checked in the input gate and new keys the attacker gains when entering a new place 
are given in the output gate leading to that place. Technically the input gate has two code fields: one for 
Input Predicate and the other for Input Function. The functionality itself is defined with C++ code in-
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serted in the code fields. The Input Function will be run if the condition in Input Predicate is true. The 
output gate has only one code field for Output Function. The Output Function will be run after the tran-
sition fires the token and before the token reaches the next place.  
The input and output gates are also managing the other variables necessary for the KCPN model 
simulation like costs and probabilities. All of the variables are implemented in the extended places of 
SAN. Each place is modelled as separate C++ class using inheritance. For example in our case the fire-
wall class is inherited from the device class which is inherited from the abstract place class. The place 
class contains general structures about the model like placeholders for keys and probabilities. The device 
class inheriting the place adds the definition of the state and version of the device. Furthermore, the 
firewall class has all of the previous attributes as well as the type and filtering rules as new additions.  
The model parameters are saved in C++ data structures (struct) as doubles and integer lists. Some of 
these variables are used for the colouring of the HCSAN model (Azgomi & Movaghar 2004, 297-308). 
For example when the attacker begins the attack towards a workstation the token is being moved to the 
place called workstations. In this implementation only one type of tokens are present, the attackers, but 
the places can still be in control of the defender or the attacker. This ownership, or colour, of the place is 
declared as a state attribute denoting the number of attacker tokens present.  
The places which have security attributes assigned are specifically monitored. When the attacker 
successfully enters a place with any of the security attributes set, the simulator logs the event and checks 
if the success criteria for the whole attack is met. The success criteria is usually the violation of security 
attributes in one or multiple places. The other possible reason for ending the simulation is the attacker 
running out of resources.  
In addition to extended places, the other important part of the HCSAN model (Azgomi & Movaghar 
2004, 297-308) and also KCPN is the hierarchy. The concept the token moving in the graph hierarchy 
had to be built manually because the chosen method of joining the graphs would conflict with the way of 
Möbius running all SAN graphs simultaneously. In practice e.g. in the output gate on the topology level a 
permission to start running the attack action graph of the next place can be given i.e. when the token is 
moved to the workstation the sub graph of the workstation is run. After the sub graph is finished suc-
cessfully the token can continue on the topology level to the next input gate. 
In the implementation of the case only two levels were used (Figure 4). The topology level (TL) pre-
sents the topology of the network and the second level is the attack action level (AAL) where the attack-
ing methods are described. In our case, every place on the topology level corresponds to one attack ac-
tion graph. In the real network there might be many devices that share the same kind of software and 
services like workstations. For example the workstations place (Figure 2), which describes many physi-
cal workstations, has a workstation attack action graph (Figure 4). In this case the attack action graph of 
the workstation represents two possible attacking methods: to use an exploit or login with a proper user 
account.  
On the attack action level every attack method like a Trojan horse or an exploit has a list of required 
keys. If the attacker has all of the keys on the list of the attack method, the probability of successful at-
tack will be significantly greater and the costs of resources are lower than without. Still it is possible to 
use an attack method without any keys e.g. by brute force but the cost is much higher. The attacker gains 
control of the device when the token manages through the attack action graph. After successful attack 
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the keys belonging to the last place of the attack action graph are given to attacker in the last output gate, 
and the permission to continue will be given to the upper level. 
 
 
Figure 4.  The hierarchical implementation of our case study. 
If more detailed simulation of the behavior of the vulnerable devices is wanted, the KCPN model al-
lows using further hierarchy levels, both AAL and TL. (Kiviharju et al. 2009, 190-206). In this example 
only two levels were used, but e.g. on the third level attack methods of same type could be separated. For 
example Trojan horse on the second level could be separated to remote access, data theft and keystroke 
logging Trojans. Optimal use of the multiple hierarchy levels brings simplicity for the graphical layout of 
the graph, and at the same time enables very detailed results on a chosen focus area to be provided if 
required.  
Preliminary Results 
The main goal of our work was to implement the KCPN model into the simulator. Some test simulations 
were also run but their results are just suggestive. In this chapter we present and discuss the preliminary 
results.  
For this implementation we used very basic set of input parameters. Every device had at least two 
vulnerabilities and in some devices multiple steps were needed for gaining complete control. The time 
spent in every attacking step was chosen randomly from the interval which was defined by the vulnera-
bility in use. The total time of breaking the device was affected by a success probability of each attack 
method.  
The attack success probability without the required keys was categorically set to a low figure, usually 
less than one percent in a resource unit. It means that the attacker has to try to research and brute force 
trough the security protection of the device and in every step the resources is spent. In cases where the 
attacker had all the required keys the probabilities of success were set close to 100% in a resource unit. It 
is to be noted that the resources were spent only on the attack action level of the model, as the token 
movements on the topology levels are considered practically instantaneous compared to the usually in-
teractive and slower paced attack actions.  
Determining the realistic parameter values and keys for the device- and attack libraries is one of the 
biggest challenges in the implementation work. For this simulation test he parameter values were chosen 
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by using expert opinions and educated guesses. The model validation with the real world network data 
and parameter tuning would be the next natural step of the KCPN simulation implementation work. 
Figure 5 shows the ratio of the attack success plotted against the resources available for the attack. 
The initial results seem to be in line with expectations: The model is stable in the simulation and the suc-
cess trend is believable. It can be seen from the figure that to a certain threshold the amount of resources 
available to the attacker is the limiting factor to success. Considering the amount of unpatched vulnera-
bilities present, it was no surprise that the success ratio approaches 100% quickly. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Total number of successful attacks as for used resources. 
Naturally, a single run of simulation does not include a lot of valuable data, especially when the 
model validation is incomplete. The real value of simulating a model, even an abstract one, would come 
from variating the configuration of the network and the resources and skill level of the attacker and seek-
ing the optimal defense strategies in different threat scenarios.  
Conclusions 
We have accomplished a basic implementation of the KCPN model to a simulator environment. As the 
main goal of the implementation process was to use Möbius simulator to produce the preliminary result, 
the work was a success. Möbius was proven as a versatile simulation tool for working with the KCPN 
models. One significant factor of the success was the flexible and well designed C++ interface within the 
simulator. In the resulting implementation the model behaved in a stable and predictable way and there-
fore proves to be a good basis for validation work and more detailed analysis of the model behaviour. 
In the present setup the creation of new scenarios is very laborious and slow. The interactive editor 
forces the user to enter the source code in small snippets separately for each gate and place of each 
graph. For managing large models, integrated support for creating and using libraries of different places 
and their internal sub graphs would be needed. Now the challenge was managed to a degree with disci-
plined source code management and commenting. The fact that Möbius doesn't provide or link to a 
proper Integrated Development Environment (IDE) or a debugger makes working with larger models 
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even harder. The only help available for code verification are the debug printouts and the simulation 
logs.  
For the more practical use of the simulator, more advanced means of importing a new model to the 
simulator are needed. Even if the libraries would be in place for the needed device types, the lack of a 
proper graphical network topology editor or an import tool in Möbius would make the creation of any 
larger model a significant effort.  As Möbius is able to read the SAN graphs from a file, the investigations 
continue whether this could be used for creating an import functionality of our own. 
Despite the lack of debugger and import feature, simulating the KCPN model in Möbius provides a 
lot of freedom to the researcher in variability and scalability for modelling information security attacks. 
The next step in our work is to make more realistic and complex scenarios and validate and balance the 
chosen parameterization approach with a real reference system The KCPN model makes modelling very 
complex attacks possible with the inherent scalability via hierarchy and the unique usage of key chal-
lenges.  This could enable a realistic simulation of Botnet DDoS attacks, Phishing and other emerging 
Internet threats. 
Another interesting development path could be developing the model implementation from the de-
fender's point of view and creating some interaction between the attacker and defender. The behaviour 
of the attacker can be made more human with parameters like skill level and the style of attack. Even 
some chosen technologies from the artificial intelligence research could be used to enhance the simula-
tion of how attacker discovers new vulnerabilities and makes choices during his attack.  
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ABSTRACT - Security is capricious in nature, with many practising domains and heterogeneous oc-
cupations. In addition, security can only be defined by its applied context. Such diffusion leads to a 
need to develop and present a consensual body of knowledge for the practising domain of Organisa-
tional Security; one domain of many parts of security. Organisational security may be considered, in 
part, that which provides security services and functions as a commodity within either public or com-
mercial enterprises. There have been studies that have put forward a number of organisational securi-
ty bodies of knowledge; however, there is still restricted consensus that is needed if we are to under-
stand the future of organisational security. 
This study considered existing body of knowledge studies and puts forward a body of knowledge 
framework for organisational security, with integrated knowledge categories. In addition, further 
analysis was applied to this framework using a psychometric multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
knowledge mapping technique. The psychometric MDS mapping technique allowed implicit expert un-
derstanding of the framework and knowledge categories to be measured and interpretations made. 
Interpretations lead to an adjustment to the initial organisational security framework, resulting in a 
body of knowledge that better reflects organisational security experts’ view of their practising domain 
and considered Security Science. 
 
Introduction 
The security industry is one of Australia’s fastest growing sectors, generating revenues of approximately 
$4.5 billion per year and employing over 150,000 security personnel (Australian Security Industry Asso-
ciation, 2008). In a recent study, census figures for a ten-year period from 1996 to 2006 demonstrated 
that while the Australian population increased by 12 percent and the police workforce by 15 percent, the 
number of security providers grew by 41 percent (Prenzler, 2009, p. 3). However, security providers in-
cluded many security occupations that would suggest that such comparison lacked some validity, an is-
sue raised by Prenzler (2009, p. 4) which resulted in a more conservative figure of 26 percent. 
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Security has strong parallels with Defence, as they both provide protection; nevertheless, there are 
“disturbing differences” between these industries (Tate, 1997, p. iii). Defence, as with other related in-
dustries, are often considered to be security. An example may be the parallelism demonstrated through 
police and military organisations, with increasing convergence in their response to national security 
challenges (Ferguson, 2004). Such diverse and multidimensional approach to security cannot support 
the definition of security (Morley & Vogel, 1993), as ASIS International stated, “every time we think 
we’ve got the definition of the security field nailed, somebody … starts taking some of the nails away” 
(2003, p. 10). 
Such diversity results in difficulty in providing a single encompassing definition for the many applied 
domains and heterogeneous occupations of security. Security cannot be considered singular in concept 
definition, as definition is dependent on applied context (Brooks, 2009b). A lack of concise understand-
ing of security is becoming more significant, as the many practising domains of security such as public 
security, private security, national security, and private military security converge in the current social 
and political environment. As Zedner states “scholars have tended to think about security within their  
immediate discipline and in detachment from one another” (2009, p. 3). 
Significance of the Study 
There is an ever increasing reliance by both private and public sectors on private security, as public po-
licing no longer has a monopoly on such services (Bradley & Sedgwick, 2009, p. 468), although it is as 
important to be able to provide an understanding and demarcation of security domains. However, there 
has been limited research in presenting an understanding of organisational security body of knowledge, 
with publications primarily by ASIS International (2003; 2009) and others (D.J. Brooks, 2009b; Hesse 
& Smith, 2001; Talbot & Jakeman, 2008). Therefore, the study provides a better understanding of a part 
of security, namely organisational security, its body of knowledge and its practicing knowledge catego-
ries. Organisational security is a multi-disciplined field and the identification of discrete knowledge cat-
egories could assist in better understanding a part  of security. 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study was gain a better understanding of one part of the multidimensional domain of 
security, in particular, the group who provides a significant portion of applied security within our socie-
ty. The study addressed a number of discrete objectives, namely: 
1. What knowledge categories are most relevant for the practising domain of organisational secu-
rity? 
2. Can a singular body of knowledge framework be developed for the practising domain of organi-
sational security? 
 74 
Material and Methods 
The study design was divided into two discrete phases (Figure 1). The first phase critiqued existing body 
of knowledge studies to develop an integrated framework of organisational security. The second phase 
tested this integrated framework using psychometric multidimensional scaling (MDS) knowledge map-
ping and from this analysis, produced a final integrated framework. 
 
Phase One: Body of Knowledge
Critique existing body of knowledge studies to develop and present an 
Integrated Framework of Organisational Security.
Result: Integrated Framework of Organisational Security
See Figure 3
Phase Two: Psychometric MDS Review
Using psychometric multidimensional scaling (MDS), test the integrated 
framework using domain experts.
Result: Integrated Framework of Organisational Security
     See Figure 5 O p e r a t i o n a l
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Figure 1.  Study design. 
The second phase of the study, namely the psychometric multidimensional scaling (MDS) knowledge 
mapping, used a web based survey instrument embedded with a number of security knowledge catego-
ries. Non-probabilistic peer selected expert participants (n=27) made up the study’s sampling group. In 
general, the participants consisted of people operating in private or public organisations at a managerial 
or executive level within their corporation’s security group or were academics researching the security 
industry. Participants selected, on a sliding scale, how similar or dissimilar they considered pairs of 
knowledge categories (Figure 2). Data were extracted from the completed survey’s, summed and inserted 
into Excel, considered the source document. At this point, validity and reliability measures were applied 
on the source data and multidimensional scaling analysis applied. 
 
when compared to Similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Dissimilar 
Security   Security management                         
Security   Physical security                         
Security   Security technology                         
Security   ICT                         
Figure 2.  Sample of the MDS survey instrument. 
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The underlying theory of the study used interpretative analysis, where existing security body of 
knowledge studies were considered and expanded. In addition, psychometric multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) knowledge mapping technique (D. J Brooks, 2009a) was incorporated, presenting a spatial ex-
perts’ representation of organisational security knowledge structure. 
Knowledge categories 
Knowledge may commence with object and pattern recognition; nevertheless, this does not provide an 
appropriate explanation to define knowledge. Knowledge is constructed and built on previous experience 
by using and expanding existing ideas (Novak & Gowin, 1984). Therefore, it can be stated that as new 
knowledge is gained, change in understanding existing theories may be achieved. Nevertheless 
knowledge is integral to memory structure, concerned with how the memory may organise, store and 
retrieve such knowledge. As a person is exposed to information in their everyday life, concurrent 
knowledge has to be economised and abstracted into what are defined knowledge categories. 
These knowledge categories are developed and maintained within long-term memory; however, 
there is a cognitive balance between the number and effectiveness of such categories. Categories need to 
be informative, based to a degree on the natural world, economic and cohesive (Eysenck & Keane, 
2002), and organised (Kellogg, 2003). Similar objects are grouped together within a conceptual category 
and these groupings are generally a product of the learner’s environment. 
Multidimensional scaling 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a statistical technique within the area of multivariate data analysis, 
“attracting worldwide interest” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2002, p. 369) and has been used in many 
other similar studies (Cox & Cox, 2000). MDS operates by reducing complex dimensional data and pre-
senting such data as a spatial representation, allowing hidden data structure formation. MDS commenc-
es with a set of objects that are paired and their dissimilarities measured, with configurations of points 
sought in dimensional space and each point representing as an object. MDS calculates a dimensional 
space configuration where the points match, as close as possible, to the paired dissimilarities. Dimen-
sional representation demonstrates object proximity, with proximity being how similar or dissimilar ob-
jects actually are or perceived to be (Cox & Cox, 2000; Kruskal & Wish, 1978). Such a technique results 
in a spatial representation of knowledge concept clusters (Trochim, Cook, & Setze, 1994). 
Phase One: Organisational Security Body of Knowledge 
The study critiqued existing body of knowledge studies that focused on what could be considered organi-
sational security. These studies included an introductory course in organisational security (Nalla, 2001), 
Integrated Framework of Organisational Security (D.J. Brooks, 2009b), Security Risk Management Body 
of Knowledge (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008) and ASIS International Symposiums (ASIS International, 
2009). 
Nalla (2001) explores the core components of an introductory course in organisational security, 
where nine security topics were ranked important (Table 1) drawn from benchmarking security text-
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books, security professional’s interviews and proceedings of the ASIS first academic/practitioner sympo-
sium. The study emphasised, to a lesser degree, the consensus on the conceptual and methodological 
components of security education such as fire safety, workplace violence and workplace drug use. How-
ever, this study is considered too narrow in approach and lacking core and relevant knowledge catego-
ries put forward by others, such as Brooks (2008; 2009b), ASIS International (2009), and Talbot and 
Jakeman (2008). 
 
Table 1.  Components of an introductory survey course in organisational security. (Nalla, 2001, 
p. 49) 
Component’s description 
Physical security and asset protection Access control management 
Emergency and incident management Risk assessment and management 
Personnel security Investigations 
Legal issues Information security 
Computer security  
 
Brooks (2008; 2009b) investigated and critiqued 104 security related undergraduate security cours-
es from Australia, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States. From this critique, seven courses 
were selected for in-depth course content analysis using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Penne-
baker, Francis, & Booth, 2001). This analysis resulted in 2001 security concepts being extracted, with the 
14 more implicit concepts considered knowledge categories (Table 2). In addition, this study used other 
related body of knowledge studies (American Society for Industrial Security, 2002; Bazzina, 2006) to 
support and valid these security related knowledge categories. 
 
Table 2.  Organisational security knowledge categories. (D. J. Brooks, 2008, p. 19) 
Security categories description 
Criminology Business continuity ma-
nagement 
Fire science 
Facility management Industrial security Information &computer 
Investigations Physical security Security principles 
Risk management Safety Security law 
Security manage-
ment 
Security technology  
 
From the 14 knowledge categories (Table 2) a proposed integrated framework of organisational se-
curity (Figure 3) was developed. The framework considered the breadth of organisational security, op-
posing many past studies that have presented a narrow approach to the diverse role of organisational 
security, such as Kooi and Hinduja (2008). Such breadth was supported by Yates (2007) when he stated 
that traditional security categorisation does not consider the large range of security related functions, 
including business continuity, emergency response, information security and risk management. As the 
integrated framework indicates, Level 1 security knowledge categories comprises of risk management, IT 
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and computing, physical security, security technology, investigations, personnel and industrial security. 
Business continuity management may be considered a subordinate concept or risk mitigation strategy of 
risk management. Level 2 was considered an allied or supporting disciplines or practising domains. 
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Figure 3.  Proposed integrated framework of organisational security. (D.J. Brooks, 2009b). 
 
Note: BCM = Business Continuity Management, comprising of crisis, emergency and business recov-
ery 
ASIS International (2009) academic/practitioner symposium continues to develop a security body of 
knowledge. The most recent 2009 symposium attempted to gain an understanding of the security body 
of knowledge, understand what disciplines security may extract its knowledge categories from, what 
knowledge categories are core, how can these knowledge categories be used and to consider if consisten-
cy and consensus can be gained? In addition, a list of 18 knowledge categories was put forward as the 
symposium’s security model (Table 3). 
 
Table 3.  ASIS International Symposium security model. (ASIS International, 2009) 
Security model 
Physical security Personnel security Information security systems 
Investigations Loss prevention Risk management 
Legal aspects Emergency/continuity 
planning 
Fire protection 
Crisis management Disaster management Counterterrorism 
Competitive intelli-
gence 
Executive protection Violence in the workplace 
Crime prevention CPTED Security architecture & enginee-
ring 
 
Phase one has put forward the most current studies into organisational security bodies of knowledge. 
Such studies assist our understanding of this security domain; however, further analysis had to be ap-
plied to consider underlying knowledge categories and their interrelationships. 
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Phase Two: Expert Knowledge Structure 
Phase two tested the security knowledge categories and integrated framework in an attempt to measure 
how relevant these were according to security experts. The study analysis and following interpretation of 
the source data resulted in a spatial multidimensional scaling (MDS) map of the participating experts’ 
knowledge structure (Figure 4). There were some interesting aspects to the spatial locality of some of the 
organisational security knowledge categories, such as investigations, the cluster of technology catego-
ries, the relationship of risk management and business continuity management, and locality of indus-
trial security. What was expected was the central locality of security, being the most abstract and ordi-
nate knowledge category 
 
 
Figure 4.  MDS expert knowledge structure of organisational security. (SSTRESS1=0.222; 0.992 
Cronbach Alpha). 
 
When considering Figure 4, the categories of security and security management were both located 
relatively central in respect to the other knowledge categories, indicating more abstract and central ide-
as. In addition, the categories of law and industrial security were located between these two categories. 
Why law was located in such a locality would require greater research, perhaps with greater in-depth 
interviews with the expert participants. However, it is postulated that law may be spatially located at this 
point because it is a fundamental principle by which society and its members exists, and is therefore a 
foundation for security. Nevertheless, the locality of industrial security appeared to indicate that this 
category was not clearly understood in respect to definition, supported by such comments from the par-
ticipating experts. 
The technology categories of physical security, security technology, ICT and information security 
were spatially clustered, indicating similarity of concepts and that these functions are closely related. 
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Nevertheless, it was proposed that information security was not necessarily a technology category, relat-
ed more to security management as a procedural function. As Talbot and Jakeman (2008) states, the 
knowledge category information and computer should be divided into two discrete categories, namely 
information security and information communications technology (ICT); however, according to the 
MDS knowledge structure these were viewed as similar categories and should perhaps remain as one 
knowledge category. 
Investigations was found to be an outlier, relatively separated from the other knowledge categories. 
Based on this locality, it could be suggested that investigations is not a significant knowledge category of 
organisational security. Finally, Figure 3 put forward that risk management and business continuity 
management (BCM) would be similar and therefore clustered. Nevertheless MDS placed these two cate-
gories relatively apart from each other, indicating that these categories as quite discrete functions (Table 
3). 
 
Table 3.  Interpretations of MDS knowledge structure. 
Knowledge category MDS interpretation 
Security Central location due to its ordinate position 
Security & security management Only some degree of cluster, indicating discrete catego-
ries 
Industrial security Located between security and security management, 
indicating no clear category definition 
Investigations Spatial outlier, indicating that this is not a core category 
Physical, ICT, information security 
& security technology 
All concepts clustered, indicating a common knowledge 
category 
Information security Clustered with technology, indicating that this should be 
integrated with Computing & Information Technology 
Risk Management & BCM Spatial separation, indicating distinct functions 
Integrated Framework of Organisational Security 
Reflecting from the interpretations of the MDS knowledge structure of organisational security (Figure 
4), the integrated framework of organisational security (Figure 3) was adjusted. Adjustments to the 
framework included the relocation of business continuity management to Level 1 and investigations to 
Level 2. The categories of security technology and information technology and computing were inte-
grated into a single category of security technology. From discussions with the participating experts, it 
was suggested that security intelligence should be included as a supporting organisational security cate-
gory. Adjustments to Figure 4 resulted in the final integrated framework of organisational security (Fig-
ure 5), considered Security Science. 
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Figure 5.  Integrated framework of organisational security or Security Science. 
 
Notes: BCM = Business Continuity Management; Technology = security technology, information 
technology and computing 
The ASIS International body of knowledge (ASIS International, 2009) security model (Table 3) fur-
ther supported the inclusion of many of the study’s defined categories and to some degree, the integrated 
framework of organisational security (Figure 5). For example, Business Continuity Management (BCM) 
encompasses the security model’s categories of emergency/continuity planning, crisis management and 
disaster management categories. Therefore, from the 18 proposed categories from the ASIS Internation-
al security model, five categories are presented in Level 1 and three are in Level 2. Nevertheless, it is ar-
gued that the ASIA International security model categories such as crime prevention through environ-
mental design (CPTED), crime prevention and counter-terrorism are tasks or functions embedded with-
in the prescribed knowledge categories. 
Conclusion 
There is still future study required in gaining consensus in knowledge category definition and an organi-
sational security body of knowledge; however, it could be suggested that both are required to achieve the 
other. Continued research with similar studies being completed by such groups as ASIS International 
and the development of national and international standards will ultimately result in such common un-
derstanding. In addition, organisational security has to have a clear understanding of its operating 
boundaries, from which further consensus in a body of knowledge will be achieved. There are many 
overlapping and defuse security domains that interact, interrelate and have independencies with organi-
sational security, such as public policing, national security, military security and private security, to 
name a few. 
Security is diverse and multidimensional in nature and practice. Such diffusion results in the need to 
define various operational parts of security, achieved to some degree through a body of knowledge. The 
study put forward an integrated body of knowledge framework of organisational security (Figure 5), de-
veloped from core security knowledge categories and with integration from previous body of knowledge 
studies. The study used multidimensional scaling (MDS) to present a spatial knowledge structure of the 
participating security experts. Such a knowledge structure allowed the implicit expert understanding of 
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the security categories to be analysed, displayed and interpretations made, resulting in a number of cat-
egory interrelationships. 
There will be a degree of overlap between the knowledge categories, as they are not hierarchical or 
applied in isolation. The study considered the need to present a practical and industry focused organisa-
tional security consensual body of knowledge, considered Security Science. It is suggested that the study 
outcomes could further improve the comprehension of the practising domain of organisational security 
and support the advancement of this security profession. Nevertheless, the diversity of organisational 
security mandates interdisciplinary studies to sum competencies under each knowledge category. 
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ABSTRACT – The security industry provides us with novel and interesting examples to analyze the 
service orientation of companies providing business-to-business security services. Our study draws on 
a qualitative research approach to investigate the manifestation of service orientation in security com-
panies. The study reveals that although the dominant business logic in the security industry has previ-
ously relied on product-oriented offerings, many firms increasingly emphasize service-dominant logic 
over product-dominant logic in their security solution business. Such service orientation spans over 
several aspects of the business models of the security firms and goes far beyond their offerings. 
Introduction and Background 
Security business has its origins in services. Already a century ago, night watchmen and security guards 
were protecting the safety of the citizens in the cities of central Europe. In addition, in-house security 
officers were common in industrial companies of that time (de Waard, 1999.) In today’s highly competi-
tive business environment, we are witnessing the re-birth of services, and industrial firms including se-
curity companies are increasingly integrating services into their product offerings. This trend is spurred 
by factors related to economic considerations (higher margins, incremental and more stable revenues 
offered by services), customer expectations (customers’ increasingly complex needs and wants, and 
higher requirements) and intense competition (Gebauer 2009; Oliva and Kallenberg 2003). Especially, 
Homburg et al. (2003) argue that in today’s competitive landscape one of the few ways left for firms to 
differentiate from competitors is by offering value-added services. 
As suggested by Vandermerwe and Sada (1988) modern companies are increasingly offering fuller 
market packages or “bundles” of customer-focused combinations of goods, services, support, self-
service, and knowledge. This movement is termed the “servitization” of business.  One of the main mo-
tives driving companies towards servitization is that it leads to new relationships between them and 
                                                             
 
1 The authors’ names are in alphabetical order 
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their customers. Oliva and Kallenberg (2003) stress that recent studies almost unanimously recommend 
product manufacturers to integrate services into their product offerings, and Jacob and Ulaga (2008) 
support the view that industrial manufacturers are developing value-adding services in order to sustain 
competitiveness and long-term growth. On the other hand, Nijssen et al. (2006) point out that in new 
service development the company's willingness to cannibalize organizational routines and prior invest-
ments is more important than the R&D-related strengths. This indicates that companies need to unlearn 
from the traditional R&D capabilities and develop a new mindset to gain success in more service-
oriented business. 
The augmented service orientation in firms is seen as an indication of the so-called service dominant 
logic. Lusch et al. (2007) signify that the primary focus in service dominant logic is on the exchange of 
specialized competences between the service supplier and the customer. In this vein, the service-
oriented view of business is customer- and market-driven. This means that a service-oriented company 
is constantly learning from customers and adapting to their dynamic needs. However, service orienta-
tion has been mainly studied at the level of employees among the service staff (e.g. Cran 1994) and prior 
investigation into service orientation at the level of organizations especially in the b-to-b setting (Hom-
burg et al. 2002) is almost exiguous.  
Previously, security has been studied within several research streams. These include, e.g., criminolo-
gy (Armitage and Pease 2007), sociology (Zedner 2003), international political studies (Wolfers 1952; 
Baldwin 1997), economics (Brück et al. 2008) and technological studies (Rouhiainen 2009). Thus, secu-
rity environment, as well as preconditions and solutions for organizational security are well covered in 
an extant literature, but a thorough analysis of a supplier–customer relationship in business-to-business 
security services seems to be lacking in current research. One of the few studies that take the customer 
perspective on security is that of Ian Loader’s (1999) who studies the consumerism of public and private 
security services. In spite of its absence in extant academic debate, privatized security is one of the most 
fast growing businesses in Europe and security services are under active development worldwide (de 
Waard 1999). This has also caused criticism against the ever-spreading “securitization” and the replace-
ment of public policing with private security services (see e.g. Zedner 2003). In the light of all these no-
tions, security services are presented as an interesting and current research topic. 
This study strives to fill the aforementioned research needs by investigating how the service orienta-
tion is manifested in the security firms’ business models. We take a service research approach to security 
and focus our study on business-to-business security services and the service orientation of the security 
suppliers. We focus our study on private security industry that aims at preserving the security of per-
sons, information and property using both manpower, alarming and surveillance technologies (de 
Waard 1999). As the relationships between business models and service operations in security compa-
nies have not yet been fully revealed, a qualitative research approach, built on a thorough literature re-
view and rich data was an obvious choice for this study. Rather than testing a pre-determined hypothe-
sis, we aim at generating new descriptions and categorizations for the private security business from the 
perspective of service research. The data were collected through semi-structured interviews with the 
managers in these companies. In addition, we analyzed an extensive set of secondary material on securi-
ty service business. 
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This paper is structured as follows: First, we introduce the concept of organizational service orienta-
tion as the focus of the research and the business model of a firm as the level of analysis. We use these 
concepts in our investigation of transition towards increased service orientation in the security industry. 
Then, we present the research setting, methodology and the empirical findings. Finally, we discuss the 
findings and conclude the paper with suggestions for further research. 
Service orientation as the focus of research 
The service dominant view on strategic management has gained ground in diverse business fields. In 
their seminal paper on the service-dominant business logic (SDL), Vargo and Lusch (2004) advocate the 
shift towards increasing service orientation in contemporary business. According to them, goods-
dominant logic has been the prevalent logic in the markets, but over the past decade increasing competi-
tion has forced industrial manufacturers to adapt a more service-oriented perspective to business. While 
the traditional goods centered view is based on the exchange of tangible goods, the service-dominant 
logic focuses on intangible resources and co-creation of value (Vargo and Lusch 2004; Lusch et al. 
2007). Hence, the dominant logic of doing business is shifting away from the exchange of manufactured 
goods towards the exchange of intangible aspects such as professional know-how and specialized skills. 
Moreover, Vargo and Lusch (2004) underscore that value is co-created by service providers and custom-
ers rather than received from the use of tangible outputs. Prior studies suggest that the service-oriented 
view is a business strategy that can be adapted to any market offerings (Vargo and Lusch 2008), even in 
the business-to-business context (Homburg et al. 2002). 
Academic literature by and large lacks an exact definition of organizational service orientation. One 
of the few exceptions is provided by Homburg et al. (2002), who conceptualize the service orientation of 
an industrial firm’s strategy in terms of two dimensions: (1) the number of services offered, and (2) how 
strongly these services are communicated to customers. Much of the academic literature on service ori-
entation focuses, without more precisely defining the concept, on analyzing the extent of service orienta-
tion in firm’s business strategy (Gebauer 2009; Antioco et al. 2008; Lytle et al. 1998; Berthon et al. 
1999). For example, Gebauer (2009) categorizes manufacturing companies into those with high service 
orientation and those with low service orientation. According to Gebauer (ibid.), the former group heavi-
ly emphasizes services in their business strategy and operation, whereas the latter group focuses the role 
of product in their value propositions and receives their profits and revenues mostly from the product 
offerings. 
Service orientation is intertwined with the company’s business model. In concordance with Hombug 
et al. (2002), Rajala (2009) suggests that an organization’s service orientation can be determined upon 
the extent to which (1) the firm’s marketing strategy emphasizes the importance of customer service, (2) 
the firm’s solutions are sold as services, (3) services constitute a source of competitive advantage in the 
firm’s business, (4) the firm responds to customer needs through service, (5) the organization structure 
supports the realization of service, (6) the organization culture is service-centered, and (7) the compa-
ny’s information systems support the service activity. Furthermore, Hombug et al. (2002) stress that the 
realization of service orientation in business necessitates a number of other organization-related factors, 
such as the human resource management. All these measures of service orientation actually comprise 
the business model elements of the firm. Thus, we argue that the shift towards increasing service orien-
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tation should be analyzed through the framework of firm’s business model as it covers the crucial aspects 
of company’s every-day business and manifests the realization of its business strategy.  
Business model as the level of analysis 
Business model offers a viable concept for the analysis of service orientation at the firm level. This is be-
cause firms promoting service orientation in their business embody changes far more than merely accen-
tuating the share and role of services in the company’s offering or value proposition. That is, the change 
towards more service-oriented business necessitates changes on all aspects of the firm’s business model. 
This is consistent with the notion of Oliva and Kallenberg (2003), who state that “not only are new ca-
pabilities, metrics and incentives needed, but also the emphasis of the business model changes from 
transaction- to relationship-based”. Also other authors (e.g., Homburg et al. 2002) state that increasing 
firm’s service orientation requires changes in several organizational factors. 
The concept of the business model of a firm has reached a position as a strategy-based (Rajala and 
Westerlund 2007) “thought-focusing device”, a pertinent notion in the managerial vocabulary (Shafer et 
al. 2005; Tikkanen et al. 2005). It includes the key components of a company’s every-day business, and 
embodies the fundamental processes of value creation and value capture underlying the business (Möller 
et al. 2008; Chesbrough 2007). Although the two concepts – business model and strategy – are some-
times used interchangeably, it should be noted that business model is not the same as strategy (Shafer et 
al. 2005; Magretta 2002). Instead, business model is a reflection and a result of the strategy, and a way 
to implement it. In other words, business model is a conceptual and theoretical layer between firm’s 
strategy and operations (Rajala and Westerlund 2007). We also argue that a clearly defined business 
model can help the company to create ‘mindsets’ and foresight in order to cope with future (cf. Naisbitt 
2006).  
Following the conventions of the previous literature that often defines business model through the 
value-creating components it includes (see e.g., Morris et al. 2005), we define business model as “a con-
cise representation of how an interrelated set of components – the offering, relationships, resources, 
revenue model and management mind-set – are addressed to create value in defined markets”. (Mul-
tanen 2009) further characterizes these components to represent the most important aspects of the 
business, and, hence, the business model of a firm. Each of these key components is discussed in more 
detail in the empirical section of the study, with examples and illustrations from the security service 
business. 
Material and Methods 
This paper adopts a qualitative study approach to investigate service orientation in security companies. 
Our conceptual framework was developed on the basis of a literature review. To illustrate this frame-
work, we conducted interviews with the top managers and line managers in several Finnish security ser-
vice firms. In addition, we analyzed an extensive set of secondary material on these companies and the 
industry. All of the interviews support the view, that there is an ongoing shift towards increased service 
orientation in the security service business, with some companies taking more drastic competitive repo-
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sitioning in the market, whilst others developing their offerings to a lesser extent. Through the inter-
views we can illustrate how changes in the service orientation transcend the boundaries of the security 
service offerings, covering the key aspects of the business models of the case companies. That is, in addi-
tion to analyzing the offerings, the investigation covers the companies’ revenue models, resources and 
relationships as well as the management mindset. 
Large data 10F2 were collected in 2009 from three types of security service firms. For the purpose of this 
paper, we chose a handful of companies for analysis. Two of the firms are security systems suppliers and 
one focuses on traditional guarding and other security services. Two firms provide security-related 
products and support services such as maintenance and training. The turnover of the firms ranged from 
about 1.5 million to 50 million Euros in 2008.  
Yin (1994) emphasizes that a reliable empirical study requires multiple sources of evidence, a suffi-
ciently operational set of measures, and internal and external validity. To this end, Denzin (1978) rec-
ommends triangulation as a way of improving the reliability and validity in social research. Data triangu-
lation uses multiple sources and types of data to investigate the research question. In this study, we col-
lected data from several informants in the case companies (semi-structured in-depth interviews) and 
used secondary data (documents, reports, etc.) from the same companies as support. Some observation 
data was also collected from a number of meetings and workshops arranged with the participating com-
panies. Investigator triangulation involves multiple researchers in an investigation. In the present study, 
this was addressed both in the data collection and in the analysis phase when separate researchers in the 
research team scrutinized the qualitative data to cross-check and verify the findings.  
Observations on the security service business models 
In this section, we investigate the security service providers’ business models through five cases in the 
private security service business. Due to confidentiality issues the cases are only identified as Cases A to 
E. As defined earlier, the subjects observed include the offerings, relationships, resources, revenue mod-
el and management mindset that are perceived as the elements of the business models of companies 
providing security services. 
Towards new security business models 
Business models of industrial firms concurrently undergo a shift towards increased organizational ser-
vice orientation. In general, Oliva and Kallenberg (2003) suggest that the transition from products to 
services in firms occurs in stages. That is, the business logic of such firms evolves gradually into a more 
customer-driven and service-oriented operation. In our data, the security systems suppliers are witness-
ing a somewhat similar transition, as highlighted with the following excerpt of the interviews: 
“Our company provides security systems and related services that are valuable to our custom-
ers. --- We have a long history as an equipment supplier --- starting from maintenance ser-
                                                             
 
2 This data collection was a part of a research project ValueSSe (The Value of Corporate Security Services) carried 
out by Aalto University and VTT (Finnish Technical Research Central) 
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vices in 1990s --- we have changed gradually towards more service-oriented operations in the 
2000s. --- However, we still have a long road ahead.” (Case A” 
Although the security industry has traditionally focused on guarding services, automation and tech-
nology such as video surveillance has over time transformed the industry logic. Our data indicates that 
the service logic of the security industry is twofold. On one hand, the companies that have a tradition of 
providing guarding services are searching for new service concepts and offerings, and are chasing more 
value-adding services. On the other hand, the business logic among the security systems suppliers is also 
shifting in favour of providing more comprehensive solutions to customers. The view surfaced in our 
interviews:  
“We do not focus on the overhaul of security systems but on ‘maintaining’ the customer rela-
tionship.” (Case A) 
The service-dominant transition of business models, along with its increasing customer focus, which 
is ongoing in many industries at the present, seems obvious also in the security service business. Howev-
er, the change carries many features that have been previously unknown to the industry. Next, we illus-
trate the various changes in more detail within business models of the firms that have accompanied the 
shift towards increased service orientation. 
Offering 
Offering as a business model element refers to products, services and solutions offered to the market to 
satisfy customers’ specific needs and wants (Westerlund et al. 2008). This component, also described as 
the firm’s product/service offering (Rajala and Westerlund 2007; Morris et al. 2005) or value proposi-
tion (Chesbrough 2007; Linder and Cantrell 2000), emphasizes the company’s decisions on the nature 
and role of what it offers to the customers, such as the degree of the customization (i.e. standardized or 
customer-specific) (Westerlund et al. 2008), depth and breadth of the product/service mix (Linder and 
Cantrell 2000), the role of the firm in service production or service delivery, and how the service is made 
available to the customers (Morris et al. 2005). 
Mathieu (2001) recognizes two distinctive strategies that service providers can utilize: services that 
support the products (SSP) and services that support the client’s actions (SSC). Our data reveals that 
providers in the contemporary security service business execute both of these strategies. Some security 
service providers focus more on offering products, and services are additional supporting the implemen-
tation and use of those products. In the security service business such services include, e.g., training, 
maintenance and repair. However, as the following excerpts from our interviews reveal, security busi-
nesses are increasingly merging their products and services into more comprehensive total offerings or 
solutions where services have an integral role: 
“Our company offers security service solutions. Our focus is to be even more service oriented in 
the future.” (Case C) 
“We aim at providing more comprehensive solutions that increasingly include service compo-
nents. --- The objective is that the clients need to focus their efforts on security issues.” (Case E) 
Technology has had a major impact on business and society during the previous century. Our inter-
views illustrate that companies whose main offerings have consisted of “traditional security services” 
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such as guarding have started to utilize the latest technology more effectively, resulting in novel service 
solutions that comprise technology-driven products and services. That is, the increased technology usage 
may help the service providers to serve their customers more efficiently and to be more flexible with re-
gard to technological uncertainty. Moreover, service coverage can be significantly increased with the 
help of ICT and other technology, including remote operated camera and 24/7 based surveillance ser-
vices, as well as wireless emergency alarms and buttons, and even security service related robotics as in 
the case of Japan. Our interviews clearly show that the role and importance of technology in security 
business is rising: 
“Our key business idea is to assist our clients in developing their core businesses. This is pur-
sued through providing security services. A significant part of the security services consists of 
technology.” (Case B) 
Moreover, our data highlight that the investigated security service providers’ business models com-
prise ever more comprehensive and customer-specific offerings and integrated security service solutions. 
Resources 
Resources constitute a fundamental factor in strategic business decisions (Barney 1991). Betz (2002) 
investigates resources by differentiating between two forms of resources: tangible and intangible. Firms’ 
resources can be defined as assets and capabilities that are needed to develop and implement a given 
business model (Rajala and Westerlund 2007). Morris et al. (2005) describe resources in terms of firm’s 
internal source of advantage, ‘the core competency’, and Linder and Cantrell (2000) as firm’s ‘distinctive 
capability’. These concepts can be used to investigate firm’s skills or capabilities in developing and deliv-
ering specific benefits to customers through service.  
“All our activities are premised on the basis of trustworthiness. That is, our key qualities and 
competitive advantages consist in credible processes and we need to be convincing about our 
resources in providing our customers with security.” (Case C) 
“We aim at providing our customers with comprehensive services based on our internal re-
sources and capabilities.” (Case E) 
On the other hand, the service-dominant view emphasizes resource access over resource ownership 
in the service business. This perspective calls for investigation of resources in relation to other business 
model elements, such as relationships. Our observations support this view:  
“We meet the customers’ expectations about security through our close collaboration with the 
clients. --- We will help our customers throughout the lifecycle of the long-term relationship.” 
(Case A) 
The security service industry has been considered as low-level education business environment and 
significantly the standard of service know-how is somewhat low. Increased service orientation necessi-
tates changes in required skills and expertise. Security service providers are developing/improving their 
business relationships in order to fulfill and complete their offerings. The use of partners from multiple 
heterogeneous business fields enables security service providers to offer a more extensive service pack-
age. Our interviews indicate that some of the case companies recognize there are important resources 
and specialization in their partner network consisting of different actors in the security service business.  
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Another issue that surfaced in the interviews is that almost none of the security service providers use 
marketing communications to support their sales. For example, security industry magazines and other 
security-related publications are the main channels used for advertising. Professional direct-mail adver-
tising and specialized market research analysts seem to be an almost untapped resource among the in-
terviewed companies. 
Relationships 
Relationships in the business model context underscore the value-creation process between the service 
provider and its clients. More specifically, relationship component attends to the entire network of the 
firm’s social and inter-organizational relationships, including organizational processes and activities 
(Tikkanen et al. 2005; Betz 2002) as well as the organizational structure (Linder and Cantrell 2000). 
Relationships in service oriented business models provide an important perspective to understand the 
roles of different business actors and their contributions to the service provision. The roles include, for 
example, service component providers, system integrators, end-users’ maintenance suppliers, independ-
ent service providers and other relevant contributors (Oliva and Kallenberg 2003). Our findings under-
score that increased service orientation creates challenges to the whole network of business actors:  
“We have discussed a lot about daily issues with our customers --- but we need to go further in 
developing the security solutions together.” (Case A) 
“We had better let our partners focus on their core competencies. We serve them in other im-
portant issues. That is, the customers need not to be out there alone.” (Case B) 
“Networking with our partners is the key to growth in this business.” (Case D) 
The trend towards tighter customer relationships is shown in the way security service providers de-
scribe their value propositions. Our findings highlight that all the essential business operations in the 
security business are governed by an outcry for trustworthiness. Security service firms provide their cus-
tomers with the feelings of security, safety, problem-solving, short response times and credible operation 
and cost efficiency. Our data reveals that the service providers are willing to offer more extensive part-
nership agreements than what the clients are willing to adopt. Hence, the service providers constantly 
attempt to train their customers and partners to understand the benefits of accepting more comprehen-
sive services and total solutions, and themselves listen to their customers in pursuing to learn and co-
create solutions for emerging customer needs. 
Revenue model 
Revenue model specifies the ways to appropriate value for the company (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom 
2002). Usually this business model component is discussed in terms of revenue sources, pricing policy, 
cost structure and profit potential (Rajala and Westerlund 2007; Pateli and Giaglis 2003; Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom 2002). The first two of these involve determining the different pricing options (e.g., 
value-based, market-based, or competition-based prices) as well as the modes of transactions (e.g., sub-
scription payments). Moreover, cost structure, which refers to the operating leverage, margins and vol-
umes (Morris et al. 2005) is an important aspect of any service-based business model. Our empirical 
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findings underscore that the revenue models in the security business are increasingly based on service 
contracts where the pricing is considered in a case-specific manner: 
“Security has no price as such. The price is jointly agreed with the customer. We only are tak-
ing the first steps to assess the value of security for our customers. --- In my opinion, there are 
two underlying grounds [for customer and value-specific pricing] --- first, it is uneasy to quan-
tify the value of safety. Second, although some aspects of the value can be measured –such as 
the costs of damages or mishaps– there are important aspects that are extremely difficult to 
quantify. These include the state and feeling of safety.” (Case C) 
The previous excerpts suggest a significant change in the pricing scheme. According to the data, the 
common way to price the products in the service business has been the use of fixed product pricing. That 
is, customers have paid separately for each product they are using. Our interviews provide new evidence 
that security service firms may probably experience a momentous change in their pricing policy in the 
near future. This is because companies are taking a more and more value-based pricing approach by in-
troducing, e.g., fixed monthly rates and service contracts that are fundamentally value centered. 
“We are not aiming at being the cheapest provider of security services in the market, but the 
most credible partner for our customers.” (Case E) 
Value-based pricing appears to be a viable pricing model even in the future. As the previous excerpt 
from the interviews suggest, its strengths lie in the long-lasting and trustable supplier-customer partner-
ships. Our data further puts forward that some of the managers of the security firms interviewed would 
be willing to define the criteria that would serve as the basis for assessing the value of security services 
and solutions. In addition to this, they are interested in producing specific case examples based on past 
projects and best practices that could be communicated to prospective customers in order to demon-
strate the benefits of purchasing more comprehensive security services and solutions.  
Management mindset 
Management mindset signifies the business model’s existence in the minds of the people pursuing it. In 
particular, from the perspective of an organization’s service orientation, it determines whether the man-
agement of a firm specifies the company’s business in terms of products, markets or services provided to 
the clients. Following the idea by Porac et al. (2002), Tikkanen et al. (2005) conceptualize managerial 
cognition in terms of the industry logic and cognitive representations that link, for instance, product or 
service attributes, usage conditions and buyer characteristics. Whereas previous literature on service 
orientation has emphasized the more operational individual employees’ service orientation (e.g., Cran 
1994), the management mindset focuses on the strategic and organization-level service orientation by 
considering managers’ – those who typically are responsible for strategy-making – perceptions on the 
relevance and appearance of service business logic in their respective organizations. 
“We need to shift our mindset towards customer and personnel orientation. --- The personnel is 
the cornerstone of our service.” (Case D) 
Amongst the most important issues that enable or disable a firm to become more service oriented are 
its managers’ perceptions on what the company is doing. Service dominant business logic necessitates a 
new kind of thinking; one that considers the firm as providing services and not producing products. For 
this purpose, both unlearning of the old and learning of the new become of essence. If managers main-
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tain thinking of the firm primarily as a product company, it is difficult for the staff to communicate the 
potential value of the amplified service solutions to customers. In fact, the staff and especially the firm’s 
customers may not even learn and understand the difference and potential value of provider’s new ser-
vice oriented logic compared to the old operation logic. In this vein, the firm meets a considerable mana-
gerial challenge as it can either succeed or fail in becoming a true service oriented business, as illustrated 
by the following excerpts from our interviews: 
“The problem is that our customers still believe they are buying appliances --- and we still 
think we are producing them.” (Case B) --- “We are not just security guards, but a service pro-
vider that assists our customers to conduct their business better.” (Case A) --- “We need new 
thinking “when selling security as service”… that is the hardest thing – unlearning. --- And we 
would be too narrow-minded if we would sell to security managers only.” (Case E) 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Security industry’s business models are facing a shift towards increased service orientation. In general, 
transition from products to services in many industries manifests the strategic choice of firms to increas-
ingly compete through service. Prior research (e.g., Lusch et al. 2007; Nijssen et al. 2006; Vandermerwe 
and Rada 1988) shows that several factors drive the increased service orientation in firms’ business 
strategy. These factors include, for example, diminishing product margins and, at the same time, in-
creasing customer expectations (Oliva and Kallenberg 2003; Gebauer 2009). To these points, Mathieu 
(2001) suggests two distinctive strategies that service providers could employ in their business: services 
that support the products (SSP) and services that support the client’s actions (SSC). It seems fairly obvi-
ous that foresight providers in the contemporary security service business execute both of these strate-
gies. 
Organizational service orientation has been studied in many fields including manufacturing (Gebau-
er 2009) and consumer retailing (Homburg et al. 2002). In addition, there are numerous studies on the 
transition from products to services in business marketing (e.g. Jacob and Ulaga 2008). However, prior 
research has not paid sufficient attention to describing these transitions in their real-life contexts, espe-
cially in the business-to-business firms business. The security industry provides us with novel and inter-
esting examples to analyze the transition from the traditional product/technology-based business to-
wards the more future-oriented service-dominant business logic. Our study draws on a qualitative case 
study approach to investigate the service orientation of companies providing business-to-business secu-
rity services in Finland. The data were collected through semi-structured interviews with senior manag-
ers in these companies. In addition, we went through observation an extensive set of secondary material 
on the security service business. 
In addition to “servitization”, security industry is faced by increasing reliance on technology. There is 
ongoing debate on whether and how the traditional forms of security service, e.g. guarding, could be re-
placed by automated security and surveillance systems. In the extreme cases, technology is considered to 
replace a vast part of the security service, as evidenced by the recent development of robotics in the Ja-
pan’s security market. However, Vargo and Lusch (2004) and Lusch et al. (2007) underscore that the 
customer-related exchange processes and business relationships are in the centre of the focus in the ser-
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vice-dominant view. This is congruent with our findings, which highlight that service oriented business 
models can not rely solely on automated service processes. 
Figure 1 summarizes the key observations of service orientation in the business models of the securi-
ty firms studied. Analysis of the organizational service orientation at the level of business model compo-
nents was found advantageous given the need for analyzing the organizational service orientation in 
firms’ business. This is because business model describes the key components of the business, and, thus, 
enables us to investigate the appearance of service orientation in specific, easy-to-identify, but utterly 
crucial aspects of firm’s business.  
Our findings indicate that security service providers strive to take care of swiftly increasing spectrum 
of customer needs. There seem to be several ongoing transitions in the security service business, includ-
ing simultaneous shifts towards more comprehensive, customer-specific and integrated security service 
solutions. In some cases, these are pursued through more standardized service processes and modular-
ized security service concepts. This is consistent with prior research, which has indicated that many 
companies struggle to formulate and implement a service orientation in their business (Gebauer 2009).  
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According to Oliva and Kallenberg (2003), the number of manufacturing organizations with strong 
services strategies is short, because 1) firms don’t believe in the economic potential of the service com-
ponent for their product 2) firms think that providing services is beyond their competencies, or 3) firms 
realize the market potential, decide to enter the market, but fail to deploy a successful strategy. However, 
we argue that an important reason why many firms struggle and experience confrontations in becoming 
service-oriented is that they have delimited their development focus on the changes in the company’s 
offerings. That is, many firms emphasize nature of their offerings in the shift from products to services 
and fail to understand that offerings are a component of the business model of a firm which is firmly 
connected to other relevant components. Thus, the other elements of firm’s business models will not 
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support their “offering-driven service orientation” very well, but would need similar changes and align-
ment to support the newly established service dominant operation logic.  
In conclusion, our study reveals that although the dominant business logic in the security industry 
has relied on product-oriented offerings, firms increasingly emphasize service-dominant logic over 
product-dominant logic in their security solution business. Along with this transition, they have to pro-
mote organizational service orientation in their business. Due to its component-like nature, the business 
model of a firm provides a conceptual tool to investigate and evaluate the appearance and effects of this 
increased service orientation in security service firms’ business. Accordingly, the use of business model 
approach creates a great potential to enhance a company’s foresight capabilities. Our findings provide 
interesting avenues for further research, such as to what extent do increased service orientation affect on 
firms’ financial performance. Thus, our exploratory study calls for more research on the performance 
implications of organizational service orientation in the security business. 
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ABSTRACT - The free flow of capital is an inherent characteristic of the world trade order. Yet in re-
cent years it has been increasingly limited, among others by legislation for the control of foreign in-
vestments in “strategic industries”. Governments have justified such measures by citing security con-
cerns such as the security of supply with arms or the risk of proliferation. The current economic crisis 
has further raised the spectre of the end of globalisation and the return of economic nationalism.  
The paper examines the possibility for an international mechanism to control FDI in strategic indus-
tries in a group of countries, in this case the member states of the European Union (EU). It argues that 
the need to balance the principle of open capital markets with security concerns related to FDI is par-
ticularly significant for the EU due to the fact that it is not merely a robust single market but aspires to 
become a political actor, albeit with national governments still controlling security policy. Based on 
regime theory and a comparative analysis of three national FDI control mechanisms, the paper devel-
ops a typology of regimes and sketches four relevant types for the control of FDI at EU level. 
Introduction and Background11F3 
The general background of the problem 
The economic crisis that has beset the world economy since 2008 has raised the spectre of the end of 
globalisation and the return of economic nationalism. “Economic nationalism” means that governments 
adopt measures to ensure that strategically important assets in one country remain under national con-
trol. For this purpose they implement law that allow them to control and constrain the free movement of 
                                                             
 
3 This paper represents the state of analysis contained in the mimeo [Strategic controls on foreign acquisitions: Na-
tional security or economic nationalism? v1.3 10/04/2009, unpublished mimeo, MIoIR, MBS, UK]. MIoIR currently 
conducts a research project on this topic, which addresses additional aspects not considered here. I would like to 
thank my colleague Andrew James for his permission to use some of the material from that unpublished mimeo. All 
errors remain, of course, my own. 
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capital, which is considered to be the cornerstone of the international trade regime, of globalization and 
of wealth creation in general. The liberalization of financial markets has allowed for the efficient distri-
bution of financial resources and has enabled corporate actors to access new sources of financing and to 
hedge against risks, which had been hitherto been closed to them. 
The free movement of capital has also been enshrined in various forms in the current economic 
world order. However, all international agreements of this kind provide the possibility for the signatories 
to derogate from the agreement for the purpose of their national security (see, for example, (GATT, 1947: 
Art. XXI). Given that many defence companies 12F4 do not only supply the armed but also form an im-
portant part of a country technological and innovative prowess governments have always been keen to 
oversee and control the defence industry. In former times direct and majority ownership combined with 
a dominant position the national government as the main customer and financial supporter of the na-
tional defence companies has ensure high levels of control. Privatization and internationalization of the 
defence industry, however, have led to a situation where the security of supply or the controlled transfer 
of high technology is increasingly beyond the reach of governments.  
Hence, many of them have enacted or tightened laws that allow them to intervene should foreign in-
vestors attempt to acquire assets in strategically important sectors such as the defence industry. This has 
been, for example the case in Poland (2001), the UK (2002), Germany (2004), France (2005), China 
(2006), or Russia in (2007). In the United States the Exon-Florio Amendment from 1988 allowed the 
administration to restrict or forbid an investment into an US company for security reasons.  
While the adaption of such law is not new, the increase in the number of national governments who 
have introduced legislation to control foreign acquisition of “strategic” assets is striking, as a recent 
study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that (GAO, 2008). Moreover, countries with 
existing legislation have adapted their laws in face of changing circumstances and increased the leverage 
of governments over the free movement of capital.  
There are several reasons for the growing attention paid by governments to this matter.  
 First, technological developments, globalization, and the experience of terrorist attacks have 
shaped a new notion of those sectors deemed to be of strategic importance for the sovereignty 
of a country. Technology produced for commercial purposes is increasingly used by the armed 
forces. Hence, some industries that have formerly not been related to the security or foreign 
policy of a country are now awarded “strategic significance”, like parts of the telecommunica-
tions industry. The actual and potential scarcity of raw materials has had a similar effect 
(OECD, 2006). At the same time, the interdependence between countries has increased as 
transportation, communication, and financial links have intensified. As a result some economic 
assets usually referred to as infrastructure e.g. gas pipelines or telecom networks are nowadays 
deemed to be too vulnerable to be simply left to an open investment regime. 
 Second, the increased role of non-OECD13 F5 countries as outward investors seems to have height-
ened concerns, at least in some countries, that not all actors may necessarily play by common 
rules or promote high standards of business conduct (OECD, 2006). While traditionally FDI 
                                                             
 
4 Although there are other “strategic sectors” that touch upon the “public” or “security” interest of governments, this 
paper is interested in the defence industry/assets/sector only. 
5 OECD stands for Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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have flown to developing countries, the last decade has seen the acquisition of assets in OECD 
countries by investors from emerging economies, for instance Russia and China. It is not so 
much the mere arrival of additional actors but rather their business practice and their close po-
litical ties that is disquieting governments of Western countries. For example the concern about 
sovereign wealth funds 14F6 of some governments stems from the fact that – because they are state 
owned – they may be guided by political objectives rather than profit maximisation or that they 
may be motivated to support creation of “national champion” companies. 15F7  
 Several high profile cases such as the successful takeover of IBM’s PC business by the Chinese 
firm Lenovo in 2004, the attempted acquisition of Unocoal by CNOOC in 2005, or that of P&O 
by Dubai Ports in 2006 have gained wide public interest. While political aspects were in the 
foreground of the debates, these cases also revealed public concern over individual acquisitions 
about the impact on jobs (OECD, 2006).  
 The recent financial crisis has added legitimacy to popular demands for to a tighter governmen-
tal involvement into business in general and a closer oversight of financial transactions in par-
ticular. 
While some fear in this context the return of protectionism, speaking of “economic nationalism” the-
se seem to exaggerations. After all, the aforementioned legislation is a milder and more transparent form 
of state intervention into the defence market than government ownership or special rights such as gold-
en shares. The rise in the number of legal provisions for the control of FDI has also to be seen in the con-
text of the privatizations of many defence companies in Europe after the end of the cold war and of the 
internationalization strategies that many of these companies have pursued.  
Nevertheless, the new legislation has raised concerns in many corners, not least the European Com-
mission and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (European Commission, 
2007; OECD, 2007). The latter has set up a special committee to investigate and monitor the develop-
ment in 2007. 16F8 With its activities the OECD has mainly sought to increase transparency and build trust 
through information exchange and conceptualization of concerns.  
These are important confidence building measures, contributing to uphold a liberalized international 
trade order. They do not entail the implementation of commonly agreed rules nor are they in any sense 
binding but can rather be regarded as a very subtle form of international cooperation. The question aris-
es, whether there would be other possibilities to address the security concerns of countries, on the one 
hand, and safeguard an open international financial system, on the other. How could a more robust in-
ternational cooperation on the control of FDI in defence assets could look like? This question seems to 
be particularly pertinent with regard to the European Union. 
                                                             
 
6 “Sovereign wealth funds are entities that can manage national savings for the purposes of investment. These funds 
may be similar in their investment behavior to other forms of investment funds, such as private equity funds. How-
ever, they fundamentally differ in that they are not privately owned” (GAO, 2008: 3). 
7 I am grateful to Andrew James for having brought this aspect to my attention. 
8 I am indebted to Andrew James for having drawn my attention to the activities of the OECD. 
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The particular situation of the European Union 
The issue of collaboration on the control of FDI in the defence industry is above all relevant with regard 
to the European Union because of the double nature of the EU. The EU is not a unitary political actor 
with a single economic and a single defence policy but it is not simply a part of the liberal world trade 
order either.  
First, the EU is in many respects a single market, which is internally much more open than the re-
mainder of the world trade order. 17F9 The free movement of capital is one of the fundamental freedoms. 
Article 63 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits as a general rule 
all restrictions on the movement of capital between member states and between member states and third 
countries (TFEU, 2008). Moreover, the Common Market has with the European Commission a powerful 
and strong guardian. Finally, the European defence firms are closely linked among each other, through 
financial participation and by a long history of armaments collaboration (Bitzinger, 1994; 2003; Jones, 
2007). Given the particularly high interdependence among EU economies a limitation of the free move-
ment of capital among them would be most disturbing. 
While one would expect the defence industry to be part of the Common Market, it is not. Article 346 
TFEU enables EU member states to derogate from the Common Market rules if they consider it neces-
sary “for the protection of its essential security interests” (TFEU, 2008: Art. 346). National governments 
have de facto controlled their defence industries and only recently started to collaborate on industry and 
market issues within the EU, allowing the Commission a mild say in the matter. For this purpose EU 
governments have set up an Agency – the European Defence Agency (EDA) – under the EU Council, 
which is governed by the Defence Ministers of 26 of the 27 EU member states. Defence Ministers have 
agreed to establish a “truly European Defence Technological and Industrial Base” (EDTIB) and a Euro-
pean Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), which allow for cross-border consolidation and rationaliza-
tion and the emergence of Centres of Excellence ((EDA, 2004; 2007). While Defence Ministers address 
several industrial issues through the EDA, FDI control is not among them. The main task of the Agency 
is rather to support governments in the improvement of military capabilities. A strong and competitive 
defence industry is to support this purpose, which points to the second specific aspect of the EU.  
The EU is second, an evolving political actor in security and defence policy, despite the fact that na-
tional governments have the last word on these matters. There is neither a single voice nor a single tele-
phone number that foreign leaders could call in order to listen to “Europe’s views”. However, EU gov-
ernments have coordinated their foreign policies, developed instruments, and established coordinating 
institutions under their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and their European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). Especially the latter, pursued since 1999 offers the possibility to develop a 
shared understanding about problems and to devise common solutions.  
In sum, due to the fact that the EU is a Common Market a common FDI control seems to be more 
needed than for the cooperation among other countries; and due to the fact that the EU is also an evolv-
ing political actor, a common FDI control has more chance to succeed than among other countries. Giv-
en that FDI controls in the defence sector touch on the one hand, on common market issues and on the 
                                                             
 
9 The recent “Monti-Report” points to considerable shortcomings of the current single market and calls actually for a 
re-launch of this project. See (Monti, 2010). 
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other on defence and security policy issues, the question arises of how EU Member States ensure control 
of investments into their defence assets and what are the effects on the common market. In other words, 
how can (national) security and economic interests be reconciled? 
This paper sets out to examine the current situation and to point the direction for a possible solution 
to this dilemma. To this end I will briefly discuss the academic literature on the control of FDI in strate-
gic industries; provide a comparative analysis of the control mechanism of individual EU member states, 
and suggest a framework for the development of a regime for the cooperation of governments on this 
issue. 
The scholarly debate on the control of FDI 
The scholarly literature has so not extensively debated this question. Two bodies of work can be distin-
guished. The first, US oriented texts have addressed the issue of potentially negative effects of FDI on the 
national security and the adequacy of national control mechanism. While the initial debate focused on 
the effects of Japanese and Western European investments in the 1980, which saw a stark rise of the 
number of transnational firms and prompted the adoption of protective legislation in 1988, 18F10 the recent 
discussions concentrated on the investment of Chinese firms (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009; Graham 
and Krugman, 1995; Hemphill, 2007). The question of international cooperation is only raised by Moran 
when discussing the issue of security of supply of defence materials. Moran suggests the maintenance of 
an oligopolistic supply at the global level, the interpenetration of defence firms from different countries, 
since that would reduce the risks of stand-offs between governments; and the creation of an internation-
al settlement mechanism, allowing to negotiate and to avoid confrontations (Moran, 1990). It is exactly 
this latter notion – voiced as early as 1990 with a global perspective – that has been picked up by Euro-
pean researchers in mid-2000s in view of the European Union. 
The second body of literature by European scholars has focused on a presentation of several control 
mechanisms at national level and on the elaboration of a possible European level solution (Nones, 2000; 
Nones and Darnis, 2005; von Wogau and Rapp-Jung, 2008). Von Wogau and Rapp outline two possibil-
ities for a EU level mechanism for the control of FDI in the defence industry from a legal perspective. 
While this is entirely legitimate and has the advantage of considering the legal feasibility in light of the 
complex EU Treaties, the approach limits itself to the institutionally feasible, sidelining the politically 
possible. While these attempts have made invaluable contributions by providing information about the 
situation in different EU countries, they have neither compared national legislations nor systematically 
probed into the full range of options for EU level control.  
An in-depth examination and comparison between the different national approaches to the control 
on FDI in strategic industries in Europe seems therefore to be in order. Regime theory provides us with 
an analytical starting point for such an examination. 
                                                             
 
10 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) was established by Gerald Ford's Executive 
Order 11858 in 1975. It was further strengthened by the delegation of Presidential Oversight by Ronald Reagan’s 
Executive Order 12661 in response to the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
was adopted in 1988. In 2007 this legislation was strengthened by the Foreign Investment and National Security 
Act. 
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In order to compare the different national legislations in view of the topic of this article, several cri-
teria should be used. They should enable an analysis as to the issues and deficiencies of the current sit-
uation within the EU, in particular the effects on an envisioned European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base and on the efficient allocation of capital i.e. the conditions for investors. With this pur-
pose in mind and based on the aforementioned studies ten criteria will be used for a comparative analy-
sis of the different national investment control mechanisms. 
Comparative analysis of control mechanisms of selected EU countries19F11 
Generally, investments from outside the EU as well as from other EU countries are not restricted by the 
governments of EU Member States. However, at least three out of 27 EU countries currently have legis-
lation allowing them to review investments in companies and organizations engaged in defence-related 
activities: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 20F12 The control regimes of these countries differ 
considerably as to their general approach, as well as with regard to the specific technicalities. 
What is the purpose of FDI controls? 
The purpose of the FDI legislation control legislation is to safeguard the “public interest”, “national secu-
rity interest” and/or “public order”. These terms are all rather vaguely defined and, hence, leave gov-
ernments considerable room for interpretation. 
To what extent does the legislation refer to European security interests? 
Does the legislation reflect a concern for the security interest of other EU countries or of the EU as a 
whole? An analysis of the legislative texts reveals that the notions of „national security interest“ and 
„public order/interests“ are understood in national terms without any reference to a European dimen-
sion. 
Which investors are concerned? 
There is a considerable difference as to whose investments can potentially be reviewed. While the control 
regimes in France and Germany apply only to investors who reside outside the country, the legislation in 
the UK extends to all investors including domestic residents. 21F13 
                                                             
 
11 The following analysis draws on empirical data presented in (Nones and Gasparini, 2008); (GAO, 2008). 
12 Two caveats are in order: First, the focus of this paper will be put on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
for three reasons. They have been the first EU countries to enact such legislation; they are the top-three EU coun-
tries according to the stock of FDI at home (CIA, 2008); and finally, they have the most significant defence industri-
al and technological base (measured in terms of turnover and employment, largest overall defence, defence pro-
curement and defence R&T budgets of the EU (EDA, 2009). Second, while all countries can shape defence investors’ 
expectations by ”indirect means” such as procurement contracts or export licenses, which are not less effective but 
which are not directly concerned to review and alter investments. This paper is only concerned with legislation di-
rected at FDI control, neither with indirect legislation nor with it application. 
13 The French legislation stipulates slightly different rules for investors from EU and EAA countries respectively 
2005). 
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What types of assets are covered by the legislation? 
While all countries consider explicitly (all but UK) or implicitly (UK) the defence industry to be at the 
core of those assets that need to be potentially shielded from foreign investments, the notions of “de-
fence industry” are by no means comparable France and Germany use lists of products, sectors or activi-
ties to specify what they mean with “defence industry”, In addition, legislation of these countries extents 
well beyond defence to cover other types or all economic activity; for example the French list includes 
dual-use technologies and gambling and the German law refers to satellite equipment. In the UK in-
vestments in any company from any sector can come under scrutiny if the authorities deem the “national 
interest” to be in jeopardy. 
What threshold triggers the review? 
The minimal size of the investment – measured in terms of shares of the voting rights – that triggers a 
control differs across the three countries. In Germany a transaction triggers a review if 25% of the voting 
rights of a defence company are acquired, in France the number is 33% for non-EEA investors or and “a 
controlling share” for EEA investors. While in the UK such changes don’t need to be notified, they can 
prompt an examination on the initiative of the authorities, if they fall under the merger regulation. 
Which body within government is responsible for the review? 
The dimension of which department in the government is vested with the authority to oversee the con-
trol of FDI shows a high degree of commonality: the Ministry dealing with economic and trade matters is 
in charge of overseeing the review of foreign investments in the defence industry in Germany and the 
UK; and the Ministry of Finance in France. While the Minister oversees the process and takes the final 
decision, a subordinate body such as the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK is conducting the review. 
In all countries the authorities in charge consult with the Ministry of Defence on investments in defence-
related companies and with other Ministries in case of investments in other sectors deemed of strategic 
importance. 
Is a notification of the intended investment required? 
While all countries but the UK require the investor to notify the transaction to the authorities, there are 
some differences as to the exact obligations of the investor. In France, the investment has to be notified 
before the transaction takes place, as investors have to seek approval or obtain a permit from the author-
ities for the transaction to go ahead. An omission represents an offense and can be prosecuted. In Ger-
many authorities have to be informed about the investment within one month. 
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How is the review process structured? 
The review process and duration differs from country to country, though the essential steps are similar. 
Once a review has been announced, the investor is required to submit specific documents to the gov-
ernment. When all documents have been completely submitted to the authorities, the latter have to fi-
nalize the review and respond within a period of several months (one month in Germany, two months in 
France; six months in the UK). In all countries a transaction will be considered automatically as ap-
proved if the authorities have not responded within the prescribed period of time. 
What are possible outcomes of a review? 
In principle there are four possible outcomes of a review procedure – a government can not oppose a 
transaction, give formal clearance, impose amendments to it and agree on mitigations or ban it. While in 
France and Germany all four outcomes are possible, banning is not an option the UK. However, the UK 
authorities can refer a case to the Competition Commission for an assessment of its effects on the condi-
tions of competition, presents a practical equivalent to a ban of the transaction. 
Are the decisions made public and can they be appealed? 
In none of the countries except the UK do the authorities publish the decisions following a review. It is 
only made accessible to the investor whose transaction was reviewed. In other words, competitors, other 
governments or the wider public have no access to this information (or need to rely on leaked infor-
mation), which has an effect on the transparency of the entire processes. Finally, all countries grant the 
investor a right to appeal a decision to an administrative court.  
Possibilities for cooperation on the control of FDI in defence assets 
Possible regimes for the cooperative control of FDI 
The comparative analysis has shown that the legislation for the control of FDI in the defence sectors dif-
fers considerably across the EU countries with the most significant defence industrial base. In fact there 
was only one parameter in which they did not vary: in all countries an investor has the right to appeal 
against the outcome of a review. 
Such a situation presents an impediment to the declared political goals to create a European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base and a European Defence Equipment Market and to safeguard the free 
movement of capital. It seems to be worthwhile then to raise the question of how EU governments could 
cooperate on the control of foreign investment in defence assets. To this end the following section sug-
gests a framework to delineate different types of cooperation drawing on regime theory. 22 F14  
                                                             
 
14 Regime theory provides a formidable starting point for the development of possible solutions for EU cooperation. 
While being a systematic school of thought it is general enough and at the same time rigorous tool to open up the 
 104 
According to one often cited definition regimes “are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations” (Krasner, 1983: 2). This definition merits the question, “expectations” about 
what? As Haas has aptly shown, the size and nature of an issue area are contested, as different govern-
ments might have different ideas about which problems to include in the common effort (Haas, 1980). 
He and others have, therefore, pointed to the importance of the specific activities that actors are inter-
ested in, for the set up of a regime (Young, 1980). The activities will in our case be those that are re-
quired to ensure control of FDI in defence assets.  
Cooperation on FDI control can then be characterized along two dimensions: the degree of integra-
tion of national behaviour and the function of cooperation (Ruggie, 1975). Two functions of cooperation 
can be distinguished for our purposes: the regime can serve governments to inform each other – e.g. 
about the size, structure, and nature of transactions, their review and the outcome of the review or about 
the understanding of the problem and the application of laws. Alternatively, EU governments could col-
laborate on managing the control activities together. 
As for the degree of integration of national behaviour four types can be distinguished here (Haas, 
1980; Ruggie, 1975): A Common Framework provides for pooling or combining individual behaviour on 
the basis of sharing information. A Joint Facility coordinates national behaviour and tries to make it 
“commensurable”. For example governments will standardize and harmonize some of their information 
gathering routines, making their behaviour more comparable and compatible. A Common Policy regu-
lates the national behaviour according to common rules. While individual national enteritis will continue 
to exist and to act, they will do so according to a commonly agreed upon set of understanding of the is-
sues involved, rules, norms, and principles that shape the way they manage theses issues. In case of a 
Single Policy states loose their autonomy with regard to a specific issue area. It substitutes common 
management for independent national behaviour. The Single Policy can be implemented in various 
ways, either directly by the central organization or indirectly through the national authorities but under 
common supervision. 
The matrix that results from a combination of the two dimensions yields eight possible ideal types of 
EU regimes for the control of FDI in defence assets. 
 
Table 1.  Matrix of possible regimes for the EU level control of FDI 
Instrumentality 
Function 
Common 
Framework 
Joint Facility 
Common  
Policy 
Single  
Policy 
Informing     
Managing     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
widest possible space for heuristic investigation into the possibilities of how cooperation could be institutionalized. 
This aspect is particularly important since cooperation on the control of FDI represents a very sensitive area and a 
nuanced, step-by-step approach to cooperation seems to be most appropriate to overcome hesitation and mistrust 
over time. 
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Out of the eight possible regime types shown in Table 1, not all seem to be sensible, as the two di-
mensions characterizing a regime type are interconnected. For example, a Common Framework, aiming 
at the pooling of behaviour will not be sufficient to manage the control of FDI. Equally, a Common Policy 
managing the control requires a common policy for informing partners about transactions and their 
treatment. We can, of course imagine a Single Policy for informing each other. However, it would not 
significantly differ from the behaviour of states cooperating in a Joint Facility. 23 F15 Against the background 
of these deliberations, it seems that out of the eight possible regime types, four – marked grey in the ta-
ble above – are particularly relevant, and will therefore be briefly sketched in the following section. 
Four relevant regimes for cooperative FDI control 
Common Framework for informing about FDI control 
The lightest level of integration would be achieved through the establishment of a Common Framework, 
integrating governments’ behaviour with regard to informing partners of FDI activities and (potentially) 
how they are treated and why. For example, EU member states could agree that they would inform each 
other if an investor from a non-European country intends to invest in defence assets in one country, giv-
en that this might potentially affect the security of supply of defence goods or other aspects of the de-
fence policy of another EU country. The latter would simply be informed without having a right for con-
sultation. The Heads of State and Government of the EU in fact suggested such an information exchange 
with regard to investments from non-EU countries in December 2008, albeit it seems without any prac-
tical implications to this point (Council of the European Union, 2008).24F16 
Though a Common Framework to inform partners is only a first step, it is by no means trivial, as the 
following issues will have to be addressed: which transactions will be scrutinized – only from non-EU 
countries or also those from other EU countries? Will governments be obliged or can they choose to in-
form their partners? Will they have to do so retrospectively or in parallel to a transaction or review? 
What information are they going to share? Which circle of countries should be informed – all EU mem-
bers or only those with a substantial defence industry? How shall transactions from a EU country in the 
defence industry of another EU country be dealt with? Which authorities should be informed – the Min-
istries of Defence or that of the Economy? What would be the role of European institutions? 
Joint Facility for informing about FDI control 
In a more extensive form of cooperation, a Joint Facility, governments would exchange information 
about FDI according to commonly agreed norms. A Joint Facility would involve the standardization of 
procedures and formats of data that is to be collected and transferred on a regular basis. It could then be 
                                                             
 
15 The most significant difference would concern the legally binding character of rules and procedures, which is a 
precondition for cooperation in a Single Policy but not for in a Joint Facility. 
16 I am grateful to Michel Gari for having brought this fact to my attention. The aforementioned roundtables and 
seminars organized by OECD could equally evolve into such a Common Framework. 
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compared and consolidated into a common report. This would require, however, joint understanding of 
key concepts and the change of administrative procedures in each country.  
Cooperating in a Joint Facility does not imply any relocation of staff and resources. However, it 
might require the support through a central organizational structure – for example, the European De-
fence Agency or the Council of the EU – to compile and consolidate the data. Alternatively, one of the 
governments could volunteer to provide such a facility. Such an organization would still be light in its 
character, as national experts would do most work. In addition, a research or advisory staff, for example 
a board of industry or academic experts, would not need to be institutionalized as a permanent body but 
could function as a regularly meeting working groups of independent experts. 
Common Policy for managing FDI control 
In case of a Common Policy national authorities continue to work, albeit according to commonly agreed 
rules and procedures. While cooperation in the first two regime types does not involve any substantial 
agreement on the FDI control, a Common Policy requires a shared notion about the general approach 
and purpose, the scope, the procedures, the assessment criteria and outcomes, and a way to appeal 
against a decision.  
The conceptualization, implementation, and monitoring of such commonly agreed rules would re-
quire the support of a central organization, endowed with considerable financial and human resources. 
As the central organization would merely assist national authorities in carrying out their tasks, the Euro-
pean Defence Agency seems to be well suited for this job, as it plays such a supportive role already today 
in related matters. 
Finally, a Common Policy can but does not need to involve a legally binding agreement on the rules 
and procedures. It would also not require all EU member states to take part in the management of con-
trol according to common rules. Instead governments could sign a voluntary, legally non-binding Code 
of Conduct. Such a “loose” commitment would not be possible in case of a Single Policy. 
Single Policy for managing FDI control 
The main difference between a Single and a Common Policy is that a Single Policy requires legally bind-
ing agreements on the rules for the management of FDI control and that a central authority substitutes 
common management for independent national behaviour. The Single Policy can be implemented in 
various ways, either directly by the central organization or indirectly through the national authorities but 
under common supervision by an EU body. 
While this seems to have been the model that von Wogau and Rapp had in mind in their article (von 
Wogau and Rapp-Jung, 2008), they did not yet make any suggestions with regard to which institution(s) 
should be authorized to oversee and conduct the review process. In line with national practice it could be 
a department of economics e.g. the Directorate General (DG) MARKT or COMPETITION of the Europe-
an Commission. It is in general responsible for overseeing the common market and has ample experi-
ence to assess mergers and acquisitions in other sectors. However, it lacks the security policy expertise, 
which could be provided by the European Defence Agency. Alternatively, the EDA could oversee the pro-
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cess and take the final decision, tasking DG MARKT/COMPETITION with the review of the transactions. 
The latter option would come close to a solution originally envisioned by Nones and Darnis in their 2005 
article (Nones and Darnis, 2005), where they vest the authority of an evaluation and decision with “the 
Prime Minister’s Office” – the EU equivalent of which would be the European Council – with input from 
various ministries. 
A major challenge for a Single Policy is the provision and integration of security policy advice. Who 
or which institution is going to furnish that advice: the Ministry of Defence of the country in which the 
target company is situated or a common European Union structure? How can negotiations be handled as 
to guarantee the informality and subtleties of negotiations that are characteristic for the close ties be-
tween national authorities and defence companies? Finally, what if the security assessment of different 
Ministries of Defence vary on the case, how can conflicts of interest between different EU countries be 
resolved? While all these are pressing questions, an elaboration of their answers lies beyond the purview 
of this paper. 
Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the question of how investments in the defence industry are controlled within 
the European Union. It started from the observation that the EU faces a dilemma: on the one hand, the 
single market, of which the defence industry is an organic part, is overseen by the Commission; on the 
other, control over defence policy and the defence industry has remained with each government. The 
central question of the paper was how do EU Member States ensure control of investments into their 
defence assets while at the same time adhering to the rules of the single market? It was shown that three 
countries representing the bulk of the European defence industry have specific legislation for the control 
of investment into their defence industry, which differs considerably across countries. Assuming that 
such a divergence and the fact that only three EU countries have control legislation is not conducive to 
the political goals of consolidating the EDTIB and the EDEM, as well as ensuring the free movement of 
capital, the paper suggested a framework for the development of different regimes. It finally sketched 
four relevant regime types for cooperation on the control of defence-related FDI, which governments 
might implement in the future. 
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ABSTRACT 27F19 – The financial crises have large impact on stability and security of persons, corporate 
and nations. This paper defines a set of security variables to evaluate the impact of the crises on stabil-
ity and security through the analysis of the needs and expectation of the economical system. The results 
of the analysis of the causes and reasons of the financial crises are linked to the variables. A proposed 
ethical financial model is shortly explained and linked to the security variables to balance the impact of 
the financial crises.  
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Introduction and Background 
A financial crisis is a disturbance to financial markets, associated typically with falling asset prices and 
insolvency among debtors and intermediaries, which spreads through the financial system, disrupting 
the market’s capacity to allocate capital (Eichengreen 1987). 
It is possible to differentiate between three different types of financial crises: Banking crisis, Curren-
cy crisis and Sovereign debt crisis.  
Historically, in total, we count 124 banking crises, 208 currency crises, and 63 sovereign debt crises 
over the period 1970 to 2007.  Several countries experienced multiple crises. Of the mentioned 124 bank-
ing crises, 42 are considered twin crises and 10 can be classified as triple crises. (Laeven 2008)  
This means that the actual financial crisis is not a unique case, it is one of several.  “Yes, we have 
been through this before, tragically many times” (Gorton, 2010). 
At the same time, we do pretend –despite several similarities- that all financial crises tend to be quite 
diverse. Initial conditions are different; industrial and institutional structures are different; levels of de-
velopment are different; degrees of openness are different; policy frameworks are different; and external 
conditions are different (Cecchetti  2009), but as we are going to explain, a lot of common things exist, 
they are mainly related to the paradigm of the system not to its mechanisms.  
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A recent strand in the literature, suggests that economic conditions are important determinants of 
the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. Wars often start following growth collapses (Collier, 2009).  
In this study, the objective is to establish a model where “security variables” are selected and defined 
out of the expectations of individuals and groups from the economical and financial sector. The link be-
tween these variables and the reasons and impacts of financial crises is established analytically. 
An alternative financial model which deals with the different reasons of financial crises is proposed 
based on Islamic Ethical Financial Model (IEFM). The link between the security variables and this model 
presents contingencies to the reasons leading to economical crises and their impacts. The ultimate objec-
tive is to find a remedy to the recurrence of the financial crises. 
The case study (here in the annex), as application of the IEFM on the sub-prime crisis shows the 
possibilities to reduce -or even to stop- the development of the chain leading to the crisis. 
This paper is a part and a summary of some results of an ongoing research project at Zurich Univer-
sity for applied sciences in cooperation with the Arab Academy for Science and Technology. For the pur-
pose of this summary, the number of variables is here reduced to 15 only (in the original study they are 
33 variables). 
The Human Security Variables 
Looking at the history of financiaal crises from 1800 until today, it seems that the more developed the 
financial sector is, the more likely there will be accidents (Nazari 2009), it is to be asked if Man can learn 
from his mistakes!.  
Human beings are always pretending that they are able to learn from negative experiences and capa-
ble to find definitive remedies for these experiences.  
To start with let us define a set of security variables. Security variable is a variable related to human 
needs and expectations and influenced by different factors or elements coming from the economical 
field. The variable may also be influencing the economical sector and may –under large variation- lead to 
instability and subsequently to insecurity. Variables could belong to political, social or economical sec-
tors.  We will divide these variables into three categories:  
First category of variables are related to the materialistic and physiological needs, they are the tangi-
ble variables; They are mainly covered by Maslow’s first two levels of his model. Second category of vari-
ables are related to the non materialistic needs for security, these are the happiness supporting variables. 
The third category of variables is related to the ethical issues and values as basis for an expanded happi-
ness with sustainable materialistic and non-materialistic security. 
”Actually, economics is the study of the factors affecting employment and standard of living” (Jain 
2006). This means that the ultimate objective of economics is to achieve higher living standards through 
higher GDP, per capita income, higher GNP, lesser inflation, higher level of employment, good economic 
conditions for attracting foreign investors, flourishing of businesses, optimum circulation of money, wise 
foreign investments , creating favorable environment for businesses etc, making the society and subse-
quently the individuals in the society the ultimate beneficiaries of this declared objective.  
111 
But these elements are not only defining the living standard, they also define the chance of survival 
and continuity of the corporate and subsequently the individuals and the society in general ensuring cer-
tain stability for their development creating through that a sustainable security.  
The concept of human security has been slowly developing since it first surfaced in the Maslow pyr-
amid of needs and later in the UNHDP Report in 1994. In box 2.6 of the report, selected indicators of 
human security risks are listed. These are food insecurity, job and income insecurity, human rights viola-
tions, ethnic or religious conflicts, inequity and military spending (Human Development Report, UNDP, 
1994). 
The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) defines economic security as the condition of an 
individual, household or community that is able to cover its essential needs and unavoidable expendi-
tures in a sustainable manner, according to its cultural standards. Needs include: food, shelter, access to 
health care, access to education, and fair tax regime among others. Food alone is not sufficient (ICRC, 
2008). 
The above mentioned definitions were only dealing with the material part of Man’s and society’s  
needs and aspirations. This focus on materialistic aspects may be understood in the frame of considering 
economics as a positive science, but it should also be put in the frame of a capitalist economy. They are 
more quantifiable than other aspects.   
But if we consider the safety and security needs, it will be clear that, both the actual need for physical 
safety and the need to feel secure from threatening events or surroundings, refer to relieves such as or-
der, stability, routine, familiarity, and control over one’s life and environment. This leads us to speak 
about Happiness, which is a need or requirement ranked higher than the achievement of materialistic 
income (Ruckriegel, 2007).  
This was proven through the Easterlin-Paradox which indicates that happiness is not related to the 
absolute income but to the relative one (Easterlin, 2005). This didn’t inhibit the critics saying that hap-
piness is in any case, not a simple empirical phenomenon but a cultural and historical moving target 
(Wilkinson, 2007). 
 
We can summarize the retained variables and their categories in the following table: 
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Table 1.  List of security Variables. 
# 
Category of the 
variable 
1=Material 
2=Non- material 
3= Values Security Variable*** 
1 1 Basic conditions: Food , shelter, work, health care and education  
2 1 Guaranteed minimal social security  
3 1 Physical integrity (personal security),  
4 1 GDP level, per capita income, inflation , National Debts 
5 1 Circulation of money, Affordable taxation 
6 1 Stable condition for business development, foreign investments 
7 1 Sound Financial regulation 
8 1 Control of technical development 
9 2 Mental integrity 
10 3 Freedom of belief, Tolerance 
11 2 Providing welfare, solidarity 
12 3 Personal belonging, trust and confidence, dignity 
13 2 Family relation and broad social cohesion** 
14 2 Job satisfaction 
15 3 Equity, Equality, Fairness 
** With social cohesion we understand the combination of tolerance of differences (race, culture, minorities, social 
structure and cultural order)  
***Originally they were 33 variables, they are grouped here for this paper 
Reasons for Financial Crises  
International financial crisis can be considered as a nexus of foreign exchange market disturbances, debt 
defaults (sovereign or private), and banking system failures: a triple crisis, in which the interactions are 
the key to causality, depth, and persistence (Eichengreen 1987).  
Some persons would also add globalization as a factor making a crisis international in today’s con-
text leading to problems (Carse, 1999).  
In way to understand the impact of financial crisis on security variables and therefore on stability 
and security, we are going to categorize the reasons behind the financial crises (with focus on the last 
one) into two set of reasons: Technical set and Ethical set of reasons. 
Technical set of reasons 
A deeper look to the financial crises –especially the subprime crisis- will give us several technical reasons 
behind it (not sorted according to the size of their impacts and only shortly explained, the code of each 
reason is used for reference in the next tables):  
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1. Economical cycle (T1) 
The congruence of the end of a growth period with the blast of a bubble creates a double impact 
on the economy with deeper impacts. 
 
2. Distribution of risks through interests based financing (T2) 
The actual business model is based on charging interests against mortgages and then securitiz-
ing the total on the base of -again- charging interests is a manner of transferring the risk from 
one party to another one, with the creation of unbalanced burdens. In case of crisis, distabilizing 
one element of the chain may lead to a global destabilization of existing structures. 
 
3. Dissociation of finance and real economy (T3) 
It is agreed upon today that through the divorce between finance and the underlying projects 
there is weak direct participation of finance to the development of the real economy. Institutions 
providing loans are more concerned with the credit ratings or the financial intermediaries than 
whith the actual projects being funded (Wilson 1998). Several channels between financial system 
and real economy do exist (Cecetti 2009) whether they are properly used or not is the issue.  
The “funding costs” channel was actually the start for the actual financial crisis, due to the 
change of the interest rates.  All the other channels reacted as consequence to the first one and to 
other factors in the set of reasons leading to the crisis. 
The problem is that in case of debt financing, the implication of any crash may not be limited 
to the persons or institutions involved but spill over to the rest of the system or even goes be-
yond the region as it is observed nowadays. This spillover may harm all types of deposit institu-
tions once public confidence is shaken, with as result destabilizing the whole economy regardless 
of the sector or the branch due to the lack of confidence, the lack of liquidity or the lower de-
mand added to the channels mentioned above. 
 
4. The essence and implementation of the Home Mortgages system (T4) 
Mortgage is an essential credit form in the capitalist economy. We do here look at the subprime 
mortgage market and let aside the prime mortgage market.  Despite that banks are traditionally 
conservative in doing business; banks didn’t use the same strict conditions to lend the money as 
the prime market. Mortgages were given with less control; loans were given to clients with poor 
or no credit histories. 
In US, the reasons behind this development in banks’ attitudes were politically, legally, tech-
nically and business driven: 
(T4.1) Change in the usage of a law named Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)  
(T4.2) Poor regulation: 
(T4.3) The US financial policy subsidized homeownership in several ways promoting financial 
fragility in the real estate market. 
Several mainstream scholars, using different methods of scientific inquiry, have concluded 
that the Fed’s accommodative monetary policy and the applied interest rates following the 2001 
recession caused the housing boom that followed, Taylor (2007). 
(T4.4) The impact of technological development on mortgage business’ landscape.  
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(T4.5) Networking -through the game of “being-member-of-board”-, created business clans and 
lobbies. As consequence the distribution of the benefits and privileges happened according to 
persons’ and corporate’ interests.  
(T.4.6) The operational structure of the system itself. The capitalist system is by nature greedy, 
steady growth is the key word, the company or the personal or the nation successes are meas-
ured by terms of money, expansion, growth, and control. 
 
5. The lack of risk analysis and the tendency to minimize the impact (T5) 
Actually, each developed country has a security net in its financial regulation, guaranteeing the 
safety of deposit and taking care about the failure of banks. The International Monetry Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) as well as some transnational organizations or Development 
Banks are playing such role for the other countries or on the level of the countries. This gives the 
impression that failure would never be as dramatic as previous crises. If we add to it the belief 
that ”too big to fail” rule applies, then we see the extended limits of risk acceptance in the busi-
ness model.   
 
6. Everything is a commodity for sale as long as partners accept the terms (T6) 
Within this frame, time is considered a good; money, debts, information, rating of companies, 
security, personal resources, feelings, values, virtual objects and documents recognizing debts, 
all are goods. Since they are all goods, this means that they are tradable according to the rules of 
trading goods; it also means that they are quantifiable and subject to the market laws, to abun-
dance and scarcity as well. This may not be applicable to all ”goods” in the same way. 
 
7. The globalization and belief in a self problem resolving financial system (T7) 
Shifting the crises from one part of the world to another is one characteristic of the global econ-
omy of today. When all players are involved it is easier to continue the game where all are con-
tributing in it. The naïve belief that the market can regulate itself as if the market has a concert-
ed, integrated intelligence and shares the same interests is part of the misleading elements. 
Ethical set of reasons 
Another set of elements could help to explain the reasons of the financial crisis; they are the “Ethical set 
of reasons”. Here they are presented unsorted:  
(E1) “The level of actual ethics embedded in business systems and institutions” (Crane  2010). 
The capitalist system is based on the theories of Adam Smith; David Ricardo gives a great weight 
to the individual satisfaction and action, linked in the case of Adam Smith to a certain personal 
ethic. The definitions of ethic and satisfaction are too open and hard to control in a time where 
the individual and his search for personal satisfaction became the center of a complete material-
ized world. 
 (E2) Actually, Man is developing and applying the ethical rules, this creates de facto a conflict of 
interest since Man is the legislator, the actor and the judge at the same time.  
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Additional reasons standing behind the financial crises could be named (Duska  2006): 
(E4) Self-interest sometimes morphs into greed and selfishness,  
(E5) Some people suffer from stunted moral development 
(E6) Some people equate moral behavior with legal behavior, disregarding the fact that even 
though an action may not be illegal, it still may not be moral.  
(E7) Professional duty can conflict with company demands. 
(E8) Individual responsibility can wither under unethical demands of the client   
(E9) The dissociation between individuals and society in term of interests is also behind the cri-
ses:  “We lost sight of the structural questions - the systemic questions of how does a certain set 
of actions in the financial world affect all parts of society rather than that how does this affect 
those part of society that have most access to the public forum” (Cowley Catherine, 2006) 
(E10) The double standards applied in the society regardless whether this is fair, accepted or al-
lowed. The best example –among others- is the myth of “too big to fail” which created differenti-
ated treatment among touched persons or organizations.  
The link between the two sets of reasons 
The link between the two sets of reasons (technical and ethical) is evident, since the latter influences the 
personal as well as the collective behavior of decision makers and consumers as well. The dissociation 
between the two sets of reasons represents some of the roots behind the recurrence of the financial cri-
ses.  
We do here share the widely spread idea among politicians, economists and financiers that  ‘Better 
information’, ‘early warning’ and ‘preventive measures’ will not remove the need for orderly workouts, 
whatever the source(s) of the crisis (Richard Portes, 1998); this workout could only be based on a com-
prehensive ethical measures in addition to the other measures.  
The presentation of the financial crisis as just a technical failure is misleading. It is a combination of 
both technical and ethical. 
The Impacts of Financial Crises  
The impact of the crisis is the motivation behind an economical instability. The depth of the impact is 
behind the definitive results of a crisis including instability and security issues on different levels.   In 
fact, in today's world of integrated capital markets, financial crises easily assume international dimen-
sions. This leads us to say, that any of the impacts and the security variables should be taken with con-
sideration to two issues: 
1.  The culture of the given society, countries or community 
2. The actual economical, political and social situations in that given society or country.  
Even well managed economies may fall prey to contagion effects, through trade, investment and 
speculation linkages or changing market sentiment, like what happened lately to Greek financial system 
and its impact on EU member countries. This transforms financial crises, which may start as national 
public bads, into regional bads, and eventually global public bads (IMF, 2002). 
We are going to focus more specifically on the latest GFC. 
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Impact of the financial crisis on the economy (C1)  
The actual and definitive figures for the actual financial crisis are difficult to know. It may even be diffi-
cult to imagine, for instance, an attempt to measure all the costs of a financial-crisis episode (IMF, 
2002). 
An estimation of IMF made in August 2009 mention the total figure of 11.9 Trillion US$, where 10.2 
were for the developed countries while the Emerging states have contributed only with 1.7 trillion (Info 
Making Money, 2009). 
Impact of financial crisis on retirement security (C2) 
The impact of the financial crisis on the retirement security is coming from three sides: 
1. The return on the amount invested by social security schemes  
2. The higher number of unemployed people, leading to less participation and saving in retire-
ment schemes.  
3. The exposure to large market swings, as we have experienced twice in the past decade, can send 
individual investors scrambling for an exit at the most inopportune time. This prevents them 
from saving enough, and actually increases their exposure to financial market risks and lower 
retirement saving (Weller 2008 and Munnell 2009). 
4. Not only the basic retirement schemes were hit, but also the complementary one like the Amer-
ican 401(k) plans (Munnell 2009). 
Impact of financial crisis gender equality (C3) 
The threat to gains in promoting gender equality, reducing poverty and hunger, achieving universal edu-
cation and improving women’s health — in fact, to all of the Millennium Development Goals — is seri-
ous.  
The quality of and access to health care is likely to deteriorate significantly as a result of the crisis, 
obliging women to take on an increasing burden of unpaid care-giving responsibilities and further re-
stricting their opportunities for paid employment (Alberdi, 2009). 
Impact of financial crisis on employment (C4) 
During the Asian financial crisis 1998 unemployment rates increased many folds in Asian countries (Fal-
lon 2002). 
Regarding the GFC, according to the director general of the ILO (Figure 1) , the global unemploy-
ment could affect 231 million people in 2009, an increase of 52 million as compared to 
2007(Trendsupdate 2009). 
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Figure 1.  ILO Unemployment rates 1993-2009. 
The Bank for International settlements doubts that the current crisis will be typical in its impact on 
deficits and debt. The reason is that, in many countries, employment and growth are unlikely to return 
to their pre-crisis levels in the foreseeable future (BIS, 2010): 
The employment situation was the worst in the US. The number of net losses during the middle of 
the crisis was tremendous with 1’763’000 lost jobs for the first 3 quarters of 2000  (Boyer, 2009): 
Impact of financial crisis on health and poverty (C5) 
According to several studies, sharp economic slowdowns and low levels of income per capita appear to 
increase the likelihood of conflicts (Kim, 2009). 
The crisis comes at a time when the Millennium Development Goals has never been higher. It comes 
in the midst of the most ambitious drive in history to reduce poverty and distribute the benefits of our 
modern society, including those related to health, more evenly and fairly in this world (Chan, 2008). 
Developing countries expects to have 53 million more people forced to live on less than $2 a day in 
2009; this will wipe out much of the progress made through the Millenium Development Goals (NS 
Network, 2009). 
The problem with the health sector is that crises’ effects are to be observed on the long term, because 
budgets were shifted away from investments in the social sectors, most notably health and education and 
many countries are still suffering the legacy of these errors (Chan, 2008). 
Impact of financial crisis on food supply (C6) 
According to IFAD, as result of the GFC consumers are responding by eating less and shifting to less nu-
tritious food (The Crawford Fund, 2009).  
The financial crisis, along with still high food prices, reduces access to food for many household. In 
addition to that, the affected government social services, trade, investment, aid, remittances, and ex-
change rates, will make the food less accessible and imports more expensive. (UN Task Force, 2009). 
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In addition, speculators looking for assets with rising prices re-oriented their portfolios towards food 
commodities; this came along with the rising demand on bio-fuel, together with the decline in agricul-
tural production (UNCTAD, 2008).  
Speculations skewing agriculture commodity market to such a degree that both farmers and con-
sumers are losing out (IATP, 2008). 
Impact of financial crisis on small crime, identity theft and fraud (C7) 
A research report prepared for the congress showed that there was a clear relation between economic 
factors and crime in the cities of the US. The factors used in the study were unemployment and foreclo-
sure. At the same time, the relation was established between the increase in number of unemployed and 
number of foreclosures happening during the crisis periods concerning violent crimes and property 
crime (Finklea, 2009) 
But the impact of the financial crisis is not limited to the violent or property crimes. The worldwide 
financial crisis is also exacerbating Americans' fear of identity theft, according to research conducted by 
Unisys Corp. In this survey, ninety percent are also at least somewhat concerned about becoming victims 
of credit or debit-card fraud, compared to slightly more than 85 percent in fall 2008. 
Impact of financial crisis on national and regional security (C8) 
An extensive and inconclusive literature on relation between economic conditions and security (internal 
and external) does exist. Ibn Khaldoun, Marx, Tocqueville, Michiavelli, Hoffer, Deng and Huntington, 
they all mentioned the relation in different forms and visions creating schools of thoughts like the real-
ists and the idealists. 
 
 
Figure 2.  GDP per capita and probability of new conflict. 
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Recently, Admiral Dennis Blair US intelligence chief warned that the economic crisis may be the 
source of the primary threat to global security right now. Security experts note that the economic down-
turn is already creating social unrest and political instability in some strategic hot spots around the 
world (Trumley 2009). The risk of instability for certain regimes will increase if the crisis persists for a 
certain time. Economic drivers matter in part because it is economic characteristics that make a rebel-
lion/conflict feasible, it enables fighting parties to buy the weapons, to maintain a private army over long 
periods, and to perpetrate large scale killing without endangering themselves (Collier, 2006).  
Here the issue of proliferation is part of crisis’ impacts. The diminishing contribution to the budget 
of international defense organizations like the NATO may also be an aspect. 
Certain researches proved that there is a direct relation between the economic development and con-
flicts and that the level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a new conflict (Kim  2009).  
After this analysis (summary in table 2), we can say without being far away from the truth that, the 
actual economical and financial model with all its rules, regulations and organizations couldn’t stop the 
recurrence and repetition of economic and financial crises as well as reducing their impacts on the long 
term.  
It is clear that the level of the impacts is not the same for all security variables. At the same time, the 
levels of impacts on variables are not everywhere the same, nor are they perceived with the same degree 
of seriousness.   
To have a serious danger on security, a certain degree of pain should be resented by the studied per-
son or group. It is well known that it is important to study pain reactions keeping the socio-cultural fac-
tors in mind (Zborowski, 1952), therefore that is very difficult to estimate the total risk on security.  
At this stage we get a serious problem since economy instead of being a reason for stability and secu-
rity –as we defined it at the beginning- is transformed in reason for instability and possible turbulences.  
An Ethical Proposed Solution 
Our intention is to oppose a global solution to a global crisis dealing with all the above mentioned as-
pects whether in terms of reasons or in terms of impacts. 
A world which is obliged to produce for each event new regulations and forget others, is reflecting its 
failure. The first handicap is having the Man as player,  judge and  legislator. Philosophically it doesn’t 
work because of the conflict of interests. 
We are going here to present an alternative which is an old one in new shape, adapted to contempo-
rary conditions and contexts. 
The alternative is tackling the deep roots of the economical logic, mechanisms and means. This al-
ternative has -in its form and depth- to be comprehensive.  
We may name the alternative Islamic Ethical Financial Model (IEFM).   
This proposal of having religion in the center of a “materialistic” issue may seems strange for many 
of us. But to the same results came also different thinkers. In fact, Fukuyama said in 1997: “without the 
transcendental sanctions posed by religion … modern societies would come apart at the seams”. (Fuku-
yama,1997). 
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Islam and the economical system: 
Actually, Islam arrived with a revolutionary spirit, revolution against: injustice made by strong toward 
weak, inequity between rich and poor, harm done from men to women, undermining of countrymen by 
citizens, exploitation of slaves by “freemen”, hegemony of society over the individuals, corruption of the 
society by individuals, etc.  
Islam in its vision for a sustainable durable equitable solution integrated all life’s aspects whether 
material, intellectual or spiritual and advanced two very basic dimensions: 
First Dimension (Shifting egocentrism) Economical and financial rules (I1): 
Islam moved the Man from his absolute egocentric position to a neighboring position where his inter-
ests, needs and resources are meeting those of others in a stronger global harmony, relativizing through 
that the nature of pure materialistic scope and objectives. 
The system includes economic and financial rules as well as social directives and injunctions based 
on principles like: 
(I1.1) profit and loss sharing (instead of interest based transactions),  
(I1.2) risk sharing (and not risk transfer as prescribed by conventional system), 
(I1.3) link between assets, financial transaction and real economies. 
(I1.4) Transparent transactions, far from speculation and mainly asset based, 
(I1.5) role of the state (guarantor of equitable chances) 
(I1.6) role of the work in the economy (as main source of wealth)  
(I1.7) wealth and ownership rules  
(I1.8) and collaborative insurance system (as the active part of the safety net) 
(I1.9) solidarity and institution of charity (as a part of the socio-economic system)  
(I1.10) Decision should be taken in accordance to equity and justice as well as following the rule 
of closing the door of interested motivations  
(I1.11) Actions are to follow the rule of no harm (one himself) and no harming (others)  
 
The system is based on the Quran, the Sunnah of the Prophet and the consensus of the Muslim 
scholars, as well as on the precise methodology developed by scholars during 14 centuries responding to 
the needs and the aspirations of the people and institutions. The development is continuing nowadays 
with all possible and imaginable challenges, successes and mistakes. 
This IEFM system –as any system- has its products, methodologies, mechanisms, processes and 
benchmarking which are derived from the above mentioned principles. 
Some of the principles, products or issues are: 
(I1.12) Prohibition of interest rates and using instead the principle of profit and loss sharing with an 
equitable distribution of risks. Several financial products were developed for this purpose garanteeing:  
equity in contribution, mutual counseling, agreed upon contingencies, transparent mechanisms and 
sharing the outcome of the operation. At the same time every transaction is supposed to be asset backed. 
The possibility of securitization is also existing through the different models of Sukuk. 
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(I1.13) Other instruments with more financial security in term of return were also developed like Ija-
ra (renting) offering fix rate of return. This is also used in a type of Sukuk. On the top insurance products 
were developed on the base of mutual interest. 
Second dimension Ethical and moral values (I2): 
In addition to the two dimensions of rights and feelings which are venerated by the Man, a symbiosis 
between Man, his material and spiritual needs and the cosmos in general should be established. The 
IEFM gives Man and his transactions a new dimension combining: 
 A set of moral and ethical values in business, where the rules and regulations should fit within. 
 Response to Man’s aspirations for social justice, welfare and spirituality  
 Tthus creating -mainly- a “self-control system” (through education and raising awareness). 
 
These points may be an efficient remedy to the possible shortcomings of the first set which remains 
–by its nature- tightly linked to legal aspects, rules and regulations. The first idea about egocentrism and 
its set of recommendations and rules is exogenous to the human being and may create some constraints 
The second set brings the right supporting frame to the first idea leading to self-satisfaction and may 
offers much bigger chance of success. 
Let us take the idea of values: When we mention moral values we mean respect paid to the work, to 
the workers, to the laws, to the other human beings, to the nature in its multiple dimensions, trust in 
one’s and other’s capacity and engagement, perfection and honesty at work, utility of the conducted ac-
tivity, perseverance, equity, justice, mercy, generosity, love, etc. Interestingly, these values are shared by 
all “normal” human beings if they were to be asked. When it comes to apply them on own person or in-
terests, then the logic and the measurement change.  
These moral values are covering the domain of distribution of production, of consumption, of ex-
change and of distribution. There shouldn’t be superiority for economic logic over the moral values. 
Welfare and social justice may be linked to the spiritual aspiration: The idea is that this type of ele-
ments is part of the human instinct; it is part of the Happiness search of each person. The fulfillment of 
Man’s aspirations is part of Man’s need for global security, where global means: the cosmos wide and 
beyond the measured time-space dimension of individuals and groups – as example on collective level 
and beyond the human time span, the transmission of an intact environment to next generations-, hence 
balancing materialistic needs and non-materialistic ones to reach the global sustainable success and 
Happiness resulting in stable and balanced behaviors in term of production, consumption, exchange and 
distribution. 
Way and impact of the application of the Islamic principles on security:  
The fulfillment of these aspirations needs –for our case- a re-integration of the ethical education in every 
day life.  
The purpose is to have: a better education, sound understanding of one himself in his global dimen-
sion, a better exchange of ideas and experiences, a combination of a self-control system and a construc-
tive solidarity to follow the ethical path despite the materialistic temptations.  
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This integration –in way to be effective- requires not separating personal life from economic life and 
public life. It doesn’t means having a religious economy in the dogmatic form and essence, with a fix set 
of rules and directives supervised by narrow minded theologists. We think about a moral and ethical 
economy model.   
In our proposal we don’t forget that “while a certain degree of regulation is indispensable to ensure 
competition, maintain order and standards, and safeguard the rights of others, excessive regulation can 
prove to be a great burden. The absence of moral dimension leads to more and more regulations”. 
(Chapra, 2007)  
Having all that in the daily life requires a consequent moral-ethical education imbedded in the whole 
education process to reach ethical behavior.  
The hope for reaching such ambitious objective lays in strengthening the dialogue between the sup-
porters of the ethical values: religious, political, economic, intellectual persons, entities, institutions and 
organization. 
If we take the sum of all the above mentioned elements and transpose them on the macro level in the 
next table we may have the following links as keys for establishing a certain stability: 
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Table 2.  Security variable and influence of Alternative model. 
# 
Category of 
the variable 
1=Material 
2=Non-
material 
3= Values 
Security Variable**** Influenced by 
the following 
results of 
financial cri-
ses   
Influenced by 
the following 
Causes of 
financial cri-
sis  
Influence of 
IEFM 
1 1 Basic conditions: Food , 
shelter, work, health care 
and education  
C4, C5, C6 T3, T4.1 I1.1, I1.2, 
I1.6, I1.7, 
I1.9 
2 1 guaranteed minimal social 
security  
C1, C2, C5  I1.5, 
I1.8,I1.9,  
3 1 Physical integrity (personal 
security),  
C7, C8 T6 I1.5, I1.9, 
I1.10, I1.11 
4 1 GDP level, per capita 
income, inflation , National 
Debts 
C1, C8, C2, 
C4; C5 
T2, T3; T4,3 I1.4, I1.5, 
I1.6 
5 1 Circulation of money, Af-
fordable taxation 
C1, C5 T2, T3 I1.4, I1.5, 
I1.7, I1.9, I2 
6 1 Stable condition for business 
development, foreign in-
vestments 
C1, C4; C7, 
C8 
T2, T3; T5 I1.5, I1.6, 
I1.10, I1.2, 
I1.4, I2 
7 1 Sound Financial regulation  T4.2, E7 I1.5, I2 
8 1 Control of technical deve-
lopment 
 T4.4 I1.5 
9 2 Mental integrity C3, C5, C8  I2 
10 3 Freedom of belief, Toleran-
ce 
C8  I1.5, I1.10, I2 
11 2 Providing welfare, solidarity C5,C8 E1, E9, T4.6, 
E4 
I1.5, I1.7, 
I1.9, I2 
12 3 Personal belonging, trust 
and confidence, dignity 
C3, C4, C5, 
C8 
T3, T4.5,T7 
E8 
I1.5, I 1.9, I2 
13 2 Family relation and broad 
social cohesion 
C3, C7 E4, E9 I1.5, I1.8, 
I1.9, I2 
14 2 Job satisfaction C4, C5 E8 I1.5, I2 
15 3 Equity, Equality, Fairness C3, C4, C5 T6, E10 I1.4, I1.5, 
I1.10,  I1.11, 
I2, 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Does Islamic Ethical Financial Model prevent from crises?  
The proposed system –as any system bringing together a bunch of rules and directives- will lead only 
to soften the amplitude of the crises and reduce their frequencies but will not deactivate them, for at 
least one reason: not all crises’ elements are controllable. Think about natural disasters, wars, different 
applied systems in an international environment, etc.  
Not to forget that we deal with human beings. Human beings are very different in their behaviors 
and attitudes and may with the time change too. 
Does this system offer a viable solution? Do we have a “proof of concept”? 
The system as it is today is not able to really create an comprehensive efficient economical and finan-
cial system and hence reduce globally the impacts of crises due to several reasons: 
1. The lack of political support. 
2. The lack of resources –mainly personal.  
3. The lack in creativity and objective orientation in product development due- among others- to 
lack in human resources.  
4. The frozen structures within and above the Islamic financial organizations.  
5. The financial inefficiency due to several reasons and the abscense of a needed critical mass.  
6. Lack of coordination and collaboration in term of knowledge transfer and exchange of experi-
ences, etc. 
As we could establish through this shortened paper, the financial crises are a threat to the stability of 
individual, corporate, society and countries and as consequence a potential threat to the security if not a 
source for conflicts.  
The situation is worsening in term of the development of the crises’ size, number of persons, coun-
tries and amounts involved,  as well as the frequency of recurrence. 
The crises’ reasons and their impacts were linked to security variables with the objective to prevent 
the crises from happening and reduce their impacts.   
We proposed as alternative to today’s system the IEFM and linked it to the variables. In the annex 
the model was applied on the sub-prime crisis to show its impact on its elements.  
Many questions are to be answered about the inter-relation and cross-influences between the varia-
bles and the models. A quantitative and impirical research on the variables over longer period could pro-
vide us with additional information about the importance of each security variable. The selection of the 
variables should be part of a comprehensive security concept or theory on macro as well as micro levels. 
Defining and prioritizing the security variables  would make it possible to see or measure the pre-signs of 
a crises and allows a better definition of the domains of actions in way to strengthen the stability and 
security if crises happen.. These points are parts of the further study which we are conducting.  
Two other ideas which may be of interest is to analyse the possible development of the selected vari-
ables within the frame of future studies to read the possible trends and see if the proposed model will 
reduce or inhibit the negative developments.  
The second point would be to study how to bring the ethical values into application during a transi-
tional period which the education may need to change mentalities and behaviors. 
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Annexes 
Application of IEFM on the Subprime chain: 
As an application we are going to apply the general IEFM rules on the chain of the process which 
created technically the subprime crisis. 
First we may represent the whole process as follows: 
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Figure 11.  The subprime chain 
  
Secondly, we analyze every step of the process and compare it with the IEFM rules: 
 
Step Process’s step Islamic Opinion Islam. Model 
ref. 
Islamic Alternative Impact 
1 Contracting a mort-
gage: money to home 
buyer, mortgaging 
home and interests 
to be paid 
The contract between buyer and bro-
ker is a loan contract. Contract should 
not include interests 
I1.1, I1.2, 
I1.3,  
I1.12,  
Murabaha, Leasing, Diminishing 
Musharaka. Other possibilities 
do exist for developers through 
Istisna’. 
Transparent transaction until its 
end, Risk shared, more en-
gagement of the financier, no 
(or limited) role for brokers 
less fees   
2 Selling the contract 
from broker to com-
mercial bank for a 
fee or part of the to-
be-paid-interest 
It is not allowed to sell debts for bene-
fits. 
I.1, I.11,  
I1.1, I1.2, I1.3 
Purchase at face value for the 
debts.  
Possibility to have broker as 
agent of the bank paid lump 
sum or as part of contracted 
capital. 
Such transaction will not work 
in this form. Knowing that the 
financier will think twice and 
evaluate the risks before con-
tracting a mortgage. 
3,4,5 Creating securities 
through MBS in way 
to make them easier 
tradable and cross 
cover the risks 
It is not allowed to sell debts for bene-
fits 
I1.1, I1.2, 
I1.3, I1.4, 
I1.5,  
I1.10, I1.11, I 
1.12, I2 
Securitization is allowed but 
always linked to underlying as-
set, for example Sukuk al Ija-
rah. 
Guaranteed transparence, sus-
tained link between real and 
financial economy, larger risks 
to financier.   
6 Creation of SPV and 
transferring the se-
curities to them, re-
leasing the bank 
from some legal obli-
gation related to the 
ration Debt/asset 
and improving Bal-
ance Sheet’s outlook 
The purpose of such creation is reject-
ed. The transfer of debt is not al-
lowed. The “manipulation” of the BL is 
not allowed. 
I1.1, I1.2, 
I1.3, I1.4, 
I1.5,  
I1.10, I1.11, I 
1.12, I2 
Creation of special entity deal-
ing with this type of business 
with the adequate capital and 
means. 
Less intermediary, more trans-
parency, shorter chain between 
the ultimate financier and home 
buyers. 
  
 7 Slicing and dicing the 
securities hold by the 
SPV 
This type of distribution of risks is re-
jected since risks are not dividable and 
not a good to be sold as such. The dif-
ferent treatment of ultimate holders is 
also rejected even if accepted by 
them. This case is considered a gam-
bling 
I1.1, I1.2, 
I1.3, I1.4, 
I1.5, I1.6, 
I1.10, I1.11, I 
1.12, I2 
Differentiated contracts linked 
to each home buyer’s risk as-
sessment could be envisaged (if 
this is conform to laws or to 
marketing strategies, is another 
issue) 
Risk evenly distributed, security 
holders know what they have as 
assets for what conditions. 
8 Insuring the certifi-
cates (CDS). The 
purpose is to get an 
insured sum if de-
fault happens and to 
improve the rating of 
the CDOs in way to 
make them accepta-
ble to institutional 
investors. 
This is insuring what is undefined, 
since it is not known where the default 
may happen, neither its size because 
the risk are distribute unevenly, at the 
same time, in the case of default the 
protection buyer delivers the default-
ed CDO to the protection seller against 
the sum insured and not obligatory the 
face value, which is again a selling 
debts.  The purpose of this insurance is 
not evident, since it includes the will 
to improve the rating to attract insti-
tutional clients. The other issue is the 
coverage and reserves put by insurers 
to cover the certificates. These insur-
ances don’t cover all risks since they 
are mixed. For example what happen 
if only a certain type of mortgages is 
defaulting because of changes in regu-
lations concerning these mortgages 
and not the other?  
I1.1, I1.2, 
I1.3, I1.4, 
I1.5, I1.8,  
I1.10, I1.11, I 
1.12, I2 
Insurance is allowed within the 
limits of certainty (against am-
biguity) , of allowed product 
(no interest bearing) and not for 
profit seeking insurance compa-
ny and certainly not for the 
purpose of misleading a poten-
tial buyer (through rating). The 
issue of the reserves presents 
also a point of difference.   
Transparent transaction, better 
relationship between all play-
ers, less fees (because less 
premium due to the transparen-
cy and risk sharing instru-
ments), keep closer to the real 
asset. Insured will think twice 
before getting in the collective 
insurance since he is responsi-
ble of covering the shortage in 
coverage. 
  
  
9 Rating the CDOs 
through rating agen-
cies in way to get 
CDOs’ market price 
for potential global 
investors 
Rating for improving the selling chanc-
es through institutions paid by issuers 
represents an unethical step and a 
conflict of interests. The examples 
show the misleading information prop-
agated by rating agencies during this 
crisis as well other crises. 
I1.1, I1.2, 
I1.3, I1.4, 
I1.5, I1.9, 
I1.10, I1.11, I 
1.12, I2 
Rating in term of evaluating the 
quality of an asset is allowed, 
but it should be independent. 
The rating remains linked to the 
asset and not to documents. 
Less fees, clearer picture of the 
situation, closer to the asset 
10 Selling to institu-
tional investors 
Investors are cheated due to his con-
viction that he is doing a good invest-
ment based on the information pre-
sented by different partners, without 
having himself any idea about what is 
behind the CDOs. The greed of the 
purchasers and the sellers as well as 
the costs linked to any possible inves-
tigation about the assets backing the 
CDOs will stop any deeper analysis. 
Uncertainty and deceiving are not al-
lowed.  
 Through different models of 
securitization and direct asst 
backing. 
Transparency, reduced fees and 
complexity in case of default or 
problems. 
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This short analysis on micro level (related to one crisis and to a certain product in a definite country) 
shows us the number of hurdles put by IEFM rules. They are applicable for all the steps and players 
whether mortgage, securitization or institutionalized investors. These rules enhance the confidence, re-
duce the parasite internediaries through improving transparency and accessibility to the real players and 
linking them directly, reuce the fees and costs hence increase the efficiency. This is certainly a contribu-
tion to the security.  
The model, limits the possibilities of creating artificial financial bubbles not linked to real economy, 
therefore preserving the investors from surprises. This will stabilize these investors –many of them are 
social security, retirement and insurance funds-. This is an additional contribution to stability and secu-
rity.  
In addition, the model will discharge the national debts of the countries through higher taxation 
since no off-shore SPV are systematically needed and less bailout required to save bad players; this lib-
erates means for other development projects and provides a stable business environment as well as en-
hancing the social cohesion. 
All these elements together will create a stronger confidence and trust between the different players, 
since justice, equity and transparency are guaranteed. This is also an additional element strengthening 
the security. 
 
 
  
  
  
 
4. CULTURE 
 
 134 
SECURITY IN FUTURE SHOPPING MALLS 
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ABSTRACT – The paper deals with the content and importance of security in future shopping malls. 
Research data consists of three sub-studies including focus group discussions organised among con-
sumers and semi-structured interviews among sales staff, shop owners and shop managers. The re-
sults of the study suggest that the importance of security is increasing and the security element consist 
of security systems, security guards, product quality and atmosphere. Based on the results three sce-
narios, human oriented, technology oriented and co-operative scenarios, are introduced.  
Introduction  
Security can for good reason be considered one of the success factors in future shopping malls. If cus-
tomers believe that the mall is not safe, they decide not to shop there (Hayes 2007). The study of Gips 
(1996) reveals that around ten per cent of customers avoid shopping malls because of feeling unsecured. 
On the other hand, both disorder and being a target for criminal activity prevent customers shopping 
habits and result smaller profits for retailers.  
According to the study of Juvonen and Järvinen (2010) the store staff forecasts shoplifting, robbery, 
drug users and problematic patrons the most remarkable threats during the coming years. However, all 
kinds of smaller and bigger disturbance are being experienced in shopping malls every day, e.g. in Finn-
ish malls alone there has been at least four serious damages during the last year: one smash-and-grab 
burglary, two plumbing leakages and one shooting. In spite of these and other risks research in the area 
of security in retailing context is scarce even at the international level 
The purpose of the article is to discuss the content and importance of security in the future shopping 
malls. The empirical part is based on the studies by Koistinen and Peura-Kapanen (2009), Järvinen and 
Uuspelto (2009), and Juvonen and Järvinen (2010). All these pieces of research belong to the research 
project titled “Security and competitiveness in shopping centres” that is going on years 2008-2010. The 
framework of the paper is formed on the basis of the earlier published research. The paper is limited in-
side the shopping mall and thus outside areas, such as parking facilities, are left outside the scope of the 
paper.  
The article is organized as follows: After introduction the framework of the study is presented, then 
data and methodology are described and results indicating the scenarios for more secure shopping malls 
are elaborated. The article ends up conclusions and suggestions how to improve security in future malls. 
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Framework of the study 
The starting point of the article is based on the fact that in order to survive shopping malls are complete-
ly dependent on their customers. Successful shopping malls need to be attractive, i.e. preferable or fa-
vourable, for their customers on every single stage of the buying process (Teller & Reutterer 2008). 
Based on extensive literature review, Teller and Reutterer (2008) consider the most important attraction 
dimensions accessibility, parking, tenant mix, merchandise value, orientation, ambience, atmosphere 
and distance. Close to attraction are the criteria that customers use when they choose shopping mall. 
Koistinen and Järvinen (2009) have studied customer choice of retailing outlets and they conclude that 
price, quality, selection and assortment together with shopping environment are the most important cri-
teria (see also Morschett et al. 2006). Pitkäaho et al. (2005) include also location and ease of patronizing 
among the choice criteria.    
So far, only the study of Takkinen (2009) examines security as one of the key criteria of attraction. In 
this he refers to Mitchell and Harris (2005) who consider security as a part of general health and well-
being including personal and car security, store design, cleanness and quality. However, the results of 
the study by Takkinen suggest that security in malls consists of pleasant atmosphere, reliability, honesty, 
high quality products, security guards and technical security systems. All in all, customers aim to opti-
mize their needs in the shopping mall choice, and in this, security has influence at least to some extent 
(Takkinen 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Elements of mall security. 
Based on the above discussion the framework of the study is depicted in Figure 1. It is modified on 
the basis Takkinen’s (2009) results, as there is in practice no other published research on the area of se-
curity connected to the retail outlet attraction or choice. In Figure 1 mall security from the consumer and 
personnel point of view consists of technical security systems, security guards, product quality and at-
mosphere. Security systems as construct covers all the technical devices and equipment required to 
Mall 
Security 
Security 
Systems 
Security 
Guards 
Product  
Quality 
Atmosphere 
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maintain security in modern shopping malls. Security guards on their turn are professionals that are 
employed by the mall to maintain security. Product quality refers to fresh, healthy and tasty food but 
also other first class products and assortments that please customers. Atmosphere, on the other hand, is 
a personal and social feeling that is experienced, but on the other hand it contains more concrete issues 
like store design, lights, music and style. In the framework mall atmosphere includes also reliability and 
honesty.  
Data and Methods 
Research data consists of three sub-studies including focus group discussions organised among consum-
ers and semi-structured interviews among sales staff, shop owners and shop managers (called here on 
‘staff’). The focus groups were formed of consumers living in Helsinki and Turku areas (urban, suburban 
and rural areas around the two cities) in 2009 and a total of 40 consumers participated in seven discus-
sions. The first semi-structured interviews consists of 16 interviews; two safe guards, three shop owners, 
five shop managers and six members of sales staff. The interviews were carried out in 2008. The second 
round of semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2009 consisting of 18 participants of which five 
shop owners, four shop managers and nine representatives of sales staff. 
All three conducted studies are qualitative in their nature. The reason for this choice lies on the lim-
ited number of published studies in this research field. In qualitative research to some degree, data col-
lection, analysis and interpretation take place simultaneously (Gummesson 2005).  Focus group method 
is recommended especially in cases when consumer experience, perspective or opinions are studied 
(Barbour & Kitzinger 1999; Bloor et al. 2001). On the other hand, the major advantage of semi-
structured interviews is that data gathered is rather systematic and comprehensive, but interviews are 
still conversational and informal (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). Research data was organised according 
to the security elements in the framework, and data of each element was analysed by content analysis.     
Scenarios have become a paradigm of future studies (Mannermaa 1991). In retailing the future is 
projected by studying factors that affect long-run performance and then forming contingency plans 
based on alternative scenarios (Berman & Evans 2004). Consequently, on the basis of the sub-studies we 
suggest three alternative scenarios.  
Häyrynen (2009) calls scenarios as future manuscripts. A scenario is a snapshot of a possible, plau-
sible future outcome. Scenarios are either deterministic or stochastic. An analysis based on deterministic 
scenarios typically considers just a few scenarios. These scenarios might be historical or hypothetical. A 
historical scenario reflects a significant event that has occurred in the past, and a hypothetical scenario 
reflects a significant event that is deemed plausible, but has not yet occurred. (Swiss Re 2009) In this 
paper the scenarios are deterministic owing elements of both historical and hypothetical perspective. In 
addition, the method and data of our scenarios are qualitative, although scenarios usually employ quan-
titative data. Qualitative scenarios can be used to develop alternative views of the future that are meant 
to stimulate thinking about how to respond to changes, for example, in the business environment. (cf. 
Swiss Re 2009)  
In this paper, the scenarios are mostly formed by the aid of respondents’ critical experience and 
opinions, but also perceptions creating security are taken into account. This means that perceived risks 
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and threats handled during the focus group discussions and interviews are treated as unsatisfactory 
states of the malls, which should be eliminated in the future. This follows the guidelines of scenario work 
suggested by Cornelius et al. (2005), especially when reacting to various changes or events.        
Scenario analysis is subject to weaknesses in three major areas: 1) the quality of the model, 2) the 
quality of the data, and 3) the quality of the scenario team (Swiss Re 2009). 
Results 
In this section the results of the sub-studies are presented. The results are organized according to the 
framework presented in Figure 1 and summarized in Table 1. 
Consumers connect security systems to security in physical surroundings. Especially they pay their 
attention to the design of the mall interior such as corridors, doors, staircases and lightning. In addition, 
technical equipment like CCTV, have earned their acceptance. However, staff relies mainly on technolo-
gy, like CCTVs and various alarm systems, when security systems are discussed. Both consumers and 
staff see the role of security guards  important in maintaining security, but consumers would appreciate 
more service-minded behaviour from their side. Staff, however, rely more on guards and their capability 
to handle all disturbance. Both consumers and staff emphasise the role of personal service and qualified 
staff in maintaining security in the malls. In addition, consumers recognise the role of co-customers and 
their influence on perceived security, whereas staff does not expect customers to play any part in security 
issues. Instead they believe that security leads for higher customer satisfaction level in general. High 
product quality is important for both groups, but if there happens to be any failure, consumers and staff 
look at it from the different perspective. Namely, consumers see spoiled products and all other unpleas-
ant ‘things’, but for staff it materialises in number of product complaints and returns. 
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Table 1. Elements of security from consumer and staff point of view. 
Elements of Security Consumers Staff 
Security systems Interior design 
CCTV 
Product alarms 
Check-outs and payments 
Disorder  
IT-assisted information sharing 
CCTV 
Product alarms 
Fire alarms 
Locked glass displays 
Security guards Amount and quality of guards 
Staff quality  
Co-customers 
Amount and quality of guards 
Staff quality  
Customer satisfaction 
Product quality Spoiled products 
Dirty shelves, displays and dishes 
Unclear product specifications 
Price  
Assortment 
Complaints 
Product returns 
Atmosphere Staff social competence  
Loitering gangs 
Crowded malls 
 
Staff service orientation 
Disturbance 
Problematic patrons 
Shoplifting 
Vandalism 
Cheating 
 
The mall atmosphere seems to be an issue of delicacy and as a construct it appears to be multidi-
mensional and fragmented. In this paper we included honesty and reliability in the construct of atmos-
phere (see also Takkinen 2009), but our empirical results give no evidence for this solution. Instead, we 
find that the atmosphere is formed by both negative and positive issues. Staff has crucial role in main-
taining positive atmosphere through social communication and high service orientation towards cus-
tomers, but if they lack social competence, the atmosphere will suffer without delay. On the other hand, 
co-customers may cause disorder and disturbance that decrease positive atmosphere and lead some con-
sumers to avoid certain malls totally or at least they select their shopping time outside rush hours.   
When consumer and staff opinions of security elements and their contents are compared, it can be 
concluded that staff is more oriented to technical security systems than consumers, whereas other peo-
ple and social interaction seem to be more important for consumer security. In addition, consumers em-
phasize more product quality than staff. Atmosphere is important for both groups but it manifests itself 
different ways; staff pinpoint the problems caused by customers and consumers connect atmosphere 
more to phenomena that either cause them stress or pleasant shopping hours. Both groups, however, 
recognise the importance of staff in creating attractive atmosphere.   
Based on the above comparison the future mall security could be built either from the staff or con-
sumer point of view. If consumers’ feelings of security are the main focus, the future malls concentrate 
on security created by people and high quality products. We call this human oriented scenario. If this 
scenario is chosen, security is provided mainly in co-operation with security guards, staff and customers. 
The role of customers in security work is completely novel idea, but it seems that they are willing to take 
this responsibility (see Koistinen & Peura-Kapanen 2009). 
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If staff will be able to decide the security guidelines for future malls, they would equip malls with 
technical security systems, and the minor role is given to the security guards. Even more minor role is 
reserved for staff themselves, and customers carry no responsibility. We call this technology oriented 
scenario. However, the combination of the interests of both groups provides more holistic scenario 
which we call co-operative scenario. The co-operative scenario unites superior technology with superior 
customer service. This scenario has even experienced in UK, where it was used in creating highly con-
trolled and highly successful shopping centre called Highcross in Leicester that opened in September 
2008 (see Beck 2010).   
The results of the study indicate that the importance of security is increasing in future shopping 
malls. Like one of the consumers claimed:  
“… I look to the future and I am scared, extremely scared, how to do my shopping and how to 
take care of my money…” (man 62 years)  
In fact, we believe that these elements belong more closely to the retail attraction factors in the fu-
ture. However, this requires more close co-operation between security and retailing researchers and 
practitioners. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of the article is to discuss the content and importance of security in future shopping malls. 
The empirical part is based on the studies by Koistinen and Peura-Kapanen (2009), Järvinen and 
Uuspelto (2008), and Juvonen and Järvinen (2010). The framework of the paper is modified from the 
study of Takkinen (2009) and accordingly the security in malls consists of following elements: 1) security 
systems, 2) security guards, 3) product quality and 4) atmosphere.  
The study widened the contents of some security elements compared to that of Takkinen (2009). 
Namely, in this study security systems contain also store interior design like Mitchell & Harris (2005) 
suggest, whereas Takkinen refers purely to technical devices. Furthermore, this study connects respon-
sibility of human oriented security to the staff and co-customers in addition to security guards. However, 
consumers connect price and assortment to the product quality (see also Koistinen & Järvinen 2009), 
especially balanced correlation between price and quality creates trust towards mall, but staff do not pay 
any attention to price level in this connection. However, staff reports that limited assortment often re-
sults negative comments or claims from customers’ side.     
Our study indicates that consumers still appreciate personal service above all, and at least part of the 
staff realise its importance, but the problem is the self-service orientation that dominates in retailing in 
Finland. The trend is likely to continue as self-scanning starts to replace cashiers. In addition, consum-
ers expect service oriented attitude from the security guards (Koistinen & Peura-Kapanen 2009), and as 
a consequence of this many retailing organizations have now taken steps to train guards accordingly.   
When comparing consumer and staff data it become evident that consumers emphasise more human 
work on maintaining security, whereas staff highlight the importance of technical systems. When com-
bining the two perspectives there will be more options to develop holistic view that is based on co-
operation between human beings and technology. As the result three scenarios are suggested: human 
oriented, technology oriented and co-operative scenarios. However, there is still on alternative scenario 
to be discussed. It is the scenario, what will happen, if security work is stopped completely in the malls. 
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The study does not reply to this question, but it is our guess that it will end up in some degree of chaos 
and corruption. 
In this article we did not discuss about the unforeseen threats towards security that are called black 
swans, because of their ultimate improbability (Taleb 2008). That is simply because theses issues did not 
earn attention in our empirical data. However, the history of Finnish retailing security tells that even 
passion murders and bomb men can become reality in shopping malls, which makes it relevant to in-
clude black swans in alternative scenarios. Black swans in retailing may materialise in natural and man-
made catastrophes, that prevent retailing logistics or in pandemia that put both staff and customers in 
quarantine. 
No doubt the importance of security will increase in shopping malls in the future. Successful mall se-
curity is managed in many ways; first, the high technology assists in maintaining and even improving 
security, while it is more invisible. It also affects staff and consumer perceptions of security and leaves 
staff more room to concentrate to take care of their customers and serve them the best way they can. Se-
cond, for consumers security will be materialised in “soft” ways, such as service oriented and capable 
staff, friendly and nice looking guards and pleasant atmosphere. All these require more staff and guard 
training, more interests towards mall architecture and store interior design. After all, the best and most 
successful results are achieved with superior technology that co-operates with superior staff and security 
guards. Even co-customers and their behaviour play an important part of the perceived security. 
References 
Barbour, Rosalie S. – Kitzinger, Jenny (eds.) (1999) Developing focus group research: politics, theory 
and practise. Sage.  
Beck, Adrian (2010) Securing the cathedrals of consumerism. A UK case study on shopping centre secu-
rity. University of Leicester. Forthcoming.  
Berman, Barry – Evans, Joel R. (2004) Retail management. A strategic approach. 9th ed. Pearson.  
Bloor, Michael – Frankland, Jane –Thomas, Michelle – Robson, Kate (2001) Focus group in social re-
search. Sage.  
Cornelius, Peter - Van der Putte, Alexander - Romani, Mattia (2005) Three Decades of Scenario Plan-
ning in Shell. California Management Review, Vol. 48 (1), 92-109.  
Eriksson, Päivi - Kovalainen, Anne (2008) Qualitative methods in business research. Sage. 
Gips, Michael (1996) Shopping for security. Security Management, Vol. 40 (1), 12. 
Gummesson, Evert (2005) Qualitative research in marketing: road-map for a wilderness of complexity 
and unpredictability. European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 39 (3-4), 309-327. 
Hayes, Read (2007) Retail security and loss prevention. 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Häyrynen, Simo (2009) Tarinoista todeksi – skenaariot tulevaisuuden tutkimuksessa. Tieteessä tapah-
tuu, 4-5/2009, 26-32.  
Juvonen, Marko – Järvinen, Raija (2010) Turvallisuus kaupan vetovoimatekijäksi? [Security as one of 
the attraction factors in retailing?]. Aalto University School of Economics. Forthcoming 
Järvinen, Raija – Uuspelto, Juha (2009) Uhkaavatko asiakkaat? Kaupan henkilökunnan näkemyksiä 
turvallisuusuhkista. Helsinki School of Economics, B-111. 
Koistinen, Katri - Järvinen, Raija (2009) Consumer observations on channel choices  -  Competitive 
strategies in Finnish grocery retailing. Journal of Retailing and Consumers Services, (16), 260-
270. 
Koistinen, Katri – Peura-Kapanen, Liisa (2009) “Kassajono se on se kaikista turvattomin paikka” Ku-
luttajien näkemyksiä asioinnin turvallisuudesta päivittäistavarakaupassa ja kauppakeskuksissa 
141 
[Standing in the ceck-out line ranks high on the list of concerns]. Kuluttajatutkimuskeskus, Julka-
isuja 5.  
Mannermaa, Mika. (1991) In search of an evolutionary paradigm for futures research. 
Futures, 23(4), 349-372.  
Mitchell, Vincent Wayne – Harris, Greg (2005) The importance of consumers’ perceived risk in retail 
strategy. European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 39 (7-8), 821-837. 
Morschett, Dirk – Swoboda, Bernhard – Schramm-Klein, Hanna (2006) Competitive strategies in retail-
ing – An investigation of the applicability of Porter’s framework for food retailers. Journal of Re-
tailing and Consumers Services, (13), 275-287. 
Pitkäaho, Mari – Uusitalo, Jemina - Marjanen, Heli (2005) Ostosmatkojen suuntautuminen ja 
ostopaikan valintakriteerit Turun seudulla vuosina 2001–2003 – Mylly-projektin toinen vaihe 
[Shopping trips and store choice criteria in Turku area in 2001 and 2003 – second phase of the 
Mylly-project]. Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Series Discussion and 
Working Papers, 3:2005.  
Swiss Re (2009) Scenario analysis in insurance. Sigma 1/2009.  
Takkinen, Matti (2009) Kuluttajan ostopaikan valintaperusteet: Kyselytutkimus naiskuluttajien valinta-
orientaatiosta pääkaupunkiseudulla. In Lindblom, Arto – Olkkonen, Rami – Mäkelä, Vilja (eds.) 
Liiketoimintamallit, innovaatiotoiminta ja yrityksen yhteistyön luonne kaupan arvoketjussa. 
Helsinki School of Economics, B-106, 219-247. 
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2008) Black Swan. The Random House.   
Teller, Cristoph – Reutterer, Thomas (2008) The evolving concept of retail attractiveness: What makes 
retail agglomerates attractive when customers shop at them. Journal of Retailing and Consumer 
Services (15) 127–143. 
 
  
 
  
  
 
5. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY  
OF FUTURES STUDIES  
(NOT ONLY SECURITY-RELATED) 
 
 144 
ROADMAPPING AS A FUTURES STUDIES METHOD IN 
THE FIELD OF SECURITY – APPLICATION AND  
CHALLENGES 
Antje Bierwisch, Benjamin Teufel & Kerstin Cuhls 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research 
 
Contact: Benjamin Teufel, Email: benjamin.teufel@isi.fraunhofer.de 
 
ABSTRACT – In developing technologies for security applications, awareness is growing that only 
systemic perspectives can ensure that the various and often diverging needs of citizens, public authori-
ties, operators of critical infrastructures or producers of security technologies are met. Many of the 
innovations to be developed are systems innovations which are of great concern for the public, inte-
grate many different stakeholders and exhibit a high degree of market regulation. This paper shows 
how such a perspective can be turned into a participatory technology roadmapping process to arrive 
at a common understanding of the shaping of future developments and research strategies. This con-
tribution is based on an empirical case where a roadmapping workshop on future sensor technologies 
in the field of personal security controls and luggage inspection at airports was conducted, for the pe-
riod from 2009 to 2025. The findings show that within the field observed the roadmapping method is 
well suited to stimulating the public debate and the participatory formulation of public research strat-
egies. 
Introduction and Background 
Introduction 
Foresight methods try to cope with problems of incomplete information, complexity and the resulting 
uncertainty about future developments, as well as adequate political or corporate responses. Among the-
se methods, roadmapping can be seen as a practical method of visualizing future developments, thereby 
serving different goals, depending on the actors by which they are employed, and the level of observation 
(Möhrle and Isenmann 2008, 8).  
This paper shows how a participatory technology roadmapping workshop can be conducted to arrive 
at a common understanding of the shaping of future developments and research strategies in the field of 
sensor technologies for personal security controls and luggage inspection at airports. This contribution is 
based on the empirical case of a roadmapping workshop on future sensor technologies. By applying an 
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inductive method, it is shown how the major challenges in this field of strategy formulation can be coped 
with in a roadmapping process, thereby demonstrating that roadmapping is an appropriate method if 
applied in this way. The following elements are important: at the end of the roadmapping process, it 
should be possible to formulate research strategies by integrating the social subsystems that are affected 
by the technologies, as well as and the perspectives and interests of several stakeholders. Participants in 
the process should be able to integrate all the non-technical aspects that are relevant for the technologi-
cal field observed in the roadmapping process, and assumptions about the public interest should be 
transformed into the formulation of functional requirements on security technologies in the absence of 
“pure” market mechanisms. 
Roadmapping 
Technology roadmapping has been a useful method for formulating technology strategies and technolo-
gy planning for many years (Laube and Phaal 2007). Developed in the 1980s by Motorola Inc, it is rec-
ognized as helpful at very different levels by policy-makers, scientists and industry alike as a basis for 
strategic decisions concerning future technologies. It is a “[…] method which outlines the future of a field 
of technology, generating a timeline for the development of various interrelated technologies […]” (Pop-
per 2008, 68). In most roadmapping processes, however, technologies are not an isolated object of in-
terest: as future technologies can neither be assessed without the requirements, nor the potentials they 
contain, roadmapping has to encompass all relevant associated future products, processes, functions, 
market drivers, competencies or projects (see Möhrle and Isenmann 2008, 5).  
A technology roadmap, as the outcome of the process of roadmapping, can be defined as a graphical 
representation of technologies and their interdependencies (Möhrle and Isenmann 2008, 3), as well as 
related aspects, over time (Figure 1). There are many different ways to design a roadmap. In the 
roadmap visualization as a two-dimensional space, the different classes of aspects, like for example mar-
ket developments, products in this market, product technologies and related R&D projects, can be visu-
alized as levels along the object-axis (ordinate) of the roadmap. The x-coordinate represents the time 
axis on which future developments are assessed, with the specific time period depending on the thematic 
focus. Roadmaps explicitly use the metaphor of an itinerary to highlight the importance of a graphical 
and transparent process of information, in order to enable orientation. During the roadmapping process, 
new products and markets that are driven by technological developments are recognized (forecasting), 
and technological developments that are required by future markets and related product needs are iden-
tified (backcasting). Figure 1 shows, for example, the interdependencies between new technologies that 
realize new products, and new products which in turn define new technologies. If one focuses on the 
technology, it is also important to address the respective know-how in the roadmap, and if one focuses 
on the products, the applications also need to be considered. 
The logic of roadmapping thus integrates the technology push and the market pull perspective. Both 
perspectives are considered as increasingly important for innovation success if taken into account simul-
taneously (Moorman and Slotegraf 1999, 248 ff.; Perl 2003, 38 f.). The visualization helps to assess 
which developments may emerge through new demands and a market-pull effect, and which new devel-
opments emerge because of new technological developments, the technology push effect. 
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Figure 1.  Typical framework of a roadmap design, source: Groeneveld (1997). 
Roadmapping can be regarded as the interface between foresight and planning. Moreover, by organ-
izing information on possible futures, it provides a partial solution of the problem that can best be de-
scribed by quoting Simon (1979, 353): "Given a particular environment of stimuli, and a particular back-
ground of previous knowledge, how will a person organize this complex mass of information into a prob-
lem formulation that will facilitate his solution efforts?" For Möhrle and Isenmann (2008, 10), 
roadmapping aims at “thinking out of the box” in combination with a process of communication. A fur-
ther advantage is its use as an integration instrument that allows structuring of the information gathered 
from other foresight methods, such as scenario techniques or surveys like Delphi, and thus to arrive at a 
more coherent, common understanding of the future. Therefore it can be described both as a foresight 
method and a strategic planning tool (see also Specht and Behrens 2008, 394). Among other foresight 
methods, roadmapping can further be classified as a short- to medium-term method (Cuhls 2008, 150 
ff.). In addition, it can be regarded as a mostly qualitative (Lichtenthaler 2002, 41) and both analytic and 
normative method (Cuhls 2008, 153) which is applied through the combination of group- and desk-work 
(Popper 2008, 68). During the roadmapping process, information is gathered exploratively in a commu-
nication process that allows for both individual and collective learning (Lichtenthaler 2008, 69). The 
classification of the method on these aspects is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Classification of technology roadmapping. 
The objectives of roadmapping also depend on the level to be observed. Roadmaps for R&D units are 
usually employed for internal steering. Roadmaps at a corporate level ensure the coordination of activi-
ties at the company level, and sector-specific roadmaps can focus on the future development of a coun-
try’s technological or economic sector, and at the level of the National Innovation System (NSI), it serves 
strategy formulation in science, technology and innovation (STI) policy (see Figure 3), the latter often 
implying political aspects. To apply roadmapping as a method for inter-personal exchange in a workshop 
concept (see for example Laube and Phaal 2007), and on a regular basis, roadmapping can be institu-
tionalized in different ways for example as a so-called closed-shop procedure within R&D units as well as 
"public" participation of suppliers, cooperation partners, key users and other external stakeholders 
(Möhrle and Isenmann 2008, 8 f.). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Different goals as a function of different stakeholders, source: Möhrle and   
Isenmann, 2008. 
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In order to “fill” the roadmap, a process to work out a vision, or more concretely, a goal is necessary. 
This is often performed by different foresight approaches, starting from this goal, and in a second step, 
back- and forecasting are both performed to work out and fill in the “milestones” of the roadmap. 
There are different designs for a roadmap, starting from a simple “time arrow” with different layers 
in a very simple form up to a “radar” or a subway map. The variety of application contexts does not guar-
antee “one best way” to conduct a roadmapping process. Instead, situation-specific experiences have to 
be gathered. In the field of technologies for security applications, several specific framework conditions 
have to be addressed, like the central role of public operators, the relatively high degree of market regu-
lation or the broad range of end users, like for example airline passengers.  
Many of the innovations to be developed represent systems innovations which are of (1) great con-
cern for the public, (2) exhibit a high degree of stakeholder integration, (3) have to address many regula-
tory, ethical and organizational aspects. All these aspects result in a growing awareness that only system-
ic perspectives can ensure that the various and sometimes diverging needs of citizens, public authorities, 
operators of critical infrastructures or producers of security technologies are met. In the following sec-
tions, it will be shown how such a perspective can be turned into a participatory technology roadmap-
ping process to achieve a common understanding of the shaping of future developments and research 
strategies. In the empirical case, where a roadmapping workshop on future sensor technologies for per-
sonal security controls and luggage inspection at airports was conducted, the following questions are 
addressed by using an inductive method. 
 How can roadmapping be used to formulate research strategies and how can the different social 
subsystems and the perspectives and interests of several stakeholders be integrated? 
 How can the relevant non-technical aspects be identified and integrated in the process of 
roadmapping? 
 In the absence of “pure” market mechanisms, how can assumptions about the public interest be 
transformed into the formulation of functional requirements on security technologies? 
The Case of the SimSecur Roadmapping Process 
This section describes the empirical case and its special characteristics compared to other roadmapping 
processes. Practical implications for similar roadmapping processes in the field of security technologies 
will be drawn from this case in the next section. The process took place in a one-day roadmapping work-
shop conducted in the context of the French-German SimSecur project, which was funded by the Ger-
man Federal Ministry of Education and Research.  
The project aimed to develop sensors and sensor systems to detect hazardous materials, hidden 
weapons and for the biometric control of persons to increase security in critical infrastructures. The con-
tribution of the other Fraunhofer Institutes 28F1  to the project encompasses the optimization of sensors and 
                                                             
 
1 Seven Fraunhofer partners were part of the SimSecur project consortium: the Fraunhofer Institute for High-Speed 
Dynamics, Ernst-Mach-Institut EMI, the Fraunhofer Institute for Chemical Technology ICT, the Fraunhofer Insti-
tute for Applied Solid State Physics IAF, the Fraunhofer Institute for Production Systems and Design Technology 
149 
their method of measurement, the signal quality, and systemic aspects in the protection against malevo-
lent acts. This optimization was achieved by simulating the performance of sensor functions and systems 
under various environmental conditions. Because of the significance of passenger streams in aviation 
security, the technologies are considered to be especially relevant in this field of application. The as-
sessment of the potentials and the performance of sensor technologies for aviation security and the re-
flection of non-technical aspects of various application contexts becomes increasingly important. This 
assessment was part of the research conducted by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation 
Research, an institute working mainly in socio-economic disciplines. Part of these contexts is the discus-
sion of potential security threats caused by malevolent actors, but also the object-specific, ethical, legal 
and financial framework. This means, for example, asking questions about the choice of attackers' strat-
egies, architectural conditions at airports or about possible invasions of personal privacy.  
It was assumed that a systematic integration of these various aspects in a roadmap could offer valua-
ble clues about research needs and potentials with regard to current and future technological develop-
ments in this field. Due to the unique combination of experts and contacts in the project network, the 
goal was to generate and integrate new insights for the formulation of strategies for researchers and pol-
icy-makers alike. In the workshop, these research needs and the potentials of sensor technologies for 
airport security should be discussed in the process of generating a technology roadmap. An interdiscipli-
nary expert group was involved, representing the technically-oriented Fraunhofer project partners, 
“non-technical” security experts from the field of social psychology, psychology and ethics in sciences 
and humanities, as well as the airport operators. This was assumed to be a first step towards a common 
understanding of future developments in the fields of security needs, requirements and framework con-
ditions, sensor systems and the underlying sensor technologies. This common understanding should 
form a basis for the strategic orientation of future activities in the fields of research and STI policy. 
The workshop started with a short introduction about the roadmapping method and its application 
in the project context. The following three steps for creating the SimSecur Roadmap were introduced in 
this presentation: 
 Step 1: Where are we at the present? (Roadmap level: sensor system) 
 Step 2: Where do we want to go? (Roadmap level: security needs and framework conditions) 
 Step 3: How can we get there? (Roadmap level: all three)  
After that, the technically-oriented experts were asked to position their specific sensor technologies 
and the connected sensor products at the roadmap level “sensor system” with regard to technical realiza-
tion possibilities. The non-technical experts were assigned to the roadmap level “framework conditions”. 
The challenges were to identify ethical, legal, organizational and other framework conditions which play 
an important role in the present and in the future in the context of sensor technology application in air-
port security checks. The next step spent time on the security needs. In group work the needs for sensor 
functions in cooperative and non-cooperative security controls were discussed. The focus was on ques-
tions like: Which kind of weapons and hazardous materials should be detected in the future? How can 
future security checks be designed? How much should passengers know about the control to ensure both 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
IPK, the Fraunhofer Institute of Optronics, System Technologies and Image Exploitation IOSB as well as the Fraun-
hofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI. 
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deterrence and customer-friendliness? During the generation of the “framework conditions” and the “se-
curity needs” levels, information on non-technical aspects that had been gathered from previous desk 
research was provided to stimulate the discussion. Subsequently, it was necessary to reflect the interac-
tion between the roadmap levels and to point out which technologies are able to address the needs and 
the future challenges from technological and non-technological perspectives. These technologies were 
then assessed according to their market attractiveness and the national competitive advantage. In the 
following discussion it was possible to jointly analyze the resulting research needs and strategies. 
Results 
The SimSecur case described how the following major challenges in the field of security can be coped 
with in a roadmapping process: Firstly, at the end of the roadmapping process, it should be possible to 
formulate research strategies by integrating the different social subsystems and the perspectives and in-
terests of several stakeholders. Secondly, participants in this process should be able to integrate all the 
non-technical aspects that are relevant for the technological field observed in the roadmapping process. 
Thirdly, assumptions about the public interest should be transformed into the formulation of functional 
requirements of security technologies in the absence of “pure” market mechanisms. 
Based on the SimSecur case, it can be assumed that roadmapping is a method that is flexible enough 
and well suited to an application in the field of security technologies. It could be shown that in particular 
the combination of foresight and planning logic, the participative application and the possibility to com-
bine previous desk work with group work in a workshop made it possible to arrive at a basis for formu-
lating strategies in the fields of research and STI policy. Moreover, the strategies discussed correspond to 
many aspects of the "Research for Civil Security Program" of the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (e.g. the acceptance of technological developments, the sources of threats, data protection 
and the impact on human rights and civil liberties, as well as the recently published call on “Biomet-
rics”), and of the 3rd Security Call of the European Commission. However, in order to properly and ef-
fectively apply the roadmapping method, it became clear that the following aspects, which are summa-
rized in Table 1, have to be taken into account. 
Integration of previous desk work: because of the broad range of non-technical aspects that are rele-
vant in conjunction with the sensor products and technologies in the project, these aspects had to be 
specified in advance of the roadmapping workshop. For this purpose, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the Fraunhofer partners to identify their assumptions about non-technical, contextual 
factors. These implicit assumptions, which included the types and the relevance of these aspects, were 
reflected, categorized and complemented by the relevant literature. 
Order of the roadmap levels: the project-related focus required a clear definition of the field of ob-
servation of all the participants. Therefore, the roadmapping process started by first drawing the product 
and technology levels of the roadmap (see Figure 4). After drawing the “security needs” and the “frame-
work conditions” levels, assumptions on product and technology developments could be validated 
against them. 
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Figure 4.  Sketch of the SimSecur Roadmap. 
Security needs: as opposed to roadmapping processes for example in some consumer goods indus-
tries, backcasting could not be conducted by only focusing on classical market drivers. Especially the fact 
that every citizen could be potentially affected by the sensor products to be developed required a very 
broad view of the “customer”. Moreover, in place of the classical user-provider relationship, a series of 
stakeholders from various societal sub-systems, such as citizens, airport operators, representatives of the 
legal system and research policy had to be addressed in formulating the requirements of sensor products 
and technologies. Instead of a “market needs” level, a more holistic view was taken by drawing a “securi-
ty needs” level. The security needs encompassed aspects as different as the similar detection of hazard-
ous substances based on the potential security threats, a good usability of technical devices for the con-
trol staff, and customer-friendly controls. 
Separate application categories of technology: the security needs and the respective application of 
the sensor products could be classified into cooperative and non-cooperative person controls. These 
types allowed for an elaboration of the respective security needs in two groups, and allowed for/ necessi-
tated a general discussion about the desirability of cooperative vs. non-cooperative controls. 
Framework conditions: before assessing the human, intellectual and financial resources necessary to 
pursue the development of the sensor technologies mentioned in the roadmap, the legal, ethical, organi-
zational and acceptance aspects had to be discussed. Thus, instead of a “resource level”, which is used in 
most roadmaps, these framework conditions were worked out at the lower visualization level and dis-
cussed as technology enablers or restrictions. In contrast to the resources needed for the development of 
different sensor technologies, these aspects were considered to be relatively stable over time. Especially 
the need for an operational stability in airport security led to the assumption that the infrastructure and 
organization of personal controls and luggage inspection will remain relatively constant until 2025. In a 
second step, the sensor products and technologies that had been pre-selected according to the broader 
security needs and framework conditions in a qualitative discussion were assessed in a technology port-
folio according to the dimensions of “market attractiveness” and “competitive strength”. 
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“Objective” discussion process: the facts that workshop participants came from different institutions 
and that the roadmap focus was the macro level of national research strategies had two important impli-
cations for the roadmap process: (1) Compared to corporate or other in-house processes of strategy for-
mulation, the “public” nature of this roadmapping process ensured that there was no bias from personal 
career interests or rivalries in the discussion of future products and technologies, as can be the case in 
corporate roadmapping processes. (2) At the same time, technologically confidential information could 
not be exchanged among the participants. However, at this level of detail/ granularity, it became clear 
that this restriction did not impede or significantly bias the roadmapping process.  
Need for the discussion of strategies: since the aim of the workshop was to identify research needs 
and potentials with regard to current and future technological developments, the roadmapping process 
was followed by a discussion of research and STI policy strategies. The roadmap visualization contribut-
ed not only to providing orientation in the complex thematic field, but also helped to stimulate this de-
bate. 
 
Table 1.  Challenges and methodological approaches in the SimSecur Roadmapping Workshop. 
Challenge Methodological Approach 
Broad range of non-technological aspects  Expert interviews and desk research on relevant 
aspects as input 
Project-related thematic focus Focus on (1) sensor products and technologies, 
then (2) framework conditions and security needs 
Special characteristics of the security field Not “market” level, but more general “security 
needs” level 
Different classes of applications Separate consideration of cooperative and non-
cooperative technologies in two groups 
Framework conditions instead of a “resource” 
level: 
(1) need to be addressed before focusing on 
resources/ competitive strength 
(2) relatively high stability of framework con-
ditions compared to resources/ competi-
tive strength 
(1) Discussion of legal, ethical, organizational 
and acceptance aspects as enablers and re-
strictions for security technologies 
(2) Generation of technology portfolios with 
market attractiveness and competitive 
strength dimensions 
Unbiased, “objective” discussion process No strong social or functional relationships be-
tween workshop participants 
Strategy formulation as goal Subsequent discussion of strategies in the plenum 
with the help of the roadmap as orientation 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
In summary, the findings show that in the field observed, roadmapping is well suited to stimulating the 
public debate and for the participatory formulation of public research strategies. It could thus serve as 
an orientation for future roadmapping processes on security technologies that aim to formulate STI 
strategies. 
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Although roadmapping has been proven an adequate means for foresight and strategy formulation in 
the field of security technologies, some extensions are possible. For example, the granularity in the ob-
servation of the different roadmap levels was oriented to the still relatively broad focus of the project. 
Depending on the goal, some roadmapping processes should take a narrower focus to enable discussions 
in greater detail. Another way of achieving a higher level of detail, would be, if possible, to have a longer 
workshop duration. The optimal duration of a roadmapping process are several workshop days, each day 
focusing on a different roadmap level, and the last one on the integration of the levels (Laube and Phaal 
2007). Especially in the field of research and STI policy strategies for security technologies, this would 
allow integration of more and more complex information input to meet the requirements of the systemic 
view of security innovation. A further extension of the process would be to use the roadmap together 
with the results of a general strategy formulation, as conducted in the SimSecur case, as an explicit start-
ing point for formulating more specific research questions and STI policy instruments.  
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ABSTRACT – Project SANDERA focuses on the future relationship between three critical European 
policy domains: namely, the EU science and technology policy strategy to move towards the European 
Research Area and those EU policies focused on the security of the European citizen in the world both 
through EU defence policies and EU security policies. This paper addresses the methodological chal-
lenges of using scenarios to characterise complex policy interrelationships and reports on some aspects 
of the methodological approach being adopted.  
Introduction  
This paper addresses some of the methodological challenges of using scenarios to characterise complex 
policy interrelationships and reports on the methodological approach being adopted by Project 
SANDERA.29 F2 Project SANDERA focuses on the future relationship between three critical European policy 
domains: namely, the EU science and technology policy strategy to move towards the European Re-
search Area and those EU policies focused on the security of the European citizen in the world both 
through EU defence policies and EU security policies. SANDERA is a two-year project funded under the 
Seventh Framework Programme Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities theme Blue Sky Research on 
Emerging Issues Affecting European S&T.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides some background to the SANDERA Project; 
Section 3 explains our rationale, project aims and methodological approach; Section 4 describes the 
methodological challenges presented by SANDERA and how we are seeking to conceptualise the com-
plex policy interrelationships between the three policy areas; Section 5 explains how we are seeking to 
                                                             
 
2 This paper reports on work that is the product of the joint efforts of a project team led by the Manchester Institute 
of Innovation Research (UK) and comprises the University of Lund (Sweden); CSIC (Spain); Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik (SWP); Istituto Affari Internazionali (Italy); ARMINES (France); Copenhagen Business School (Den-
mark); Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Hungary); and EGMONT Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Belgium). 
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use our conceptual framework to identify drivers of change and build scenarios; and, in Section 6 we 
provide some conclusions and an indication of the next steps for Project SANDERA. 
Background 
Over the last decade, the EU has developed a defence and security dimension. In particular, the external-
ly-oriented Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), renamed under the Lisbon Treaty and former-
ly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which is a major element of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and is the domain of EU policy covering defence and 
military aspects. The Member States have also agreed a European Security Strategy that guides the EU’s 
international security strategy with the objective of making the European Union “a credible and effective 
actor” that is “ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”. 30F3   
The EU has also developed internally-oriented policies for countering terrorism with the appoint-
ment of an EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator and the development of policies designed to prevent, pro-
tect, prosecute and respond to terrorism and other security-related risks. These internally-oriented secu-
rity policies and institutional arrangements comprise a somewhat diverse group of policies that comprise 
the internal dimension of fighting terrorism; policies for the protection of critical infrastructure; energy 
security; civil protection; and border security.  
These developments have been complemented by a science and technology policy dimension.  The 
Seventh Framework Programme has allocated €1.4 billion for funding security research for civil and 
non-lethal applications managed by DG Enterprise. The Specific Programme "Prevention, Preparedness 
and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related Risks” was established under a 
Council Decision as part of the General Programme on "Security and Safeguarding Liberties" managed 
by DG Justice, Freedom and Security. The European Defence Agency has as one of its goals enhancing 
the effectiveness of European defence research and technology and – as well as acting as a catalyst for 
more European defence R&T collaboration, it has also acted as a customer for some R&T projects on be-
half of a group of Member States or on the EDA’s own account (although its budget for this has been 
modest).  
When SANDERA was conceived in 2007 our working hypothesis was that the establishment of secu-
rity and defence research as an element of the European policy mix was the start rather than the end of 
policy innovation in this field. This working hypothesis has already proven correct. By 2010, we can ob-
serve growing attempts to promote closer linkages between the Framework Programme and the Europe-
an Defence Agency’s defence R&T agenda. This comes against a background of political calls for closer 
cooperation on defence R&D between the EDA and the Commission from both the European Council 
and the European Parliament. 31F4  
Three developments are of particular note: 
                                                             
 
3 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
4 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Council Conclusions on the ESDP 2903rd External Relations Council 
meeting, Brussels, 10 and 11 November 2008: Council of the Europeam Union Brussels, 11 December 2008 Declara-
tion on Strengthening Capabilities; Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing 
Security in a Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008; Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the 
European Security Strategy and ESDP (2008/2202(INI))  28 January 2009. 
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 The emergence of ad hoc coordination between the civil security research theme within the 
Seventh Framework Programme and the defence R&D activities of the European Defence 
Agency in a number of fields; 
 Moves by the European Defence Agency and the European Commission (at the request of the 
Defence Ministers of European Member States) to establish a European Framework Coopera-
tion for Security and Defence together with the European Commission with the aim of “max-
imising complementarity and synergy between defence and civil security-related research activ-
ities”.32F5   
 Growing discussions in Brussels about the possibility of including defence research in the 
Eighth Framework Programme (in particular amongst officials from the European Commission 
and the European Defence Agency). 
Attention has focused mainly on the implications of such developments for European security and 
defence policies, the strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) 
and the balance between EU activity and Member States. However, Project SANDERA starts from the 
belief that the emergence of an explicit defence and security dimension to EU science and technology 
policy also has potentially profound significance for the future character of European science and tech-
nology policy, the Framework Programme and the move towards the European Research Area.  
The move towards the European Research Area (ERA) has been an important theme in European 
science and technology policy for the last decade. The term “European Research Area” was coined in a 
Commission document published in January 2000 (“Towards a European Research Area”). 33 F6 In essence, 
the ERA approach was a wake up call for a step change in how the research landscape in Europe should 
be organised and governed, in order to improve its performance. The overall ERA idea was to do away 
with a traditional multi-layer governance of research in Europe and the scattered and divided landscape 
of research in Europe. We can identify six main golas of ERA policy as follows: (1) to contribute to a Eu-
ropean internal market for research, where researchers, technology and knowledge (fifth freedom) circu-
late freely, (2) world-class research infrastructures, (3) excellent research institutions, (4) effective 
knowledge-sharing (5), well-coordinated research programmes and priorities, including a significant 
volume of jointly-programmed public research investment at European level involving common priori-
ties, coordinated implementation and joint evaluation; (6) a wide opening of the European Research Ar-
ea.  
Accordingly, SANDERA will examine how future developments in European security and defence re-
search and innovation policies combined with technological change and the evolution of European sci-
ence and technology policies could interact in intended and unintended ways to affect the pace and char-
acter of the move towards the ERA as well as priorities for the 8th Framework Programme. 
                                                             
 
5 “EDA and Commission to work closely together on research”, European Defence Agency Press Release, May 2009. 
6 Commission of the European Communities, 'Towards a European Research Area (Com (2000)6 of 18/01/2000)', 
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Rationale, project aims and methodological approach 
Project SANDERA thus focuses on the future relationship between three critical European policy do-
mains: namely, the EU science and technology policy strategy to move towards the European Research 
Area; EU defence research and innovation policies; and, EU security research and innovation policies. In 
framing our study in this way we are aware that there is a growing blurring between defence research 
and security research and this is one of the issues that we will return to later in this paper. 
Rationale 
The core rationale for SANDERA is not only that these developments may have potentially profound im-
plications for the future character of European science and technology policy but also that this topic has 
been almost entirely overlooked by both the academic and policy communities. 
There are those who see potentially great opportunities arising from future developments in the rela-
tionship between European research and innovation policies security and defence and European science 
and technology policy. From the perspective of security policy, the importance of civilian-origin dual use 
technologies means that Europe’s capability to counter security threats may in the future rely on the in-
novation capability of the ERA making a strong ERA critical to the security of the EU citizen. From the 
science and technology policy perspective, interest in demand-side innovation policy has caused some to 
begin to consider the potential role of security and defence R&D and procurement as a public engine of 
innovation. At the same time, greater connectivity between defence and civil science and technology may 
allow Europe to generate some of the competitiveness benefits that appear to have accrued to the US as a 
result of its spending on defence R&D and procurement in the past. 
There are others, however, who worry about what they fear may be the potentially dangerous conse-
quences of the emergence of a security and defence dimension to European science and technology poli-
cy. There have long been concerns that defence R&D may distort scientific priorities and the course of 
scientific development. The Framework Programme has historically been a consciously civilian project 
albeit one that has funded dual-use technologies. Including defence R&D of any kind in the Eighth 
Framework programme would raise important questions not least what would it mean for the character 
and priorities of European science and technology and the ERA? At the same time, the desire of the se-
curity community to control the circulation of “dangerous” knowledge and to control the transfer of cer-
tain technologies to some third countries appear to be in tension with the ERA vision of free circulation 
of knowledge within a global scientific community.  
Despite the obvious importance of these issues, we observe that policy development for the ERA and 
policy development for security and defence research and innovation is taking place in separate “silos” 
with surprisingly little overlap between policy communities. The policy communities are by and large 
separate. Each has its own discrete set of policy concerns, stakeholders and policy networks despite the 
fact that developments in one policy field may have direct or indirect implications for the other policy 
field. 
Indeed, we can see that policy making at the European level is effectively taking place in “silos”. At 
the European level, it appears that the two policy communities (security-related community on the one 
hand and the ERA community on the other) remain more or less isolated from one another: members of 
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each community are not involved in the activities of the other community. To be sure, there is an intense 
inter-governmental organizational collaboration in security and defence matters in Europe, as described 
in the Knowledge Dynamics and Security Dynamics Scoping Papers. However, this is very weakly linked 
to ERA dynamics or instruments as such and the EU as a corporate actor is not involved in many of the 
inter-governmental activities. On the contrary, for the purpose of defence research and development co-
operation governments have over the last two decades developed a dedicated set of forums, rules, and 
funding mechanisms that are separate from the ERA. 
We can go further and argue that they represent different epistemic communities. The policy com-
munities each have their own policy “challenges”, their own policy responses and their own organisa-
tional and institutional settings. Each policy community has its own set of shared symbols and refer-
ences, mutual expectations and mutual predictability of intention. 34F7 This creates “world views” that shape 
the behaviour of each policy community and delineates a cognitive framework for problem framing and 
problem solutions.  
The extent of boundary crossing between the policy communities remains limited and when the 
boundaries are crossed the policy communities find it challenging to identify common “world views”. 
Security policy “frames” policy issues as “security” issues and thus “securitises” science and technology, 
characterising some aspects of knowledge as “dangerous” and seeking to regulate and control its practice 
and diffusion. The contrast with the world view of the ERA policy community is stark. 
At the same time, an important caveat should be added to this discussion namely that the notion of a 
single ERA “policy community” is problematic. The ERA is different things to different people, it is at the 
same time a new ‘concept’ for thinking about European intervention, a new policy and a new set of prac-
tices and instruments, and new relations with member states organisations dealing with research and 
innovation policies and their implementation). Moreover, the definition of ERA and its goals are not 
widely shared among all stakeholders, in fact even the problem definition underlying ERA is contested. 
Similarly, there is not and never has been a single “military-industrial-scientific complex”. Instead, 
there has been a variety of stakeholders with different perspectives and interests. Today, there is no “se-
curity and defence” policy community as such. The culture, interests and perspectives of police and fire 
service first responders is dramatically different from that of the armed forces and within the “military 
complex” there remain significant differences of interest between the different branches of the armed 
forces and between the military and the defence industry. 
Critics of the security research theme express concerns about the role of policy networks, with one 
arguing that: “there are real issues about the extent to which hand-picked expert groups are making se-
curity policy with little or no democratic oversight and without the inclusion of critical voices”. 35 F8   The 
emergence of the security research theme as evidence of the growing influence of the “military industrial 
complex” on European policy has also been raised by European non-governmental organisations. 36F9 
                                                             
 
7 John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends', International Organization, 
29/3 (1975), 569f. 
8 Jocelyn Mawdsley (2008), “The European Union and Security Research: advocacy, framing and accountability”, 
conference paper presented at UACES 2008 Annual Conference, University of Edinburgh, September 2008. 
9 NeoConOpticon: The EU Security Industrial Complex, Transnational Institute and StateWatch, 2009. 
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Indeed, the FORESEC study and final conference has raised the problem that European security 
foresight exercises rely almost exclusively on a community of security “experts”. By omission or commis-
sion, the broader European scientific community and civil society has been effectively excluded from 
these policy processes. 
What are the aims of SANDERA? 
Accordingly, the aim of SANDERA is to examine how future developments in European security and de-
fence policies combined with technological change and the evolution of European science and technolo-
gy policies could interact in intended and unintended ways to affect the pace and character of the move 
towards the ERA as well as priorities for the 8th Framework Programme. Specifically, SANDERA has 
four objectives: 
 To identify drivers of change in the relationship between European security and defence poli-
cies and the ERA 
 To develop exploratory scenarios of alternative futures of the relationship between security pol-
icy and the ERA 
 To analyse the policy implications of the scenarios and develop indicators of change 
 To stimulate dialogue and promote stronger networking between the security policy and sci-
ence and technology policy communities 
Methodological challenges and approach 
Project SANDERA is a scenario based study. We are using an exploratory foresight approach to develop 
scenarios of the relationship between policies for the European Research Area and European research 
and innovation policies defence and security in the year 2030. Our objective is to develop scenarios that 
will enable policy makers, stakeholders and the scientific community to explore the consequences of fu-
ture developments at the interface between security policy and science and technology policy. In this 
way, policy makers will be able to make better informed choices in the present and to be better able to 
apprehend and comprehend future developments as they unfold. 37 F10    
To address these questions, the SANDERA project team is having to develop a new scenario based 
approach to characterise the complex policy interrelationships between the three policy domains (ERA; 
security; and defence). This has presented several challenges, as follows: 
 How to work across epistemic boundaries – We have noted that at the heart of SANDERA is 
the view that each policy community has its own “world view” that shapes its behaviour and de-
lineates a cognitive framework for problem framing and problem solutions. Our project team 
                                                             
 
10 We assume that policy makers may be at the European Union level (either within the Commission, the Council or 
intergovernmental bodies such as the European Defence Agency) or at Member State level. We also assume that 
policy makers may be those who are responsible for science and technology policy or may equally be those responsi-
ble for the various aspects of defence and security policy. We define stakeholders broadly and include (amongst oth-
ers) research providers (universities or research and technology organisations), the defence, security and related 
industries including SMEs, representatives of learned scientific societies (such as the Royal Society in the UK) and 
so forth. We also define the scientific community in broad terms to include scientists, engineers and technologists as 
individuals or as disciplinary groups. 
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comprises experts on European science and technology policy/the ERA; security and defence 
policy/international security; innovation dynamics; and foresight methodology. Developing a 
common and agreed language and understanding of the “problem” has presented a challenge 
both within the project team and in our engagement with those policy communities. We will 
not discuss this problem in depth here but simply to say that the challenge has been considera-
ble and has required us to structure our project organization around the creation of multi-
disciplinary groups, frequently meetings (physical and virtual) and the conscious use of non-
technical language in all our communications. 
 How to conceptualise the interaction between policy areas – SANDERA is concerned with the 
interaction between three policy areas. However, we have soon come to realize that policy ar-
eas do not have “relationships” with one another per se but that the “relationships” are more 
complex. Thus, we have had to find a means of charaterising the relationship between policy 
areas in a multi-dimensional framework which we will go on to describe in the next section.   
 How to characterize drivers of change – we have also had to consider how to characterize 
drivers of change. Whilst there are some common drivers of change (not least those associat-
ed with technological change, economics and the future character of EU integration)), each 
policy area also has its own specific drivers that are likely to drive change in the particular 
policy area. Thus, we are having to find a means of charactering both drivers and the interac-
tion of drivers within our multi-dimensional framework.  
 How to characterize the blurring of the boundary between defence and security - Today and 
in general terms, “defence” and “security” are separate policy fields with different policy 
goals, different organisational actors and different policy communities. True, there is grow-
ing overlap (or blurring) in some aspects (the “Comprehensive Approach” favoured by the Eu-
ropean Union and many Member States means that military forces may find themselves work-
ing alongside civilian police and NGOs such as aid agencies – witness Afghanistan for exam-
ple). However, this “blurring” is only emerging and may be regarded even as a driver of change 
in our study.  
Characterising the relationships between policy domains  
Let us explain how we are seeking to conceptualise the relationship between policy areas. SANDERA is 
concerned with the relationships between three policy areas. However, as we have come to understand, 
policy areas do not have “relationships” between one another. The relationship between, for instance, 
“ERA policy” and “EU security research and innovation policies” is about relationships between: 
 Policy goals 
 Resource allocations 
 Formal and informal regulation 
 Organisational actors 
 Policy communities 
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Figure 1.  Target variables, to be explained of SANDERA. 
Relationships between policy goals 
Graphically the focus of SANDERA can be presented as in Figure 1. We begin by arguing that there can 
be relationships between the policy goals of different policy areas. We define policy goals as meaning 
the aims and objectives of a policy area.  
We have already noted the policy goals of three policy areas but for completeness they will be repeat-
ed here beginning with the ERA policy goals which are as follows: 
 Establishing large scale, longer term research projects within the Framework Programme to 
enable self-governed integrative structures in Europe.  
 Supporting the networking of firms and research organisations beyond concrete research pro-
jects (technology platforms).  
 Tighter co-ordination and cooperation among national research policies and programmes, 
through the establishment of indicators, benchmarking exercises and mutual learning 
schemes. 38F11 
 Renewed rationales for research in Europe such as the freedom of mobility of knowledge (the 
“fifth freedom”), functional integration, and the creation of European added value. 
 Grand Challenges 
By European defence research and innovation policy goals we mean the goals as expressed in the 
EDA’s Framework for a European Defence Research & Technology Strategy, namely:  
                                                             
 
11 One key element of coordination was the famous 3% goal, whereby all countries in the EU should aspire to spend 
3% of the GDP on research. 
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“a. (“Investing more…”) substantiate the level of spending required to fulfil the needs of pMS, re-
flected in the targeted EDTIB characteristics which apply to a large extent to the defence tech-
nology base, namely: capability driven, competent and competitive; 
b. (“Investing better…”) help to focus Defence R&T investment at European level on areas not al-
ready covered by civil investment, and therefore influence the convergence and alignment of na-
tional policies; it should also promote best practice, improving efficiency in collaborative De-
fence R&T; 
c. (“Investing more together…”) help to make European R&T activities more transparent, sup-
porting a step change in R&T collaboration, identifying where interdependencies among the 
pMS would aid the development of the required capabilities and the strengthening of the ED-
TIB” 
By European security research and innovation policy goals we mean the goals as expressed in FP7 
security research programme, namely:  
“To develop the technologies and knowledge for building capabilities needed to ensure the secu-
rity of citizens from threats such as terrorism, natural disasters, and crime, while respecting 
fundamental human rights including privacy; to ensure optimal and concerted use of available 
technologies to the benefit of civil European security, to stimulate the cooperation of providers 
and users for civil security solutions, improving the competitiveness of the European security 
industry and delivering mission-oriented research results to reduce security gaps”. 39F12 
Resource flows 
Another important type of relationship between the policy areas that we can observe from the three 
Scoping Papers is through resource flows between those policy areas. We define resource flows as 
movements of financial and human resources between policy areas. 
The main sources of financial resources under the ERA are: 
 The Framework Programme 
 Joint programming (ERANet and JTI) 
 European Space Agency 
 
For EU security, the main sources of funding for research and technology are: 
 The Security Research theme of the Framework Programme managed by DG ENTR 
 The Specific Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of  Ter-
rorism and other Security-related risks managed by DG JLS 
For EU defence, the main sources of funding for research and technology are: 
 Funds from Member States managed on their behalf by the European Defence Agency 
                                                             
 
12 DECISION No 1982/2006/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 18 December 
2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological de-
velopment and demonstration activities (2007-2013) 
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Relationships between regulatory frameworks 
We also propose that there can be relationships between the regulatory frameworks that underpin each 
policy area. We define regulatory frameworks as the formal contracts, laws and standards and the in-
formal rules of behaviour such as norms, routines, common habits and established practices that regu-
late “appropriate” behaviour by actors. 40 F13   
The regulatory frameworks that are important to the ERA include certain formal contracts, laws and 
standards such as those that govern intellectual property ownership/patents. The rules that govern the 
selection of projects under the Framework Programme and the ownership of resulting intellectual prop-
erty are another example of formal regulatory frameworks. Equally, there are certain informal rules of 
behaviour such as the ERA’s emphasis on scientific excellence and openness. 
In the case of defence, the Knowledge Dynamics Scoping Paper emphasizes how, during the Cold 
War, the closed defence innovation system used a culture of secrecy as a means of limiting knowledge 
diffusion. In turn, this was supported through formal processes including laws governing access to sensi-
tive facilities and the nationality of those who were able to work within the military-industrial-scientific 
complex. Arms export regulations were put in place by individual governments and international con-
ventions and treaties were agreed to limit the development and production of certain technologies un-
derpinning WMD such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC).  
In the case of security, one example of the regulatory frameworks that are important is provided in 
our Background Paper on Defence and Security R&D in Europe.  This noted how the sensitive nature of 
some security technologies and the issues surrounding operational security policies and vulnerabilities 
place an emphasis on secrecy rather than openness. In turn, this means that the Security Research 
theme of FP7 has some distinctive features that sets its governance apart from other elements of the Sev-
enth Framework Programme.  
Relationships between organisational actors 
We have also recognized that there can be relationships between organizational actors from different 
policy areas. By organizational actors, we mean those organizations who are responsible for a policy 
area. Organizations can have a facilitative, enabling, or operational role in the relationship between 
policy areas, depending on how many of the three following tasks are done by the organization: plan-
ning; decision-making; and implementation. 
Organisational actors in the ERA include: 
 DG RTD 
 DG ENTR 
 Member States 
 
                                                             
 
13 Krasner, S. D., International regimes, Ithaca ; London, Cornell University Press, 1983; North, 1991; Edquist and 
Johnson, 1997; Nelson, 2008 
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Organisational actors in EU security policy include: 
 DG ENTR 
 DG Justice Freedom and Security 
 External Action Service 
 High Representative/Vice President of the Commission 
 FRONTEX 
 EUROPOL 
 European Maritime Security Agency 
 European Space Agency 
 Member States 
 
EU defence policy organisations include: 
 High Representative/Vice President of the Commission 
 European Defence Agency 
 European Military Staff 
 Member States 
Relationships between policy communities 
Finally, we might foresee relationships between policy communities. By policy communities, we have in 
mind the milieu of elected politicians, government officials, experts and expert bodies, industrial com-
panies and associations and non-governmental organisations (including civil society) that actively 
influence the policy making process in a particular field.  
The ERA policy community (i.e. those who actively influence the policy making process) includes: 
 EU Institutions (for every subject): EU Parliament, EU Committee of the Regions and the EU 
Economic and Social Committee 
 (quasi) institutional groupings linked to EU policies: COST / also EUREKA / ESFRI platform 
(for infrastructures) / all Technology platforms 
 European representations of stakeholders: EUA for universities (but also parallel elitist group-
ings such as LERU), EUROHORCS for heads of research organisations and research councils 
(and on a secondary level now ESF), EARTO for research and technology organisations, EAR-
MA for research managers and administrators, EURODOC for PhD students, EASAC for the na-
tional academies of science, and the Confederation of European Business (CEB) 
 European representations of different industries: maritime, aeronautics, rail, chemistry, iron 
and steel, digital technologies, software industries 
 Non Governmental Organisations representing a diverse body of interests. 
 
The defence policy community includes: 
 The European Commission (as policy advocate)  
 The European Parliament 
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 Defence companies and their industrial association (ASD) 
 Defence-related research organisations 
 Think tanks and the academic community 
 Member States 
 
The security policy community includes: 
 The European Commission (as policy advocate)  
 The European Parliament 
 Companies with an interest in the security sector (in some cases there is an overlap with de-
fence companies but there are also security-focused companies)  
 Industrial associations for the security sector 
 The network of organizations that came together as ESRIF (European Security Research and 
Innovation Forum) and may soon receive funding as an ERA-Net 
 Security-related research organizations (again there are some overlaps with defence) 
 Think tanks and the academic community 
 Member States 
Identifying drivers of change and building scenarios 
The core task for SANDERA is to identify drivers of change and develop scenarios as a base for policy 
analysis and recommendations. We are using a three step process: (1) developing ideal type “tones” for 
relationships; (2) identifying drivers of change that might influence a move in the direction of one of 
those “tones”; and, (3) developing scenarios. 
Ideal-type “tones” for relationships 
Four ideal-type “tones” for relationships have been identified and agreed. The four tones are: 
 Indifference - The relationship between the different properties of policy areas could be one of 
“indifference” where the developments of the properties in each policy area are perceived to be 
independent of one another or are perceived to have little impact upon one another. 41F14 
 Competition - Alternatively, the relationship between the different properties of policy areas 
could be one of competition where developments in one policy area are perceived to be in com-
petition or actively antagonistic to one another. The relationship between the policy areas may 
be one of “competition” where the majority of properties of the policy areas are competing (or 
in conflict with one another). 42F15  
 Cooperation - Under a situation of cooperation, there is a recognition by policy actors that 
working together may generate mutual benefits, identifying many common interests while re-
                                                             
 
14 Note there are possible scenarios where one of the subsystems is very interested in the work, resources, etc. of the 
other,  but  the latter is fairly indifferent to the former and seeks to continue with its existing goals and activities. 
15 For the time being we agreed to stick to the slightly less confrontational term competition rather than conflict. 
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taining their distinctive goals, regulations and rules, and largely working with separate funding 
mechanisms. 
 Integration - Finally, the relationship between the different properties of policy areas could be 
characterised as one of “integration”. The major properties of formerly distinct policy areas 
would grow together at European level. Under a situation of integration, the policy areas give 
up some aspects of their separate identities and processes in favour of shared goals and pro-
cesses in some discrete and well defined aspects of policy. 
Drivers of change 
Our next step is to consider the drivers of change that might influence a move in the direction of one of 
those “tones”. 
This task has presented some challenges. Whilst there are some common drivers of change (not least 
those associated with technological change, economics and the future character of EU integration), each 
policy area also has its own specific drivers that are likely to drive change in the particular policy area. 
We are charactering those drivers as follows: 
 Contextual drivers - common drivers of change that act on all policy areas (although they may 
act to different degrees and in different ways). For example, these contextual drivers might in-
clude those associated with technological change, economics and the future character of EU in-
tegration. 
 Drivers specific to a policy area – there are likely to be drivers that are specific to a policy area. 
These drivers promote changes in the policy area that in turn may have an impact on the tone 
of the relationship between that policy area and other policy areas. For example, new tasks for 
the military such as peace keeping are requiring a new understanding of the causes of conflict 
and means of conflict resolution short of armed conflict. This is causing the military to pay 
more attention to the social and behavioural sciences and in turn is a driver from the defence 
side for closer linkages to non-defence sources of expertise residing in the ERA. 
 Drivers that act directly on the relationship between two policy areas – there are likely to be 
drivers that act directly on the relationship between two policy areas. For example, political 
pressures for closer linkages between defence and security research and innovation policy. 
 
We are in the process of identifying drivers of change based on a combination of desk based research 
and face-to-face interviews. Our desk based research has been undertaken by three multi-disciplinary 
groups comprising members of the SANDERA consortium only that have looked at: security dynamics; 
ERA dynamics; and technology dynamics. Each analytical Task Group has collated and analyzed public 
domain material drawn from secondary sources including government reports, academic studies and 
reports produced by think tanks and expert bodies. They have also identifed and reviewed the results of 
foresight exercises that are relevant to SANDERA. There is a growing body of reports from foresight ex-
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ercises that focus in whole or in part on security-related issues. 43F16  Equally, there are a number of Europe-
an Commission-sponsored foresight studies on the future of the ERA. 44F17  
We are (as of May 2010) just beginning our face-to-face interviews. These interviews will be con-
ducted with a variety of experts across the European Union including policy makers, stakeholders, scien-
tists in key disciplines and experts located in universities and think tanks. We are conducting interviews 
across four groups: ERA policy; security research and innovation policy; defence research and innova-
tion policy; and a fourth group comprising independent analysts, civil society and those we have charac-
terized as “dissenting voices” (i.e. who have expressed critical perspectives on current developments). 
We are also seeking to draw on other Commission funded studies as a source of drivers. In particu-
lar, “wild cards” derived from the iKNOW project and on evolving security threats from the FESTOS pro-
ject. 
Scenario building  
Drawing on the drivers, the next stage of our methodology will be a driver-based scenario building exer-
cise leading to scenarios on the future role of defence and security policies in the ERA.  The core of the 
scenario building exercise will involve a workshop involving approximately 20 experts drawn from policy 
makers, stakeholders and the scientific community. The scenarios will focus on how each relationship 
“tone” could emerge by 2030. 
Conclusion  
In this paper we have introduced Project SANDERA which focuses on the future relationship between 
three critical European policy domains: namely, the EU science and technology policy strategy to move 
towards the European Research Area and those EU policies focused on the security of the European citi-
zen in the world both through EU defence policies and EU security policies. We have considered some of 
the methodological challenges of using scenarios to characterise complex policy interrelationships and 
we have reported on some aspects of the methodological approach being adopted. The project remains a 
work-in-progress and we would welcome comments and suggestions which we ask you to send to An-
drew.James@mbs.ac.uk 
                                                             
 
16 We have already noted the foresight studies undertaken by the United Nations, European Defence Agency and 
NATO amongst others. 
17 See for instance, The Future of Key Research Actors in Europe. DG Research, 2007. This and other studies are 
available at  http://cordis.europa.eu/foresight/ 
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ABSTRACT – Scenarios are an important tool for strategic planning, policy and capability develop-
ment, and, ultimately, investment decision-making. They play a major role in providing the context 
against which future planning decisions are made. Equally important is an understanding of the im-
plications of the potential changes depicted in the future scenarios. Rigorous methods are required for 
developing scenarios and analysing the implications. Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) provides a way 
of developing plausible future scenarios and has been widely used to support strategic analysis and 
planning. The Delphi technique is used to gain consensus from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) through 
a series of rounds of questionnaires, where results from the previous rounds are fed back to the panel 
of SMEs through the subsequent rounds. This paper describes how these two methods were employed 
within the Space 2030 Study conducted by the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisa-
tion. The paper discusses the different stages of the study, how a set of alternative future scenarios 
were derived and how the Delphi technique was adapted and used to obtain expert opinion on how 
military operations and national security might be affected by space-related future technological, po-
litical and economic trends. The strengths and weaknesses of the tools are examined with the intention 
of communicating important lessons and key insights to other researchers doing a similar type of 
work. 
Introduction  
Scenarios are an important tool for strategic planning, policy and capability development, and, ultimate-
ly, investment decision-making. Scenarios are used to identify and represent a range of new threats and 
opportunities that arise across a set of plausible alternative futures, uncovering early warning signals 
and refining perceptions of emerging problems to inform capability development and strategic planning.  
Scenario planning methods have been employed by various organisations, ranging from academia 
and research institutions to law enforcement agencies and the military. They have been used to address 
issues ranging from global environment and climate change1, 2 and future energy planning3 to future mil-
itary planning4-6. Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR)7 provides a way of developing plausible future scenar-
ios and understanding how they may evolve, and has been widely used to support strategic analysis and 
planning. FAR does not, however, provide a rigorous approach for assessing the implications of scenari-
os. Other methods, such as the Delphi technique8 (used to gain consensus from Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) through a series of rounds of questionnaires) can provide such an approach.  
169 
This paper describes how these two methods were combined within the Space 2030 Study conducted 
by the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) in order to investigate the im-
plications of space-related future technological, political and economic trends on how military opera-
tions may be conducted in 2030.  
Space 2030 drew on existing bodies of work conducted by DSTO and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). DSTO and the Future Land Warfare Branch of the Australian 
Army Headquarters used the FAR technique to develop the OPTEC4 model as part of Defence’s analysis 
of requirements for future warfighting capabilities. The model identifies five key drivers that will shape 
the future - political, physical, technological, economical and cultural. In 2004, the OECD developed a 
set of space scenarios to describe the future space environment in 20309. These scenarios were con-
structed using influential factors, similar to those in the OPTEC model, but focussed largely on commer-
cial and civil futures. 
The paper discusses the different stages of the study, how a set of alternative future scenarios were 
derived and how the Delphi technique was adopted and used to obtain expert opinion on the implica-
tions of potential futures for space-related military operations. The paper discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the tools and techniques used in developing the scenarios, and establishes lessons that 
will be of value for other researchers in the field of futures analysis. 
Space 2030 Study 
The Space 2030 study was commissioned by the Defence Space Coordinating Office within the Australi-
an Department of Defence and is being conducted by the Joint Operations Division of the Australian De-
fence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). The aims of the study are to: 
 develop view of potential future trends in the drivers and enablers of space-related activities;  
 develop a reusable set of future scenarios to support analysis of space operations; 
 establish the impacts of future trends on space operations; and 
 raise awareness of implications of trends for developing space capability and space policy.  
Its scope includes a consideration of anticipated political, military, economic and technical trends 
and drivers that will define the future operating environment out to 2030 and how these trends and 
drivers will impact on future space operations. The study’s initial focus has been on the Space Situational 
Awareness (SSA)10 mission.  
Overview of the FAR Process and Delphi Technique 
Future Strategic Planning and the FAR Process 
A variety of methods, have been developed for supporting future strategic planning. Some of these 
methods, such as forecasting and backcasting, are better suited to short- or medium-term planning be-
cause they cannot anticipate rare (but plausible) events11-14. Various interactive, workshop-style tech-
niques have been used for constructing alternative future scenarios for long term planning7, 15. One such 
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method, Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR)7, 16 allows researchers to systematically identify, describe and 
link potential plausible futures through a four-stage workshop style process: 
1. Identify influential drivers. For example, the OPTEC model was built on pOlitical, Physical, 
Technological, Economical and Cultural drivers. 
2. Develop a matrix of these drivers and their range of possibilities. The OPTEC matrix was pop-
ulated with the five identified drivers and their associated factors. For instance, OPTEC’s Tech-
nological driver can be in ‘revolution’, ‘evolution’, or ‘stagnation’ state. 
3. Eliminate anomalies (implausible configurations of futures). The developed matrix allows 
construction of an enormous amount of futures, many of which are implausible. Such anoma-
lies are removed which significantly reduces the number configurations, which are, in turn, 
clustered into distinct environments. 
4. Form a Faustian tree from remaining clusters and create narratives for scenarios. A Faustian 
Tree is a visual representation of how the future might evolve depending on the type of change 
that can occur. The paths within the tree represent these changes. Short narratives are created 
to provide a broad description of each scenario, represented by a node in the tree.  
Gathering Expert Opinion and the Delphi Technique 
Various processes have been developed to help gather expert opinion17-19. The Delphi technique has been 
widely used as a way of seeking consensus amongst experts8. It originated in a series of technology fore-
casting studies conducted by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s20 and has proven to be popular 
amongst researchers due to its flexibility in allowing positive attributes of interactive groups while avoid-
ing negative dynamics of such interaction (for example, a dominant member influencing the group opin-
ion). It is an iterative process, where the collected results or opinions from the previous rounds are 
summarised and fed back into the subsequent rounds and respondents are asked to revise their respons-
es. This is conducted through a series of questionnaires. The technique’s key features are anonymity and 
iterations of questionnaires with the purpose of refining opinion through controlled group feedback21.  
Space 2030 Study Process 
This study has followed a four-stage process. This section describes these stages in detail.  
Stage One – Exploratory Phase 
In this exploratory stage, a comprehensive (but by no means exhaustive) literature review established a 
broad-brush overview of the current state of the space domain and its future trends. This process pro-
duced a qualitative picture of future space trends, classified into the categories of Drivers – Enablers – 
Constraints. Drivers strategically shape efforts and priorities in the space domain, and include the geo-
political environment and operational requirements. Enablers are the various technologies (satellite 
platforms, sensors, etc) and research and development activities that underpin new space-related sys-
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tems and capabilities. Constraints, such as cost, space law or space weather, inhibit what can plausibly 
be achieved. These trends were inputs into the development of a set of future space scenarios.  
Stage Two – Scenario Construction Phase 
This stage produced a set of “Future Space Worlds”: plausible alternative scenarios intended to support 
future analysis of space operations.  
Rather than implement the FAR technique in full in order to produce a set of space futures, this 
study drew on an existing body of futures analysis (DSTO’s OPTEC model4, which was created using the 
FAR process, and OECD space scenarios9) and the trends identified in the previous stage in order to de-
velop the study’s space futures. 
Comparison of OPTEC and the three OECD scenarios revealed that the OECD scenarios mapped well 
onto the major clusters of the OPTEC Faustian tree (Figure 1). The paths leading to these clusters within 
the OPTEC tree were judged to be plausible within the next two decades given the results of the initial 
literature review.  
The OECD scenarios were further extended. The trends established in Stage one were used to inform 
the development of finer levels of detail in a set of space-focussed, militarily-relevant future scenarios. 
The resulting three scenarios can be described from the geopolitical and technology development aspects 
as “Continuity”, which depicts the natural evolution of today’s world out to 2030, the ”Dystopian world”, 
which represents the high tension – low tech future, and the “Utopian world” for the low tension – high 
tech future. For completeness, two more scenarios were created to encapsulate the high tension – high 
tech and low tension – low tech worlds. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mapping of OECD scenarios to OPTEC matrix and Faustian tree. 
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Stage 3 – Scenario Refinement Stage 
A two round Delphi study was used to refine the “Continuity” scenario by gathering best estimates from 
experts in the space-technology field about the likelihood of progression for each of the trends identified 
in the initial literature review.  
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) were chosen for their experience and expertise in the area of space 
technology research and development. A total of 20 SMEs completed the Delphi questionnaires. Of the 
20 participants, there were four academics working in the field of space systems and space technology 
(20%), four experts from space industry (20%), six military space operators (30%) and six defence scien-
tists (30%). Representatives from US and European Space Agency were included. 
Questionnaires were developed with the aim of identifying the importance of established trends to 
military space operations. The questionnaires were constructed so as to capture the following four types 
of information: 
 Probability of a specified trend, 
 Military importance of a specified trend, 
 An estimate for a numeric value, and  
 Open-ended discussion of a specified topic. 
The questions were grouped based on the identified trend areas (including but not limited to satellite 
size, debris, sensors, communications), with each trend examined using questions of all four types. The 
questionnaire were designed to allow the SMEs to self rate their degree of confidence in each answer 
along a clearly defined scale of 0 to 1, providing a means for the study to incorporate degree of expertise 
or confidence in subsequent analysis. SMEs were able to make comments against any question as they 
saw fit. The developed questionnaires were tested on a group of four scientists (who are not in the origi-
nal list of SMEs) with the purpose of removing ambiguities and identifying complex questions. The ques-
tionnaires were emailed to the SMEs specifying a two-week response time. 
A snapshot of the questionnaire is shown in Table 1 
 
Table 1. A snapshot of round 1 Delphi questionnaire. 
 
 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the collected data was undertaken. Scatter plots were pro-
duced to visualise SME viewpoints on probability and importance questions showing their self-assessed 
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level of confidence. The resultant set of plots consisted of one plot for each probability and importance 
question. Based on the graphs, SME responses were then clustered into four categories – strong agree-
ment, strong disagreement, mixed responses with mixed confidence disagreement, and interesting pat-
terns (e.g. probability/importance grows as confidence grows).  
SME comments were analysed together with the scatter-plots to identify associations between SME 
comments and the numerical responses. This uncovered ambiguities in the first round questions that 
may have contributed to the apparent lack of consensus identified during analysis. The second round 
questionnaire was designed to eliminate these ambiguities. Contentious views were also fed back into the 
second round. 
Answers to open-ended questions and SME comments were analysed using a ‘theming’ technique. 
This was done by going through the SME’s answers and counting the number of times a certain theme 
was mentioned. This indicated the bias or preferences the SMEs might have established in their minds.  
This two-round Delphi process allowed the production of a refined set of space scenarios. The SME 
estimates were projected in the “Continuity” world. The four other scenarios were modified to take into 
account the SME estimates of technological rate of development. 
Stage Four – Analysis of Implications on SSA operations 
A two-round Delphi process was designed for this impact analysis stage. Two to four scenarios are con-
sidered sufficient to allow futures to be explored22, and the “Continuity” and the “Star Wars” (high ten-
sion – high tech) worlds were chosen for this stage. The list of SMEs was modified to focus on experts 
with space operations (and especially SSA) background and experience. SMEs were informed about the 
purpose of this part of the study, the methodology and the expected outcome. The purpose of the scenar-
ios was clearly explained, emphasising the fact that scenarios intended to provide an illustrative context 
for an analysis of implications but not to be predictive.  
The questionnaire for this stage was used to elucidate the implications that the trends presented in 
the two scenarios would have on SSA operations in 2030 timeframe. The questionnaire sought expert 
opinion on how SSA operations might be performed in each of the presented worlds and how differently 
these operations might be carried out if there were any “game changing” technological events.  
To design the questions for this round, it was critically important to understand the ‘how’ of modern 
SSA operations from a functional point of view. Current doctrine and contemporary research on space 
operations formed the basis of this understanding10, 23, 24. From this, two identical questionnaires, one 
for each scenario, were structured as follows:  
 For every hypothetical event x in the set of SSA vignettes24: 
 For every SSA function y necessary to be performed in the event x: 
 How would SSA function y be carried out? 
 How well (based on that function’s specified measure of performance) will it perform? 
 What are the consequences if it cannot perform or perform well enough? 
 What are the alternative ways of performing this function? 
The analysed data collected from these two rounds formed the basis of recommendations given to 
the stakeholders of this study. 
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Discussion and Lessons Learned 
Synergy between FAR and Delphi 
FAR is suitable for exploring wide-ranging dimensions of future worlds, and, thus, for providing means 
to deal with problems wide in scope. Delphi allows for delving into the depth of a problem by asking 
questions that requires specificity or low level detail.  
In the Space 2030 study, FAR was used to construct a set of scenarios (incorporating several influen-
tial drivers) across a wide range of technological trends and then the Delphi questionnaires were used to 
gain a deeper understanding of specific trends. For example, the satellite size trend area was explored to 
a certain extend in the scenario construction phase (Stage 2), but Delphi was used to estimate the distri-
bution of satellite size and configurations. 
Potential exists to make better use of this synergy. The Delphi questionnaires were very long because 
we attempted to examine the specificity of the trends while still covering all ten trend areas. Variability 
in some trend areas can be reflected in careful construction of FAR scenarios, with those aspects that 
need more detailed examination tackled using Delphi. For example, the ‘access to space’ trend area could 
have been removed from the Delphi stage: initial findings in Stage one showed no major breakthrough in 
this field for the next few decades, and the Delphi questions on this trend was not to discover any major 
advances over the next two decades but only to confirm the initial findings; any possibility of a signifi-
cant advance could have been represented in a FAR variation rather than requiring a set of Delphi ques-
tions.  
Reuse of FAR Model 
It is not always feasible to conduct a FAR process in its entirety due to the challenge of bringing experts 
together to conduct a face-to-face workshop over several days. Instead, this study demonstrates that ex-
isting work can be leveraged to good effect if such work satisfies the requirements of the study.  
Stage 2 and 3 demonstrated that a considerable amount of effort was required in creating the set of 
space scenarios while building on an existing body of work. When considering which FAR model to use, 
it is important to take into account the drivers the model was built on, because these drivers are the ones 
that determined the paths to the alternative futures described by the model’s Faustian tree. It is also vital 
to check whether the model remained valid and the Faustian tree is still relevant by examining the “pres-
ence” (present scenario) described by the tree’s root node. Moreover, the validity and feasibility of the 
paths within the tree must be evaluated. Mapping of the OECD scenarios with the OPTEC Faustian tree 
confirmed the suitability of these artefacts to the study. The process also revealed that the paths to the 
scenario clusters were not too far fetched and were plausible for the next two decades. 
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The Delphi Experience 
The Delphi technique proved to be a useful tool for gaining consensus amongst experts. However, the 
credibility of the technique is easily compromised with poor implementation. Gupta and Clarke20 sum-
marise criticism of the Delphi technique: 
conceptual and methodological inadequacies, potential for sloppy execution, crudely designed 
questionnaires, poor choice of experts, unreliable result analysis, limited value of feedback and 
consensus, and instability of responses among consecutive Delphi rounds. (p.187) 
Reflecting on the methodology undertaken in this study, the experience gained and the lessons 
learned can be grouped based on these categories. 
Choice of Experts 
There is no precise mechanism for identifying an optimal number of participants to obtain valid results 
from a Delphi survey. Some authors25 suggest ten to fifty participants as a good range. Miller26 argues 
that feedback beyond the first thirty responses would generate repetitive information. Van Zolingen and 
Klassen27 suggest that an acceptable number of respondents may vary according to the nature of the re-
search being conducted. 
In the context of this study, it was not simple to gather a large number of experts as space operations 
is a relatively new area in Australia. The final number of 20 participants (out of 38 invited and 26 ac-
cepted), covering experts from academia, military, industry and research organisations was deemed ad-
equate for the study, with an analysis of the confidence measures obtained from SMEs indicating a rea-
sonable amount of expertise within each trend area. However, it would be more efficient to ask the SMEs 
to self rate their expertise with regards to each trend area during the selection process to ensure ade-
quate coverage of the topics of the study, and future work will adopt this approach. 
Questionnaire Design  
As previously discussed, the questionnaires were extensive. In the invitation letter and information 
sheet, we specified that two to three hours would be required to complete the questionnaires, but the 
time required for the SMEs to complete the questionnaires was considerably greater. This had an impact 
on the timeliness of questionnaire completion and the degree and completeness of commentary provided 
by the SMEs. Reducing the number of questions from round one to round two (82 questions in round 
one to 37 in round two) significantly improved the timing as well as the quality of commentary respons-
es. More thorough testing of this variable prior to circulation of the questionnaires would also have been 
beneficial. 
Given the multi-dimensional nature of the study (ten trend areas), it was difficult to reduce the 
number of questions in round one without compromising the data to be gathered. An alternative ap-
proach might be to split the SMEs into panels based on their expertise and provide separate question-
naires covering different trend areas to each panel.  
The comments box proved to be a useful tool for gathering interesting insights when participants 
provided justifications for the answers in a form of comments. These comments provided further quali-
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tative understanding of the SME judgements and helped uncover the ambiguities in round one that led 
to the disagreements identified during analysis. 
Feedback 
Nelms and Porter18 provide a useful scheme for classifying expert opinion gathering techniques. The 
techniques are differentiated based on whether they possess certain attributes: Talk (whether there is 
interaction between experts), Feedback (whether there is any feedback provided to help with the subse-
quent stages of the gathering process) and Estimate (whether the expert opinion gathering aims at arriv-
ing at a final decision).  
The Space 2030 study was undertaken in an environment where collocation was not feasible. How-
ever, it required that experts engage with one another in discussion and feedback. Given these require-
ments, the Delphi technique was chosen as the means for gathering expert opinion. The technique 
worked well in Stage 3. However, due to the exploratory nature of the questions in Stage 4, the study re-
quired more elements of Talk and Feedback amongst the participants. If geography and logistics permit, 
it would be more productive to bring the SMEs together in a more interactive Delphi-style workshop to 
increase the level of idea exchange between the experts. 
Having international representatives was useful in gaining an international perspective. However, 
given the security and the sensitivity of some topics, it was not possible to obtain information beyond 
unclassified levels from the international participants. In one instance, a SME returned an incomplete 
response because they had to remove some potentially confidential information. One SME from a par-
ticular organisation withdrew from the study in order to not compromise the integrity of their response. 
One other SME response contained classified information, which required extra effort during analysis 
and feedback. While gaining more insightful information is helpful to any study, it is important during 
the design stage to consider the effort to be invested in handling unclassified and classified responses, 
especially during feedback stage. Declassifying classified responses for feedback can result in distorted 
information. 
Data analysis 
Numerical responses invite numerical analysis, but for the most part the SME commentary provided 
the more significant information. The goal of data analysis was primarily graphical representation of 
data to allow the development of intuition about the participant responses.  Several standard formats 
were used (Figure 2), including 
 Scatter-plotting SME responses (of probability or importance) against confidence; 
 Taking histograms of SME responses; and 
 Taking histograms of SME responses weighted by confidence. 
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Figure 2. Example graphical representation of collected data. 
The design of the questionnaires for Stage 3 investigated trends independently from one another. To 
test this non-dependency, all trends vs. all trends probability plots were generated. These plots were 
intended to show any correlation in the ideas of participants – did those who thought ‘near-space devel-
opments’ likely also believe that ‘in-orbit’ manoeuvring would be necessary. Results show that correla-
tions are generally rare and usually weak. We might conclude from the relative rarity of correlations 
that: 
 the trends selected are in fact orthogonal, with little real overlap in either their more primordial 
(science) or their higher (more applied) levels. 
 most SME’s thinking is not organised with the intimate detail that would allow relating the 
trends to one another. 
Finally, one disappointment was that the logical combination of probability and importance (i.e. 
Risk) was not a direct subject of inquiry, since these parameters were estimated for different circum-
stances in different questions.  Consequently such analyses had to be made inductively. 
Conclusion 
This paper has presented how the FAR process and the Delphi technique were employed within the 
Space 2030 Study and discusses the valuable lessons that were gained.  
FAR has proven to be a useful method for constructing future scenarios and providing a traceable 
path from one scenario to another. This study has shown that, within limits, a well constructed FAR 
model and Faustian tree can be reused and the scenarios can be adapted for the requirements specific to 
this study, and that the Delphi technique could then be used to fine-tune scenarios to reflect the best es-
timated futures and to gather expert opinion on the implications of the scenarios on the space opera-
tions. 
Implementing the Delphi technique requires considerable understanding of the analytical purpose, 
the required expertise and the domain of enquiry: sufficient expertise is required to cover the important 
areas of the study; a deep and broad understanding of the domain of interest is needed to formulate 
meaningful questions that will net useful data, and this process might require iterations of questionnaire 
design and testing; gathering data on expertise during Delphi provides a powerful tool for supporting 
future Delphi iterations and for interperating the results 
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Each technique has strengths and weaknesses. However, when combined the two are complimen-
tary, providing a means for exploring the scope of a given problem and for undertaking more narrow 
development of aspects of that problem through structured and rigorous use of expert opinion. These 
insights will prove valuable as others seek to exploit these two techniques within analysis of futures. 
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ABSTRACT - One of the aims of futures studies is to highlight the possibility of sudden, rare, unlikely 
and unexpected events with widespread impacts, as well as to teach the capacity to anticipate them. In 
our turbulent world, such competence is critical not only in order to diminish the vulnerability of socie-
ty and of its actors facing such events, but also to adapt our activities proactively to sustain the conse-
quences of these occurrences. Such events have traditionally been called as Wild Cards in futures stud-
ies. The concept of Black Swans emerged as a synonym for wild cards, introduced by Nassim Taleb a 
few years ago. The list of modern Black Swans is getting longer all the time, while the concept itself is 
highly  debatable.  The Icelandic volcanic ash cloud in April 201 is being discussed in this paper as a 
case in point for collective learning from a black swan.  The effort to anticipate and analyse Black 
Swans is related to several crucial issues in futures studies. First, it is an epistemological and semiotic 
question. Second, Black Swans are closely related to the notion of risks and uncertainties (Future as 
Risks). Third, Black Swans can be used to trigger a learning process towards higher futures aware-
ness, futures consciousness, systematic proactiveness, sustainability and impact analysis (Future as 
Learning). 
Introduction and Background 
One of the aims of futures studies is to highlight the possibility of sudden, rare, unlikely and unexpected 
events with widespread impacts, as well as to teach the capacity to anticipate them. In our turbulent 
world, such competence is critical not only in order to diminish the vulnerability of society and of its ac-
tors facing such events, but also to adapt our activities proactively to sustain the consequences of these 
occurrences. Such events have traditionally been called as Wild Cards in futures studies. The concept of 
Black Swans emerged as a synonym for wild cards, introduced by Nassim Taleb a few years ago (2007). 
The list of modern Black Swans is getting longer all the time, while the concept itself is highly debatable. 
Often presented, well known examples include such events as 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, tsunami in 
SouthEast Asia in 2004, global financial crisis 2008, Haiti earthquake in 2010, as well as the Icelandic 
volcanic ash cloud in April 2010 which is being discussed in this paper as a case. The most recent event 
as a candidate for a manifestation of a Black Swan is the earthquake in Japan in March 2011, followed by 
a devastating tsunami and consequent impacts for a potential nuclear disaster. 
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The effort to anticipate and analyse Black Swans is related to several crucial issues in futures studies. 
First, it is an epistemological and semiotic question. Can futures be anticipated through various signs 
and signals at the present - can futures be foreseen through signs?  Can futures be perceived as consist-
ing of signs? Black swans can be preceded by weak signals or signs of possibly emerging trends pointing 
to them. However, black swans should not be confused with weak signals even though some of them may 
be interconnected. Second, Black Swans are closely related to the notion of risks and uncertainties – can 
futures be perceived as consisting of risks? Third, Black Swans can be used to trigger a learning process 
towards higher futures awareness, futures consciousness, systematic proactiveness, sustainability and 
impact analysis - can futures be approached as a learning process?  
The Icelandic volcanic ash cloud provides a case in point for collective learning from a black swan. 
This case covers several issues ranging from the future of transport, ICT, health, food and agriculture, to 
the relationship and interaction between humans, nature and technology interaction.  
Material and Methods 
At the moment, there is no existing commonly acknowledged methodology for anticipating and identify-
ing Black Swans. This is because black swans are by definition almost impossible to identify prior to 
their happening. However, there is a body of theoretical futures research around the topic of Black 
Swans and Wild Cards. A literature survey was made as a web search covering the journals of Futures, 
and Technological Forecasting and Social Change. The time horizon was chosen as that of a 12 years' pe-
riod, starting from January 1995 up to January 2011. The results are presented in the following chapter 
of results. 
All this discussion in futures literature about Wild Cards and Black swans has not, however,  been so 
far developed into a coherent framework for identifying and anticipating sudden, rare, unlikely and un-
expected events. Futures research is a proactive discipline that seeks for sense-making by developing 
understanding of the future world and helping decision-makers and citizens to prepare themselves for 
the future. There is growing interest shown towards the concept of black swans. They are a challenging 
and debatable but central topic for the advancement of futures research. 
Although no stable models able to predict the future of the earth or of global economy exist, and even 
their theoretical possibility is an open question, it can be argued that the models and toolboxes used in 
futures studies can be significantly improved by a more sophisticated understanding of unexpected, 
Black Swan -like events. There are a few efforts worldwide to provide a methodological framework for 
monitoring forthcoming black swans 45 F18. 
                                                             
 
18 For example, Singapore has established a comprehensive system for Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning 
(RAHSS). Since its inception there is an international conference programme to provide input to the system. The 
University of Manchester has developed another system for gathering and assessing weak signals and wild cards in 
its iKnow project http://wiwe.iknowfutures.eu/scan/easy/. In Finland, a few organisations such as Tekes (The Finn-
ish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation) and Finpro scan regularly futures signals. At Finland Futures 
Research Centre we have developed a concept "Creative Foresight Space" for creatively imagining possible futures 
and corroborating futures thinking and consciousness. The focus of action within this hybrid space (physical, virtu-
al, digital, social) is on using imagination, intuition, improvisation, and exploratory experimentation as co-creative 
futures design. (Heinonen & Kurki 2011). 
 
 182 
Consequently, this paper aims at presenting an evolutive approach to black swans, consisting of a 
three-fold analysis of the Future (futures) as signs, as risks, and as learning. A futures wheel was applied 
in conference session for analysing the case of the volcanic ash cloud from the eruption in Iceland in 
spring 2010. 
Results 
Future as Signs 
The effort to anticipate and analyse black swans is related to several crucial issues in futures studies. 
First, it is an epistemological and semiotic question:  can futures be foreseen through various signs and 
signals at the present or be perceived as consisting of signs as proposed by e.g. Kuusi & Hiltunen (2007)? 
Is it possible to acquire foresight knowledge of forthcoming sudden events? Can such foreknowledge be 
sought through identifying futures signs and signals? 
Futures signals can be strong as presented by megatrends. They can be medium as shown through 
trends. They can be weak as presented by weak signals which are signs of emerging issues, possibly 
strengthening. 46F19 It is advisable to monitor the emerging world by identifying, analysing and interpreting 
futures signals at all these levels (megatrends, trends, weak signals and black swans/wild cards). Black 
swans can be preceded by weak signals or signs of possibly emerging trends pointing to these low proba-
bility but high impact events (see e.g. Petersen 2000; Hiltunen 2010, 74; Kaivo-oja; Kuosa 2007; 2009; 
2010; Schoemaker 2002; Day & Schoemaker 2006). However, Black Swans should not be confused with 
weak signals even though some of them may be interconnected.  
So, what then is a Black Swan? It is by definition a rare, sudden, unlikely, subjectively unexpected 
event that has wide impacts, either unfortunate or fortunate. Its characteristics are rarity, extremity, and 
post-event efforts to explain it. The concept of Black Swans emerged as a synonym for wild cards, intro-
duced by Nassim Taleb in 2007.  In the 17th century people in Europe were convinced via empiric obser-
vation that all swans are white. Later on they discovered that black swans exist too. This proves that 
mere observations are not reliable in forming theories about reality. Taleb, while describing Black 
Swans, says:”the world is most changed by extremely unlikely and unexpected events.” The list of mod-
ern Black Swans is getting longer by the day. Recent events befitting the description range from the man-
made 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 and the ongoing financial crisis of 2008 to the natural ones such as 
the South-East Asian tsunami in 2004, the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the volcanic ash cloud of Ice-
land in 2010. The most recent black swan was seen in Japan in March 2011, followed by a devastating 
tsunami and consequent impacts for a potential nuclear disaster. 
                                                             
 
19 The concept of weak signals dates back to the 1970s (see I.H. Ansoff, Managing strategic surprise by response to 
weak signals. California Management Review Vol. XVIII (2) (1975) 21-33). 
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Wild cards have been discussed in futures studies since the 1970s and black swans since 2007 47F20. We 
conducted an article search using search words “black swan” and “wild card”. The Journals Futures, and 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change were included in the search. Among the search results we 
selected the following articles due to their relevance: Devezas 2010, Elahi 2011,  Goodwin & Wright 
2010, Kuosa 2010, Mendonça et al. 2004, van Notten et al 2005, Saritas & Smith 2011, Smith & Dubois 
2010 and Walker et al. 2010. In the following we summarise and synthesise the discussion on the topic 
in these texts. 
The black swans are about discontinuities and unexpected, they are manifestations of unlinearity. 
The concept of black swan can be seen as a complement to the standard, linear way of anticipating the 
futures by trend analysis (Dubois & Smith 2010). Scientific methods focus on issues that can be empiri-
cally studied and that can be assigned a probability of some degree. An obvious weakness of this ap-
proach is that it neglects discontinuities and the unexpected. Still, the unexpected happens and its wide-
range impacts result partly from the very fact that we are not prepared to their occurrence. Our under-
standing of discontinuities is rudimentary. According to van Notten et al. 2005 the scientific function of 
black swans is the very exploration of potential discontinuity. Discontinuities and unexpected events are 
of crucial importance especially in social sciences where they are ubiquitious and where mathematical 
and strictly scientific methods are largely quite ineffective (Devezas 2010). 
By definition black swans cannot be predicted by looking at the past and present trends. This does 
not mean they are unimaginable, though. Uncertainties are always plausible and surprises conceivable 
(Saritas & Smith 2011). The notion of surprise is strongly related to perception and expectation. Events 
are never surprising in itself, but only in relation to certain views about the environment. A proper sce-
nario development should explore discontinuities to avoid future shocks catching us off guard (van Not-
ten et al. 2005). Thus, black swans can be seen as a practical tool in adapting to turbulent environments. 
They help to switch our thinking mode into a more non-linear and imaginative direction and prepare us 
to confront the environment of constant flux. Though, it is not a sole question of preparedness and adap-
tation. Black swan consequences can open up new space and unforeseeable directions. Black swans tend 
to alter the fundamentals and have radical impacts so that new, possibly beneficial trajectories are creat-
ed. (Saritas & Smith 2011.) In order to escape from the restricted approach of linear trend extrapolation 
Kuosa (2010) proposes an environmental scanning and pattern management framework to provide 
sense-making tools for futures signals. 
Imaginative and open thinking mode is one way of approaching black swans. Goodwin and Wright 
(2010) stress that because anticipating rare and non-linear events is problematic there are only two rem-
edies to them: firstly a) to provide protection for the organisation against the unexpected and also allow 
it to benefit from them if possible and secondly b) to provide conditions to challenge conventional ways 
of thinking. Altough black swans are hard to anticipate, expecting the unexpectable can also be empir-
ism-based.  Mendonça et al.  (2004) suggest a tool that combines imaginative and empiristic approaches 
to identifying black swans and preparing to them: the wild card management system. It is based upon 
two components: weak signals and organisational improvisation. 
                                                             
 
20 Another concept, synonymous of wild cards and black swans is "xevent" or extreme event as proposed by John L. 
Casti at IIASA to illustrate shocks that change our environment. ks. Casti, John, Ilmola, Leena, Rouvinen, Petri & 
Wilenius, Markku (2011) Extreme events. Helsinki. 
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The component of weak signals takes into account those black swans and wild cards that can be an-
ticipated by observating, analysing and interpreting the environment. Weak signals are usually seen as 
information on potential change toward an unknown direction and thus as indicators of black swans. 
(Ibid.) An efficient way to operationalise this kind of research is to mine out-of-the-ordinary sources of 
information (Mendonça et al. 2009). The blindness for black swans and wild cards is often due to lack of 
awareness and a disregard for weak signals and not so much a total surprise (Dubois & Smith 2010). 
The second component of organisational improvisation shows how improvisation can be used to deal 
with the events that cannot be predicted and are unexpected. It encourages non-linear thinking and not 
remaining loyal to planned actions. When needed general plans should be complemented with locally 
sensitive plans. Organisational improvisation highlights emergence: contrary to traditional planning 
practices which ignore emergence issues, organisational improvisation views them as inevitable part of 
complex systems. It calls for experiment with new and untested ways of thinking and problem solving. 
(Mendonça et al. 2004.) Consciousness of black swans tests and enhances the ability of a system to pre-
pare and react to unforeseen but high-impact events (Dubois & Smith 2010). 
Future as Risks 
Black Swans are closely related to the notion of risks and uncertainties. 
 
Figure 1. Futures studies aim at highlighting and alleviating the risks looming above the globe 
(Heinonen 2008). 
185 
Risks are about survival. Humans, companies, nations, wish to have continuity as individuals and 
within communities. This is the basis for both security thinking and futures thinking. (Heinonen 2008).  
New, uncertain, or unexpected things often threaten the feeling of security and survival. Risks have to be 
identified, faced, interpreted and managed. Risk is like the future, they both share the same qualities. 
The future holds a spectre of promises, a huge menu of possibilities. Only a fraction will be realised. Sim-
ilarly of all the risks looming in the future above the globe and humankind – near or far – only a fraction 
will be realised. The concept of risks merits re-thinking within the futures thinking paradigm – new in-
terest has been shown towards risks. The current foreseeable major risks emerge from social, environ-
mental and energy-related issues. These risks have to be anticipated alongside with economic and tech-
nological risks that are often more conspicuous – new angle must be given. Some social phenomena put 
pressure on social cohesion, emerging rapidly and unpredictably in virtual communities – new risks are 
emerging. It is important to note that there are risks looming in real life, but also in virtual life. Not just 
computer crime, but pathological thinking of some minority groups (which can attract masses rapidly in 
virtual communities).  
Risks are associated with uncertainties, and become visible in the flat world due to rapid change, in-
terconnectedness and complexity (Friedman 2006). The future may look as a risky business due to such 
uncertainties. Competitive edge and even survival may result if one is strategically prepared for any-
thing. Schoemaker (2002) even claims that one can profit from uncertainty and succeed in any circum-
stances because of the very capacity to expect the unexpected. Flexibility and robustness are essential 
characteristics of a strategic vision. (Ibid, 220). Aaltonen (2010, 28-29) draws attention to a multi-
ontological futures landscape where different kinds of systems exist in which different causal assump-
tions apply. Therefore, robustness is needed to distinguish between linear, visionary, and disruptive sys-
tems. Uncertainties and risks are especially related to disruptive systematic change. Petersen (2008, 6) 
emphasises the necessity of not only understanding what is coming, but also adapting and adjusting to 
the new reality of coming large-scale disruptions. This is all the more challenging a task, since there are 
no direction-pointing precedents for what is coming. However, he points out that preparation is only 
useful before the fact. 
People tend to think in probabilities and getting the odds right is treated as a critical skill in decision 
making. Black Swan phenomena pose a challenge, because their probability cannot be estimated. (Pos-
ner 2010.) Uncertainty can be simply defined as missing knowledge. Policy failures often follow from a 
failure to take uncertainties into account. Thus considering uncertainties is often crucial for long-term 
policymaking. (Walker et al. 2010). In a world of deep uncertainties illusion of knowledge is the greatest 
danger of all. Despite this ignorance is not associated with wisdom; Socrates said he knew nothing ex-
cept the fact of his ignorance. (Elahi 2011.)  One of the aims of futures studies is to highlight the possibil-
ity of sudden, rare and unexpected events with widespread impacts. Another aim is to teach the capacity 
to anticipate them –  learning from futures. 
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Future as Learning 
Black Swans can be used to trigger a learning process towards 
 higher futures awareness, 
 deeper futures consciousness 
 systematic proactiveness,  
 agile adaptation strategies 
 alternative thinking 
 sustainability and  
 impact analysis. 
The Icelandic volcanic ash cloud provides a case in point for collective learning from a Black Swan 
through interpretations.  The volcanic ash cloud case covers several issues: the future of transport, the 
business of air transport, utilisation of ICT and social media, health issues, food and agriculture, the 
humans’ nature–technology relationship. Black Swans can be used as a starting point for new develop-
ment (patterns of behaviour). Their identification and interpretation is one sub-field within foresight 
competence, foresight intelligence and futures consciousness. In analogy to mathematics where arithme-
tic and geometry provide important fields within the discipline, in futures studies and futures conscious-
ness anticipation of black swans is a useful, although controversial skill that can be learned and prac-
ticed. Learning to expect the unexpected, to imagine the unimaginable, and to know the unknown is a 
mental aptitude and process. It can be learned by doing, by using the existing few systems and frame-
works for identifying and analysing weak signals and black swans/wild cards as mentioned above. It is 
also a part of the peripheral vision that Day & Schoemaker (2006) propose for companies to develop, in 
order to look beyond the field of core businesses or known developments. Peripheral vision aims at de-
tecting weak signals that are considered as critical to company strategies and futures. Such peripheral 
vision could also be sharpened to detect black swans as well. 48F21 Futures consciousness could then cover 
not only horizontal scanning including megatrends, weak signals, and black swans or wild cards, but also 
multisensory and multidimensional grasping of futures as a learning process both in organisations, gov-
ernment, and educational institutes. 
Description of the chain of events of the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud 
The 2010 eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland, although relatively small for volcanic eruptions, caused 
enormous disruption to air travel across western and northern Europe over an initial period of six days 
in April 2010. Additional localised disruption continued into May 2010, as the dry volcanic ash that lay 
on the ground was intermittently swept up by surface winds. The seismic activity started at the end of 
2009 and gradually became more intensive until on 20 March 2010, a small eruption started. The ash 
                                                             
 
21 Day & Schoemaker (2006, 5) use the metaphor of peripheral vision (human eye cf. organization eye) to highlight 
the complex mechanisms underlying an organization's capability to see what lies around the corner. They propose 
seven steps to bridging the vigilance gap: scoping, scanning, interpreting, probing, acting, organizing, and leading. 
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plume rose to a height of approximately 9 kilometres (30,000 ft). 49F22. A few weeks after that, a larger 
eruption created an ash cloud that interrupted all air traffic to, from and within Europe for almost an 
entire week. The volcanic activity of Eyjafjallajökull has of recent returned to normal levels but the scien-
tists at the Icelandic Meteorological Office (IMO) and the Institute of Earth Sciences, University of Ice-
land (IES) continue to monitor the volcano. 50F23 
This paper also presents the results from a workshop session in the conference on Security in Fu-
tures - Security in Change organised by Finland Futures Research Centre (FFRC) in June 2010 in Turku. 
Participants in the methodological session were invited to analyse the case of the above mentioned vol-
canic ash cloud, by applying the futures wheel method (Glenn 2009). On the wall of the conference 
room, there was a futures wheel. The participants then wrote their comments and ideas on the impacts 
of this black swan and attached them directly on the futures wheel. Immediate impacts from the event of 
the volcanic ash cloud were generated on the first circle of the futures wheel. Then indirect or secondary 
impacts were envisioned on the second circle. 
 
 
Figure 2. Futures wheel of the impacts of the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud. 
                                                             
 
22 By 21 May 2010, the second eruption phase had subsided to the point that no further lava or ash was being pro-
duced. However, due to the large quantities of dry volcanic ash lying on the ground, surface winds frequently lifted 
up an "ash mist" that significantly reduced visibility and made web camera observation of the volcano impossible 
23 Igrún Karlsdóttir, Guðrún Nína Petersen, Halldór Björnsson, Halldór Pétursson, Hróbjartur Þorsteinsson, Þórður 
Arason: Eyjafjallajökull eruption 2010 - the role of IMO. http://en.vedur.is/earthquakes-and-
volcanism/articles/nr/2072. Retrieved  27.3.2011 at 17:54. 
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As the Futures wheel indicates, although black swans are often natural disasters, their consequences 
are socio-cultural, political, economic, technological and also ecological. Black swans have deep and far-
reaching impacts on the whole human world. Most consequences of catastrophes are naturally negative 
(e.g. economic losses, negative impacts on the agriculture, and decreasing supply of fresh food), but a 
few positive results can also be found (positive effects for climate, more relaxed attitude towards busi-
ness appointments and slow life, technological improvements). All in all, the consequences are in multi-
tude, so not only a thorough contemplation of possible black swans is essential but analysis and interpre-
tation of their effects also. Thus, we can learn besides anticipation mindset, to rethink the existing para-
digms and patterns of behaviour. This black swan was another reminder of the vulnerability of sophisti-
cated technological systems (here air traffic). The lack of an alternative functioning transport system by 
rail in eastern Europe was accentuated. High speed train network throughout the whole continent could 
outbalance negative impacts from air traffic coming to a halt. One of the participants pointed out that 
the belief in the strength of unexpected nature phenomena will be stronger among younger generations. 
Perhaps the most critical lesson learned was that people remember their size and place on the globe and 
in their respective environments. Human interaction with nature should not take place through techno-
logical domination or dependent on vulnerable constructions, but through human/nature companion-
ship with ambient technology as enhancing the quality of life. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
What you do not know, may become more relevant than what you do know. Anticipation of black swans 
builds up our preparedness for extreme futures. The identification and interpretation of weak signals 
(especially as clustered) may also help in anticipating black swans. The interpretation of black swans 
that have occurred may become a game changer – understanding how the current structures, thinking 
and behaviour should be changed to survive in our turbulent world. Black swans may on one hand lead 
towards discontinuities and tipping points, on the other hand they may be a result of such turns. Antici-
pation of possible (not yet occurred) black swans also means methodological evolution where various 
tools and systems have and will be developed specifically for this purpose. Since the black swans swim 
where the dragons are hidden (Elahi 2011), such techniques, approaches and frameworks are most wel-
come as focus on using imagination, intuition even, and exploratory experimentation as co-creative fu-
tures design. 
We found no major differences or controversies in the definitions of the concept black swan. Instead 
we could formulate a clear synthesis. Above all black swans have a practical function: recognising them 
makes it easier to live and navigate an a world of deep uncertainties. Black swans were seen as vital 
complement or even replacement of the linear, predictable, scientific world view we are so used to. A 
world view that includes black swans brings a lot of added value into human systems: black swans are 
radical by nature, so their impacts are also profound. There are no definite methods to foresee black 
swans, but they can be imagined by thinking out of the box and prepared to by changing the ways we 
organise our actions and systems into a more improvisational direction. Acknowledging the importance 
of weak signals and synthesising individual ones can lead to possible black swans. Re-appreciation of 
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ignorance and the importance of unexpected events is needed: it sets our cognitive framework to suit the 
reality it really is. 
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ORGANISED CRIME AND ENERGY SUPPLY: 
SCENARIOS TO 2020  
Victoria Baines 
The European Police Office (EUROPOL) 
 
ABSTRACT - This paper presents the results of a joint scenario exercise which considered the impact 
of different energy futures on state, society and security, with particular emphasis on lifestyle and be-
havioural change – of the public, the authorities, and organised crime groups. 51F1 The scenarios present-
ed highlight a number of different dynamics with the potential to affect interaction between organised 
crime and energy supply at all levels, and the responses of EU law enforcement. 
Introduction and Background 
Around the world and more specifically in the EU, concerns have been raised regarding future energy 
availability, particularly levels of dependence on hydrocarbon imports (oil and gas). At the same time, 
law enforcement and open source information has indicated that organised crime groups are involved in 
energy supply to the EU and within EU Member States (MS). In the Strategy for Europol 2010–2014, the 
organisation has committed itself to scan the environment for new developments in internal security 
threats. With this in mind, Europol has carried out a scenario management exercise to examine the pos-
sible future involvement of organised crime in energy supply. 
Material and Methods 
A timeframe of ten years was set for the exercise, with the focus on interaction between Organised Crime 
and the energy sector in 2020. Narratives were drafted on the basis of plausible features within this 
timeframe. 
Experts from MS law enforcement, the EU Commission, academia and the private sector were con-
sulted on both the current situation and future developments. Analysis of these responses enabled the 
identification of current signals and helped to structure a subsequent workshop, in which the same 
group of experts identified critical uncertainties based on common themes and key factors in the partici-
pants’ contributions. The following uncertainties were identified as the most critical: geopolitics and se-
curity of supply, price volatility, “respectabilisation” of crime, and lifestyle change. 
                                                             
 
1 This paper is a condensed version of the full report, which can be viewed at www.europol.europa.eu  
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Security of supply and price volatility were considered to be the two uncertainties with the largest 
impact on the energy future and the greatest levels of uncertainty, and as such formed the axes on which 
the scenarios were plotted. A high level of price volatility correlates with a world of unplanned responses 
and inconsistent regulation, while a low level of price volatility correlates with planned responses and 
more consistent regulation. Organised Crime’s drive for respectability and lifestyle change were never-
theless considered to be cross-cutting issues and key factors in the possible futures described, which 
therefore served to flesh out the narratives. 
 
LOW PRICE VOLATILITY HIGH PRICE VOLATILITY
SECURITY OF SUPPLY
INSECURITY OF SUPPLY
§ Unplanned response
§ Inconsistent/Ad hoc Regulation
§ Planned response
§ Consistent/Effective Regulation
Scenario I
“Market Forces”
Scenario II
“Open Season”
Scenario III
“Prohibition”
Scenario IV
 
Figure 1. Plotting the Scenarios. 
This paper presents the first three of these on the basis of consideration of their plausibility, impact 
and opportunities for Organised Crime. Scenario IV remains possible: where energy supply is secure and 
highly regulated, Organised Crime finds opportunities in, for example, illicit fuel supply which undercuts 
legitimate pricing by means of regulatory non-compliance, and the exertion of corruptive influence in 
order to subvert existing restrictions or press for regulation which is more suited to its interests. 
The worlds which result from the dynamics between the two critical uncertainties have been elabo-
rated using the PESTELO approach to environmental scanning 52 F2, not only responding to signals present-
ed by current and developing interactions between Organised Crime and the energy sector, but also 
drawing on an extensive literature review. 
                                                             
 
2 The PESTELO approach considers in turn the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legislative 
and organisational factors. 
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Results 
Scenario I - “Market Forces” 
This is a world in which energy supply is secured by various means, and an absence of more stringent 
regulation of the energy and financial sectors affords a continued role for the major commercial suppli-
ers. In the sense that the energy supply arrangement is not sustainable, this world represents an inter-
mediate stage on the road to “Open Season” (Scenario II). 
MS engage in a certain amount of cooperation in order to achieve comfortable levels of energy secu-
rity on the basis of national priorities. The EU loses its vision in as much as it comes to serve national, 
and even personal, interests: EU policies are somewhat changeable as a result. MS come together to se-
cure energy supply from the most important sources. In cases where supply companies experience high 
levels of OC infiltration, governments and the EU increasingly rely on “deals with the devil” – e.g. bilat-
eral agreements with partners infiltrated by OC, further legitimising OC interests. 
The agreement reached at the 2009 Copenhagen summit on climate change (COP15) is viewed as a 
bargain based on shifting national priorities. As a result, there is little will at central government level to 
exceed the minimum expectations set. Measures to reduce emissions are driven by the prospect of profit 
rather than by climate change concerns: “cap and trade” gains strength because of an already established 
trade in carbon credits and a market for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS); in the absence of requisite 
regulation, this is accompanied by an increase in Emissions Trade Fraud (ETF). Moreover, in light of 
limited will to drive forward anything but the minimum requirements to tackle climate change, popula-
tions outside the EU experiencing the first effects of global warming are on the move. Within the EU, 
national borders remain open, facilitating migration for employment purposes. Such freedom of move-
ment not only acts as a pull factor for both licit and illegal migration to the EU but, especially in areas of 
energy development, also begins to create temporary migrant communities which are vulnerable to the 
influence of OC because of their isolation from mainstream society. 
Free market principles preserve a role for international energy companies, and both globalisation 
and the import/export trade are largely unhindered. The liberalisation of the EU energy market contin-
ues apace, and competition results in price reductions for some consumers. Since the EU market re-
mains open both to foreign direct investment and to acquisitions by foreign energy supply companies, 
OC groups based within and outside the EU have the opportunity to act as shareholders and suppliers 
respectively. Both eventualities afford OC greater control and influence over the legitimate economy, and 
opportunities to exercise power in commercial decision making. 
Outside of the EU, private companies compete with local governments to exploit remaining fossil 
fuel reserves, including those – such as unconventional gas or shale oil – made profitable or accessible 
through technological developments. In cases where supply companies experience OC infiltration, this 
leads to increased OC influence over fossil fuel production. Ultimately, competition for resources leads 
in some source areas to tension between governments and international energy supply companies, and 
the re-nationalisation of dwindling fossil fuel reserves. In this event, such actions push the future to-
wards the “Open Season” scenario.  
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Fuel prices, meanwhile, are still subject to volatility: speculation on energy markets initially goes un-
checked, and recession prompted by spikes in liquid fuel prices remains a real possibility. Further OC 
infiltration of the EU energy sector and the continued practice of speculation conspire to create a situa-
tion in which OC has the ability to affect energy prices for its own profit, whilst each economic setback 
renders legitimate business more vulnerable to compromise. In a similar vein, OC engages in corruption 
of the private sector to gain privileged information on energy futures and to capitalise on short-term in-
vestment opportunities by anticipating price changes. By playing the energy markets, OC groups are also 
able to engage in potentially profitable money laundering. 
Because on the whole EU energy supply is not yet self-sufficient, it remains vulnerable to disruption 
by non-state actors, with a potential impact on price levels. Whilst disruption can be achieved by means 
of terrorist activity (e.g. damage to oil pipelines), equally this vulnerability presents OC groups with op-
portunities to disrupt supply in order to affect price levels, thereby deriving increased profit on invest-
ments. 
In many ways lessons have not been learnt from the global financial crisis of 2007–9. Amongst pri-
vate citizens, meanwhile, the fear of recession and financial hardship remains. This manifests in behav-
iour such as stockpiling and voluntary, consumer driven transition to energy efficient technologies in the 
belief that these will reduce individual expenditure. A cycle of “boom and bust” – be this actual or merely 
perceived – encourages OC groups to hoard liquid fuels and other consumer items for resale in the event 
that prices rise. At the same time, lack of tax harmonisation results in differences in price for end con-
sumers in MS. OC profits from these discrepancies, smuggling liquid fuel within the EU, from low du-
ty/price to high duty/price areas. 
Although renewable energy technology remains expensive, some individuals and local communities 
choose to meet the initial outlay of small-scale independent generation, on the understanding that it will 
be more cost effective in the longer term. Likewise, energy efficient technology is embraced because it is 
money-saving technology. Lithium batteries, for example, are popular because they require less charg-
ing, and there is increased uptake of hybrid vehicles in response to rising or unpredictable fuel prices. As 
energy efficient products become more sought after by consumers, so too is there an upsurge in their 
illicit and counterfeit supply. 
In the absence of enforced limitation on energy consumption and globalisation, however, MS popu-
lations remain active consumers of electrical appliances and electronic gadgets. There is a persistent 
trend for incorporating several different functions and applications in a single appliance, and increasing-
ly efficient infrastructure – e.g. ever faster broadband Internet connections – puts less of a strain on 
electricity consumption: at a global level, this is counterbalanced by the first-time introduction of such 
products to the developing world. By the same token, portable electronic items continue to be highly 
sought after, and illicit supply of these – be they stolen or counterfeit – proves attractive to OC. 
In terms of the energy sector’s attractions to OC relative to other criminal activities, continued glob-
alisation and free market principles combine to make this world one of persistent expansion of telecom-
munications and Internet-mediated functions such as online retail and banking. In this environment, 
Internet-facilitated frauds by means of identity theft and hacking allow OC to derive higher profit and 
quick gains by less visible – and therefore lower risk – methods than direct involvement in energy-
related sectors. Equally, when loss of revenue prompts the adoption of more stringent data security 
measures by banks, retailers and individual consumers, and more concerted legislative and law en-
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forcement responses, the focus of OC reverts to the assured demand and essential supply of the energy 
sector. 
In a profit- as opposed to policy-driven energy landscape, legitimate investment in large-scale re-
newable technologies runs into difficulty. The larger energy companies are unable to justify the compar-
ative lack of quick return to their shareholders, leaving those willing to make longer term investments 
and those with lower capital costs – such as OC – to step in. Beyond 2020, the implications of this are 
that by default OC will be a leading player in renewable energy supply, on which the EU will become in-
creasingly dependent as remaining fossil fuel reserves dwindle. 
The dominant legislative feature of this world is an absence of effective regulation of the energy and 
financial sectors, or more specifically, prevailing self-regulation, a situation reinforced by a comparative 
lack of law enforcement knowledge of these sectors. Since the geopolitical and economic factors provide 
fertile ground for OC infiltration of the energy sector, self-regulation serves to facilitate concealment of 
OC activity. 
Eventually, however, a more consistent focus on asset recovery by governments, and the desire of 
energy companies to know and manage the expectations of their shareholders, lead to the introduction 
of tighter controls on investments, e.g. to determine the origin of investments in the energy sector, and 
legislation throughout the EU against money laundering. As prices continue to fluctuate, speculation on 
energy futures comes under particular scrutiny in an attempt to encourage stability. Additionally, there 
develops a greater focus on corporate criminal liability, in response to the effects of OC infiltration of 
energy supply companies. Legislation to protect the environment from damage related to energy produc-
tion and supply is an afterthought. 
Due to a lack of knowledge and experience in the field, law enforcement initially fails to provide ef-
fective responses to OC involvement in the energy sector and energy finance, preferring that these indus-
tries police themselves. As the amount of lost revenue and the level of OC influence on private compa-
nies become apparent, the tendency for transnational OC investigations to follow money trails leads to 
prioritisation at both national and international levels of financial investigation and money laundering 
cases, incentivised in some countries by the prospect of additional funding for law enforcement, as pro-
vided for in Proceeds of Crime legislation. 
Scenario II - “Open Season”  
In a world of low energy security and high price volatility, governments and non-state actors alike com-
pete to secure access to remaining fossil fuel reserves. Absence of a binding agreement on climate change 
results in poorly coordinated and ad hoc responses to the problem. Outside the EU, populations experi-
encing the first effects of global warming are on the move, putting added strain on the energy resources 
of EU MS against a backdrop of increasing scarcity. 
In some parts of the developing world, this competitive atmosphere manifests as neo-colonialism: 
interested parties seek to carve up territory in energy hotspots, which in turn engenders geopolitical in-
stability. Recognising that fuel ownership is power, the best resourced OC groups move to infiltrate and 
influence both government machinery and large energy companies in source countries, perpetuating the 
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culture of “rent-seeking” 53 F3 already observed in some areas. OC groups from overseas, including those 
from the EU, profit from opportunities for unregulated investment in these areas. 
At the same time, rising prices prompt an increase in oil bunkering, and other fuel thefts in consum-
er nations such as the laundering of “marked” oil 54F4. Meanwhile, suppressed economic growth associated 
with the “resource curse” 55 F5 acts as a push factor amongst source country populations towards both in-
volvement in criminal activity and migration (both licit and illegal) to countries with better living stand-
ards. Prioritisation of energy security in source areas prevents the authorities from responding effective-
ly to other types of criminal activity, abstracting law enforcement resources from policing the trafficking 
of other illicit commodities, such as drugs, counterfeits and human beings. 
Within the EU, increasing energy scarcity, unpredictable price levels and changes of government in 
some MS weaken the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and prompt a movement away from planned 
cooperative responses to ad hoc bilateral agreements. Whilst designed to secure energy supply for indi-
vidual countries, unless complemented by supply diversification these in fact result in new inter-
dependencies, and a shift in the balance of power towards those countries within and outside the EU on 
which the MS depend, and those MS who are self-sufficient, e.g. those with unconventional gas deposits. 
Moreover, in cases where there is direct OC involvement in the energy sector, this entails MS depend-
ence on OC for essential services. Cracks start to show in the EU itself, as new political alliances are 
formed and old alliances regain their strength on the basis of energy requirements. In such a competitive 
environment reduced communication between MS and less effective regulation at EU level foster politi-
cal corruption, thereby providing opportunities for fraud, and the undue influence of OC on decision-
making.  
Accordingly, and in line with an increasing politicisation of energy, MS turn inwards and work to ex-
pand their own energy supply capacities by developing alternative energy sources at a national level and 
improving energy efficiency in response to uncertainty over its availability – also expanding or renewing 
development of local fossil fuel reserves which have previously been inaccessible or unprofitable. In 
some MS this heralds a reversion to nuclear power, in others to solar, wind and hydroelectric generation. 
Whilst nuclear power generation itself remains under state control, nuclear fuel and components be-
come sought after commodities, and impaired cooperation amongst MS means that those nations em-
bracing nuclear power have to make difficult choices concerning the disposal of nuclear waste. In light of 
sensitivities over the risks attached to local storage, there are increased opportunities for OC groups ex-
perienced in waste disposal: given OC’s propensity for non-compliance, this presents obvious risks to 
public health and safety in both MS and countries outside the EU, especially the developing world. The 
drive for local energy supply also prompts increased development of waste-to-energy (WTE) technology, 
doubly attractive in so far as it combines energy production with recycling. Whilst this technology is still 
in its infancy, OC’s historical involvement in waste management means that they are in the vanguard of 
its introduction. 
                                                             
 
3 “Rent-seeking” denotes behaviour whereby individuals or companies use their resources to effect changes in public 
policy from which they themselves will derive benefit. 
4 E.g. cheaper diesel dyed red and intended for use only by off-road agricultural vehicles. 
5 “Resource curse thesis” denotes the phenomenon whereby countries with abundant natural resources experience 
lower economic growth than those with fewer natural resources. 
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Renewable technologies remain expensive to develop in the short term, so public subsidies continue 
to be offered in order to attract investment. These in turn are liable to exploitation by OC, to the detri-
ment of local and national budgets and ultimately, in the event of a failure of these projects to be real-
ised, the end user. Whilst greater focus on renewables and energy efficiency has self-sufficiency as its 
aim, some dependence on countries with reserves of components and expertise essential to current re-
newable technology is inevitable: for example, the importance of rare metals to wind power generation 
and energy efficient battery development, and advances in green energy research and development 
(R&D) not only find world leaders in East and South East Asia, but also open up these markets to the 
possibility of illicit trafficking of components and intellectual property (IP) theft. 
High price volatility results in part from a lack of effective regulation. Energy prices – particularly 
those of liquid fuels – impact on transport costs and, by extension, on the price paid by consumers for 
basic supplies such as food. Because MS enjoy different levels of economic growth, some are more 
equipped than others to weather the storm. Higher operating costs mean fewer opportunities for “new” 
MS growth, which renders legitimate business structures (LBS) vulnerable to investment from OC. At 
the same time, OC profits from differences in terms of taxation and prices by means of illicit traffick-
ing/smuggling of fuel, food and other essential commodities. Black markets thrive, OC profiting from 
price volatility by buying low and selling high. Since these markets are entirely unregulated, customers 
come into contact with dangerous, poor quality and waste-grade commodities. 
The inward focus of MS and constraints on long-distance commercial transport encourage local in-
dustry and agriculture, including biomass crop cultivation. In so far as this improves energy efficiency 
and helps to secure the availability of essential items for local populations this is a positive move. How-
ever, it also presents new opportunities to legitimate and criminal investors alike. Equally, it acts as a 
pull factor to migrants from countries outside the EU and, indeed, MS with lower economic growth and 
living standards. Gangmasters have sizeable irregular workforces at their disposal, and MS become in-
creasingly dependent on OC and irregular labour for the production of both essential and luxury con-
sumer items. 
In the absence of EU-wide financial regulation, investment in MS energy sectors by non-EU actors 
continues apace, with legitimate and criminal investors alike exploiting opportunities presented by regu-
latory diversity in the EU, facilitating the further infiltration by OC of essential legitimate services. 
Moreover, a world in which energy is increasingly sought after and subject to fluctuations in price is one 
in which OC is able – with the requisite knowledge and expertise – to launder money at a profit, thereby 
generating further funding for criminal activity. Additional opportunities emerge in the form of privati-
sation of state-controlled services in response to recessions triggered by oil spikes: with comparatively 
high levels of ready funds, commercial concerns with links to OC are well placed to step into this gap in 
the market. 
Private citizens subject to higher prices, a lower quality of life and perhaps unemployment come into 
increasing proximity with OC, through direct involvement in criminal activity, purchasing fuel and other 
goods from the black market, or indeed looking to OC groups for security. In this society, outages and 
brown-outs are a reality, and low-level criminals take advantage of the cover of darkness to engage in 
looting and robbery. Fear of crime increases, fuelled by feelings of insecurity and isolation, and tensions 
between resident and migrant communities: national and local law enforcement, meanwhile, are subject 
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to the same cuts in expenditure as other government services and are less able to respond effectively. 
Street policing is increasingly conducted by private security firms, and OC groups are instrumental in 
keeping the peace and communities safe. At its worst, this manifests as racketeering, with OC profiting 
from threats of violence. 
Reduced availability of liquid fuel at a stable price combined with technological advances encourages 
more people to work from home. This has a positive impact on both family life and community spirit, 
marking a reversal of the trend for commuter towns which are deserted in the day. Overseas tourism is 
adversely affected by fuel prices. In some MS a surge in local tourism driven by family budgets compen-
sates for this, and opportunities for investment present themselves accordingly: in those MS and non-EU 
nations with high levels of economic dependency on overseas tourism, numbers of unemployed and de-
prived citizens swell.  
Driven by uncertainty and financial constraints, there is increased interest in small-scale power gen-
eration by individuals and local communities. Since in the short-term this technology remains expensive 
there is a corresponding increase in the theft and resale of generators and components: at the same time, 
OC steps in to provide power facilities where local funds are lacking. As individuals seek to become more 
self-sufficient, MS also begin to see an increase in organised wood theft and resale, with a corresponding 
impact on local environments as a result of both deforestation and higher levels of emissions from wood 
burning. 
In an effort to save money the public also embraces energy efficiency. There is a captive market not 
only for stolen, but also counterfeit or “duty free” versions of, goods such as lithium batteries, energy 
efficient light bulbs, and electrical appliances with low energy ratings. This buoyant illicit trade has a 
negative impact on the legitimate trade in such products, further restricting economic growth in MS. 
Legislative measures are largely reactive, driven by perceived energy insecurity and introduced only 
in response to observable activities. In an effort to preserve dwindling resources, MS legislate against 
immigration, effectively shutting their doors to migrants: accordingly, the largest migrant communities 
are found in the MS which are last to legislate. Higher penalties are introduced for crimes such as theft 
of fuel and energy components, and electricity diversion, as are administrative penalties for energy wast-
age and inefficiency. Legislation against counterfeit products becomes more stringent as the negative 
effects of counterfeit medicines, etc. on public health and safety are observed, as does legislation against 
the underground economy in an attempt to protect legitimate commerce. 
By the same token, new investigative priorities (e.g. fuel and IP theft) and reduced law enforcement 
capacity conspire to take their toll on the concept of Intelligence Led Policing. A shift of focus to national 
and local policing priorities makes transnational OC less visible, enabling it to flourish comparatively 
undetected. Environmental crime becomes a priority only when the effects of unregulated waste disposal 
become visible. Whilst there exists the will to regulate the energy and financial sectors with a view to de-
termining the origin of investments and stabilising energy prices by limiting speculation, in practical 
terms the need for capital injection in an uncertain financial climate overrides this. 
Scenario III - “Prohibition” 
A world of low energy price volatility is one in which effective regulation – be this by means of fuel price 
banding or taxation – is key. EU MS therefore cooperate to achieve fuel price stabilisation. A stable price 
 202 
is not necessarily a low price, however, and the elimination of differences in taxation puts some of the 
newer MS at an economic disadvantage. 
Subsidies on fuel are afforded to MS with lower levels of economic development. Indeed, this is an 
EU which relies on subsidies not only for price relief, but also for the implementation of planned energy 
transition. These subsidies enable, for example, MS with land to spare to become powerhouses for the 
production of biofuels, thereby boosting growth. From a social perspective, subsidies create new energy 
production and transition “hotspots” within the EU, which experience the social problems and volume 
crime associated with rapid urbanisation, and which act as a pull factor to migration – both licit and ille-
gal – from outside. This inevitably puts added strain on law enforcement in these areas. 
Subsidies incentivise energy efficiency, and demand and emissions reductions in MS, encouraging 
active participation in the EU. But where there are subsidies, there is subsidy fraud, and the potential for 
political corruption with the aim of rent-seeking. And since subsidies are necessary to the successful in-
troduction of a range of green energy initiatives including renewable energy production, research and 
development (R&D), public transport and industrial Green Growth (e.g. LED production) there are a 
plethora of opportunities for OC in this arena. 
A united EU negotiates with major oil and gas companies to ensure supply of hydrocarbons, impact-
ing on bilateral agreements between MS and energy companies, companies’ revenue from these and, 
ultimately, relations between the EU and major suppliers. Whilst the energy market within the EU con-
tinues to be liberalised, regulation is such as to discourage non-EU involvement. 
Producing nations excluded from major deals with the EU start to engage with criminals in MS with 
a view to feeding illicit markets in the EU. By this token, state and non-state actors deemed unsuitable 
for partnership in licit energy supply have the opportunity to forge powerful networks of illicit suppliers. 
Some producing nations outside the EU are consequently in the process of transforming into rogue or 
pariah states, ultimately risking military intervention from consuming nations. 
Standard fuel prices and tax levels across the EU shift OC focus from smuggling within the EU to 
smuggling to or from the EU. Policing the borders of the EU is therefore a high priority, with low levels 
of energy security making “leakage” particularly undesirable. By the same token, standardisation 
prompts the involvement of EU OC groups in illicit energy supply outside the EU, exploiting those areas 
where price and taxation differences persist. EU policing agencies therefore find themselves increasingly 
responsible for preventing and investigating energy-related crimes committed by their nationals over-
seas. 
In line with a more planned response to the issue of energy security, there is some political will to 
drive forward climate change targets. Accordingly, there is greater regulation of carbon emissions, and 
more severe penalties are introduced for environmental crime – both of which have positive effects on 
the environment in the longer term. Policy rather than market forces stimulates expansion in the EU 
Emissions Trading System (ETS), providing further opportunities for Emissions Trading Fraud, whilst 
the burgeoning industry of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) attracts the attention not only of public 
subsidy fraudsters but also of those wishing to place criminal investments. Beyond 2020, advances in 
carbon transport enable those MS wishing to store large amounts of CO2 to benefit from subsidies and 
growth opportunities, but also engender a situation in which a small number of states become “carbon 
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dumps” for the rest of the EU. Where OC is directly involved in CCS provision, its tendency to non-
compliance raises legitimate concerns about public safety. 
Measures taken to minimise price volatility also contribute to improving energy security, in time bring-
ing the situation closer to the “ideal” scenario of low price volatility + high levels of energy security. In ful-
filment of commitments to reduce emissions, renewable and nuclear energy solutions are developed at 
both MS and EU level. These require considerable amounts of investment over and above subsidisation 
which, along with investment in price-stabilised hydrocarbons and electricity, offer the prospect of sound 
returns in the longer term: with regard particularly to renewable technologies, as in “Market Forces” (Sce-
nario I) OC’s lower capital costs mean that it can step in to meet the shortfall in legitimate investment. 
The overwhelming need for substantial investment in the energy sector to fund transition therefore su-
persedes the requirement for comprehensive legislation against money laundering and regulation of the 
origins of investments. Energy speculation, on the other hand, is increasingly the object of regulatory scru-
tiny, as MS and the EU seek to eliminate sources of price volatility: accordingly, energy investment is not so 
attractive to OC groups looking for quick returns, but rather benefits those who are willing to play the long 
game, or who are content merely to have successfully placed the proceeds of crime. As in “Open Season” 
(Scenario II), transition to renewables entails – at least in the short term – a level of EU dependence on 
countries with reserves of essential components such as rare metals, or those with more developed exper-
tise in green technologies. As a result, the EU is a choice destination for the illicit trafficking of renewable 
components. 
Price stabilisation contributes to the prevention of economic volatility in general, which helps to make 
life more predictable for end consumers. At the same time, energy consumption is subject to a number of 
controls, and measures are introduced which are designed to effect profound lifestyle change. Energy effi-
ciency measures are welcome where they have the added benefit of reducing costs for consumers, e.g. in 
the use of energy efficient light bulbs, white goods and buildings insulation. But where the drive for energy 
efficiency is enforced by means of prohibitive legislation or pricing it is met with some resistance. 
So, when smart electricity grids are introduced in order to charge consumers more for energy con-
sumed at peak times, and MS governments introduce in-car meters and charges for car use, public feel-
ing against “surveillance state” measures gathers strength and concerns are raised over perceived moves 
to calculate the worth of a human being by means of his carbon footprint. This manifests as civil unrest, 
and MS law enforcement agencies find themselves increasingly required to abstract resources from 
combating OC in order to police public disorder. 
Some private citizens inevitably look to unorthodox and even illegal means to maintain their life-
styles: in this context black markets for both foreign goods and liquid fuels flourish. More specifically, 
there is a market for fuel stolen or diverted from authorised use by e.g. agriculture and the emergency 
services. This impacts on the effectiveness of these sectors – including the responsive capacity of law 
enforcement – and renders employees in these professions vulnerable to corruption. Looking ahead, in-
creased fuel losses prompt an expansion of marking or dyeing, and higher penalties for diversion. Detec-
tion of diversion, however, remains a problem. By the same token, there is a market for devices which 
subvert demand limitation measures, such as smart energy meter or vehicle charge “scramblers”. 
In order to enforce demand limitation, energy efficiency and environmental protection, penalties are 
introduced or made more severe. Where a criminal offence is established (e.g. environmental crime) in-
vestigation and prosecution falls to law enforcement in MS and, if appropriate, at EU level: for civil or 
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administrative transgressions such as energy wastage or failure to meet green construction regulations, 
fines are imposed. Over time, however, the authorities come to deal with such a high volume of in-
fringements that some MS establish law enforcement agencies dedicated to policing offences relating to 
energy production and consumption. 
Those who accept the restrictions placed on their energy consumption inevitably experience lifestyle 
change. In the short-term at least, electricity, gas and petrol take larger shares of household and compa-
ny budgets, encouraging reductions in consumption and an uptake of energy efficient technology. This 
manifests in small changes which impact on traditional perceptions of productivity e.g. prolonged travel 
times as a result of increased public transport use, a reduction in long distance travel for face-to-face 
business meetings. Facilitated by ever faster broadband internet connections – themselves increasingly 
energy efficient – individuals and commercial concerns exploit online and “virtual” presences to their 
full potential, until such time as research and development in aviation and automotive industries pro-
duce viable long-distance transport alternatives. 
The more commerce is conducted online, the more data there is liable to compromise. Energy-
related regulations therefore indirectly provide increased opportunities for internet facilitated organised 
criminality such as identity theft and – at a commercial level – cyber-espionage. The energy sector itself 
is vulnerable, e.g. to hacking into smart grids for the purposes of extortion or power diversion. Accord-
ingly, the number of cybercrime investigations of this type is even higher than projected on the basis of 
technological developments alone. 
Many OC groups experience the same constraints on mobility, etc. as other members of society: in 
this regard, policing them becomes more cost effective, as offline surveillance is replaced by online 
monitoring. Better resourced and better connected OC groups with ready access to illicit fuel supplies, 
however, have a commercial advantage in so far as they are able to travel comparatively unhindered and 
transport goods over long distances. In this regard they are able to provide services such as haulage 
which can no longer be fulfilled by legitimate business. In some MS, the impact of regulation is such that 
OC has more fuel at its disposal, and is therefore more mobile, than law enforcement. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Ultimately, there is no “preferred” scenario for law enforcement – for instance, regulatory diversity with-
in the EU leads to OC exploitation of national differences, whilst strong EU regulation prompts OC ex-
ploitation of external borders. Engagement in this exercise has, however, highlighted a number of differ-
ent dynamics with the potential to affect interaction between Organised Crime and the energy sector at 
all levels, and the responses of EU law enforcement. It is now the intention to prepare for these by moni-
toring indicators of events described in the scenarios, and disseminating updates to law enforcement on 
their implications. More detailed discussion of the challenges and opportunities facing law enforcement 
remains classified. In demonstrating the value of scenarios to Europol, this exercise paves the way for 
further use of futures methods in the EU’s fight against Organised Crime. 
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ABSTRACT – Airports, as part of the critical infrastructure of a country, have repeatedly been the 
target of terrorists’ attacks. Security measures meant to render these threats harmless have mostly 
been introduced in response to specific occurrences, thus allowing the potential attackers to always 
remain one step ahead. As this approach seems inappropriate for dealing with future security threats, 
this paper provides a proactive approach to identify future threats and their coverage by airport secu-
rity processes. To meet the requirements of a complex and critical system such as airport security a 
standard scenario process has been enhanced. This approach is presented in this paper.  
Introduction 
Mobility, in particular air transport, is vital to the economic stability and growth of a nation. Air 
transport symbolises national self-confidence and self-conception, which made commercial aviation a 
preferred target for attacks of terrorists and other offenders. Airports are part of the critical infrastruc-
ture of a country and form the gateway for most terrorists’ attacks on the air transport system. In the 
past political and related scientific approaches to cope with airport security matters were primarily reac-
tive ones (Salter, 2008; Sweet, 2002). New security measures have regularly been introduced in a politi-
cal ad-hoc process as a consequence of specific security incidents. The well coordinated terrorist attacks 
on September 11 are the most prominent example (ACRP Synthesis 3, 2007). The liquid ban after the 
transatlantic aircraft plot in 2006 is another example for this costly and often inefficient process of reac-
tive action.  
A precondition to overcome this reactive procedure would be to apply an anticipatory approach, 
which allows exploring the different characteristics of potential threats and to adapt the security pro-
cesses accordingly. This would not only require an in-depth understanding of the many interlinked and 
complex airport processes, but also a systematic assessment of threat aspects or elements as well as a 
related analysis of possible and plausible future threats. Future research methods could in principle fill 
                                                             
 
6 This article has been developed in course of the research project „SiVe“, which is funded by the Federal Ministry 
for Education and Research as part of the German research program for civil security, which in turn is part of the 
high-tech-strategy of the Federal Government of Germany. 
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the methodological gap for this purpose. The use of the well established scenario technique can give new 
insights into possible future threat situations and thus is an important prerequisite for any assessment of 
current and future security measures. 
The typical scenario building process is, however, insufficient for these purposes as it only results in 
a small amount of plausible future scenarios with a rather global focus (see next section). Furthermore, 
such an approach allows dealing with only a relatively small amount of elements in order to keep the 
process manageable. This is not appropriate for analysing a clearly defined system, which has to deal 
with a large variety of possible threats and whose processes are to be improved at a very detailed level. 
This scope requires an approach for the development of a very high number of standardised scenarios 
which show a detailed level of abstraction. 
In this paper we propose a method, which allows generating the required large variety of consistent 
scenarios and analysing them in a systematic way. A matrix-based method adapted from system analysis 
and complexity management methods is applied in order to analyse the airport security system. The 
combinations of different threat aspects forming a valid threat scenario and their link to related security 
measures have been assessed and implemented in a matrix. Drawing upon such a database, structurally 
consistent scenarios can be produced in a standardised form. Analysing the resulting scenarios enables 
the user to better anticipate possible future threats, identify weak points in the security structures and 
thus to proactively improve the respective processes. 
First, the standard scenario approach with its advantages and shortcomings in context of airport se-
curity will be described. Next the enhanced approach, which allows including a high level of detail and 
complexity of the respective system without compromising the manageability for decision makers, will 
be introduced. This includes system “capture”, scenario building and related analyses. The last section 
concludes the results and provides an outlook for further research tasks. 
The Standard Scenario Approach 
In order to deal with prospective challenges in a proactive way, future research or foresight methods are 
increasingly gaining acceptance and relevance for companies and politics alike. The scenario process is 
one of the most prevalent techniques in the toolbox of future research methodology 57F7, which is justified 
by a variety of strengths of this method. Scenarios broaden the scope of a decision maker by providing a 
range of possible outcomes and insight into the underlying drivers of change. Furthermore they uncover 
already well developed trends or predetermined outcomes such as demographic developments and they 
help to avoid biased and lopsided group results by facilitating contrarian thinking. Godet described sce-
narios as useful in a fivefold way, as they “stimulate the imagination, reduce inconsistencies, create a 
common language, structure collective thought, and enable appropriation by decision makers” (Godet, 
2000). However, scenarios are also prone for misinterpretation and abuse (Roxburgh, 2009). Some have 
described scenarios as counterproductive for developing a clear vision and therefore not suited for lead-
ership tasks. Such a position neglects the fact that a goal can also be robust under several different sce-
                                                             
 
7 The Millennium Project of the American Council for the United Nations University has published the most com-
prehensive documentation of related methods (Glenn and Gordon, 2009). 
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narios. Decision makers, however, confronted with scenarios when they are actually searching for a one-
dimensional vision or prognosis, therefore often choose one or two scenarios, which are closely related 
to their own image of reality. Ignoring the outer scenarios leaves leaders exposed to any kind of dramatic 
change. The potential of scenarios can therefore only be exploited if they are correctly applied and un-
derstood.  
The procedure. In the 1970s scenarios entered the field of strategic planning, both in public and pri-
vate sectors, with the methodologies developed and made popular by consultancy groups such as Battelle 
(Godet and Roubelat, 2000). The Battelle approach (e.g. Von Reibnitz et al., 1982) was structured in 
eight steps, where a problem specification (1) is followed by environmental screening (2) which then re-
quires a specification of the relevant parameters and characteristics (3). This is followed by a clustering 
of assumptions (4), an interpretation of selected scenarios (5), an analysis of wild cards (6) and implica-
tions (7), which is then concluded by concrete action planning (8). 30 years later de Jouvenel (2000) 
provided a comprehensive review of scenario methods and described the prospective procedure in a sim-
ilar way but condensed it to five basic steps: defining the problem and choosing the horizon (1); con-
structing the system and identifying key variables (2); gathering data and drafting of hypotheses (3); ex-
ploring possible futures, often with the help of tree structures (4); and outlining strategic choices (5). In 
the following these steps will be referred to as the standard scenario process. The system analysis (in 
step 2 and 3) also includes an assessment of the interrelations within the system, which is generally im-
plemented by a cross-impact analysis (Gordon and Hayward, 1968). Apart from similarities in the differ-
ent standard processes described above, it is obvious that every scenario generation process varies with 
the specific topical context, the experience and the tools of the respective moderator. 
Characteristics of standard scenario problems. Before starting the scenario generation process the 
following question has to be asked in order to choose the appropriate methodological steps: For what 
purpose are scenarios generally well suited and what are the relevant features in the respective system or 
topical context? In cases of large uncertainty and thus numerous and quite different possibilities for fu-
ture developments in the respective environment, scenarios cannot be built reliably at any level of detail. 
But even if this is not the case, it is problematic to structure “the unknown”. A reasonable and helpful 
way to approach this problem is to identify and describe the scenarios by means of a small amount of 
decisive variables. Scenarios can thus be characterized by the two most important driving forces, result-
ing in an illustration of scenario-axes (van’t Klooster and van Asselt, 2006) with the four quadrants rep-
resenting four related scenarios. Such a structure, which allows making seemingly unrelated data opera-
tionally useful, proved to be quite valuable in environments, where few decisive variables characterise an 
economic sector or certain political developments sufficiently. However, even for issues where many var-
iables are needed to describe the environment 58F8 the number of resulting scenarios rarely exceeds four. 
This is mainly due to simplicity reasons in order to avoid overwhelming the decision maker (de 
Jouvenel, 2000). 
Airport security. In the context of airport security it is neither sufficient to use a small amount of de-
scriptive variables, nor is a small number of scenarios adequate to cover the possible varieties of future 
                                                             
 
8 The choice of used variables is mostly based on an uncertainty-impact-analysis, where a high value for both of the-
se characteristics is required for including a variable in the further analysis. 
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threats. Here a clearly defined complex security system (characterized by a variety of utilized processes, 
technologies and involved actors) has to deal with a large variety of threat aspects and therefore many 
variables or critical uncertainties. An approach for dealing with airport security in a proactive way would 
therefore require a process, which includes advantages of scenario planning without compromising the 
specific requirements of the airport security system. Such requirements include the development of nu-
merous standardised scenarios, which still offer a high level of abstraction. This is necessary as scenarios 
– in this context – serve to identify as much security threats as possible and not just an idea of the most 
plausible lines of development. These requirements are not in line with the standard scenario approach 
delineated above. The next chapter describes an approach, which allows to fulfil these requirements in a 
prospective and therefore proactive way and thus to overcome the shortcomings of standard scenario 
planning in the context of airport security. 
The Enhanced Structural Complexity Scenario Approach 
System coverage, data gathering and structuring  
As mentioned above most scenario processes approach the topic in question in a structured way, follow-
ing clear steps. The procedure may vary in detail from one scenario project to another but the basic steps 
mostly stay the same. This chapter will demonstrate how the adaptation of standard scenario methods 
helped to overcome the constraints faced when dealing with large, complex systems on a very detailed 
level. The procedure shall be demonstrated by drawing on examples from a scenario process conducted 
at Bauhaus Luftfahrt concerning airport security, which was performed by means of methods of struc-
tural complexity management, originating from product development methodology (Lindemann et al., 
2009). 
The first step of the standard scenario process (see previous chapter) is conducted to define the 
problem as well as to choose the horizon. Environmental scanning (Gordon and Glenn, 2009) can help 
to detect important influencing factors as well as to define the limits of the system in question. In the 
case described in this chapter expert discussions as well as literature reviews helped to identify potential 
influencing elements of the airport security system. During this process the borders of the system were 
clearly defined or, to put it in de Jouvenel’s words, the horizon was chosen. 
Once the system’s borders were defined, the variables influencing airport security were compiled – a 
procedure corresponding to step two of the standard approach. To be able to analyse interdependencies 
within the airport security system from an integral point of view, security measures as well as elements 
of threat scenarios were gathered. To escape the danger of subjectivity, elements were collected by ex-
perts from different backgrounds and with different interests in the process. Structuring the collected 
elements was the next step in the conducted scenario process. The terms were clustered and structured 
hierarchically. In this first version 210 elements constituted the system on the lowest hierarchy level, 
structured by up to seven hierarchy levels and subsumed under 15 top level categories. 
Following a standard scenario process the next step would have been to transfer the elements to a 
matrix to be able to carry out a cross-impact analysis of all gathered elements. By transferring the col-
lected terms to a matrix the elements serve as row headings and as column headings – both in the same 
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order. Diagonal matrix cells thus represent self-reflexive dependencies. Since the system shows a very 
high level of detail this would have required specifying 44.100 relations (Figure 1). 
 
 
 Figure 1.  Multiple Domain Matrix on element level. 
Since this is an impossible task concerning time resources 59F9 another way had to be found to approach 
the cross-impact analysis. At this point it was necessary to alter the standard scenario process and adapt 
the approach to the specific requirements of the airport security system. Thus an intermediate step was 
introduced to reduce the relations to the logically necessary connections: This is generally necessary if a 
system consists of too many single elements (and thus element interrelations) to be considered within a 
reasonable timeframe. To gain a more general impression of the system it is vital to change the level of 
abstraction. Up to this point the focus has been laid on the element level, the perspective is now broad-
ened, focussing on the highest level (the “domain level”) of the system. On this level of abstraction it can 
be verified which of the domains are directly linked to each other and which of them are not connected at 
all. The latter domain-pairs can later be excluded when performing a cross-impact analysis on the ele-
ment level. This interim step reduces the considered element connection significantly to a feasible 
amount. 
After identifying the domain-linkages, the direction and specific quality of each relation was dis-
cussed and named. With the help of a flowchart these connections were illustrated (see Figure 2). The 
arrows in Figure 2 represent the direction as well as the quality of a relation between two domains (e.g. 
“Potential Offender” has “Intention”; “Tool/Weapon” is suitable for “Target”). 
 
                                                             
 
9 If seven experts would have discussed each element-pair for only one minute this would have resulted in approxi-
mately 650 person days of work. 
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 Figure 2. Detail of flowchart (showing 9 out of 15 domains). 
After both the quality of the logically necessary interrelations and their direction of influence are 
specified, domains can be transferred back to a matrix design. Figure 3 shows the result for those do-
mains of airport security, which are relevant in the context of this paper. Each filled matrix cell repre-
sents an arrow from the flow chart und thus the connection of one domain to another. In the matrix cells 
each type of connection is specified. Just as in the element matrix (Figure 1), the domains in the rows 
influence the domains in the column heading. This representation method makes it possible to docu-
ment the direction as well as the specific kind of relation in a very clear way and thus allows for an intui-
tive access to the data. The presented section of this domain matrix can be subdivided into two major 
areas: the red represents the elements necessary to form a valid threat scenario and the blue represents 
the preventive and reactive (i.e. emergency) countermeasures an airport can apply. 
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Figure 3.  Detail of matrix on domain level (showing 11 out of 15 domains). 
After the domain’s relations have been reduced to the logically necessary ones, the standard scenario 
process can be picked up again. According to de Jouvenel (2000) a cross-impact matrix is often em-
ployed at this stage to analyse the relations between elements. It is typically used as “a schema for collat-
ing and systemizing […] expert judgments, so as to make it possible to construct a conceptual substitute, 
however imperfect, for a whished-for but nonexistent theory of how events affect each one another in a 
multidisciplinary context.” (Helmer, 1981). At this point the level of abstraction has to be changed back 
to the lowest hierarchy level of the system, the element level. Each matrix cell in the domain level repre-
sents a sub-matrix on the element level. For the following cross-impact analysis only those element rela-
tions are considered that belong to a domain interrelation that is marked as logically necessary in the 
domain matrix.  
To ensure a certain level of quality and to overcome the impending subjectivity the determination of 
the connections has to be carried out by a certain number of researchers with different scientific back-
grounds. In most cases binary decision (indicated by 0 and 1) sufficed to document the relationship of 
two elements. In some cases a more detailed differentiation was necessary and the relation was specified 
by a weighted value (+2, +1, 0, -1, -2), indicating positive or negative influences. For example a terrorist 
could have the intention to cause commercial damage, a high loss of human lives and thus demoralize 
the population. He could do this by attempting to smuggle explosives or a knife through the hand lug-
gage check. This is the point where the airport can render the whole threat scenario harmless. Security 
measures always address single aspects of threat scenarios and never the scenario as a whole. By detect-
ing elements of the scenario one hopes to render the whole potential threat unsuccessful. If, for example, 
the explosives are detected during the hand luggage check the whole scenario falls apart because the of-
fender cannot complete the scenario without a weapon.  
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In a standard scenario process the next step would be to collect data concerning the past, present 
and possible future development of the considered variables. As a consequence of the very high level of 
abstraction of the considered airport security system the elements themselves are not subject to devel-
opment. It is their interaction within the system that lets the system as a whole evolve. Thus the com-
plexity and high detail does not allow for approaching the compilation of scenarios with the help of plau-
sible projections. Consequently, another way has to be found to extract the information gathered during 
the cross-impact analysis to generate consistent scenarios. This process, which is completely beyond the 
scope of the standard scenario process, will be described in the following section. 
The Scenario Building Process 
The specified connections in the scenario-part of the matrix (illustrated by the red area in Figure 3) build 
the base for generating structurally consistent and thus plausible scenarios. Assuming that the matrix 
comprises all possible threat elements and correct interconnections between them, one could theoreti-
cally claim that all possible threat scenarios are covered by this approach. All different shapes a scenario 
can assume are documented through different combinations of the interlinked elements. The elements 
of a historic or fictive threat scenario then can be traced within the detailed system matrix (see Figure 1). 
Two results arise from mapping scenarios on to the documented structure: By mapping historic scenari-
os the quality of the documented system can be scrutinized and by mapping fictive scenarios on to the 
matrix the plausibility of the scenario itself can be validated regarding its structural consistency.  
To verify the consistency of fictive scenarios one has to take a close look at the system on element 
level and check the interlinkage of the different element pairs one by one. Since the system does not only 
consist of threat scenario elements but also includes security measures, the relation between the scenar-
io and potentially effective counter-measures can be traced. Again the connection of each element of the 
threat scenario to each element of the security measures has to be assessed. Because of the high struc-
tural complexity it is very time consuming to trace each connection. To make the system more easily ac-
cessible and to overcome these problems, the domains of the system were connected via an underlying 
process logic derived from the partitioning process and connected by the Boolean algebra operators AND 
and OR. This logic was applied to the whole dataset (the single matrix elements) in a tool based on MS 
Excel called “scenario builder”. 
The “scenario builder” helps to compile threat scenarios and offers a clear representation of the sce-
nario-specific countermeasures. It allows generating (threat) scenarios by successively choosing con-
sistent elements from different domains until a scenario is completed. The sequence is based on the un-
derlying logic (starting with the “potential offender”, as illustrated in Figure 2) and every successive 
choice or step only allows choosing from a reduced selection of elements in the next domain, according 
to the logical link from the previous choice. The scenario builder thereby guides the user through the 
process of compiling elements to form a consistent scenario. Besides creating scenarios in a very time-
efficient way, this approach has the advantage of also producing scenarios that might seem to make no 
sense from a rational point of view but that are at the same time structurally consistent – e.g. scenarios a 
mentally disabled person might pursue. After the scenario is compiled, the scenario builder automatical-
ly lists the security measures that are connected to the elements of the scenario. This helps to evaluate 
 214 
the effectiveness of existing security measures because the scenario and the related measures are directly 
opposed.  
The System Analysis 
The content of the matrix allows analysing many structural aspects of the security system and their rela-
tion to specific threat elements. One possibility is to analyse the risk coverage by preventive security 
measures (Cole et al., 2009) but single threat aspects or elements are not the relevant perspective, as 
their combination (or the scenario) creates the valid threat. The scenario builder renders the broad space 
of all structurally consistent scenarios accessible in a rather intuitive way. To gather a certain amount of 
scenarios in order to analyse them, for example with respect to the related security measures, is still a 
time-consuming activity. The scenario building process has been automatised in order to be sure to base 
the evaluation of the function of the security measures in relation to different scenarios on a broad data 
base. Through the automatic analysis the span of the space of all structurally consistent scenarios can be 
fully exploited. The first analysis of the airport security system, which had to run under certain re-
strictions 60F10 in order to match the available calculating capacity, resulted in more than 220.000 scenari-
os. With this large (and theoretically complete) set of scenarios it is possible to analyse structurally weak 
points in the airport security system. For this purpose the scenarios can be sorted by the number of re-
lated security measures, which are potentially addressing the respective threat elements. By clustering 
similar scenarios, where in principle only a small amount of countermeasures are able to address the 
threat, one can identify threats which are dangerous from a structural point of view. 61F11  Thus, focusing on 
the system itself, one can identify points in the system, which are so far insufficiently protected or where 
processes can at least be ameliorated in order to address more threat aspects. 
Figure 4 illustrates how the different parts of (standard) threat scenarios can be opposed to relevant 
counter-measures and consequently be visualized. This example shows a cluster of similar scenarios, 
where a suicide bomber tries to smuggle explosives into the security zone of an airport to reach a specific 
target. The columns depict the nine domains of the threat scenarios. The numbers in the blue squares 
represent the scenario elements, while the ones in the red boxes indicate the elements of preventive 
counter-measures, which are part of the airport security system. When the terrorist tries to conceal the 
weapon on his body (item 58), the most relevant counter-measure is the passenger control (item 111), 
while concealing in the hand luggage (item 61) is, amongst others, addressed by the hand luggage check 
(item 113). 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
10 These restrictions included the limitation to one threat element per domain, which significantly reduced the pos-
sible combinations and therefore number of threat scenarios. 
11 At this point in the analysis we neglect the differences in actual effectiveness of security measures, the focus here is 
on structural links between threat elements and security measures. 
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 Figure 4.  Threat scenario cluster with respective security measures. 
Similar analyses can identify where redundancies in the system are very large, which might indicate 
a bad cost-benefit performance. 
Discussion and Outlook 
In the past new airport security measures have regularly been introduced in political ad-hoc processes, 
often as a consequence of specific security occurrences. A precondition to overcome this reactive proce-
dure would be to apply an anticipatory approach. Scenario planning methods could in principle be ap-
plied to address this problem. However, the typical scenario building process is insufficient for this pur-
pose since a large database of plausible scenarios is needed to be able to systematically improve the air-
port security system. Thus an approach merging elements from standard scenario process, system analy-
sis and matrix-based complexity management has been developed and are described in this paper. 
This approach allows combining the advantages of a prospective foresight method, which is generally 
vague in terms of tangible developments in specific sub-systems, with the accuracy of an in-depth system 
analysis of airport security. Two adaptions of the standard scenario process are central: first, the logical 
reduction of possible links between elements for the cross-impact analysis, which is necessary to handle 
large complex systems. The second major extension is the introduction of the “scenario builder”, allow-
ing for a time-efficient analysis of the complex data. This kind of extended scenario analysis allows 
demonstrating effects of a specific scenario on other affected stakeholder or systems (in this case on air-
port security). This automatised approach is valuable, when a large variety of scenarios has to be ana-
lysed. This in turn allows to better optimise the system in concern because the interrelations are docu-
mented and thus evaluable, for example concerning structurally weak points in the system. Further 
analysis of the documented database still remains to be done. Consequently, as a central result of the 
project, implications for a proactive structure of airport security measures and processes will be derived.  
For a general overview on the complete airport security analysis of the whole “SiVe” project, which 
includes simulations as well as cost-benefit-analyses, see Breiing et al. (2010). A more specific descrip-
Potential 
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TargetIntention of 
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Weapon
Approach of 
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1
6
15 42 102
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7
8
9
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1: Terrorist, 6: Economical damage, 7: Human lifes, 8: Attention, 9: Fear, Demoralization, 15: Explosives, 42: Manually – calculating 
own death, 45: Street, 46: Rail, 58: Concealing weapon on body, 61: Concealing weapon in hand luggage, 72: Aircraft flying, 
73: Aircraft at ground level, 75: Fuel depot, 78: Restricted area, 82: People, 85: On-board, 88: Restricted area, 100: Hijacking, 102: 
Sabotage, 103: Renegade
106: Deterrence – Security controls, 107: Deterrence – Safety facilities, 108: Deterrence – Security personal, 109: Deterrence –
Sanctions, 110: Profiling, 111: Standard passenger control, 112: Employee control, 113: Hand luggage check, 114: Luggage 
screening, 116: Deliveries to airplane, 117: Deliveries to airport, 118: High-security clearance, 120: Training, 121: Constructional 
measures, 122: Fence/Wall, 123: Door/ Gate, 124: Intel (Secret service investigation), 125: Sky-Marshall, 127: Armored cockpit door
 216 
tion of how the scenario builder is interconnected with simulation and risk quantification modules and 
how aggregated risk values are derived is given by Maurer et al. (2010). 
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COMBAT SIMULATION AS TOOL FOR EVALUATION OF 
FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS AND SOME RISKS IN SCE-
NARIO BASED WARGAMING  
Esa Lappi & Bernt Åkesson  
Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre, Electronics and Information Tech-
nology Division 
 
ABSTRACT – In the Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre (PVTT) combat simulation 
models are used in order to choose optimal combinations of weapons. In the defence analysis different 
tools are used. In this paper we describe the methods and tools used in the military analysis and dis-
cuss the sources of errors in the future weapon evaluation and estimation process on technical, tactical 
and operational levels.  
     In military analysis the scope of the simulations vary from platform level technical analysis to tacti-
cal and operational questions. The technical level analysis is basic science and engineering, for exam-
ple calculating probabilities of detection of targets in different weather conditions using different sen-
sor systems. In the analysis we can predict the trend of the technological improvements and also ex-
plore physical limits of system of interests. The technical and small scale combat analysis can fail, 
however, if completely new technology is invented in the near future.  
     Operational planning and brigade level analysis pose a more challenging problem. The operational 
level analysis is based on scenarios, which are simulated using computational combat models. These 
are often man-in-the-loop simulations, which are based on the tactical and technical models, and 
where the wargaming is based on predictions of future warfare and a vision of how the forces will be 
used. A worst case situation in operational level wargaming is using the wrong assumptions when 
predicting the concept for the use of forces. A completely new doctrine may emerge for the forces and 
their use, in which case defence forces have been optimised for the wrong type of war. 
Introduction and Background 
The time span of defence planning is decades. This means that defence planning includes assumptions 
about the future and acquired systems are intended to be used for several decades. Therefore, in acquisi-
tions it is important to evaluate the capabilities of current and future systems with regards to future 
threats. In this work the applicability of Finnish computation and simulation methods to weapons pro-
curements, motivated by potential battles 10-15 years in the future, is evaluated. In addition, the re-
search process itself is studied and its functionality is evaluated.  
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Currently the basis for the analysis are scenarios derived from the threat models (Facts about Na-
tional Defence 2008), in which Finland is subject to an armed attack and is forced to use military power. 
These scenarios are restricted, but in this paper only the research process and simulation tools are stud-
ied. 
Since the life span of the systems used by all parties is measured in decades, we assume the newest 
systems, which are currently in use and under procurement, to still be in use in 15 years. This means that 
a large number of the systems are known, but they can still have been upgraded e.g. by installing better 
communication equipment, fire control systems or using more powerful ammunition. In addition to the-
se known weapon systems, some completely some new weapons or weapon systems could have been de-
veloped by the year 2025 through technology and new innovations. Furthermore, the use of current sys-
tems and capabilities could have been changed on either tactical or operational level. 
In the study of the use of weapon systems, the basis is formed by an assumption about the situations 
where the systems are used. Thus, the research depends on the scenarios derived from the threat mod-
els. Simulation software tools, which estimate the outcome of battles, are used to support the estimation 
of how the scenarios unfold. In this paper the simulation methods and their application, which support 
decisions concerning the defence solution of the future, are described. The usefulness of the assessment 
methods is discussed by making a brief comparison based on historical events as to how the methods 
would have worked in light of the events during May 1940. 
Material and Methods 
In Finland the development of future technologies and its effect on the outcome of battles is estimated 
by producing an Estimation and prognosis of military technology (Estimation and prognosis of military 
technology 2025, parts 1 and 2 2008), which contains descriptions of all fields of military technology and 
a prognosis of technological development. This provides the foundation for assessing developing tech-
nologies in the defence forces, although naturally other sources are used as well to support the analysis. 
Aside from the survey of technological alternatives is the military political analysis of Finland’s sur-
roundings which is left out of the technical analysis. The technical and tactical analysis starts with a 
crude assumption of the military threat to Finland, based on the threat models (pressure, attack), and of 
the different alternatives. (Facts about national defence 2008) 
The different threat models and the series of events related to them result in scenarios, which can be 
analysed using computer simulation. These national level scenarios are further refined into smaller sce-
narios and even further into combat technical level evaluations. The practical simulation starts at the 
combat technical level, where the capabilities of different systems are evaluated in different situations. 
In this study the combat technical and tactical level simulation models are described. The results from 
the higher resolution models provide input to the lower resolution/large scale model.   
Wargames and simulations are used when developing Army tactics. Major General Arto Räty pre-
sented a chart of the development process in a recent article (Räty 2009), shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Wargames and simulations are a part of the process when developing the tactics, or-
ganizations and equipment of new Army troops. The results that are obtained are veri-
fied by exercises (Räty 2009). 
A suitable simulation software tool for the combat technical level is e.g. FLAMES (Ternion Corpora-
tion 2010). It can be used to examine situations within a company, comparing tactical alternatives or 
changes at the platform level, e.g. how a better or more accurate gun changes the situation. After the re-
sults have been obtained by FLAMES, they can be transferred to brigade level analysis tools, such as 
Sandis (Lappi 2008). This multi-level simulation process is, however, very labour intensive.  
FLAMES (FLexible Analysis, Modeling, and Exercise System) is a commercial OA-tool, which is used 
for comparative analysis on system and platoon-battalion level. The software is based on component-
based physical and mathematical system and action models. FLAMES can be used to automatically ana-
lyse the effect of different system, parameter and tactical alternatives through high-resolution simula-
tion, where units are modelled on platform level (individual tanks, aircraft etc). Because of its generality 
the software is suitable for Army, Navy and Air Force simulations. 
 
The inputs are: 
 system parameters 
 troops and their equipment 
 action logic (tactics) for the units 
 unit actions (routes and missions) in the scenario 
 digital map material (ESRI/DTED). 
 
FLAMES produces, among others, the following output: 
 casualty distributions for different unit and weapon types 
 distributions of units destroyed by different weapons 
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 2D and 3D visualization of the simulation 
 other interesting information, such as average detection or firing distance. 
 
Sandis is a combat modelling tool based on probability calculus and fault logic analysis. It is devel-
oped by PVTT and it is used for comparative analysis of cost effectiveness and tactical alternatives on 
platoon-brigade level. 
 
The inputs of the tool are:  
 weapon and communication characteristics  
 units and their equipment  
 fault logic for the units and operation success  
 map  
 user actions for the units at company or platoon level. 
As output, Sandis gives, as functions of time,  
 operation success probability  
 probability of each unit being beaten  
 unit strength distributions  
 killer-victim scoreboard  
 ammunition consumption  
 radio network availability  
 medical evacuation logistics and treatment capacity analysis. 
 
The use of simulation systems is time consuming, so the simulations are focused on the most im-
portant cases. Figure 2 shows an estimate of the time needed for Sandis simulations as a function of sce-
nario size. The other simulation models and methods are also needed for the analysis. 
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Figure 2. The time needed for the simulation process as a function of the scenario size. The scale 
on the horizontal axis represents the approximate size of the scenario. Dots start from 
platoon level and end with brigade level. The upper line represents the first simulation 
and the lower a variation of it. For example, a brigade level battle lasting a week re-
quires 4 man-weeks of work for the first simulation and then a man-week for each var-
iation. 
Results 
The suitability of the presented method is discussed through a historical example: How would this 
method have worked in France in May 1940. However, this is not a study in military history, but an ex-
ample to emphasise how the method can be applied. In this study several possible reasons for the out-
come of the battle are considered, as described by the contemporary Tapio Hiisivaara in his book 
“Saksan voitto lännessä 1940” (“Germany’s victory in the west 1940”), published in 1941 (Hiisivaara 
1941). This example is chosen because it contains different types of combat and the surprise caused by a 
new type of warfare. 
In the work by Hiisivaara the main points of the German attack are noted to be, among others, the 
significance of manoeuvre warfare and activeness, that are closely associated with the use of air support 
to ground forces, armoured and light units and the concentration of armoured forces at a very narrow 
break point, emphasis on deep penetrations, use of paratroopers, direct fire using artillery and the use of 
anti-aircraft guns for antitank defence and destroying nests (Hiisivaara 1941, 258-260). Combined arms 
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warfare is also emphasized (Hiisivaara 1941, 266). The command and control (C2) systems required for 
combined arms warfare are described in (Hiisivaara 1941, 129).  
These factors can be analysed with the available simulation software. In FLAMES duels between in-
dividual tanks and tank companies can be played as well as duels between antitank weapons and ar-
moured units. These analyses would have showed that the rate of fire, the ability to fire at moving targets 
and the hit probability of weapons are significant for the outcome of the battle. This information could 
have directed the effort towards acquisition of systems that would have been more effective for the bat-
tlefield and towards noticing essential factors. The technology for firing at moving targets was already 
available in anti-aircraft defence and during the war the Germans used 88 mm anti-aircraft guns for an-
titank defence. The quality and need for such weapons or similar ones would have been discovered in 
wargames played using simulation tools. 
In Sandis it is possible to evaluate the state of communications and their significance for warfare. 
That way the importance of more powerful radios and C2 systems could have been evaluated through 
simulation, although partly as a man-in-the-loop simulation. A typical situation is depicted in Figure 3. 
In a wargame only units with some form of communication between them are able provide fire support 
to each other. The concentration of armoured units and its effect on the situation would have been pos-
sible with Sandis, if the tank duels and the duels between tanks and antitank weapons had first been 
analysed in FLAMES and the results transferred to Sandis. This way the comparison of concentrated and 
dispersed use of tanks would have been possible. 
 
 
Figure 3. A close-up from a battalion-level scenario in Sandis. The red and blue circles represent 
platoons. The green lines represent functioning radio links. 
The movement of civilians and their casualties in the warzone could have been included in Sandis, 
but the actions of civilians are based on assumptions made by the user and as such would only serve as 
bookkeeping based on an enlightened guess. Even then moving civilians would be visible on the map in 
urban areas and on roads, and it would be possible to take into account their effect on warfare, provided 
that the estimate of their behavior is in the right ballpark.  
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The panic of troops and civilians and the use of psychological weapons are completely left out of the 
analysis. There are no computational models for describing their effects, although troops and civilians 
can be moved on the map. 
There are several ways of modelling air combat, but air combat simulators are not studied any fur-
ther in the scope of this paper, although FLAMES would be suitable for this type of studies. The effect of 
aerial bombardment on different targets can be studied using both Sandis and FLAMES. However, duels 
between an individual target (tank) and an aircraft can only be solved using FLAMES. On the other 
hand, the average effect of an air strike to units of platoon size or larger could also be examined using 
Sandis. 
It is especially worth noting that only if the possibility of enemy armoured forces had been consid-
ered in the beginning of the development process, would such a large force be included in the wargame 
and as an optimization alternative for the systems. Simulation of an armoured division would have pro-
ceeded in two phases: details using FLAMES and the whole using Sandis. Thus, simulation of concen-
trated forces and dispersed tanks would have required a significant amount of personnel resources. 
When allocating the limited simulation resources such an alternative could still have been left out.    
As a result, we notice that simulation tools would have shown the effectiveness of antitank troops 
and the technical execution of the plans on a rough level. The Germans could have tested their blitzkrieg-
concept and assured themselves of its effectiveness, whereas the French would not necessarily have 
played any game containing operational level German armoured forces. If such a scenario had been 
played, the strategic level surprise in May 1940 could have been avoided. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The example discussed shows that computational methods could have exposed some unexpected issues 
about the battles of May 1940, so the approach following the current development cycle seems largely 
like a workable development method for the military. 
The deficiencies are also significant. The computational models would not have predicted panic, alt-
hough they could have been used to estimate the civilian movement on the roads and thereby estimate 
the slowdown of movement.  
The biggest risk lies in that so-called Red teaming (Chua, Choo, Sim & Tay 2008; Lauren, Silwood, 
Chong, Low, McDonald, Rayburg, Yildiz, Pickl & Sanchez 2009) is not considered or the amount of tacti-
cal and operational alternatives is too small. If in the Red alternatives significant modes of operation 
have been ignored, the simulation and optimization process can still lead to optimization of the defence 
system for the wrong type of threat and mode of operation. 
Finally, it should be noted that the simulation process described in this paper is labour intensive and 
the analysis in the example would have required several man-years of work, if multiple German attack 
alternatives had been played against multiple French defence alternatives. 
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EDUCATING SOLDIERS AND SECURITY SECTOR AC-
TORS FOR HUMAN SECURITY ORIENTED ACTIVITIES 
Juha Mäkinen 
Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy, National Defence University of Finland 
 
ABSTRACT – A new kind of soldiership, akin to the security sector actorship, is emerging in the na-
tional security sector in Finland. An efficient and good national security sector should have some 
shared aspects like for example some ends and objects of the activities but also some mediating means. 
The analysis done in the paper shows how human security -oriented activities are mediated in Finland 
at the moment for example by such concepts as human security and action competence. These concepts 
are operational for the 21st century education of soldiers and civilians facing new kinds of global 
threats collectively.    
Introduction and background 
In the Nordic countries, soldiership has got a new flavour in our ‘postmodern’ times (Moskos et al. 
2000), with primacy given to international missions (Stoltenberg 2009; Bailes et al. 2006) instead of 
old-fashioned territorial defence and some comprehensive internal security activities. By comprehen-
siveness, I mean that both civilian and military resources and personnel are needed for internal security 
activities, as the duties of the Finnish Defence Forces also highlight at the moment (Finnish Parliament 
2007). At least in Finland we should keep our soldiers also nationally oriented, being able to think by 
themselves while keeping in mind fundamental questions, such as how to maintain one’s ethical con-
sistency and to be an ethical subject by justifying killing and respecting human dignity and human secu-
rity at the same time. 
It follows that instead of just being ‘hired guns’ and ‘traditional warriors’, the (Finnish) soldiers are 
national security actors 62F12  in our forthcoming comprehensive national security age. Both soldiership and 
the emerging security actorship have to be reinterpreted when more justifiable ethical-moral grounds for 
the activities of the comprehensive national security sector have to be established. 
The soldiers are in the security business and are acting on a broad field of the security sector that has 
been under a global transformation process (i.e. Security Sector Reform, SSR). Security, and more spe-
cifically human security, is a widely shared interest, and soldiers are actively seeking new kinds of means 
                                                             
 
12 A new, more comprehensive national security strategy is needed for national (strategic) security actors, replacing 
the strategies/policies of security and defence policy, the strategy for securing the functions vital to society, and also 
the internal security programme. 
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and ways for collaboration with the representatives of the other branches of government 63F13, as well as 
with the security sector in general. 
Already after the Second World War 64F14, military establishments have been heavily engaged in human 
security-related activities in the peacekeeping and in many kinds of duties in assisting civilian authori-
ties. This shift in orientation has been accelerated also by academic studies and debates. At least since 
the 1980s, the so called ‘interparadigm debate’ (Raitasalo 2008) between the traditional realist, or posi-
tivistic, interpretations and the emerging anti-positivistic interpretations has been going on. Instead of 
taking an ‘either-or’ stand in these debates, the present paper focuses on the meaning, dynamics and 
application of (security) concepts, and debates that have often taken place across these categories (Fier-
ke 2007, 3). This means that the most enlightening debate for the human oriented security studies seems 
to be the debate over the traditional orientation to security versus critical security studies (CSS) (Fierke 
2007; Booth 1991; see Limnéll 2009, 57–60). In other words, this paper has the emansipatory interest 
that is shared by critical security studies and military pedagogical studies. The subjects to be emancipat-
ed are the soldiers (i.e. citizen soldiers) but also the other security sector actors, including all the citizens 
of Finland.  
The military pedagogists of the Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy at the Finnish Na-
tional Defence University feel the need to enhance educational considerations within the wide field of 
comprehensive crisis management and among human security researchers and educators. For this pur-
pose, a new kind of course for MMSc students (i.e. MA students) was held this winter, called ‘Security 
and Comperehensive Crisis Management’, and this paper reflects on the progressive inquiries done be-
fore, during and after the innovative and future-oriented course. 
A brief and critical introduction to the (too) various kinds of security 
strategies of Finland 
Based on the premise that the Finnish security sector already has some shared and mediating concepts, 
at least in its strategies, a qualitative content analysis is done in this paper. Through the content analysis 
we can see how widely the focal concepts (i.e. human security; action competence) are shared or not 
within the branches of the Finnish government. Also the possible differences in the conceptual meanings 
of the focal concepts can be identified. For a start, it is assumed that the strategies and policies in ques-
tion construct a hierarchic constellation where the more normative strategies, such as the Finnish Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (FSDP, 2009) and e.g. Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy 
(2009) should form a clear basis for coherent political guidance of the several branches of the govern-
ment. The ‘coherency check’ can be done by comparing the most normative strategies/policies to several 
                                                             
 
13 According to the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (=SSFVS 2006) each ministry, within its 
mandate, shall steer and monitor the implementation of tasks and the development of required capabilities related 
to securing the society’s vital functions. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the coordination of total defence 
activities. 
14 Cf. Henk (2007, 225) who claims that after the early 21st century the military establishments have been heavily 
engaged in human security- related activities. Interestingly, Henk’s interpretation neglects the long historical roots 
of e.g. UN-led peacekeeping operations, as well as the soldier’s role as an actor of internal security. 
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security oriented “sub-strategies” 65F15. The analysis is done in a future-oriented manner due to the fact that 
the potentially identifiable lack of coherence in the strategies/policies can be to a large extent avoided in 
the forthcoming security strategies/policies. 
According to the FSDP (2009, 71, 82), Finland follows a comprehensive approach which recognizes 
the interrelationship between internal and external security. Finland will be defended by focusing the 
resources of the entire society on national defence efforts, in line with the principles of the comprehen-
sive defence approach and the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (SSFVS, 2006). 
The FSDP (2009, 129) continues that in the Comprehensive Approach (CA), the goal in crisis man-
agement is to coordinate different activities coherently while respecting the independent role of each 
actor. The FSDP claims also that the impact of the activities must be assessed in its entirety, and along 
with this, the policy runs into difficulties. Firstly, all the impacts (consequences; both intended and unin-
tended) have to be assessed holistically, and secondly, the impacts have to be linked back to the actors 
having ‘independent roles’. The position ‘actors having static and independent roles’ is an example of the 
‘old-fashioned’ functionalist sociological interpretation, and sociologically an extensively and convinc-
ingly criticized position. Also when interpreting from the angle of the cultural-historical activity theory, 
the actors participate in collective activities having a shared object and outcome (i.e. ‘consequences’) be-
ing potentially related to human beings and their basic needs (i.e. safety; human security). Instead of a 
static independency position, the security sector actors should favour more dynamic 66F16  interpretations of 
their basic premises, values and their position in the security-oriented networks, e.g. due to the continu-
ous cultural evolution of their operational environments. 
According to the FSDP (2009, 110), the deterrence of Finland demands that the Defence Forces are 
capable of repelling an attack requiring e.g. a comprehensive situation picture and an early-warning ca-
pability, constant readiness in the chain of command, highly capable key troops and systems in every 
service, good operational mobility across the nation, and capability of cooperating with other authorities 
and key actors of the business sector.  
But what kinds of threats are the Defence Forces and the other (European) security sector actors fac-
ing? According to the FSDP (2009), the threats are wide-ranging and interdependent. Logically, it fol-
lows, like the FSDP claims, that traditional security policy instruments and military defence will not suf-
fice; fresh approaches are needed in order to respond to new kinds of threats.  
Let us return to the issue of what the deterrence of Finland, Europe and the globe demands? As stat-
ed, a comprehensive situation picture and early-warning capability with constant readiness to act with 
appropriate means is needed for the evolving security sector in Finland, and even more so on a Europe-
an, and also on a global level.  
A recent analysis made by Jarno Limnéll of the FSDP in 2004 (2009, 189) clearly shows how rapidly 
the security strategies are evolving in Europe as well. For example the European Security Strategy 
(2003) does not discuss environmental, or human, security threats (cf. European Union 2008). On the 
                                                             
 
15 The Internal Security Programme is an example of a “sub-strategy”. 
16 By dynamic I refer simply to the “non-static” nature of the phenomena in question and additionally also to such 
ongoing debates as the debate on agency versus structures, Latourian discussion about the actants, and the “subject-
less” sociological theories (see Mäkinen 2006). 
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other hand, the FSDP (2009) emphasizes that long-term global trends, such as climate change, need to 
be countered by a comprehensive approach. 
The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI) has a long tradition of polling the opinions of 
Finns on the Finnish foreign and security policy and defence policy. In addition, since 2007, citizens 
have been asked to provide their views on how they think security will develop over the next five years, 
and to assess factors which affect the security of Finland and their personal sense of security. When 
comparing the ABDI polls done in 2007 and 2009 it can be seen that in 2009 a deep, global crisis of the 
international economy, getting 48 % share of the answers (41% in 2008), was seen as the most likely 
threat. The result is understandable in the midst of a severe global economic crisis. The second most 
likely threat in the ABDI poll of 2009 was an environmental disaster caused by global warming, getting 
46 % (37 % in 2008) of the answers. The number of those seeing the environmental disaster as an influ-
ential source of a security threat has risen by 9 % in a year, maybe partly because now it has been proven 
that we humans have an influence on climate change (IPCC 2007). This trend should be notified both in 
the next FSDP and in the next European Security Strategy, although the fundamental question of ‘what 
threatens us’ remains partly unanswered. In a way our situational picture is a non-comprehensive one, 
giving no real support for comprehensive security planning nationally or internationally. 
According to Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy (2009), the objective of crisis 
management is to strengthen human security 67F17  and comprehensive crisis management through shared 
training and research. For these purposes, Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland and Finnish De-
fence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) have intensified their training cooperation by founding 
the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. However, (academically) educa-
tional co-operation within the emerging national security sector has to be established as well. High qual-
ity (national/international) human security education has to have some shared concepts and dimen-
sions. One major candidate to act as a mediating means within the security sector is the concept of hu-
man security. 
Human security – an end itself but also a mediating concept within the 
security sector 
In the course of the profound and complex contemporary developments, the paradigm of human securi-
ty might be the ‘third step’ coming after the first step to the ‘postmodern warfare’ and the second step to 
‘fighting against terrorism’ (Toiskallio 2007, 9). In the 1970s, the so called ‘human rights regime’ 
emerged as a result of the development of the human rights law, the Conventions and the Helsinki 
Agreement of 1975, and the proliferation of human rights activists concerned about human rights abuses 
(Kaldor 2007, 8). Another complementary and central explanation for the emergence of the human se-
curity has been offered by Sabine Alkire (2003; cf. CMC 2009) who has claimed that due to the mis-
                                                             
 
17 Interestingly both the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (2006) and the Internal Security Pro-
gramme (2008) do not mention the concept of human security at all. It is possible, and actually justifiable to as-
sume, that the forthcoming SSFVS and ISP strategies deal with human security and do it comprehensively and co-
herently. 
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match between the security threats, and the national and international responses to these threats, the 
human security approach has got its pivotal position within the global security sector. The ‘mismatch’ 
feeling has been shared also by soldiers, the seminal book of general (ret.) Rubert Smith (2005) being a 
prime example of this point.  
Instead of aiming to analyze and show the most appropriate definition of the concept, the famous 
‘right answer’ for the ‘question’ of the human security (see Alkire 2003; Commission on Human Security 
2003; CMC 2009), the intent in this paper is to show the main dimensions 68F18 of the human security ori-
ented activities to be shared by the main security sector organizations and actors. One of the main prem-
ises of the paper is that the dimensions emphasized by the human security approach suggests that we 
should enable our students, both military and civilian ones, to shift their orientation along the dimen-
sions (cf. the key educational dimensions; Mäkinen 2006) proposed in this article. 
The seminal report of the UN, the Human Development Report (1994), sets the stage for those inter-
ested in finding out the main dimensions of the human security approach. Instead of ‘adding more cooks 
to the soup of the conceptual mess of human security’, a clarification is sought after by a multidimen-
sional framework already potentially identifiable in the Human Development Report of 1994. 
According to the Human Development Report (1994) the threats to human security are no longer 
just personal or local or national, they are becoming global69F19. Against the awakening awareness about 
the global security situation, the report stresses that a sharable new paradigm of sustainable human de-
velopment and security has to be sought for. The needed framework has to bring humanity together 
through more equitable sharing of global economic opportunities and responsibilities (ibid). Of course 
the global orientation is closely intertwined with the ‘old-fashioned’ national/local orientation, and this 
kind of conclusion may seem surprising, but we have to reinterpret the local/national orientation for it 
to become a glocal human security orientation.   
The orientation of the international community often seems to be a reactive one, and especially for 
soldiers, this kind of orientation has meant overemphasis on post-conflict situations and on phases after 
open conflict (e.g. Koskela 2008, 7). Also the Human Development Report (1994, 3) challenges the tradi-
tional interpretation by stressing that it is important to develop some operational indicators of human 
security as an early warning system allowing us to help in avoiding to reach a crisis point. The main fo-
cus of the global community, including all security sector actors, should be on the whole spectrum of 
conflict resolution responses 70F20 (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, 12; Human Security Study Group). The special 
focus of the attention should be, instead of ‘post-conflict’ situations, preventive peace building means of 
overcoming structural and cultural violence when heading towards a ‘positive peace’ (Webel & Galtung 
(ed.) 2007) and ‘better peace’ (Liddell Hart 1954: 1991). Interestingly, Johan Galtung, the founder of 
peace studies and a peace researcher, and Sir Basil. H. Liddell Hart, a military strategist and a theorist of 
art of war, share the very same ‘grand strategist’ object – peace71F21. It seems that especially soldiers, as 
                                                             
 
18 In other words the intent is to construct a multidimensional framework for human security-oriented activities. 
19 It follows that the first dimension of human security is the dimension between local and global. Therefore instead 
of “globalness” and “globalization”, the emphasis of the paper is on the glocalness meaning an emphasis both on the 
global and on the local (i.e. local human agency). 
20 The whole spectrum of conflict resolution is the second dimension of human security. 
21 E.g. in 1994 NATO launched the Partnership for Peace program, and since 2004 the Partnership Action Plan on 
Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIP) has been operational. For additional information see 
http://www.nato.int/). 
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well as all security sector actors, have to be educated for ‘whole spectrum’ operations including also 
peace building operations and activities. 
Neither peace nor war are ontological facts. Both are potentially socially constructed, and it is our 
responsibility to choose our side in this debate. According to the Human Development Report (1994, 13), 
human beings are born with certain potential capabilities. The purpose of development is to create an 
environment in which all people can expand their capabilities. One option, elaborated later in this paper, 
is to conceptualize these human potential capabilities as action competence. By emphasizing action 
competence we can agree with the Human Development Report that at the global level, sustainable hu-
man development requires no less than a new global ethic and glocally shared responsibility (Heinonen 
2002; Heinonen & Romppanen 2010; Mäkinen 2010).  
Let us now turn the attention to the Kaldorian interpretations about the question of adopting the 
human security approach in Europe. The first reason to adopt the human security approach (Human 
Security Study Group 2004) is based on morality, like emphasised in the Human Development Report 
(1994). All human life is equal, and it is not acceptable that human lives become cheap in desperate situ-
ations (i.e. be it in Rwanda, Srebrenica, or anywhere else). The second reason (ibid.) is legal, meaning 
that we have not only a right, but also a legal obligation, to concern ourselves with human security 
worldwide. The third reason (ibid.) for adopting the human security approach is ‘enlightened self-
interest’. The Europeans, or anybody else, cannot be secure while some people in the world live in severe 
insecurity. In a way we all are interconnected in the front of emerging security threats. 
It is often understood that the human security ‘paradigm’ argues for the importance of simultaneous 
progress in a variety of domains (i.e. economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and 
political) (CMC 2009, 16-18), but instead of this traditional ‘linear and unsystematic’ kind of thinking, a 
more holistic (Toiskallio 2007, 8–9) and systematic way of thinking is needed 72F22. This is a shared chal-
lenge for all security sector actors and not just for soldiers. The demand for holistic and systematic 
thinking goes in parallel with the ‘utility of force’ (i.e. the means) debate (Smith 2005). The situation is 
really challenging when both comprehensive situational awareness (i.e. awareness of the global and 
shared threats) and understanding of the means to counter these threats systematically are lacking.  
According to the human security approach, in line especially with its European branch, a set of se-
lected principles (Human Security Study Group 2004) should, and could, guide the actions of the securi-
ty sector actors on all the levels of the epistemic infrastructure (Mäkinen 2006). In other words, the 
proposed principles are intended to be applicable both at the grassroot level (i.e. the soldiers and the 
civilians in the field) and at the “grand strategic level” (i.e. the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE etc).  
The proposed set of complementary human security principles are the following (Human Security 
Study Group 2004; 2007): 
 the primacy of human rights 
 legitimate political authority 
 multilateralism 
 bottom-up approach 
                                                             
 
22 The third dimension means shifting our thinking from linear towards more systematic ways of thinking. 
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 regional focus 
 use of legal instruments 
 appropriate use of force. 
At this phase, only a short analysis of the proposed principles can be done. Traditionally, it has been 
assumed that the interests of states (i.e. natural resources, economical advantages), or the interests of 
“the military-industrial complex” (see Mäkinen 2010), override the needs to promote e.g. human rights 
and security. Contrary to this kind of traditional interpretation, the hypernorms should and could con-
strain the local authentic norms (Donaldson & Dunfee 1994; e.g. globally destructive overemphasis on 
self-interests (i.e. freedom) over interests of our humanity). One proposed candidate for such a hyper-
norm is human dignity 73 F23 (Mäkinen 2010). At this phase, the proposed hypernorm is just a “potential” 
one, waiting to be checked in e.g. crisis management realities. In other words, the emphasis on “reality 
checks” means also emphasis on case studies, and more precisely, on hierarchic/networked case studies. 
By hierarchic/networked, or systemic, case studies I refer to studies whose unit of analysis is neither on-
ly soldiers/security sector actors on the field nor only a specific mission (e.g.. ISAF in Afganistan or 
KFOR in Kosovo), but instead the whole epistemic infrastructure from the individuals up to the “grand 
strategic level”, according to the bottom-up principle. 
The meaning of multilateralism should be interpreted more comprehensively than ‘acting with a 
group of states’ (Human Security Study Group 2004). Multilateralism means a commitment to work 
with international institutions, but it also means commitment to common ways of working and to 
agreed rules and norms. Additionally, multilateralism means coordination of collective efforts and ac-
tivities 74 F24. Finally, the regional focus needs to be explained, although it is closely linked to the above-
mentioned bottom-up (i.e. epistemic infrastructure) approach. The emphasis on regional issues means 
that not only local-global interaction is needed for stability, well-being and peace. The activities at a re-
gional level play a crucial mediating role between the national and international/global levels. Interest-
ingly, the regional approach is not applicable somewhere in Africa only, or in the former Soviet Union, 
but also here in Finland with its neighbours. The fundamental question, in the case of Finland, is the 
regional cooperation between the Nordic countries and with our Eastern neighbours (i.e. the Russians; 
see e.g. Heusala, Lohiniva & Malmi 2008). This question is even more pivotal in the case of all kinds of 
security institutions (including military institutions), because the ultimate end is not war but peace. 
For soldiers, and for all security sector actors, the use of force, and especially ethically justifiable use 
of force is the fundamental and paradoxical question 75F25. In 2004, the Human Security Study Group pro-
posed a ‘Human Security Force’ to be composed. A minimum use of force should be the norm for such a 
Force, meaning that this kind of an attitude is more akin to the traditional approach of the police, who 
risk their lives to save others, even though they are prepared to kill in extremis, as human security forces 
should be.  
                                                             
 
23 The debate over the similarities and differences of human security, human development and human rights is an 
ongoing one among human security researchers and practitioners, but here the intent is not to deal with these is-
sues. Only the focus on human individuals and on their needs (i.e. security and many others according to e.g. 
Maslowian human hierarchic needs) is the focal point to be emphasised in this military pedagogical article. 
24 The premise of this article is that the security activities should share e.g. some objects, ends and means in order to 
achieve an appropriate level of coordination and coherence. 
25 For more about the paradoxes of the soldiers, see Mäkinen 2006. 
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Effectiveness, and the impact assessment of human security activities (CMC 2009), is more than just 
the capability to act, or to react. The preventive, more peace building oriented approach requires that 
Finland, and also the EU, will continue discussing about the strategic direction of Finland and the EU on 
a political level. But even more than traditional political discussions, a more ethically-morally oriented 
strategic debate should be going on. Systemic case studies are needed on an international, as well as on a 
collective and on an individual level (e.g. Human Security Study Group 2007; CMC 2009; Athanasiou 
2007; see Mäkinen 2010 for additional case studies). 
Is there any need for action competent human agents in the future? 
In the comprehensive field of national security, action competence is a practically mediating concept 
(Finnish Government 2008; Defence Command 2007). The concept of action competence also acts as a 
boundary object (Star 1989) between the military and e.g. the civilian national security -oriented activity 
systems. 
Traditionally, action competence has been a philosophically oriented social construction used in the 
military educational context. In the near future, the concept of action competence will be elaborated fur-
ther as a behavioural scientific concept. This means that the boundaries between philosophically orient-
ed human sciences (i.e. the position of traditional military pedagogy) and behaviourally oriented psy-
chologies and social sciences will be discussed, and crossed, with the assistance of a mediating model 
(Figure 1; Toiskallio & Mäkinen 2009, 102).  
 
Figure 1.  Action competence in its context.  
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The core of action competence features the concept of identity; namely, in our case, the identity of 
soldiers. For us this means that we keep asking and partially answering what it actually means to be a 
soldier in a democratic state, say, in Finland. To be a good, even a great soldier, means, among other 
things, that one is able to solve the fundamental paradox of being a soldier: how is it possible to maintain 
one’s ethical consistency and be an ethical subject by justifying killing and respecting human dignity at 
the same time? 
Discussion and conclusions 
Even a brief analysis like this shows clearly how the ambiguous concept of human security can be made 
understandable and sharable by utilizing dimensional, principled and systematic thinking. Education 
seems to be the main instrument for us to enhance the shift of minds, orientations and ways of acting, 
and the dimensions emphasize the main focal points of our shared interests. Education needs some 
shared concepts, and human security and action competence are justifiable candidates for this. 
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ABSTRACT – The development of prison population is one key issue in the security policy of a society. 
From a general security research perspective, this kind of international statistical analysis provides 
many important empirical insights for security policy in EU Members States, in U.S.A. and in the Rus-
sian Federation. This article provides trend analyses of European 76F26, U.S.A. and Russian Federation 
prison population in the years 1993-2007. A lot relevant observations and findings are presented con-
cerning prison population trends in different countries and in Europe. Three alternative trend shapes 
of prison population development are identified. 
Introduction 
This article will address a trend and a benchmarking analysis of European prison population. Prison 
population studies have been used in the planning of security policy, criminal policy and prison size 
management (Barnett 1987). Earlier research has indicated that the enlargement of EU means greater 
opportunities for crime, but it is also an incentive for the process of approximating law and building in-
stitutions (Loader 2002).  From this European policy perspective, it is interesting to analyze trends in 
prison population generally and especially in prison population of violent offenders during the enlarge-
ment process of the EU. The prison population study monitors prison population trends in today's en-
larged Europe and beyond. Similar types of crime comparisons between countries have been provided by 
                                                             
 
26 Country sample of Europe is including the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mon-
tenegro, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Scotland, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, 
Switzerland and Turkey. 
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Stollmack 1973, Blumstein, Cohen & Miller,1980, Gilinskiy 2006, Hofer 2003 and Vieraitis, Kovandzic 
and Marvell 2007, Holmes 2009).  
The amount of prison population is a good measure of the general security climate in different coun-
tries. Empirical database of the study covers years 1993-2007. In the study, historical development of the 
prison population in Europe, U.S.A. and Russian Federation are analyzed. We also report prison popula-
tion trends of South Africa, Turkey and Canada. This study analyses critical changes in the prison popu-
lation during the years 1993-2007. These data sets consist of comprehensive national-level data of the 
Eurostat (Eurostat 2010). Because of some problems of Eurostat data (ibid.), we have added UN demo-
graphic data to some databases (United Nations 2010). Criminal policy is considered a part of security 
policy of a country. What might be the optional level of prison population? It has been proved in earlier 
criminal and security research that severe prison sanctions increase recidivism compared to interven-
tions based on cognitive-behavioral models of social change (McGuire 2003). In this article, we discuss 
conceptual and theoretical issues of security and criminal policy in section 2 (security policy) and section 
3 (criminal policy). In section 4, we shall report the results of nationwide and regional benchmarking 
analyses. In the benchmarking analysis, conventional statistical analyses are presented. Trends in prison 
population are analyzed in Section 4. In the benchmarking analysis, special attention is paid to prison 
population of Turkey compared to European prison populations. Second key part of the statistical 
benchmarking analysis is a comparison of the prison populations in the Europe -, in U.S.A. and in the 
Russian Federation. We shall also provide an analysis of prison population in relation to total population 
and in relation to total criminality statistics. 
Thus to make a summary, the article provides updated "big picture" of prison population trends in 
Europe, in U.S.A. and the Russian Federation. From a general security research perspective, this kind of 
international statistical analysis provides many important empirical insights for security policy in EU 
Members States, in U.S.A. and in the Russian Federation. In the study, linear trend analyses are provid-
ed and expected linear BAU -scenarios are reported. The provided analyses are useful when criminal pol-
icy professionals and policymakers are planning prison capacities and social policy programs for the 
prisoners in different European countries and abroad in U.S.A. and in the Russian Federation. This 
study is not analysis special prisons of terrorists, which exist in Europe (Bures 2006). 
Conceptual issues of security and security policy research 
The role of the prison has changed over the last decades. Liebling (2006) noted that dramatic changes 
have been that the prison population has grown and its composition has altered. Security climate and 
the environment of criminal policy have also changed. We live in dynamic societies where values and 
policies are in change. Whereas some societies, favor severe criminal punishments, in some other socie-
ties less severe criminal punishment policies are favored. It is clear that prisons are needed especially for 
violent psychopathic offenders (Konttila & Holmalahti 2009). There are many factors which affect the 
size of prison populations. Such factors are (1) juridical laws, changes in penal policies, and normative 
systems, (2) employment rate, (3) demographic changes, (4) social norm structures, (5) sex related 
norms and values, (6) political decisions, (7) technical security innovations, (8) goals and means of pris-
on service, (9) courts and their decisions (Lavenex 2004, Louks, Lyner & Sullivan 1998, Blom-Hansen 
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2005, Lerch & Schwellus 2006, Deams 2008, Fábián 2010, Ochsen, 2010). There is no obvious single 
explanation for crime rates. 
Security is a challenging concept. To clarify key aspects of security, we must use two associated con-
cepts; objective security and subjective security. Objective security is real dimension of security without 
any reality biases. Subjective security reflects a subjective dimension on security, which is not based on 
real facts and the objective reality where an individual lives and exists. In Figure 1, four dimensions of 
security are identified: Ideal security situation is in depicted in B where people have high level of objec-
tive security and subjective security. The most problematic situation forms C, where both subjective se-
curity and objective security are on low levels. A is a special situation where people have very high sub-
jective security level but actually they are in danger (objective security level is low). People who faced the 
September 11 attacks were in this kind of situation in New York before airplanes came and destroyed the 
twin towers. D is also a special situation where people have very low subjective security level but they are 
not in danger in any way (consider people suffering from phobias). Security that people feel can be in 
any space of Figure 1.  
Criminal policy is connected to security policy and security concerns. One key motivation of criminal 
policy is the argument that people experience higher subjective security and partly higher objective secu-
rity when criminals are in prisons. These aspects of security are very important for policymakers. Espe-
cially sentence lengths vary much in different countries. Criminal policy is a political issue in different 
countries but also inside the EU (see e.g. Loader 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Objective and subjective security 
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Criminal policy concepts 
Modern criminal policy in Europe has emphasized the importance of rehabilitation as a goal connected 
to the execution of sentences.  For example, the main goal of Finnish prison service is to reduce the re-
cidivism, re-offending of the prisoners by using different rehabilitative methods depending on the risks 
and needs of the prisoner. According to research, many different cognitive-behavioral programs have 
been indicated to be effective in this respect (Allen et al. 2001; Andrews 1995). At the same time, howev-
er, there is a demand for more and longer prison sentences emphasizing the punitive role of crime poli-
cy. Death penalty as a form of sentence has been abandoned in most countries. Today it is used for ex-
ample in many U.S. states and in China but no longer in Russia. 
Contemporary Russian criminal legislation and police methods, criminal justice and prisons are very 
strict, unjust and repressive (Gilinskiy 2006). Russia has faced problems in maintaining control except 
through repression. It has never been a democratic state. Considerable social and economic inequality 
has always characterized Russia which has even increased in recent years. Economic inequality is one 
important criminogenic factor (that is a factor maintaining or leading someone to commit a crime) in a 
society. In addition, there are also cultural factors that have created a specific Russian mentality that is 
characterized by intolerance. These are the main factors that explain the high rate of violence in Russia 
(Gilinskiy 2006). 
Criminal policy of the United States has increasingly relied on the mass incarceration to reduce 
crime and it has been asked whether they should continue to expand prison capacity indefinitely (Mauer 
2001). On the other hand, large amounts of inmates in closed prisons are very expensive for society. 
Nowadays many American states are put in a difficult situation and as a result of the economic recession 
they try to save money by releasing non-violent prisoners on probation much earlier. There are several 
factors which contributed to the rise in the use of incarceration since 1980; Firstly, American culture of 
individualism and free market liberalism (see e.g. Milton Friedman 1962). American emphasis on indi-
vidual approaches to social welfare created a receptive climate for harsh prison policies (Mauer 2001). It 
is not amazing that a very large part of the prison population consists of poor and black males or immi-
grants. Secondly, there is the politicization of crime and growing conservative political climate which 
supports the “Getting tough” attitude on criminals (Mauer 2001). Prisoner rates are to a great degree a 
function of criminal and social policies of a country but the connection is complicated. 
There are different ways to define the concept of prison population. In this article, the definition 
of Eurostat is used: prison population is the “total number of adult and juvenile prisoners (including pre-
trial detainees) at 1 September. Including offenders held in Prison Administration facilities, other facili-
ties, juvenile offenders' institutions, drug addicts' institutions and psychiatric or other hospitals. Exclud-
ing non-criminal prisoners held for administrative purposes (for example, people held pending investi-
gation into their immigration status)”. The criminality of a country means the total recorded offenses 
against the criminal code including homicide, violent crime, robbery, domestic burglary, theft of a motor 
vehicle and drug trafficking. Most analyses are based on the total crime rates. Total crime statistics 
include offences against the penal code or criminal code. Less serious crimes (misdemeanors) are gener-
ally excluded (Eurostat 2010). 
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Criminality and prison population trends in a comparative international 
setting 
Prison population trends during the years 1993-2007 in te Nordic countries 
Basically, the Nordic countries are quite similar economically and socially and have had same kind of 
crime trends, so it is interesting and easy to compare their prison populations. In Figure 2, we can see 
that the situation in Sweden differs very much from the other Nordic countries. The amount of prisoners 
in Sweden is much higher than in Denmark, Finland and Norway and the trend is quite steady during 
the period of nearly twenty years. The difference grows even bigger when the prison populations are ex-
amined in relation to the total populations of these countries (Figure 2).  At this point it is interesting to 
examine the crime rates (Figures 2 and 3). The crime rates of Sweden from 1996 to 2007 show an in-
crease of 11 % in total criminality whereas the crime rates of the other Nordic countries has not in-
creased, for example in Denmark it has decreased about 15 % and in Finland nearly 9 %.  The amount of 
homicides has also decreased in Finland and Denmark but increased in Sweden. Other violent crimes 
have increased in these Nordic countries but the biggest growth is in Sweden. These results seem to 
show the ineffective and detrimental form of punishment (Eurostat 2010).  
In addition to looking at the means between the countries, it is interesting and useful to examine the 
standard deviations which are shown in Table 1. It is striking that the smallest standard deviation is in 
Sweden and the biggest one in Iceland. The standard deviations of the other Nordic countries show that 
the amount of prisoners does not vary very much. 
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 . Prison population in the Nordic countries, 1993-2007. Prison population in relation to 
total population in the Nordic countries. 
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Table 1. Prison population in relation to total population in the Nordic countries. Basic statisti-
cal analysis. 
 
Prison population trends during the years 1993-2007 in Baltic countries 
Figures 4 and 5 show that the amount of prison population in Estonia is at a very low level in compari-
son to Lithuania and Latvia even though the amount of prisoners is decreasing in both Lithuania and 
Latvia.  The rate is very high in Lithuania when the prison population is examined in relation to the total 
population. Lithuania has the biggest average and standard deviation of the prison population (Table 2). 
It is amazing how Estonia has been able to keep the rate of prisoners so low, when at the same time the 
total crime rate has increased over 40 %. The prison populations of all three Baltic countries have de-
creased during the years 1993-2007 although especially drug trafficking crime has increased explosively 
during the years 1996 – 2007 (Eurostat 2010). So the growth in crime rates in Estonia and Latvia cannot 
be seen in prison population trends. 
 
 
Figures 4 and  5. Prison population in the Baltic countries, 1993-2007. Prison population in relation to 
total population in the Baltic countries 
  
geo/time Min Max Range Average Median Var Standard deviation
Denmark 0,00060 0,00075 0,00015 0,00066 0,00065 1,72617E-09 4,15472E-05
Finland 0,00052 0,00074 0,00023 0,00063 0,00064 3,9394E-09 6,27646E-05
Iceland 0,00001 0,00036 0,00034 0,00004 0,00002 7,65384E-09 8,74862E-05
Norway 0,00048 0,00065 0,00017 0,00055 0,00053 2,95883E-09 5,43952E-05
Sweden 0,00065 0,02523 0,02458 0,02067 0,02191 3,41279E-05 0,00584191
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Table 2. Prison population in relation to total population in the Baltic countries. Basic statisti-
cal analysis. 
 
 
Prison population trends during the years 1993-2007 in Western Europe 
Figure 6 indicates that Germany and France have the greatest number of prison population whereas the 
other Western European countries have much lower rates. The Netherlands had its highest amount of 
prison population in the year 2005 which was nearly 20000. The situation becomes quite different when 
the prison populations are examined in relation to total populations. The Prison population in relation to 
total population is clearly highest in Luxembourg and the amount grew quite steadily since 2001 until 
2006. At first it seems amazing. There have been steadily growing migration in Luxembourg during the 
years 1961-2003 so that in the year 2007 there were 37 % immigrants of the population and 5000 illegal 
immigrants (Wikipedia/Luxembourg). Alcohol consumption is also quite high in Luxembourg (WHO 
2004): it sells the most alcohol in Europe per capita. However, the visiting foreign customers of the 
neighboring countries (Germany, France and Belgium) also contribute to the high level of alcohol sales 
per capita. Level of education has not been very high because the only university was build not until in 
2003. The situation of Luxembourg is also so central that it is quite easy for the professional offenders to 
come to the country. 
Next after Luxembourg are performing Germany and France, which have had the amount of prison-
ers quite at a same level during this checking period (Figure 7). The averages, medians and standard de-
viations of all the Western countries are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Figures 6 and 7. Prison population in the Western Europe, 1993-2007. Prison population in relation to 
total population in the Western Europe 
  
Min Max Range Average Median Var Standard deviation
Estonia 0,00038 0,00302 0,00263 0,00067 0,00051 4,24025E-07 0,000651172
Latvia 0,00287 0,00523 0,00236 0,00373 0,00367 3,72102E-07 0,000610002
Lithuania 0,00281 0,01030 0,00749 0,00738 0,00786 4,08509E-06 0,002021161
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Table 3. Prison population in relation to total population in Western Europe. Basic statistical 
analysis 
 
Prison population trends during the years 1993-2007 in Southern Europe 
Figure 8 indicates that Spain and Italy have the biggest number of prisoners and that the number of 
Spanish prisoners has been growing steadily from the year 2001. Again, the situation changes quite radi-
cally when the prison populations are examined in relation to total populations: then Macedonia has 
much more prisoners than the other Southern European countries (Fig. 9). Understandably the numbers 
are so high when we think the situation in the times of former Yugoslavia, which was the name of Mace-
donia before.  Total criminality (total recorded offences) increased in Spain during the years 1996-2007 
about 30 % and in Italy about 20 %. 
 
 
Figures 8 and 9. Prison population in Southern Europe, 1993-2007. Prison population in relation to 
total population in Southern Europe 
  
Min Max Range Average Median Var Standard deviation
Austria 0,00091 0,00263 0,00172 0,00206 0,00196 2,02806E-07 0,00045034
Belgium 0,00072 0,00097 0,00025 0,00083 0,00084 6,25931E-09 7,91158E-05
France 0,00089 0,00729 0,00640 0,00640 0,00679 2,48034E-06 0,00157491
Germany 0,00074 0,00779 0,00705 0,00658 0,00688 2,94407E-06 0,001715829
Ireland 0,00002 0,00079 0,00076 0,00008 0,00004 3,79472E-08 0,0001948
Liechtenstein 0,00001 0,00278 0,00277 0,00020 0,00002 5,07798E-07 0,000712599
Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) 0,00105 0,02109 0,02003 0,01384 0,01377 2,3698E-05 0,004868057
Netherlands 0,00053 0,00108 0,00055 0,00080 0,00077 2,34836E-08 0,000153244
Northern Ireland 0,00005 0,00051 0,00045 0,00011 0,00009 1,21324E-08 0,000110147
Scotland 0,00080 0,00111 0,00031 0,00089 0,00086 6,65762E-09 8,15943E-05
Switzerland 0,00068 0,00083 0,00015 0,00078 0,00079 1,9596E-09 4,42674E-05
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Table 4. Prison population in relation to total population in Southern Europe. Basic statistical analy-
sis. 
 
Prison population trends during the years 1993-2007 in Eastern Europe 
The sample of Eastern Europe is limited for this trend analysis because the statistics of Eurostat consists 
of only six countries. Poland and Romania have had the biggest number of prisoners compared to the 
other Eastern European countries during the follow-up period but the prison population of Poland has 
increased its growth since the year 2000 while the prison population of Romania has decreased quite a 
lot (Figure 10). Interestingly the total crime rate has increased in Poland nearly 30 % and decreased in 
Romania over 10 % during the years 1996 -2007. However when the prison population is considered in 
relation to total population the prison population of Romania grows sharply (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figures 10 and 11. Prison population in Eastern Europe, 1993-2007. Prison population in relation to 
total population in Eastern Europe. 
 
 
  
Min Max Range Average Median Var Standard deviation
Bulgaria 0,00023 0,00029 0,00005 0,00027 0,00028 1,59023E-10 1,26104E-05
Croatia 0,00180 0,00258 0,00078 0,00226 0,00234 6,54818E-08 0,000255894
Cyprus 0,00031 0,00364 0,00333 0,00078 0,00033 1,16388E-06 0,001078832
Greece 0,00002 0,00015 0,00013 0,00008 0,00006 1,52906E-09 3,91032E-05
Italy 0,00012 0,01185 0,01173 0,00903 0,01024 8,37971E-06 0,002894772
Macedonia 0,06137 0,09411 0,03274 0,08329 0,08402 6,44345E-05 0,008027109
Malta 0,00002 0,00309 0,00307 0,00023 0,00002 6,25061E-07 0,000790608
Montenegro 0,00031 0,00060 0,00029 0,00042 0,00042 7,83397E-09 8,85097E-05
Portugal 0,00007 0,00236 0,00229 0,00176 0,00181 2,4951E-07 0,00049951
Serbia 0,00048 0,02200 0,02152 0,01780 0,01896 2,6716E-05 0,005168755
Spain 0,00073 0,00085 0,00012 0,00077 0,00077 6,3852E-10 2,52689E-05
Turkey 0,00110 0,00151 0,00041 0,00124 0,00116 1,91001E-08 0,000138203
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Table 5. Prison population in relation to total population in East Europe. Basic statistical anal-
ysis 
 
The prison population trends in the USA, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and Europe  
The main trends of prison populations between U.S.A., Russia, South Africa, Turkey and Europe are pre-
sented in Figures 12 and 13.   Figure 12 indicates that the prison population in USA has increased steadi-
ly and is expected to continue its growth. However, we know that in the year 2009 the growth stopped 
because of the economic depression (look at page 4). The situation is a bit different when the prison 
population is examined in relation to total population (Figure 13): the prison population has not in-
creased so much. It seems that the prison population is related to the great number of immigrants. Can-
ada has quite different criminal policy as compared to USA at least when the prison populations are con-
cerned. Canada has a low rate of prison population – in fact it has the lowest average compared to the 
average prison populations of Russia, USA, South Africa, Europe and Turkey - and it is showing a 
downward trend, because the yearly average change was negative (Eurostat 2010).   
The criminal policy of USA differs also from that of Russia; Figure 14 indicates that the amount of 
prison population in relation to total population of USA is slightly increasing whereas the rate is decreas-
ing in Russia. Kleyman (2011) nicely explains the moral climate and the prison-punishment system in 
Russia. After the collapse of communism, the Russian society changed dramatically. Many of the sys-
tems and infrastructures that provided social security were destroyed, law and order broke down result-
ing in the growing criminalization within the society. In Putin’s era much of the political and financial 
power began to be controlled by people with a state security background. As a result in the 2000s crime 
in Russia has taken a sharp decline. 
The number of prisoners in USA is huge: nearly 600 000 inmates return to their communities each 
year (see Farkas & Miller 2011, 342) and it has created the problem of recidivism because the reentry of 
prisoners is a difficult process. The study of Vieraitis, Kovandzic and Marvell (2007) demonstrated that 
although prison population growth seems to be associated with statistically significant decreases in 
crime rates, increases in the number of prisoners released from prison seem to be significantly associat-
ed with increases in crime. This is just what has happened in the USA. 
Comparing the general European criminal policy to that of Turkey (Figure 16), we can see a differ-
ence: the amount of prison population in relation to total population is increasing in Turkey but not in 
European key countries. Turkey has a serious problem with a high rate of prisoners which is increasing 
explosively: yearly average growth is 6.7 % in 1993-2007. This means that it grows six times more than 
the total prison population of Europe (Eurostat 2010). One reason for this is that the Turkish political 
and economical system has been quite unstable until the end of 1980s, and the criminal policy of Turkey 
has been quite aggressive and punishing. Turkish society has been quite authoritarian where the army 
Min Max Range Average Median Var Standard deviation
Czech Republic 0,00161 0,00227 0,00067 0,00192 0,00186 4,18244E-08 0,00020451
Hungary 0,00024 0,00161 0,00136 0,00039 0,00031 1,15131E-07 0,00033931
Poland 0,00121 0,00175 0,00055 0,00146 0,00146 3,16445E-08 0,000177889
Romania 0,00161 0,00877 0,00716 0,00662 0,00638 3,3457E-06 0,001829127
Slovenia 0,00194 0,00508 0,00314 0,00409 0,00425 7,12661E-07 0,000844192
Slovakia 0,00002 0,00049 0,00047 0,00006 0,00003 1,43516E-08 0,000119798
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has had great political power but in recent years some democratization process has been going on.  Be-
cause of questionable human rights in Turkey there have also been much political prisoners. About 70 % 
of the Turkish population lives in urban centers and about 20 % of the population are of other ethnic 
groups than Turks – e.g. Kurds, Arabs and Romani people. There have been tensions between these eth-
nic groups. The assimilation rate has been quite low among these ethnic groups, but among the Turks 
the assimilation rate has been quite high. (Wikipedia/Turkey). 
The results concerning the relation between criminality and prison population/total population in 
U.S.A., Russia, Europe and Turkey are presented in Figures 18, 20, 21, and 24. The trade-off analyses of 
criminality and prison population are more thoroughly analyzed elsewere (see Konttila & Kaivo-oja 
2011). Interestingly, this study found three different kinds of prison population trends. These trends 
have different background criminality policy settings. First, one basic trend is: when total criminality 
increases, prison population increases. This is the case especially in Turkey. The 2nd basic model is: when 
criminality increases, prison population does not increase. The aggregated trend of European countries 
resembles this trend model. The 3rd alternative trend model is: the criminality decreases by increasing 
prison population. This is a consequence of the criminal policy model of the U.S.A.. In the U.S.A., law 
offenders are straightforwardly locked in jail in order to reduce the total criminality – and this connec-
tion is quite linear. This trend reminds also the policy of Russian Federation but the connection is not as 
straightforward in Russia as it is in the U.S.A. 
 
 
Figures 12 and 13. Prison population in the U.S.A., the Russian Federation, South Africa, Canada, Tur-
key and Europe, 1993-2007. Prison population in relation total population in the 
U.S.A., Russian Federation, South Africa, Canada, Turkey and Europe, 1993-2007 
 
 
  
Prison population in U.S.A., Russian Federation, South Africa, 
Tukey and Europe, 1993-2007
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
Time
P
ri
s
o
n
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n Russian Federation
United States
South Africa
Canada
Europe (total)
Turkey
Prison population in relation to total population in U.S.A, 
Canada, Russian Federation, Europe, Turkey and general rate, 
1993-2007
0,00000
0,00500
0,01000
0,01500
0,02000
0,02500
0,03000
0,03500
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Time
P
ri
s
o
n
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
/T
o
ta
l 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
Russian Federation
United States
South Africa
Canada
Europe (total)
Turkey
General rate
 246 
Table 6. Prison population in relation to total population in in the U.S.A., the Russian Federa-
tion, South Africa, Turkey and Europe. Basic statistical analysis 
 
 
 
Figures 14, 15 and 16. Prison population in relation to total population in the U.S.A. and in the Russian 
Federation. Prison population in relation to total population, U.S.A. and European key 
countries and Turkey and European key countries.  
  
Min Max Range Average Median Var Standard deviation
Russian Federation 0,00530 0,00709 0,00179 0,00620 0,00619 3,56553E-07 0,000597121
United States 0,00071 0,00770 0,00698 0,00616 0,00665 2,73742E-06 0,001654514
South Africa 0,00266 0,03224 0,02958 0,00705 0,00365 9,14614E-05 0,009563543
Canada 0,00105 0,00134 0,00029 0,00118 0,00116 1,09338E-08 0,000104565
Europe (total) 0,00121 0,00156 0,00034 0,00131 0,00129 1,07342E-08 0,000103606
Turkey 0,00110 0,00151 0,00041 0,00124 0,00116 1,91001E-08 0,000138203
General rate 0,00209 0,00798 0,00588 0,00365 0,00317 2,79874E-06 0,001672943
Prison population in relation to total population, U.S.A. and 
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Figures 17 and 18. Total criminality and prison population/total population trade-off in the Russian 
Federation.  
 
Figures 19 and 20. Total criminality and prison population in the U.S.A., years 1996-2007. Total crim-
inality and prison population/total population trade-off in the U.S.A. 
 
Figures 21 and 22. Total criminality and prison population in the U.S.A, years 1996-2007. Total crimi-
nality and prison population/total population trade-off in Europe 
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Figures 23 and 24. Total criminality and prison population in Turkey, years 1996-2007. Total crimi-
nality and prison population/total population trade-off in Turkey 
Summary and security policy reflections 
The trade-off relationship between total criminality and prison populations is a very complicated issue 
and varies between different countries as this study shows the issue. In this summary we do not repeat 
all the details of our research findings. There are some key findings which are summarized here.  
First, our analysis tells that Turkey has a serious problem with a high rate of prisoners which is in-
creasing explosively: yearly average growth is 6.7 % during the years 1993-2007. This means that it 
grows six times more than the total prison population of Europe. However, the rate of prisoners in Tur-
key may be changing to more positive direction, because of formal accession negotiations with the EU 
since 2005 and the Turkey has tried to change its policies towards the European model and standards. 
Increasing, quite alarming prison population/total trends were found also in Sweden, in Spain and also 
in Romania. Total prison population was increasing in a considerable way in the U.S.A., Poland, France 
and Northern Ireland. Generally, it seems that a very high amount of immigrants is a very challenging 
security policy issues for the societies generally when the amount of criminality and prison population 
are considered. The situation is quite different in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania): the 
Baltic prison populations have decreased during the years 1993-2007, although especially drug traffick-
ing crime has increased explosively.  
In this comprehensive comparative trend analysis and security policy study we found three different 
kinds of prison population trends. These trends have different background criminality policy settings. 
First, Model Trend A, one basic trend is: when total criminality increases, prison population increases. 
This is the case especially in Turkey. The 2nd basic model, the Model B is: when criminality increases, 
prison population does not increase. The aggregated trend of the European member states reminds very 
much this kind of Trend Model B. However, it is to be noticed that the criminal policies varies quite a lot 
between some European countries. The 3rd alternative Trend Model C is: the criminality decreases by 
increasing prison population. This is a consequence of the criminal policy model of the U.S.A. In the 
U.S.A. law offenders are straightforwardly locked in jail in order to reduce the total criminality – and 
this connection is quite linear. This trend reminds us that the criminal policy of the Russian Federation, 
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but the connection is not as straightforward in Russia as it is in the U.S.A. One key scientific finding of 
this trend study is these three trend models. This finding implicates that there are at least three differ-
ent security policy models in the world when we evaluate security policy from this perspective.  
As a larger visual summary of prison population trends we can present baseline scenarios for large 
regions: U.S.A., Europe, the Russian Federation and Turkey till the year 2015. However it is to be noted 
that the statistical reliability of these statistics may vary between these countries. Last figure 25 indicates 
that in larger context prison population of the U.S.A. is going to grow unlike in Europe, Russia, the 
South-Africa, Canada, and even in Turkey. Thus the criminal policy of the U.S.A. differs quite a lot from 
the policy of the other larger countries/regions analyzed in this trend study. Generally we can note that 
the changing demographic factors have also an influence on the criminality in the future. For example, 
one key trend is that the population structure is coming older, which usually decreases the volume of 
criminality. From this demographic perspective, we can expect a more secure world.  
 
 
Figure 25. Prison population baseline scenario until the year 2015, the U.S.A., the Russian Federation, 
Canada, Europe, South Africa, and Turkey. 
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ABSTRACT – The environment and its resources are central to complex societies. Inadequate envi-
ronmental governance may thereby lead to human suffering including armed conflict, while incapaci-
ty to adapt to environmental change has contributed throughout history to the collapse of complex so-
cieties. Environmental engineering technologies such as geo-engineering and synthetic biology add a 
new challenge by allowing modification from micro- to global scales at an unprecedented scope and 
pace. "Making our environment" is truer now than ever before, but unintentional and cascading con-
sequences can also contribute to the unmaking of global society, if risks are not appreciated in ad-
vance. 
 
Introduction and Background 
“International control of weather modification will be as essential to the safety of the world as 
control of nuclear energy is now” – Henry Houghton, chair of the MIT meteorology depart-
ment, 1957 
 
Nobel-prize winner Paul Crutzen considered in 2000 the impact of human actions on the environment 
so profound as to constitute a new geological era, called the “anthropocene” (Dalby 2009: 99). While the 
exact starting date is debated, its defining quality is the historically unprecedented amount of environ-
mental change as a consequence of human action. In the anthropocene the environment is no longer an 
independent background or simple context of human action: it has become a “matter of our own mak-
ing” (Ibid.).  
Modifying the environment according to some predefined specifications is not a new phenomenon, 
as illustrated by Houghton’s quote above. Arguably, since agriculture has been invented, species bred 
and civilisation emerged, the environment has been constantly modified by, and for, humans (see Dia-
mond 1999). What is different now, however, is the upsurge of the geoengineering debate in the past 
decade as well as advances in synthetic biology. The environment now seems to truly become a matter of 
our own making, as everything from microscopic scale to global weather systems could be consciously 
manipulated.  
This paper will investigate how these types of manipulations affect our security in the long term. The 
environment and security interface on multiple levels: the role of the environment in questions of peace 
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and security has been repeatedly established (see e.g. UNEP 2009, WBGU 2007) and multiple studies 
have outlined how climate change may lead to future insecurity and instability by altering productive 
landscapes and negatively impacting human habitats (see WBGU 2007, Halden 2007, Carius et al. 
2008). On the other hand targeting the environment in times of war or enlisting it as a weapon of war 
has an ancient history (Lockwood 2009), while fears of terrorist use of biotechnology have increased 
significantly with the anthrax attacks following the September 11, 2001 events (Monke 2004).  
Against this background, the paper provides a conceptual overview to the potential implications of 
these environmental modifications from a security perspective. In section 2, the interface of security and 
the environment will be further elaborated in the context of the anthropocene and global environmental 
change. In sections 3 and 4, the emerging role, and potential risks, of geoengineering and synthetic biol-
ogy as modification technologies will be highlighted. Although it is not an exhaustive review of the tech-
nologies, the paper discusses some policy conclusions in section 5.  
Security and the Environment 
Connecting security and environment via the term “environmental security” may be misleading – is it 
security of the environment or security from the environment? Without a clear reference object, the term 
security is meaningless (Buzan et al. 1998) as it depends strongly on the perspective and the reference 
object (cf. Dalby 1997). Security is additionally a term used to justify exceptional measures, such as sanc-
tioning violence or cessation of rights, and labelling something a security issue may have significant con-
sequences (Buzan et al. 1998). The term environmental security thus received much criticism, as it can 
distract attention from actual security concerns and/or may lead to the securitization or militarization of 
environmental politics (cf. Dalby 2002). From a terminological point of view, it is therefore more useful 
to keep security and environment apart.  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the environment and security nexus can be discussed by study-
ing two levels of interlinkages. The first is the interface level, where security and the environment are 
two distinct subjects. The second is the system level, where environment and security cannot be mean-
ingfully separated. Each of these levels is reviewed below.  
The interface level is useful to understanding how environmental issues and processes may lead to 
insecurity, which is here understood as violent conflict or related forms of human suffering. Past re-
search shows that over 70 conflicts between 1980 and 2005 were related to renewable resources (Carius 
et al. 2006), while natural resources in general were implicated in approximately 40 percent of all armed 
conflicts since World War II (UNEP 2009).The studies focus in particular on ways in which either scarci-
ty or abundance of resources may contribute to the outbreak, continuation or cessation of violent conflict 
(see e.g. Ross 2004; Homer-Dixon 1999). Indeed, in multiple conflicts in the past decades control over 
profitable resources such as diamonds, gold or oil has been a key driving factor. Additionally, violent 
conflicts may also be related to environmental destruction as a result of combat – which may be inten-
tional, as in case of the use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War – or unsustainable exploitation 
such as excessive logging to provide shelter to refugees (UNEP 2009).  
Access to resources or environmental destruction however, is never the sole cause of conflict, but ra-
ther one aspect that may, to a lesser or greater degree, be implicated (WBGU 2007). Indeed, it can be 
argued that environmental and resource governance – the distribution of wealth from abundant re-
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sources or allocation of scarce resources – are the actual core conflictive issues, and not the environment 
or resource availability per se. By comparing multiple cases across different regions, it becomes apparent 
that despite similarities in the respective environment/resource endowment, some tense situations esca-
late into violence while others do not (see e.g. Kahl 2005).  
Yet the interface level is insufficient to grasp the deeper relationship between environment and secu-
rity. Without agriculture, domestication of animals and cultivation of plants, there would be no complex 
society (see e.g. Diamond 1999), but it is unclear how to apply the term security in this context. Con-
versely, humanity has continued to shape the environment – thus the contemporary environment is in 
large part also the product of human action and rarely “natural” in a strict sense (cf. Dalby 2002, 2009). 
Climate change is the most clearly observable part of this process, and will leave no habitat or ecosystem 
untouched. It epitomises how societies and the environment are co-evolving, leading us to the “anthro-
pocene” described above, where environmental change is largely driven by humanity (Dalby 2009).  
The notion of the anthropocene and the view that security and the environment are constituent parts 
of a larger complex system are important to understanding how complex societies may collapse under 
environmental change: in contrast to the interface level mentioned above, security in this context is not 
only about human suffering or violent conflict, but about a form of “stability” – i.e. the continuation of 
the current socio-ecological patterns. Jared Diamond (2005) reviewed several historical examples where 
this pattern changed and societies ultimately collapsed; their way of living was inadequate for their 
(changed and changing) environment, the constituent parts mismatched and the pattern no longer sta-
ble. This may be the consequence of regional climate change or unsustainable development, as in case of 
the Easter Islands where ultimately no tree was left to sustain their culture (Ibid.). Interestingly, in most 
cases such societies collapsed because they focused on security and stability in a static sense, i.e. observ-
ing and preserving their practices and lifestyle when they were no longer viable. Or as Simon Dalby said: 
keeping things as they are when they no longer could stay as they are (cf. Dalby 2009).  
The contrast then between the interface and systems levels is that in the former the connection be-
tween security and environment is spatially and temporally limited to a specific case. It is furthermore 
relatively direct, observable and traceable, as security relates directly to individuals or groups of humans, 
be it through frustration of their physical needs or as a result of armed conflict. Concurrently, a calamity 
such as a violent conflict is quite avoidable, as it is a result of ineffective, inequitable or uncooperative 
resource governance. This can all be changed and, consequently, terms such as “post-conflict reconstruc-
tion” apply and a positive, post-calamity situation can be created, all other things being equal.  
On the complex systems level, however, insecurity may rather be seen as an existential challenge for 
a society, as it includes challenging its political, social, economic and cultural practices on a fundamental 
level. Post-calamity reconstruction would be impossible, because it would be unviable. Whatever the 
outcome of an event is when a society breaks down, the new society will look differently and adapt to the 
changed circumstances. Thomas Homer-Dixon (2005) coined the term “catagenesis” to describe this 
process: a combination of the terms catastrophe, which denotes the downfall of a society, and genesis, 
which denotes the creation of a new one after the downfall. This was the case on the Easter Islands, and 
is a process that has existed throughout history, with the rise and fall of civilisations.  
The new quality of the anthropocene is that threats on the systems level are thereby globalised as 
well: a global society has been created, which interconnects every part of the world. Its demands are 
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equally staggering. Global population is likely to increase from seven to over nine billion by 2050. This, 
and currently further rising resource demands already create a series of interlocking resource challenges, 
where local events could have temporally and spatially dislocated impacts (cf. Lee 2009). A clear exam-
ple for this is climate change, where activities by carbon-intensive societies will have disparate conse-
quences around the world. The potential implications of such a change on a global scale have been out-
lined by multiple authors (see e.g. WBGU 2007, Halden 2007, Welzer 2008). The food crisis of 2008 
exemplifies how loss of harvests and increased use of biofuels may affect food prices and lead to riots in 
distant countries (Maas et al. 2010). The global interconnectedness that comes with global society makes 
them also more susceptible to turbulences (Homer-Dixon 2005).   
This global change may have impacts on both levels, with risks of increased conflict related to natu-
ral resources – among others due to governance systems incapable of anticipating the changes – or 
whole societies becoming unviable, as islanders may for example be forced to move thereby losing their 
collective identity. 77F1  On a global level some authors consider a “creeping social change” as adaptation to 
climate change inevitable (see Welzer 2008), while others already call democracy a failure and see a 
need for more authoritarian rule to cope with the challenges of climate change (see Shearmann/Smith 
2007). 
Changing Contexts: Making Environment 
The aforementioned evolution of the environment is the sum and combination of intentional and unin-
tentional modification events – such as agriculture or climate change. They have in common the incre-
mental modification of the environment within certain parameters, such as livestock breeding over sev-
eral generations and climate change resulting from two centuries of emissions. These changes are likely 
to increase and accelerate further, not least because of globally ongoing, carbon-intensive economic de-
velopment. However, a new quality is now added, as technologies are becoming available to intentionally 
modify the environment outside of contemporary parameters. Of these, geo-engineering (or climate en-
gineering) and bio-engineering signal challenges to come and will be discussed in greater detail below.  
Geo-engineering and bio-engineering span two extremes of environmental modification, from large-
scale, intentional manipulation of the non-living elements of the environment, in particular climate, to 
the engineering of biological resources. Geo-engineering is defined as large-scale (continental or global) 
intentional modifications to oceans, soils, and the atmosphere (ETC Group 2009). Techniques focus on 
managing solar radiation, removal (and storage) of carbon from the atmosphere, and weather modifica-
tion (see e.g. Royal Society 2009). 78F2  In the last decade in particular these techniques have been proposed 
primarily to address the global problem of climate change, therefore large-scale impacts or benefits are 
desired. However, many assessments concede that most techniques that are able to deliver a high 
enough impact also carry with them high uncertainties of risk (Matthews and Turner 2009). Aside from 
                                                             
 
1 In the Pacific island states, for instance, land is customarily owned and very closely connected to socio-cultural 
identity. Giving up land thus means giving up this identity as well (Carius/Maas 2009). 
2 Methods that might provide most benefits in the short-run include the injection of aerosol materials (such as sul-
phur) into the stratosphere, and increasing the reflectivity of the ocean by injecting bubbles on a large scale (Mac-
Cracken, 2009). 
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being technologically feasible 79F3, geo-engineering may be financially relatively ‘cheap’, compared with the 
scale of mitigation and adaptation costs: estimates for keeping global warming at <2°C has been esti-
mated around US $6 billion per year (see Bickel/Lane 2009), while according to the UNFCCC costs for 
adaptation may be at least US $49 billion per year until 2030 (UNFCCC 2007). 80 F4  It is important to note 
however, that such comparisons are difficult to make, since many costs may not be taken into account, 
and uncertainties and cascading effects may be overlooked.   
Bio-engineering (or synthetic biology) on the other hand is applied in many different areas, from 
producing improved pharmaceuticals, food production, energy (biofuels) generation, to new plastics and 
materials (OECD 2009; EU 2005). Bio-engineering is defined as the making of things (improved or new) 
using biological pieces (Carlson 2010). The novel use and synergy of cells and organisms has been going 
on since the beginning of life on Earth, but what is now most interesting is the scale and intention of this 
genetic manipulation, which is unprecedented, and the scope of these endeavours: while parts of genes 
have so far been successfully introduced into organisms to encourage certain characteristics, scientists 
are now able to create an entire chromosome from scratch and endow it with tailored behaviours based 
on prior computer modelling (May 2009). The most recent feat of the J. Craig Venter Institute in fact 
successfully created an organism with no ancestor, whose DNA sequence was computer-designed.81F5  
Bio-engineering is increasingly seen as future economic growth area, with some seeing already an 
emerging bio-economy (OECD 2009) on the horizon. However, the increase in the use of synthetic biol-
ogy is not only driven by individuals empowered by a creative use of these technologies. There is in fact a 
growing demand for synthetic DNA and synthetic genes, a boom visible after the human genome was 
decoded in full in 1991, and highlighted by the size of the synthetic biology market, which was over US 
$200 million in 2008 (May 2009). Demand is driven by academic research institutions who use DNA 
parts, by companies who use synthetic biology to go beyond genetic engineering to increase the scope or 
efficiency of their work (i.e. creating designer enzymes), and by multinational biotech and pharmaceuti-
cal firms who are interested in these techniques for their own research and development work (May 
2009). In contrast to the genetically modified organisms (GMO) which are mostly associated with trans-
national companies, synthetic biology has seen significant ‘democratization’ of its technologies and a 
move towards ‘open source biology’ (Schmidt et al., 2008). Skills can now diffuse through ‘do-it-yourself’ 
(DIY) blogs or groups, between amateurs, and bio-hackers. The DIY groups 82F6 – still a rather small com-
munity mainly active in the United States – were inspired by the International Genetically Engineered 
                                                             
 
3 The unintentional modifications of the environment has already proven that human technologies and actions can 
have significant global impacts. Models and preliminary research also shows that new technologies such as ocean 
fertilization and increased desert reflectivity may indeed be feasible (see e.g. ETC Group 2009). 
4 It should be noted, that climate mitigation may have other benefits as well, such as reducing dependency on fossil 
fuel imports. Hence, making a complete simple cost-benefit analysis is difficult and has not been done yet. 
5 Please see the May 20, 2010 news in The Economist at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16163006?story_id=16163006&CFID=138095936&CFTOKEN=20811879   
6 Examples include a woman who used a PCR machine purchased on eBay to decode her own genome in order to see 
whether she carried the gene for a disease her father has; or a computer programmer created glow-in-the-dark yo-
ghourt in her San Francisco apartment and then moved on to a biosensor for the toxic contaminant in Chinese in-
fant formula (Alper, 2009). 
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Machine (iGEM) project at MIT, which showcases the steadily accelerating ability of amateur scientists 
to create sophisticated biological project with very few resources 83F7. 
Although there are clear differences in the scope, scale, and costs of geo- and bio-engineering, there 
are also several commonalities: they take an engineering approach to the environment, by dissecting 
their area of concern into basic components that can be separated, produced and assembled according to 
pre-defined properties, even though in both cases full understanding of the systems do not exist; both 
are converging technologies, combining areas such as chemistry, physics, engineering, biology, and in-
formation technology (see e.g. de Vriend in Torgersen 2009); both are working on environmental fun-
damentals, from climate to genes - together they cover the environment from the entire globe down to 
cells and viruses; at the same time, both are still very new technologies and their potential consequences 
are not fully known (Royal Society 2009; ETC 2007); their impacts may be unevenly distributed (in the 
case of geo-engineering, field testing may already have dramatic consequences (Royal Society 2009) and 
in the case of synthetic biology, while large-scale field tests are less of an issue, a community of so-called 
“bio-hackers” has emerged, i.e. people who conduct genetic engineering as hobby (Wall Street Journal 
2009)); for both technologies international regulation has been called insufficient or absent altogether 
(House of Commons 2010; ETC 2009); concurrently both technologies – although viewed with fascina-
tion – received rather mixed or negative media attention, such as the focus on creating ‘artificial’ life 
(Torgersen 2009). Thus, the potential intentional and unintentional consequences of both technological 
areas require more scrutiny, which is discussed below.   
Threats: Unmaking Environment 
Bio- and geo-engineering both rely on the manipulation of elements that are part of a complex system 
(climate, biology), whose properties emerge not as a sum of its parts alone, but through interactions (cf. 
Gunderson/Holling 2002). As a result of these interactions a system develops equilibrium, i.e. fluctua-
tions within certain parameters, which creates the stability of a system: it “behaves” along certain expec-
tations, such as seasons or the Monsoon. Interactions are thereby networked, and changing one element 
has cascading impacts on all other parts of the system, to varying degrees. Geo- and bio-engineering 
both have the potential to upset this interaction of factors, by either introducing new elements or chang-
ing interactions within climate, biology, and the environment in general. As such, they may have cascad-
ing and unforeseeable impacts.  
In the case of geo-engineering, solar radiation management may lead to significant and unpredicta-
ble changes in Monsoons (Royal Society 2009). Ocean fertilization may also carry with it potential side 
effects such as a decrease in oxygen and a resulting increase in methane emissions, or significant chang-
es in the microbiological composition and productivity (Keith 2000). Thus, geo-engineering may fix one 
problem to create yet another problem, leading to a cascade of issues. Additionally, if they are chose as a 
solution to climate change global geo-engineering systems must be put in place and continuously main-
tained. If such systems should be crippled it could lead back to rapid global warming, with disastrous 
                                                             
 
7 For more information on iGEM please see http://2010.igem.org/Main_Page 
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associated consequences given the little time left for adapting or building a new system (Brovkin et al. 
2009). 
A particular concern regarding synthetically created organisms is that they may leak into the envi-
ronment from the safety and security of laboratories. If they then undergo mutations and become estab-
lished in resident natural populations, they may cause unknown harm (Kaebnick 2009). The history of 
unintended damage caused by invasive species is an example of how unknown and potentially unstable 
consequences are proportional to our knowledge of the system upon which we are acting: the less com-
plete our understanding of the system the greater the potential for “undesirable or unforeseen environ-
mental” impacts (Matthews and Turner 2009). 84F8  The democratisation of biotechnology – including rap-
idly decreasing costs and availability of equipment and knowledge to a vast array of organisations, small 
companies and individuals – accentuates this concern.  
A further concern, often cited by both supporters and sceptics of geo- and bio-engineering, regards 
dual-use: it is conceivable that states, non-state groups, or even individuals, could apply a number of 
environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes. For instance, the genetic makeup of the 
most dangerous agricultural pests have been decoded, which can help to gain insights to prevent cata-
strophic outbreaks, but can also be used to develop new pathogens (Casagrande 2000). 85F9  Additionally, 
nearly all of the materials and equipment used to cultivate biological warfare agents have commercial 
applications in the production of beer, wine, food products, animal feed supplements, bio-pesticides, 
vaccines, and pharmaceuticals (Tucker 1996).  
Indeed, if terrorists chose to target agriculture, a pathogen could easily be found and synthesized to 
suit the target crops, or an entirely new organism could be created from scratch (Kaebnik 2009). Alt-
hough most existing pathogens would need to go through a complex process of development, produc-
tion, weaponization, and delivery in order to cause mass casualties (with the exception of the smallpox 
and 1918 influenza viruses) these processes would not necessarily be needed if agricultural crops were 
targeted (Vogel 2006). However, taking into consideration past examples and the still-significant tech-
nical obstacles for using these techniques, many studies seem confident that they could become a threat 
only at the state level; non-state actors thus, even those considering a bioterrorist attack, may still prefer 
to use traditional biological warfare agents (Kelle 2009). Bio-engineering security concerns thus may not 
be so much over individuals and non-state groups, but rather over the business industry. Several com-
panies throughout the world are already working on producing synthetic DNA pieces (oligonucleotides), 
and as their size and complexity increases they will be theoretically able to manufacture any virus, in-
cluding toxins and biological agents (Ibid.). These companies are already working together to create and 
check through databases before an order is placed, meaning they would receive an alarm if a potentially 
dangerous DNA sequence had been ordered. However, due to the increasing complexity of the genetic 
                                                             
 
8 For instance, when the cane toad was introduced to Queensland, Australia in 1929, the intended effect was that it 
would act as an insect control. Unsuccessful in this respect, the toad now threatens a number of native species (Mat-
thews and Turner 2009). 
9 Researchers in Brazil for example, have sequenced the genome of citrus variegated chlorosis (X. fastidiosa), whose 
strains cause disease in a variety of agricultural plants such as alfalfa, grapes, coffee, and stone fruit (Casagrande 
2000). 
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parts able to be manufactured, it is becoming very difficult to pick out the dangerous sequences, and to 
create a detailed enough definition of what is dangerous (May 2009).  
In the case of geo-engineering many technologies have military applications and concerns focus on 
states (or potentially also corporations): given its relative financial and technological feasibility, unilat-
eral efforts may be attempted by single, less affluent countries to use technologies either as a global solu-
tion to climate change or for regional protection from climate change impacts (Ricke et al. 2009). How-
ever, the climate is indivisible and global, thus unilateral attempts would have major repercussions and 
could be considered as hostile acts. Gwynne Dyer (2008) explores the possibility that a country severely 
threatened by climate change may resort to desperate measures and even threaten countries with car-
bon-intensive economies into acting or fearing consequences. While protecting the environment and 
preventing climate change currently appear to be globally agreed-upon goals, the introduction of large-
scale geo-engineering, climate variability and instability, and similar impacts may lead to creeping 
changes of values and perspectives (see Welzer 2008) – making the environment a target and a weapon 
alike: With environmental modification becoming pervasive politically, economically and increasingly 
accepted socially, it may also become a focus for military use and targeting – as did “cyberwar” before. A 
well-known example of environmental warfare using Agent Orange occurred during the Vietnam War, 
but a less well-known example of geo-engineering occurred at the same time: the United States carried 
out a campaign of cloud seeding during that war, with a budget of more than US $3 million per year. The 
negative public reaction to the war also extended to this effort, and lead to the international treaty of 
1972, ENMOD, or the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques (Keith 2000). Still, both geo-engineering and bio-engineering fall into 
gray legislative areas due to their dual-use purpose. The ENMOD treaty only has 75 ratifications and the 
past decade has seen deterioration and crises of several arms control treaties.    
Discussion and Conclusions 
The anthropocene is our new era in which direct human action is a major driving force in global envi-
ronmental change. Historically, complex societies could only thrive on a suitable environment and would 
collapse if they were unable to adapt to environmental change. On a local level, inequitable and ineffec-
tive environmental and resource governance along with unsustainable development may also lead to 
conflicts over resources and very direct human suffering. A major challenge is thereby the inflexibility to 
change and adapt. Keeping things as they are even as they continue to change is impossible when the 
environment created by human action no longer supports current social, political and economic practic-
es. 
The fact that environmental modifications – such as geo-engineering and bio-engineering – are in-
creasingly discussed, practiced and accepted pushes the anthropocene to a new level of potential insta-
bility by allowing changes outside of conventional parameters and on unprecedented scales. In the long-
term, a major mismatch of geo-engineering and bio-engineering are their underlying intentions: geo-
engineering focuses on nullifying climate change impacts, essentially a technology fix trying to keep the 
climate as it is; bio-engineering meanwhile is attempting the opposite, creating new organisms never 
seen before, engendering change. The major policy challenge is the view of environment as an external 
issue to be engineered, and not as an intimately co-evolving part of society. As a result, significant 
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threats of cascading, unexpected problems were discussed above, which may destabilise environmental 
processes and, by extension, societies. 
Both ongoing, often unintended, environmental change as a result of human action, as well as inten-
tional and targeted environmental manipulation, may lead to unpredictable environmental changes for 
which current societies are no longer prepared to adapt. This may also increase the risk of catagenesis: a 
calamity that leads to the collapse of the current complex global society, and the potential creation of a 
new society thereafter. Such events tend to significantly reduce social complexity and be accompanied by 
a violent release of energy as well (see Homer-Dixon 2005; Diamond 2005).  
Governance, legislation and regulation of these modification technologies, such as via the ENMOD 
treaty, are currently insufficiently developed to accommodate the upcoming challenges. Furthermore, 
regulations have a tendency to be too rigid and inflexible: the Law of the Sea is a good example, as cli-
mate-induced sea-level rise is not covered and will raise serious future legal questions (Maas et al. 2010). 
Principles and codes of conduct 86F10 guiding behaviour may be more appropriate, as flexibility will be need-
ed to adapt to ongoing environmental change. The precautionary principle should, however, be central 
to the debate – it is currently insufficiently discussed at international conferences such as the 2010 Asi-
lomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies. 87 F11  To slow down the process and 
give more time for consideration and preparation, a moratorium on experiments have been suggested by 
a number of scientists to further research unintended consequences (e.g. ETC 2009). However, this re-
quires a coordinated effort, particularly regarding monitoring and enforcement. Given the economic role 
of bio-engineering as an emerging sector, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
as well as the G20 may be suitable fora for discussing these issues. The global nature and risks involved 
in geo-engineering, however, commands a debate within the UN General Assembly.  
In conclusion a governance approach is needed, as it becomes clearer that trying to keep things as 
they are – an implicit key aspect of security – is not a sustainable option. Instead, it is likely that a tran-
sition will occur as a result of ongoing (and potentially accelerated) environmental change. The aim must 
be to identify where this transition may lead to frictions – where environment and security interfaces – 
and where it threatens to uproot societies. A set of social, political and economic practices that are capa-
ble to sustain rapid change and to adapt accordingly should be the focus of policy-makers. 
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ABSTRACT – Decisions and investments in energy sector are frequently justified in terms of achiev-
ing energy security. The concept energy security originates from the concerns generated by the first oil 
crisis (1973-74) and it basically refers to sufficient supply in affordable prices. Since then energy secu-
rity has maintained to be a dominant energy policy objective and an important tool of justification for 
governments throughout the world. Less frequently there are questions raised on energy security for 
whom and with what kind of environmental and social consequences. In the era of climate crisis these 
questions are becoming more and more significant and especially in the development context issues 
related to pro-poor energy decisions are gaining importance.  
Development banks are major actors in defining and implementing global energy governance. 
They are involved in the financing of energy sector and defining priorities in most developing and 
transition countries where the energy demand is growing rapidly. This paper analyses, firstly, the de-
velopment of World Bank’s and Asian Development Bank’s energy agenda and their understanding on 
energy-security-development nexus from 1980s to 2010. Secondly, the paper discusses how the banks 
energy agenda is implemented in practice in the Mekong Region in Southeast Asia. The focus is mainly 
on large-scale hydropower, which is the energy source with most regional relevance in the area. 
Introduction  
Energy policies, systems and technologies are the product of complex power play between divergent ac-
tors and their interests. The energy production and distribution choices are political but usually they are 
rendered technical and administrative. The pursuit of energy security has become a dominant energy 
policy objective and political tool for governments throughout the world. The way in which energy secu-
rity is understood affects the way in which countries argue and formulate their energy policy. In its basic 
and most traditional form energy security refers sufficiency of supply in affordable prices. This under-
standing of energy security remains to be the core of energy security thinking, even though in the past 
decades the understanding of energy-security nexus has changed, mainly because climate concerns have 
entered into the energy agenda.  
In the developing countries the development banks such as World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) have become major actors in defining priorities in the energy sector of the recipient coun-
tries. Due to high investment costs in the energy sector, the development banks are powerful players in 
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building energy sector in many developing countries. Therefore, the energy policies that the develop-
ment banks are promoting and the projects and programs they are financing have long term impacts on 
different levels, from local communities to states, regions and even the globe as a whole. This paper 
analyses the development of World Bank’s and ADB’s energy policy discourses and the implementation 
of their energy agenda in the Mekong region in Southeast Asia. The paper begins by examining the de-
velopment of World Bank’s and ADB’s energy policies from 1980s to the present. The analysis focuses on 
the discursive turns in the development banks’ energy policies. 88 F1  By discursive turn we refer to major 
changes in their argumentation on how energy production and distribution should be organised and the 
reasoning why the selected solutions are superior to others. The latter part of the paper gives examples 
on how World Bank and ADB have implemented their energy policy in concrete energy programs and 
projects in the Mekong region. We will mainly focus on large-scale hydropower, which in the Mekong 
Region is the energy source with most regional relevance.  
Energy-Security-Development Nexus 
The pursuit of energy security is a dominant policy objective and political tool for governments 
throughout the world. The obvious reason for this is a strong link between energy and national security, 
as energy is vital for the functioning of the state. There is no internationally agreed definition of the term 
energy security, and the way in which countries, organizations and institutions have defined has changed 
over the years. In its basic and most traditional form energy security refers to security of energy supply, 
that is, sufficiency of supply at affordable price.89F2  It is commonly thought that any longer interruption of 
a steady and plenty flow of energy would massively harm a nation’s economic output, political stability 
and the personal wellbeing of its citizens. Therefore, a country is understood to have energy security if it 
is protected against shortages of affordable fuel and energy resources. (UNESCAP 2008, 3-4; Baumann 
2008, 4) Energy security thinking is mostly centred on national energy security; how a state can guaran-
tee the flow of cheap energy. Energy security is dictated by state’s energy supplies, the infrastructure re-
quired for producing, distributing and storing the energy, and the associated costs to the consumers.  
The first oil crises of 1973-74 often mark the beginning of the international energy security concern. 
In the early-1970s oil crises and Arab oil embargo was seen as a threat to energy security because oil 
supply was heavily dependent on the politically volatile Middle East. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) was established during oil crises of 1973-74 to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy to in-
dustrialized countries. The initial role was to co-ordinate measures in times of oil supply emergencies. 90F3  
(Yergin 2006) Later the international discussion on threats to energy security shifted from concerns over 
                                                             
 
1 Energy policy papers analysed in this research include: ADB’s First Energy Policy, 1981; WB’s Energy Policy, 1993; 
ADB’s Energy Policy, 1995; WB’s Energy Policy, 2002; ADB’s Revision of  Energy Policy, 2000; WB’s Renewable 
Energy Policy, 2004; ADB’s Third Energy Policy, 2009; WB’s Energy Guidelines for East Asia and SEA (middle in-
come countries), 2010. 
2 However, the way in which energy security is conceptualized depends on national and regional circumstances. For 
countries with their own resources, energy security involves the capacity to cope with changes in energy supplies 
using their own resources, while countries with fewer resources will be looking for reliable external supplies. Ener-
gy-exporting countries, on the other hand, will be looking for security in demand, from a stable energy market. 
3 As energy markets have changed, IEA’s mandate has broadened to incorporate energy security, economic devel-
opment and environmental protection. (Yergin 2006; IEA’s web pages: www.iea.org) 
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oil embargo of oil exporting countries to anxiety over whether or not there are sufficient fossil fuel re-
sources to meet the world’s energy requirements in the decades ahead. (Yergin 2006) Widely fluctuating 
oil and gas commodity prices have impacts on all world economies, but particularly developing coun-
tries. Low income economies that import fossil fuels are particularly vulnerable to price increases, which 
can badly affect their balance of payments and increase their vulnerability. Furthermore, the energy de-
mand is growing in the Global South, which makes the issue even more severe. There are several, often 
interrelated reasons for the growing energy demand, especially in the newly developed countries. Indus-
trialization, urbanization, population growth, transfer of industrial production from the Western coun-
tries to Asia, rural electrification schemes all contribute to this development, even though the main driv-
ers for increasing energy consumption vary from country to country.  
While there is no doubt that states have certain minimum energy requirements, the rhetoric of ener-
gy security has often been used to pursue centralised industrialisation and large scale energy projects at 
the expense of other considerations. Large hydropower projects, gas pipelines and construction of nucle-
ar power plants in the name of energy security and development are rarely vetted through a process of 
environmental or social impact assessment. (Simpson 2007, 539) 
Three discursive turns in World Bank’s and ADB’s energy policies 
In the global South development banks such as World Bank and ADB have become powerful actors in 
building energy sector. The reasons for this relate to high investment costs in energy infrastructure 
planning and construction, often low capacity and weak policy and governance framework in the recipi-
ent countries. Therefore the energy policies that the development banks are promoting have long term 
impacts on many developing countries and regions, and on global climate. World Bank and ADB are im-
portant creditors in Asia and the bulk of their lending goes to governments in form of project- or pro-
gramme-based lending. They enjoy great leverage and influence by virtue of their superior credit rating 
and close cooperation with governments. The development banks’ decisions on project lending, financial 
guarantees and promotion of best practices have enormous influence on the energy strategies and policy 
choices of the recipient countries, but it also has impact on global energy governance agenda. They have 
become part of global energy governance structure as economic and technical assistance projects and 
programs both reflect and shape global agendas on how countries should develop their energy structure 
and run their economies and what paths they should follow to promote economic development. (Florini 
2009)  
Besides lending, the development banks give technical assistance, training, policy dialogue, and 
evaluation, which are especially linked to transferring certain ideas, concepts, practices, and values to 
the recipient countries. Therefore it is important to analyse the energy discourses the banks are using. 91 F4  
Discourses frame certain problems, that is to say they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than 
others. The ideas, concepts and categories that constitute a discourse can vary in character: they can be 
normative or analytic convictions; they can be based on historical references, or they can for instance 
                                                             
 
4 There are numerous definitions for a discourse. For example, Maarten Hajer has defined discourse as an ensemble 
of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena. (Hajer 1993, 45; see also Hajer 
1995; Hajer 2003) 
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reflect myths about nature. Discourse provides the tools with which problems are constructed. Discourse 
at the same time forms the context in which phenomena are understood and thus predetermines the def-
inition of the problem. (Hajer 1993, 45; Hajer 2003) The development banks’ energy discourses have 
gone through several changes in terms of what is defined to be the problem and how it should be solved. 
Also understanding of energy security has extended during the past three decades.  
World Bank’s and ADB’s first policies reflected the fears that the first oil crisis of 1973-74 had 
caused. ADB’s first Energy policy paper was published in 1981 and focused on overcoming the oil crisis.  
(ADB 1981) According to ADB there was a need for large investments to meet the energy requirements 
of rapidly growing economics in the developing member countries. ADB’s response was to finance and 
build energy infrastructure in the client countries. As a result, the Bank’s average annual lending in the 
energy sector increased rapidly from $0.5 billion in the early 1980s to $1.7 billion in the early 1990s. 
(ADB 1995) Most World Bank’s and ADB’s energy projects in 1980s and 1990s related to infrastructure 
construction such as building dams and extending transmission lines. However, at the discourse level in 
1990s the development banks’ energy discourse went through major changes. First, the banks began to 
push recipient governments to privatize the energy sector and increase regional electricity trade. This 
can be seen as first discursive turn. The World Bank’s Energy Policy Paper from 1993 oriented its activi-
ties toward liberalizing and privatizing energy markets. The reasoning for privatisation was that the 
public sector had failed to deliver energy services. It began to promote greater use of private investment 
in the energy markets of developing and transition economies. (World Bank 2001, 2-3) In its second en-
ergy policy paper from 1995 also ADB started to encourage privatization and the private sector participa-
tion in funding of large scale energy investments in order to introduce elements of competition and to 
minimize energy monopolies. At the same time with the increasing privatization efforts ADB began to 
promote regional electricity trade between the neighbouring countries. ADB started to support the 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer type 92F5 of projects in the private sector, as well as joint-venture projects be-
tween government utilities and private investors. (ADB 1995)  
Second discursive turn took place in the late-1990s when especially World Bank strengthened its fo-
cus on poverty reduction and sustainable development. Energy was increasingly considered to be criti-
cal to poverty reduction, but more emphasis was given also to the negative impacts of energy production. 
Sustainable development discourse emphasized the environmental pillar, and also ADB began for the 
first time to integrate environmental considerations to energy development and paying more attention 
to environmental impacts of the energy projects. (ADB 1995) In 2000 ADB published another energy 
policy paper in which it again defined its goals and missions. Energy was now framed in terms of poverty 
reduction and environmental protection. Also global warming was discussed for the first time. The oper-
ational priorities that it defined particularly relevant to the energy sector were environmental protection, 
good governance, private sector development, and regional and sub-regional cooperation. It had adopted 
                                                             
 
5 In Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT, or Build-Own-Transfer BOT) is a form of project financing a private entity 
receives a concession from the private or public sector to finance, design, construct, and operate a facility stated in 
the concession contract. This enables the project proponent to recover its investment, operating and maintenance 
expenses in the project. Large hydropower dams financed by private investors are usually built by BOOT agreement 
that usually lasts for 30 years. Research organizations and NGOs have criticized the BOOT e.g. because it mainly 
benefits the investors and leaves the communities to bear the consequences (changes in the river flow, impact on 
fishery etc.). See e.g. International Rivers (www.internationalrivers.org ) 
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a poverty reduction strategy in its overall lending a year earlier, in 1999, and the energy policy paper re-
flected that change. Poverty reduction had been adopted as ADB’s overarching goal. (ADB 2000, 9) This 
was a major change in the ADB’s policy. The framework for poverty reduction comprised three pillars; 
pro-poor and sustainable economic growth, social development and good governance. (ADB 2000, 9) 
According to ADB, the energy sector operations would be designed to support ADB’s approaches to pov-
erty reduction because energy plays such an important role in meeting basic needs. (ADB 2000, 9) In 
2001 World Bank published its new energy program titled Poverty Alleviation, Sustainability, and Selec-
tivity. This energy program confirmed that energy issues remain at the core of the World Bank Group’s 
activities for promoting economic growth and directly reducing poverty. (World Bank 2001) According 
to the World Bank, energy poverty in developing countries poses a persistent impediment to economic 
development. It is a serious equity issue as well. At the same time, the environmental impacts of conven-
tional energy and traditional fuels are unsustainable at both the local and global levels. (World Bank 
2004) 
Third discursive turn in the banks’ energy discourse took place in the early 21st century, when they 
began to emphasise the importance of clean energy, low carbon solutions and climate-friendly technol-
ogies. The reason given was that more than half of the global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
are caused by energy production and consumption, mostly fossil fuels. In twenty year’s time, since the 
Kyoto base year 1990, global carbon emissions from energy have increased as much as 40%. (Jackson 
2009) 93 F6  Development banks began to fund some renewable energy programs. Clean energy became one 
of ADB's highest priorities, with over one fourth, or 27%, of the total approved loans in 2008 supporting 
projects with clean energy components. 94F7   
For the Asian middle-income countries, World Bank suggested that they should begin clean energy 
revolution: Countries need to transform the energy sector toward much higher energy efficiency and 
more widespread deployment of low-carbon technologies. According to World Bank, it is within the 
reach of East and Southeast Asian governments to maintain economic growth, mitigate climate change 
and improve energy security. (World Bank 2010) ADB established the Energy Efficiency Initiative in 
2005 to promote greater investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy within the region, and 
to increase ADB’s lending to these sub-sectors. In 2007, ADB published a report which discussed clean 
energy and low carbon alternatives in Asia. (ADB 2007) The report emphasized the human impact in 
climate change and the need for increased and urgent green house gas mitigation action in Asia. As a 
large proportion of the projected growth in green house gas emissions is largely linked to energy sector 
and transportation, the ADB underlined the importance of low carbon technologies, energy efficiency, 
                                                             
 
6 There is also global interest in building low-carbon energy systems in developing countries as according to IEA 
over 70% of the increase in world primary energy demand between 2004 and 2030 comes from the developing 
countries. (IEA 2006, 68-70). Acknowledgement of the impacts of energy consumption on climate change has in-
creased interest in so-called low-carbon energy solutions. Besides the development banks, climate change awaken-
ing has happened in many global and regional organizations. For example IEA has defined energy security and envi-
ronmental protection as areas that need to be given particular emphasis by the governments; more environmentally 
acceptable energy sources need to be encouraged and developed. According to IEA, the solution lies in the clean and 
efficient use of fossil fuels together with the development of economic non-fossil sources, including nuclear energy 
and renewable energy. According to IEA, non-fossil fuels, particularly nuclear and hydro power, make a substantial 
contribution to the energy supply diversity of IEA countries as a group. (www.iea.org) Also other actors have rede-
fined energy security to include also climate change. European Union defined in 2007 that the centre of new Euro-
pean Energy Policy was the meeting the EU's commitment in greenhouse gases mitigation. (EU 2007)   
7 More details about ADB’s Clean Energy Program can be found at http://www.adb.org/clean-energy 
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and clean energy 95F8 investments.  Again a year later, in 2008, ADB defined a strategic framework till the 
year 2020 in order to set a new strategic course. While the overarching goal had been since 1999 to re-
duce poverty, the mission of the Strategy 2020 was to help reduce poverty and improve living conditions 
in order to achieve “An Asia and Pacific Free of Poverty” (ADB 2008, i) ADB would pursue this mission 
by focusing on three complementing strategic agendas: inclusive growth, environmentally sustainable 
growth, and regional integration. For the next decade or so, it would refocus its operations to infrastruc-
ture, environment (including projects to reduce carbon dioxide emissions), regional cooperation, finan-
cial sector development and education. The new results will be monitored and assessed through Millen-
nium Development Goals and other specified indicators. (ADB 2008) 
The Table 1 shows the three major changes, or discursive turns, in World Bank’s and ADB’s energy 
policies from the 1980s to 2010, and in their understanding of security and insecurity relating to energy 
production and distribution. To summarise, it could be said that at the discourse level the conceptualisa-
tion of energy security has widened from the strict focus on sufficiency of supply and low price to include 
also other dimensions like environment and poverty reduction. However, despite of these changes, ener-
gy sufficiency and price still lie in the heart of energy security thinking of the development banks. The 
ways in which the sufficiency of supply and low price has been guaranteed include infrastructure con-
struction (especially indigenous energy sources like hydropower), privatisation, and regional electricity 
trade. The inclusion of climate change considerations has not changed the agenda: the recipient coun-
tries are still expected to have economic growth but with less climate impact. According to the banks the 
combination of continuous economic growth, low climate impact and increasing energy security is pos-
sible for the middle income East and Southeast Asian countries. The solution lies in the efficient use of 
fossil fuels together with the development of economic non-fossil sources, such as nuclear energy and 
renewable energy.  According to the World Bank, a low-carbon path produces substantial benefits for 
economic development through energy savings, better public health, enhanced energy security, and job 
creation. (World Bank 2010) From different renewable energy sources, hydropower is considered to 
have the best potential. Nuclear is also an option, even though the banks are not ready to fund it them-
selves. This in the World Bank vocabulary is called clean energy revolution. (World Bank 2010, 1) How-
ever, it is not clear how revolutionary it would be, as it does not really change the energy structure, ex-
cept by opening a door for nuclear energy. 
 
                                                             
 
8 Clean energy was in ADB context used as an umbrella term to describe both supply-side and demand-side energy 
related activities or technologies that result in reduction of greenhouse gas emissions compared to business-as-usual 
practices. (Carmody & Richie 2007) 
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Table 1. Energy related security/insecurity and three discursive turns in World Bank’s and 
ADB’s energy policies from 1980s to 2010 
Discursive 
turns 
Emphasis in energy  
policy 
Source of insecurity Solution increasing  
security 
1980s - 
First framing 
of the energy 
and security 
Energy infrastructure 
development and 
indigenous energy 
sources 
Vulnerability Building of energy 
infrastructure and use of 
indigenous energy 
sources 
Early-1990s – 
First 
discursive 
turn 
Privatisation and 
development of regional 
energy trade 
Inefficiency Privatization of energy 
sector, regional 
electricity trade 
Late-1990s 
Second 
discursive 
turn 
Poverty alleviation and 
sustainable development 
Poverty and environmental 
degradation 
Sustainable development 
and energy for all, 
capacity-building, 
renewable energy, 
regional cooperation 
Early 
21century - 
Third 
discursive 
turn 
Increasing energy 
production with clean 
energy, low carbon 
technologies and climate 
revolution 
Poverty; climate change; 
population growth and other 
reasons for growing energy 
demand  
Climate-smart energy 
solutions: hydropower 
dams and other 
renewable energy and 
nuclear (for middle 
income countries) 
 
Next we will look at how the development banks’ energy policies are turned into practices in one par-
ticular area, Mekong region in Southeast Asia, where both banks during the past decades have been in-
fluential in the regional energy policy formations and where they have implemented several energy pro-
jects. 
WB and ADB Shaping the Energy Policy in the Mekong Region  
Mekong Region consists of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar (Burma) and Yunnan prov-
ince of China. The region’s name comes from the 4800 kilometers long Mekong River that runs through 
these countries and is the longest river in Southeast Asia. The history in the area has been turbulent not 
least because of the Indochina and Vietnam wars. In past decades countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos have been going through a rapid economic transition and political transformations. Where Mekong 
River previously represented a division line between the capitalist and socialist worlds it is now seen as a 
uniting element enhancing regionalization. Over the past years, energy security concerns have moved up 
in the agenda of the Mekong countries. There are two main reasons, the increasing oil and gas prices and 
prediction of fast raising energy demand. Rapid industrialization and economic growth are increasing 
the use of energy especially in middle-income countries like China, Thailand and Vietnam. In order to 
meet the growing energy demand they have set goals to import more energy, develop their own energy 
infrastructure and increase energy efficiency. The estimations on demand increases have also been con-
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tested. There are studies showing that many energy projects are largely justified by projections of over-
estimated demand for electricity in Thailand, Vietnam and China (Greacen & Greacen 2004). The poorer 
countries in the region Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar (Burma) are trying to meet their own slowly grow-
ing energy needs and electrification objectives, but actually their energy sector development has been 
more strongly influenced by the demand of their energy-hungry neighbours and by the governments’ 
hope to increase export revenues from the energy sector. 
 
Table 2. Built and planned large-scale dam projects in the Mekong Region (modified from 
Keskinen et al. forthcoming). 
 Existing Under  
construction 
Proposed 
China  3 2 10 
Thailand  10 0 0 
Myanmar 
(Burma) 
13 8 15 
Laos  8 3 32 
Cambodia  1 0 26 
Vietnam  9 9 9 
Total  30 14 77 
 
In the Mekong Region the energy source with most regional relevance is large-scale hydropower. 
Hydropower’s regional relevance is twofold: firstly hydropower is the main source of energy for the re-
gional electricity grid that is funded and promoted by the development banks, and secondly the hydro-
power plants in the Mekong Basin have significant transboundary environmental and social impacts. 
The development of hydropower in Mekong Region dates back to the Cold War period. In the 1950’s and 
1960’s Mekong Region was an important strategic area for the U.S. government which saw Southeast 
Asia as critical terrain for the spread of communism. Hydropower and irrigation development were in-
terestingly perceived as issues of geopolitical security. The idea was that taming of the river could be 
combined to the taming of the spreading insurrections and communist ideas. The model of the inspira-
tion for the several irrigation and dam projects of Mekong Region was taken from the Tennessee Valley 
which had become a sort of an American “export model for development” (Scott 1998). Backed by 
ECAFE (United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) and with financial support 
and expertise from U.S. Mekong Committee was established in 1957. Under the Committee comprehen-
sive plans and feasibility studies for the whole basin were developed. But because of the war and the se-
ries of conflicts in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s only few development plans were actually implemented. 
The earlier plans have however now in recent years come closer to realization. The banks are not directly 
involved but just in few of them as the private financing is increasing in the region’s hydropower sector. 
But more indirectly WB and ADB have been enabling the current boom of hydropower development (e.g. 
Middleton et al. 2009). As can be observed from Table 2 most of the proposed dam sites are located in 
the region’s least developed countries i.e. in Cambodia and Laos.   
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Greater Mekong Sub-Region: regionalization and privatization emphasis  
During the Cold War period the development banks mainly focused their attention to Thailand. Between 
1970’s and early 1980’s World Bank funded several hydropower projects in Thailand (Hirsch 1996). This 
period was marked by the objective to increase Thailand’s energy security by developing the energy in-
frastructure and indigenous energy sources. Starting in the late 1980s, as regional stability was largely 
restored, the World Bank and the ADB began to have a regional scope.  Since then ADB and the World 
Bank have influenced the energy policies and especially the development of dams and electricity infra-
structure in the Mekong Region.  
In 1992 ADB launched the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) program which has set a path towards 
regional economic integration and has attempted to orientate national policies towards private-sector 
led development and deregulation. In many ways the GMS programme has replaced the earlier Mekong 
Committee as the main framework for channelling economic development assistance to the region (Rat-
ner 2003). The GMS program has emphasized the physical interconnectivity which would enable the 
cross-border trade in the region and has focused on the construction of major infrastructure projects 
such as transnational highways, railways and programs that encourage the integration of markets. Ener-
gy issues have played also a very central role. One of the core objectives of the GMS program has been 
the establishment of a regional power grid that would enhance the regionalisation of the energy market. 
Significant steps were taken forward in November 2002 when the governments signed an Inter-
Governmental Agreement on Regional Power Trade.  
The regional grid with its transmission lines is closely linked to the plans to encourage hydropower 
development. The grid extensions and new transmission lines are opening up previously inaccessible 
remote and mountainous areas for hydropower projects (Greacen & Palettu 2007). Many of the hydro-
power projects that would be powering the grid include controversial projects such as Tasang in Myan-
mar (Burma), Sambor in Cambodia and the already finalised World Bank and ADB funded Nam Theun 2 
in Laos.  
Power trade strategy of ADB, also supported by WB, has had a strong emphasis on market and trade. 
One of the justifications for the regional grid has also been the assumption that regional trade automati-
cally enhances regional cooperation and mutual benefits. Some have claimed that the regional market 
emphasis has been too over-riding at the expense of national energy strategies failing to pay attention to 
meeting the basic domestic, commercial and industrial needs for electricity in these nations. (Yu 2003) 
As the poorer economies (Laos and Burma in particular) act as hydropower suppliers for their wealthier 
neighbours (Thailand and Vietnam) there has been criticism that they also have to bear the externalized 
environmental and social impacts linked to the large-scale dams. (Greacen & Palettu 2007) Some have 
also stated that dam promoters are taking advantage of the political non-democratic systems of Laos and 
Myanmar (Burma): the opposition that dams have faced in Thailand like in the case of Pak Mun dam 
(see e.g. Foran 2006) are far less likely in one party system of Laos or in the military junta led Myanmar 
(Burma). 
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Changing justifications of hydropower dams  
During the 1990’s the legitimacy of the dams has been under sever questioning and development banks’ 
hydropower projects were severely criticised by their disastrous effects on nature and people (McCully 
2001). Along with the establishment of the World Commission on Dams and its famous report (WCD 
2000) problems related to large-dams have been quite widely acknowledged. Also the banks started to 
adopt stronger emphasis on sustainable development in their policies.  This has made the justification of 
hydropower dams more challenging. World Bank funded Nam Theun 2 in Laos has been an attempt for 
the bank to show the world that large dams can be built sustainably and the project has included for ex-
ample vast watershed conservation areas. But the successfulness of the project still remains to be highly 
debated (Stone 2010). 
Also knowledge produced by experts in form of risk scenarios, models and impact assessments plays 
an increasing role in the legitimisation processes. In the regional level ADB and WB have “externalized” 
the issues of the impacts of the energy development on the Mekong River Basin to the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) which is defining its role as a basin management organization.  The Commission has 
been trying to balance conflicting ways of seeing the river basin either in terms of energy production and 
development engine, conservation and biodiversity region or source of food security and matter of social 
equity.  
World Bank and ADB have been using results of the MRC’s impact assessments in their own strategy 
papers. In their joint Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy for example they stated that “The 
development scenarios modelling exercise [of MRC] have demonstrated that the Mekong river system 
has significant tolerance for development, including of hydropower and water diversion for irrigation 
(World Bank and ADB 2006 p31).” But the actual studies they refer to are much more nuanced, careful 
and with much more emphasis on uncertainties than the bold interpretations of the banks (Käkönen and 
Hirsch 2009). The use of MRC’s assessment results has been very selective also in that the banks have 
not been using the MRC’s fisheries studies that have highlighted more explicitly the risks at stake with 
hydropower in terms of losses in fisheries, livelihoods and food security. There has been a growing body 
of studies highlighting the negative impacts of dams on fisheries. The flood pulse system has been recog-
nised by ecologists as the key for the aquatic productivity sustaining the rich fisheries of the basin and 
the livelihoods of millions of people that depend on them. The tempering of the peaks of flood and 
drought by hydropower dams would be seriously damaging for the basin’s fisheries. The dams are esti-
mated also to block important routes of migratory fish. (Lamberts and Koponen 2008, Sarkkula et al 
2009.) The attempts of WB and ADB to justify the dam development promotion by using selectively im-
pact assessment studies has been directly challenged by various civil society groups (IRN 2006, IUCN et 
al. 2006, Middleton and Lee 2007, AMRC 2007).  All in all it hasn’t been an easy task for the banks to 
demonstrate how large-scale hydropower could be enhancing poverty alleviation and sustainable devel-
opment.  
Recently the increasing relevance of the climate change agenda has been re-shaping the dam debate 
in the region. The general discursive turn of development banks from poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development to clean energy and low carbon technologies has been manifested also in the Mekong Re-
gion. And within these frames the banks have attempted to use the climate change debate for greening 
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the hydropower projects. Hydropower is now increasingly presented as ”clean energy” and the environ-
mental concerns on climate change mitigation and adaptation are over-riding the other environmental 
and social concerns. The current World Bank experts’ vision that the regional grid assures that the re-
gion has access to clean, renewable energy produced by the large-scale hydropower dams principally in 
Laos but later possibly also in Cambodia. The smaller scale renewable options World Bank is funding are 
small off-grid programs that serve more as a complementary pre-electrification strategy rather than an 
alternative pathway. The main focus in Laos is still on large-scale hydropower development serving do-
mestic needs but more importantly serving the need of its neighbors. Thus Laos is not anymore present-
ed merely as the battery but the green battery of Southeast Asia.  The energy security, regional trade and 
environmental issues in terms of climate change objectives are all presented in a win-win manner that 
paves the way for hydropower development. This is manifested well in a statement by a World Bank ex-
pert: 
World Bank has an overall vision for the power sector in the Mekong Region. If you look at 
Laos, you don't only look from the country's point of view, but from the Greater Mekong Sub-
Region's point of view. So first the World Bank is working closely with ADB, promoting re-
gional power trade. For example, Laos has much more hydropower resources than others, so 
that the clean energy can be exported to Thailand and Cambodia, Vietnam. The overall priori-
ty is to provide renewable, affordable and sustainable electricity to sustain economic growth 
and poverty reduction in the country [Laos]. In order to achieve the first priority we need to 
develop the hydropower resources for export revenue earning. So far only about 7% of the po-
tential is developed. It's more than double of the demand in this country. If you look the future 
and the 93% of the hydropower potential, the major target is for the regional market. From 
climate change point of view there is greater contributions from this point of view. (Inter-
viewed World Bank expert in 2010) 
The concerns on environmental impact and on security of local natural resources and fisheries based 
livelihoods seem to have taken a backseat in this vision. Also the questions on e.g. emissions from the 
large reservoirs that especially many of the Mekong tributary dams involve have been so far left unan-
swered. 
Also nuclear energy as part of main low carbon options? 
Besides large hydropower, also nuclear power suddenly has come into favour among governments in 
Southeast Asia as a means of helping solve looming electricity shortages. While just four or five years ago 
nuclear energy did not feature in the medium- and long-term power development master plans of coun-
tries in the region, now Vietnam and Thailand have plans for nuclear power generation. 96F9  As yet, there 
are no commercial nuclear power plants in operation in the region (except in China), though there are 
small research reactors. (Symon 2008, 119) Vietnam and Thailand have plans to establish their first 
commercial nuclear power plants by 2020. In Vietnam the National Assembly ratified the Ninh Thuan 
nuclear power project in November 2009.  The construction is planned to begin in 2014. (Foreign Press 
                                                             
 
9 Here China is not included, even though the Yunnan province of China is considered to be part of the Mekong re-
gion. The mainland China has already now 11 nuclear power plants in operation and additional reactors are planned. 
 276 
Centre, Vietnam, 8 June, 2010) In Thailand, the National Power Development plan from 2010 calls for 
five nuclear power plants. First two are planned to be build in 2020 and 2021. (The Nation 2 June, 2010) 
Pro-nuclear arguments are often framed in terms of climate change mitigation and reduced reliance on 
fossil fuels, including coal. The nuclear safety issues (e.g. radioactive waste, terrorism, tsunamis) are 
rarely discussed in public, and there is no strong civil-society opposition against nuclear energy. (Symon 
2008) 
But the new low carbon discourse has not been without emerging contestations. Especially in Thai-
land there has been civil society groups and activist researchers who have been raising up concerns re-
lated to the low carbon – nuclear nexus. A recent statement from and activist from Thai Working Group 
on Climate Justice is telling in this respect: “We see now that we have to change our strategy and start 
discussing about energy democracy, sustainable livelihoods and sustainable communities because in 
the name of low carbon the government has started talking about four new nuclear plants.” (quoted in 
Kuronen 2010, p. 137 ) 
Conclusions  
During the past three decades from the early-1980s to present World Bank’s and ADB’s energy policies 
have gone through several discursive turns, i.e. major changes in their argumentation on how energy 
production and distribution should be organised. Despite the changes in the conceptualisation of securi-
ty it remains to be a depoliticizing concept in the sense that it aims to present the solutions as serving 
everybody’s interest in the technically best manner. The conceptualisation of energy security has wid-
ened from the strict focus on sufficiency of supply and low price to include also other dimensions like 
environment and poverty reduction. Despite of these changes, energy sufficiency and price still lie in the 
heart of energy security thinking of the development banks. The ways in which the sufficiency of supply 
and low price has been guaranteed include infrastructure construction (especially indigenous energy 
sources like hydropower), privatisation, and regional electricity trade. The inclusion of climate change 
considerations has not changed this part of the agenda as the recipient countries are still expected to 
have economic growth but with less harm on the climate. The solution lies in the efficient use of fossil 
fuels together with the development of economic non-fossil sources like hydropower and other renewa-
bles. For the middle-income developing countries the banks also see nuclear energy as an option.  
The dominant discourses of the development banks have been continuously contested by NGOs and 
more critical researchers. Also the concept of energy security that still lies at the core of the energy policy 
objectives despite the different discursive turns has been challenged and questions on whose security is 
principally promoted have been raised. UN for example has demanded human security dimension to be 
included in to the energy security discussions. And more critical actors demand a conceptual change 
from energy security to energy democracy which implies that development of energy sources should be 
better attuned to basic local needs and projects that mainly foster energy exports and economic accumu-
lation of metropolitan centers deserve serious questioning. This would mean that also the development 
banks would need to more rigorously aim at avoiding high environmental and social risk investments in 
large-scale plants and take smaller scale decentralized options more seriously.  
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In this paper we have looked at the influence of the development banks in one particular area, the 
Mekong Region where during the last WB and ADB have been active in attempting to shape the region’s 
energy policies. The paper has brought into focus some aspects of the banks’ discursive turns and their 
manifestations in Mekong energy policies. Between 1970’s and early 1980’s World Bank focused its sup-
port on Thailand by supporting and promoting hydropower as an indigenous energy sources relevant for 
countries energy security. In 1990’s ADB, backed up also by WB, has supported regional economic inte-
gration through Greater Mekong Sub-Region programme in which hydropower development has been 
central as it has been planned to be the main source of energy for the regional electricity grid that lies at 
the core of the programme. The justification for the hydropower development has been however chal-
lenging especially in late 1990’s and early 2000’s as the banks’ hydropower policies and projects have 
faced severe criticism. As a consequence the banks have adopted more emphasis on sustainability and 
they have had difficult times in trying to prove how large-scale hydropower could be enhancing poverty 
alleviation and environmentally sustainable development. A new opportunity for greening the hydro-
power has occurred however very recently as the climate change agenda has become more dominant and 
the banks have promoted hydropower as key low-carbon solution.  
The case of Mekong highlights how despite the discursive shifts of the development banks the con-
tinuous preference for large-scale hydropower indicates that large-scale energy projects and centralised 
industrialisation have been in the banks’ main focus throughout recent decades at the expense of other 
considerations. Unfortunately the communities most threatened by the energy plans, as in the case of 
hydropower development in Mekong Region, still remain as subaltern subjects – not heard enough in 
the debate. More sustainable and socially just energy futures in Mekong Region as well as in many other 
regions and countries of the Global South would require support for solutions that are better tuned for 
local needs. It seems that the concern for climate change is now increasingly used as a justification for 
paving the way for high risk hydropower or nuclear solutions. The role of the development banks in this 
as well as the unequal power structures underlying energy policy decisions in more general terms would 
deserve closer scholar attention and public debates. 
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ABSTRACT – This paper builds a food, energy and water (FEW) security model with which different 
countries can assess their current state and future developmental needs of FEW security based on 
globally sustainable development. The FEW security analysis cube is built from its various building 
blocks, i.e., dimensions, taking their relationships and reflections into account. The resulting model is 
tested in four different kinds of countries: Finland, Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana. Conclusions are 
drawn on the potential practicability of the model in analysing the food, energy and water security of 
nations, and further research plans on the other levels of needs of nations are discussed. 
Introduction  
The past and present organizational form of the world is nations’ society. Regional unions, such as the 
European Union (EU), the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC), the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD and the African Union (AU) have remained politi-
cally weak organizations. The low-profile appointments to the EU’s two top offices, presidency and for-
eign affairs, in 2009 exemplify the member states’ wish to keep regional unions weak. Nations rule, and 
their power struggles create conflicts between them. The dark side of nation states inspired some of the 
lyrics for John Lennon’s song Imagine: “Imagine there's no countries. It isn't hard to do. Nothing to kill 
or die for…” However, as long as nation states exist, their needs must be addressed constructively, in 
order to minimize the problems. 
Maslow’s (1943) individual hierarchy of needs can be applied to nations. They can be described brief-
ly in the following way: 
Level 1: Physiological needs of nations: water, food and energy.  
Level 2: Safety needs of nations: sovereignty and peace. 
Level 3: Social needs of nations: good relations and cooperation with others. 
Level 4: Esteem needs of nations: respect by/of others. 
Level 5: Self-actualization needs of nations: morality and creativity. 
Level 6: Self-transcendence needs of nations: united consciousness. 
It is often thought that these needs should be met in this order, but in reality that is not the case with 
individuals, organizations or societies. At societal level, each country tries to secure the fulfilment of the 
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different level needs in its own characteristic way. The distinctive way a nation adopts does not neces-
sarily depend on its material development stage, but rather on the values of its people and leaders. For 
example, it could be claimed that Finland emphasizes the maximum fulfilment of physiological and safe-
ty needs, Botswana social needs, Bolivia esteem needs, and Bhutan self-actualization and self-
transcendence needs. The argument will be discussed later in this and subsequent papers.  
These different need emphases are one reason for choosing Finland, Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana 
as case examples. In addition, these countries are from different continents, which gives chances for lo-
cality comparisons. On the other hand, all four countries have small populations, and, therefore, they 
should be able to meet their citizens’ needs more easily than large population countries. I am a Finn and 
my expertise is currently limited to analyses of small countries – the needs and their fulfilment of large 
countries, like China and India, are on a much larger scale than those of small countries the analyses of 
which can be more focused. 
Since examining all these different level needs leads to complex analyses that go beyond one paper, I 
shall write several papers and analyse and compare only few needs at a time. The final paper will inte-
grate the findings and draw holistic conclusions.  
My study starts from level 1 and investigates the basic national needs of food, energy and water 
(FEW). The most critical challenges facing nations in the next decades involve securing fresh water, food 
and alternative energy supplies. The basic needs of people are: water to drink, food to eat, and energy to 
boil water, cook food and keep warm. Meeting these needs is crucial for the survival of the citizens. 
There is no nation without citizens. Different political ideologies see the role of citizens in different ways: 
the currently prevailing capitalist ideology reduces citizens to producers and consumers, communism to 
producers and informers, and militarism to cannon fodder. Yet all nations and their leaders need people 
to govern. That is why countries strive for securing the sustainable supply of food, energy and water.  
It might be argued that there are other, equally crucial, basic needs to be met, such as health services 
and forest conservation, but they are not really national needs. Health is an individual need, and alt-
hough the general level of health of citizens is important to a nation, people will always hurt themselves, 
get ill and die – these are inevitable consequences of living and aging. Pandemics like influenzas are 
global, not national issues. The HIV/AIDS has hit some countries harder than others – in Swaziland the 
HIV infection rate is 26.1% and in Botswana 23.9% (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008) and in both coun-
tries AIDS kills about 2 per cent of adults every year (WHO, 2006a; WHO, 2006b), leaving children or-
phans and paralyzing the country’s economic and socio-cultural development  – but no country should 
be left alone to fight it; instead its prevention and treatment should be global concerns. Forest conserva-
tion is also a major global issue. Forests protect the biological heritage of this planet, i.e., the biodiversity 
comprising plants, animals and ecosystems. In addition, forests absorb carbon dioxide emissions travel-
ling from all parts of the globe. These greenhouse gases do not know any national boundaries but fly 
freely in our atmosphere. Hence forest conservation is not just a national concern but also a local and 
global task.   
Why then should food, energy and water be national issues? Shouldn’t they, too, be solved both lo-
cally and globally at the same time? In a fair world this would be a reasonable expectation. Everyone 
should have enough nourishing food, clean water and energy at their disposal. Our current world is not 
fair, though. Nations fight over food, water and energy. They do not fight over who can save lives or for-
ests more or most. What a researcher can do in this situation is to help leaders and citizens to under-
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stand the interdependent nature of food, energy and water need fulfilment between nations. A country 
that solves its food, energy or water needs at the expense of others will have to pay for it sooner or later. 
Since climate change accelerates the speed of environmental changes leading to drastic socio-cultural 
and economic changes with exponentially growing numbers of climate refugees, that day will come 
sooner rather than later. It is understandable and acceptable that nations wish to survive and prosper 
and, therefore, secure their food, energy and water supplies – as long as this can be done without com-
promising the similar efforts of others. 
The purpose of this paper is to build a food, energy and water (FEW) security model with which dif-
ferent countries can assess their current state and future developmental needs of FEW security based on 
globally sustainable development. In this endeavour, various dimensions, relationships and reflections 
must be taken into account. 
Dimensions: Food, energy and water supply issues integrate the environmental, socio-cultural and 
economic dimensions of sustainability. These dimensions are the fundamental building blocks of a FEW 
security model.  
Relationships: In some situations, food, energy and water needs can be met parallel. The solution of 
one need may even enhance the solution of another need. In other situations, conflicts arise from trying 
to meet food, energy and water needs simultaneously: a solution to one need may harm or even destroy 
the supplies of another need. 
Reflections: The levels of needs are not independent of each other, but interact. Some solutions may 
help a nation to meet different level needs at the same time. When the different level needs clash, a na-
tion will prioritize some needs over others or make compromises between them. That is why already in 
this level 1 needs’ research other level needs must be discussed as intervening variables. 
The rest of this paper will progress in the following way. First the food, energy and water (FEW) se-
curity analysis cube will be built from its various building blocks. The resulting draft model will then be 
tested in four different kinds of countries, Finland, Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana. The data for the coun-
try cases will be derived from secondary sources: scientific journal articles, newspapers and web pages. 
Finally, conclusions will be drawn on the potential practicability of the model in analysing the food, en-
ergy and water security of nations, and further research plans will be discussed. 
Food, Energy and Water (FEW) Security Analysis Cube 
Food 
In the 21st century world, food is a global market commodity and foreign food is eaten in all countries 
together with local food. There would be shortage of many foodstuffs if imports suddenly ceased. The 
level of food security would then be revealed: if the citizens still managed to continue a balanced diet and 
found substitutions with necessary nutrients to previously imported food, the level of national food secu-
rity would be satisfactory. This is one reason why developed countries subsidize their agriculture. The 
governments of many developing countries either have no resources to support local agriculture or focus 
rather on other issues, such as rapid economic growth, which results in dwindling opportunities for non-
export farming and vulnerability to food crises. Moreover, the environmentally malignant effects of cli-
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mate change, desertification and floods and their combined impacts, tend to hit these countries harder 
than developed countries, decreasing their fertile soil area available for farming dramatically.  
In many developed countries there is overproduction of food, even of basic foodstuffs like corn, re-
sulting in farm fields left lying fallow with the assistance of subsidies, and excess foodstuffs dumped onto 
the markets of developing countries, so that local farming there becomes unprofitable, farmers lose their 
livelihoods and cannot afford to buy food for their families. While the wealthy overeat the poor go hun-
gry.  
Despite this gross imbalance developed countries wish to protect their future food supply at the ex-
pense of developing countries. In politically, economically and ecologically unstable times most coun-
tries wish to pay special attention to securing national food supplies for the future. Populous and rich 
countries have started to buy and lease farmland from developing countries to secure their own food 
supplies: e.g. China 1.24 million hectares (ha) from Philippines, South Korea 1.3 million ha from Mada-
gascar and 690,000 ha from Sudan, United Arab Emirates 324,000 ha from Pakistan, and Libya 
100,000 ha from Mali (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). The purchasers or leasers are either states 
or corporations.  
The International Food Policy Research Institute estimates that during 2008-2009 about 20 million 
hectares of agricultural land were handed over to foreigners in developing countries (von Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick, 2009). The reasons are obvious. Political and economic circumstances change fast and 
may suddenly stop food imports or multiply the price of food. Additionally, in oil-wealthy Arab countries 
desertification has been progressing so fast that soon farming will be impossible on nearly all of their 
land area. Their farming has been dependent on irrigation, which becomes practically impossible to 
maintain because of prolonged periods of lack of rainfall, which reduce the water levels of waterways, 
and because of sea level rise, which turns vast areas infertile. Asian countries have such large numbers of 
inhabitants that even partial desertification and/or flooding may cause shortage of food. China also suf-
fers from major irrigation problems on its vast fields it needs to feed its 1.345 million citizens, and from 
quickly growing cities that conquer farmland.  
But the target countries of their conquests are also suffering from desertification and/or flooding, ir-
rigation problems, urbanization, food price changes and potential import restrictions – and still they are 
selling or leasing their most fertile and least draught/flood vulnerable areas. So far there has been little 
open opposition to such deals; if local people voice their dismay, the government silences them because 
of the cash or promised infrastructure. If the living conditions deteriorate slowly, protests may spread, 
but rapidly increasing hunger will not lead to demonstrations because hunger makes people too weak to 
act. Hence the fact is that rich countries will be producing their food freely on the farms of poor coun-
tries at a low local cost and taking them to their home countries free of charge. 
It is the rich or immensely populous countries that may fight food wars amongst themselves for the 
poor countries’ farmlands in the future. All self-confident nations want to be self-sufficient and not de-
pendent on other countries in food production. Securing national food production is an acceptable goal. 
However, instead of conquering and fighting over other nations’ food supplies and destroying their fields 
with intensive, large-scale, chemically enhanced farming, they could develop their own domestic farming 
towards non-eroding, conserving forms, such as organic, small-scale, subsistence farming, which re-
spects ecosystem biodiversity and cultural traditions, and employs many, many more of their inhabit-
ants. Sustainable food production and food security start at home. 
 284 
 
Energy  
Oil wars have been fought for a century particularly in the Middle East and Central East Asia because oil-
producing countries have had a powerful weapon to force their views through in global politics and eco-
nomics. Non-oil-producing countries have been dependent on their crude oil supply. Now that climate 
change is motivating countries to develop renewable energy forms, the power of oil-producing countries 
in threatening to diminish. Renewable energy production, such as solar, wind, wave and biomass power, 
is typically a local activity, resulting in independent power supplies for communities and nations. Energy 
security is just as strong incentive for countries to invest in renewable energy as climate change. Even 
countries like China, the USA, India, Australia, Russia and South Africa, which have enormous coal re-
serves, take renewable energy opportunities seriously. They need all energy available to boost their eco-
nomic growth. China has committed to reducing its carbon intensity – carbon dioxide emissions relative 
to gross domestic product (GDP) – by 40-45 per cent from 2005 level by 2020, which means that with 
the GDP soaring, the actual CO2 emissions will be rising. While increasing energy efficiency will take 
care of much of this relative reduction, renewables are needed to offset the malignant effects of coal. Re-
newable energy seems to be an endless source of technological, economic, social, cultural and environ-
mental innovations in which research and development (R&D) is flourishing. Yet mere local renewables 
development does not seem to be enough for some countries.  
Populous and rich countries have started to buy and lease farmland from developing countries to se-
cure their biofuel supplies: e.g. China 2.8 million ha palm oil plantation from Democratic Republic of 
Congo and 2 million ha for jatropha from Zambia, and Sweden 100,000 ha for biofuel crops from 
Mozambique (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). The pattern resembles the way in which the rich and 
populous nations have conquered countries with oil and gas resources. Their next conquests will be land 
and sea area owned by developing countries captured for solar, wind and wave energy production as 
soon as their storing and transporting problems have been solved. The gradual removal from unrenewa-
ble to renewable energy forms is reflected on the kind of raw materials these nations now want to grab. 
Although renewable energy is marketed as an ethical option, the actual renewable energy production is 
no more ethical than fossil energy production. The same unethical ways of behaviour are appearing, and 
eventually leading to energy wars.     
Developed countries look after their socio-cultural energy security by building centralized energy 
systems in urban areas and decentralized energy systems in rural areas. Most developing countries can-
not afford to build infrastructure for centralized energy systems in their urban areas and even if they 
could, e.g. through development cooperation or aid, most of their citizens could not afford to buy the 
service. Urban households, companies and other organizations in developing countries are, therefore, 
interested in similar small, decentralized energy systems to the ones introduced in their rural areas and 
based on cultural traditions.  
Many nations are currently building a number of new nuclear power plants, and even those countries 
that decided after Chernobyl to gradually phase out nuclear power altogether are taking back their prom-
ise. Corporations in the developed world advocate nuclear energy as the solution to climate change, ig-
noring its major malignant impacts and hazards: the mining, transporting, utilizing and disposing of 
radioactive uranium and fuel made of it cause huge environmental, health, safety, security and economic 
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problems at every stage of the process and destroy indigenous cultures and traditions in both the urani-
um production and nuclear waste dumping sites. The only way nuclear energy is better than other unre-
newable energy forms, such as oil and gas, is that during the actual energy production it does not cause 
carbon dioxide emissions, although during its building, mining and all transportation stages CO2 emis-
sions are plentiful. From all these points of view, renewable energies – solar, wind and wave – are envi-
ronmentally, socio-culturally and economically secure energy forms. 
 
Water 
Drinking water is the most important substance for humans to survive. In the developed areas drinking 
water is tap water, in developing areas pump water, both of which usually come from either groundwater 
wells or rainwater ponds, but decreasingly from lakes or rivers, which are mostly too polluted to have 
drinkable water. Only in remote areas, not connected to other waterways, you may find a spring with 
clean water – if airborne emissions have not polluted it. Cleaning contaminated water is possible but for 
large-scale continuous use both expensive and only partial. The quality and taste of treated water does 
not equal those of fresh water.  
Climate change causes both lack of rain, leading to draught, and excessive rain, leading to floods. 
Lack of rain lowers groundwater levels, which means that drinking water becomes scarce. If it rains hard 
after a long period of draught, dry soil cannot absorb the excessive amounts of rainwater, resulting in no 
rise in groundwater levels but in floods, which spread hazardous substances dissolved into surface water 
from overflowing sewages and other industrial, agricultural and household sources. Gradually soil ab-
sorbs some of it. If groundwater becomes contaminated, or if rain falls as acid rain, people are in trouble. 
Poor people have to drink polluted water even from stagnant water ponds while wealthy people buy bot-
tled water produced elsewhere, often abroad, and transported by road or sea to these lucrative markets. 
In some cities in India and African countries the poor buy water from tanker trucks circulating around 
the slums. Tanker water is much more expensive than tap water. 
Since global warming – lack of rain and shrinking glaciers – lowers the water level of lakes and rivers 
in the problem areas, they cannot solve the fresh water problem even with the help of water purification 
plants. Seawater can be turned into drinking water only after major multi-stage treatments that are very 
expensive. So far even wealthy seaside Arab countries suffering from persistent drinking water shortages 
rather import water from abroad in tanker ships than desalinize massive amounts of seawater. 
The global need for water will increase by 40 per cent over the next 20 years because of population 
growth of 50 million a year (Kropp, 2009). Yet water reserves are shrinking even at a higher rate due to 
unsustainable water use practices and climate change. Water may become a major cause for wars in the 
future. Water conflicts on household water and irrigation have been taking place in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa for thousands of years; the names of states change, but the rivers remain the same. 
Nowadays Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon fight over water rights and distribution of the 
Jordan. The Euphrates and Tigris river basin conflict involves Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Ten countries 
along the Nile each want to direct more water onto their fields and into their towns and cities.  
Similar regional disputes will become more widespread as desertification progresses in Africa, Asia, 
Europe and America. Currently the worst hit areas include the Sahel (a belt running through Senegal, 
Mauretania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Northern Nigeria, Chad, Northern Central African Republic, Su-
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dan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti), North-Western India, Northern and Western China, Spain, North-
Eastern Brazil, Mexico, Southern and Western states of the USA and Australia.  
Some currently fresh water secure areas, such as the Nordic countries, will have increased precipita-
tion due to climate change, which means that they may be able to sell water to the rising number of fresh 
water insecure countries – unless the climate change refugees migrating from northwards cause them a 
population explosion. In any case, few small northern countries cannot solve the problem: their water 
supplies are miniscule compared to the thirst of billions of southern people. Environmental security of 
water everywhere is threatened by pollution from municipal sewage, industrial wastewater and agricul-
tural overflows. 
 
Food vs. Water 
Water is needed for irrigation of fields where food crops are grown. Climate change is changing rainfall 
patterns and quantities all over the world. Let us take Africa as an example. Conway (2009) postulates 
that Northern and Southern Africa are becoming much hotter and drier, with an impact that wheat pro-
duction in the north and maize production in the south will be adversely affected. He also predicts that 
sea levels are rising in the Nile Delta and some parts of West Africa, conquering fields and cities.    
In worst hit areas of the world complete lack of rain or constant heavy rains prevent farming alto-
gether. In the benefitting areas reduced or increased precipitation improves farming opportunities. 
While most plants need water to grow, the bond between food and water is very strong for rice, the most 
widely eaten basic foodstuff in the world. Rice is usually planted in flooded fields; therefore, if water 
evaporates or becomes polluted, rice dies. Some plants like durra, on the other hand, are not dependent 
on water and can thus be cultivated in arid lands.  
Meat production consumes more water than corn and vegetable cultivation because of both indirect 
water consumption to grow feed for cattle in sheds or to prepare fields for grazing livestock and direct 
water usage on farms and ranches. Agriculture and raising cattle pollute waterways when fertilizers, pes-
ticides, herbicides and manure flow from fields to brooks, rivers, lakes and seas. Organic farming, sub-
sistence farming and hunting are the least water-intensive food production methods.  
Fresh food needs a fraction of water compared to water consumed by processed food. The continu-
ous 24/7 processes of food manufacturing industry consume vast amounts of water. Both the food pro-
cessing industry and large-scale farming use groundwater sources. In some areas groundwater is a 
scarce resource; furthermore, in many countries increasingly frequent and prolonged heat waves reduce 
the level of groundwater. The wells of cities, towns, municipalities, villages, small-scale farmers and fam-
ilies dry up from the combined effect of over-consumption and un-renewability of water resources.  
If water is used for producing food for exports, local people may suffer a triple blow: they turn their 
fields into monoculture, which gradually destroys soil fertility; they have to sell their harvest at dumped 
export prices to greedy middlemen so that their own families go hungry; and concentrated monoculture 
farming by all farmers in the area as well as multinational food processing industry established next to 
the monocultures in low-salary, low health, safety and environmental (HSE) concern areas dry up the 
groundwater sources so that local people go thirsty. The capitalist solution to these problems is to sell 
imported foodstuffs and bottled water to the impoverished local inhabitants.  
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Multinationals also build beverages factories in many dry, population-rich market areas and monop-
olize all the groundwater, like Coca Cola in Rajasthan, India, resulting in local farmers losing their sub-
sistence crops and local inhabitants losing their drinking water (Woods, 2006). The families start using 
water from streams polluted by wastewaters from factories.  
Post-modern famine caused by mono-crops for exports and death from diarrhea and other diseases 
caused by polluted drinking and washing water take place publicly among a population of well-
nourished and healthy people, not privately in isolated villages. 
 
Energy vs. Food 
Field residues, such as straws, have always been used for energy production at farms. Increasingly also 
food crops are burned as bioenergy or refined into biofuels. In many western developed countries there 
is overproduction of barley, wheat and maize, which makes it lucrative for farmers to sell their harvest to 
biofuel refineries. Yet many people and organizations feel that corn should be used for food, not for fuel. 
The greatest problem arises from developing countries copying the formula. If important food crops like 
cassava, maize and sweet corn are put into car tanks instead of human mouths, famine becomes a per-
manent state, instead of a periodical phenomenon, in a large number of developing countries. Local food 
production by small-scale farmers is essential for the survival of not only families but also communities. 
Apart from a social issue food for fuel concern is a cultural issue: traditional, ecologically sustainable 
farming skills will be forgotten, if they are not passed on to the next generation.  
In addition to field biomasses, bioliquids are refined from plant oils, such as palm oil, soya oil, rape-
seed oil and sunflower oil. Palm oil usage is heavily criticized by environmental and social non-
governmental organizations because it causes severe ecological and socio-cultural problems. But as palm 
oil is used for many purposes also by cosmetics industry and chemicals industry, its biofuel use does not 
greatly contribute to loss of food. Many other plant oils used for biofuels – soya oil, rapeseed oil and sun-
flower oil – are more important foodstuffs, particularly since they are essential ingredients of healthy 
diets. It is recommended that these oils should replace animal fat in cooking and salads and on bread. 
That is why using these oils as raw materials for fuels is questionable. Many people think that food 
should not be used for fuel either in developed or developing countries. On the other hand, animal fat, 
which is unhealthy to humans, can be used for biofuels. There is a market niche for mass production of 
biofuels extracted from animal fat. Leftover fat from frying – whether of animal or plan origin – is al-
ready a common source of biofuel raw material. 
Energy is needed to plough, sow, harvest, transport, and process food. In traditional societies human 
and animal energy is used for this purpose, but development has meant heavy investments in machinery 
that use unrenewable oil-based fuels all over the world. The ecological footprint of food production has 
multiplied because of this “development”. Agricultural machinery use accounts for most of the CO2 
emissions and other pollution from farming. Renewable fuels have been experimented on a small scale 
at some farms for decades since the farmers have been able to produce their own biofuels. In early 1970s 
Brazil pioneered at national scale in refining sugarcane into ethanol for both cars and farm machinery, 
and the programme has been most successful. Since 1976 it has been mandatory to blend ethanol into 
gasoline in Brazil; in 2009 the minimum was 25 per cent of ethanol, but even 100 per cent is possible. 
This initiative has boosted innovations in Brazilian agricultural technology and biotechnology, which has 
benefitted also food production.  
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Use of sugarcane for biofuel is not opposed much from the no-food-for-fuel point of view because 
added sugar does not belong to a healthy diet. However, in many countries healthy food plants would be 
the only economically viable option for large-scale biofuel production. Instead of such food-for-fuel pro-
grammes it is possible to develop the production of biogas fuels from field residues, sludge, dung and 
human excrement as well as electricity from the sun, wind and wave energy. Farming and food produc-
tion can become simultaneously ecologically, socio-culturally and economically sustainable anywhere in 
the world through wise, locally specific renewable energy solutions. 
  
Water vs. Energy  
One of the oldest forms of renewable energy is hydropower, which has been used for thousands of years 
in the form of waterwheels and watermills. On a very small scale hydropower does not contribute to cli-
mate change. Micro-scale hydropower is an ecologically and socio-culturally sustainable energy produc-
tion method when it takes advantage of a stream’s natural movements to create power and respects local 
traditions.  
Large-scale dams, built to manipulate natural water levels and flow to produce electricity, have ma-
jor ecological and socio-cultural harmful impacts. Villages and towns have to be removed, which upsets 
people’s lives and livelihoods, destroys communities and leads to the disappearance of cultures and tra-
ditions. Damming land areas create artificial lakes. Groundwater sources and cornfields are lost under 
water. Land sunk into the bottom of the lake emits its heavy metals and other poisonous substances into 
the water and pollutes the lake so that emerging fish and other marine life either dies or suffers from 
serious diseases. Storms and other extreme weather conditions, which are becoming more frequent as a 
result of climate change, as well as earthquakes, can break dams, drowning whole cities for which they 
have produced electricity. Stagnant water makes plant material decay fast particularly in tropical areas, 
resulting in major methane and carbon dioxide emissions, thereby contributing to climate change. Water 
wars may break out when dams have malignant effects on the waterways and lands of neighbouring 
countries, by diverting water away from their rivers or flooding their fields and population centres.  
Power-generating methods that use the natural phenomena occurring in water without disrupting it 
are usually much more sustainable. These include tidal power, tidal stream power, wave power, osmotic 
power, marine current power and ocean thermal energy conversion. 
Energy is needed among other things to boil water, which makes even somewhat polluted water ac-
ceptable for drinking or at least for other household use like washing. Any energy form is suitable for 
electricity production, but if we think of living conditions of the poor who account for half of mankind, of 
the renewable energy forms water power is an indirect way of boiling water like wind power while solar 
and biomass energy are direct methods. Solar power is the least disruptive and energy-consuming way of 
boiling water. Many unrenewable power production methods, such as nuclear power plants as well as oil 
refining and coal production, need large amounts of water in their processes. Their wastewaters are haz-
ardous waste that should be cleaned before discharging, or rather not be discharged at all. Those oil re-
fineries and coal power stations that have adopted the best available technologies (BAT) have closed-
loop wastewater treatment processes, which decrease the need to dump wastewater into waterways. Nu-
clear power plants use huge amounts of water for cooling, and, instead of being used as an energy source 
the heated water usually ends up in cooling ponds, rivers, lakes, or seas, causing at least ecosystem 
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changes. Mining the raw material, uranium, for nuclear power plants, may also need masses of water, 
which leads to radioactive wastewater, the treatment of which is expensive and dumping tempting in 
countries were environmental laws are not enforced effectively. This may result in the radioactive pollu-
tion of groundwater.  
 
Food vs. Energy vs. Water 
Food, energy and water issues are interrelated in many ways, and sometimes create a tangle, such as in 
the case of alga. Exploitation of algae integrates the fulfilment of food, energy and water needs, but caus-
es further ecological, social and economic problems. Naturally growing large algae, i.e. seaweeds are im-
portant foodstuffs particularly in Asia, the British Isles, western coast of the USA and New Zealand. In 
addition, algae can be harvested and used as organic fertilizers on fields. Algae can also be used to cap-
ture chemical fertilizers that are flowing from fields to waterways. Moreover, sewage and other 
wastewater can be treated with algae instead of chemicals or direct discharges into waterways. Plans to 
refine algae into biofuel are also coming true. Although sewage from cities and wastewaters from indus-
try and agriculture have made the sea and lake conditions favourable for alga growth, which has caused 
marine life to die for lack of oxygen, biofuel production will require active alga farming. This may cause 
further lake and sea deaths. Marine biodiversity will be destroyed. Health of local people may suffer. 
Fishing, tourism and recreation will end. While collecting algae for biofuel extraction cleans up water-
ways and revives marine life, thus giving the triple benefit for food, energy and water security goals, cul-
tivating algae for biofuel extraction may lead to benefitting energy security goals but impeding water and 
food security goals. Similar complex interrelations can be detected in most food, energy and water secu-
rity issues. 
Figure 1 illustrates the way in which nations can assess their food, energy and water security on 
scales 1-5 for each of the three variables. 
 
 
 Figure 1. Food, energy and water (FEW) security analysis cube. 
 
Change of strategies by the personal disconnection of 
decision maker 
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The ideal FEW situation is at the top right hand corner of the figure where food, energy and water 
security are all at levels 5 and the worst situation is in the bottom left hand corner where they are all at 
level 1. The basic FEW security level criterion is self-sufficiency: 
  level 5: very high:   ≥ 100 % self-sufficiency 
  level 4: high:   75-99 % self-sufficiency 
  level 3: moderate:  50-74 % self-sufficiency 
  level 2: low:   25-49 % self-sufficiency 
  level 1: very low:  < 25 % self-sufficiency 
Self-sufficiency needs to be supplemented by great strengths and potentials for and great problems 
and threats against food/energy/water (FEW) security. For great strengths and potentials, one level, or 
even two levels in exceptional situations, can be added. For great problems and threats, one level, or 
even two levels in exceptional situations, can be subtracted. The measurements for each level need to be 
tested through cases. The food, energy and water situation of four small countries – my home country 
Finland and three developing countries of my interest – Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana – from different 
continents will be analysed through the FEW security analysis cube. 
Testing the FAW Security Cube in Four Countries 
Let us first look at the very basic data on the four case countries (table 1). 
 
Table 1. Some basic information about Finland, Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana (NationMaster, 
2010abcdefghi) 
 FINLAND BOLIVIA BHUTAN BOTSWANA 
POPULATION 5.36 million 9.78 million 0,69 million 1,99 million 
TOTAL AREA 
-Water 
-Agricultural land 
338,424 km2 
10 % 
7.44 % 
1,098,581 km2 
1.29 % 
34.2 % 
38,394 km2 
< 1 % 
12.6 % 
581,730 km2 
2.6 % 
45.84 % 
ARABLE CROPLAND PER 
CAPITA 
0.42 ha 0.25 ha  0.07 ha  0.23 ha  
FOOD PRODUCTION INDEX 103.6 % 110.3 % 94.5 % 104.3 % 
GDP PER CAPITA  $ 33,556 (PPP) $ 4,455 (PPP) $ 5,212 (PPP) $ 13,992 (PPP) 
ELECTRICITY PRO-
DUCTION / CAPITA 
14,702.794 kWh  621.549 kWh  1,922.376 kWh   
 
556.919 kWh  
ELECTRICITY CON-
SUMPTION / CAPITA 
16,850.372 kWh  558.385 kWh  227.163 kWh  1,464.260 kWh  
 
Bolivia is the largest of the four countries both in area and population. Botswana is second in area 
but Finland in population. In Finland surface water covers a much higher percentage of the land area 
than in the other three countries. Bolivia’s and Botswana’s actual water surface coverage is just over 40% 
of Finland’s, Bhutan’s only just over 1%.  
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In agricultural land percentage of the whole area Finland ranks even lower than Bhutan while Bot-
swana and Bolivia have great areas dedicated to agriculture. However, it is the quality of agricultural 
land that counts: Finland has nearly twice as much arable cropland per capita as Bolivia and Botswana, 
and six times more than Bhutan. The high food production index of all other case countries than Bhutan 
means that, at least in theory, these countries are self-sufficient in food production, which would suggest 
that their food security level would be very high – yet there are problems and threats that may reduce 
food security. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita gives some idea how well a country could afford 
to mitigate or solve its food, energy and water problems and threats and take advantage of its strengths 
and potentials. Finland is a high-income, country Botswana a middle-income country and Bhutan and 
Bolivia low-income countries.  
Energy security covers both electricity and fuels, but reliable, comparable statistics are available only 
about electricity. The production and consumption of electricity per capita is the highest in Finland, 
which is 87% self-sufficient and needs to import 12.5% of its electricity. Bhutan produces the second 
largest amount of electricity but consumers least of all these countries, leading it to a tremendous 845% 
self-sufficiency in theory. Bolivia produces slightly more electricity than it consumes, making it 111% 
self-sufficient in theory. Botswana is only 38% self-sufficient in electricity production.  
The numbers may be misleading because there are many strengths and potentials as well as prob-
lems and threats that they do not take into account. The following, more detailed descriptions of food, 
energy and water (FEW) security and their interrelations of the four countries will pay special attention 
to these intervening factors. 
 
Finland 
Food: F4: Finland is self-sufficient in food production with enough, good arable land for farming, green 
pastures for grazing and well-developed food production industry. Finland produces a good variety of 
food, securing a nutritious, balanced diet. The country could feed its current population without imports. 
It could replace imports with domestic substitutes. Finland is dependent on fertilizers but organic food 
production is increasing. Climate change refugees could add mouths to feed, but since Finland is the fur-
thest country up north in its longitude, the refugees from Africa will populate first Southern Europe, 
wander then to Central Europe, and of the Northern European countries probably try Denmark and 
Sweden, which are accessible by road, before taking a ferry to Finland. 
Energy: E2->3: Currently Finland imports 70% of the energy it needs. Most of it, 45%, comes from 
Russia as unsustainable, unrenewable oil, gas and coal. Of the domestic energy production nuclear ac-
counts for 25%, wood 20%, hydropower 5% and peat 5%. In electricity production Finland is 87.5% self-
sufficient. There are 200 hydropower plants in Finland; the largest is 170 MW, others much smaller, all 
totalling nearly 3,000 MW. It is not really possible to build more hydropower in Finland without damag-
ing the environment. According to the government’s energy plan (Finnish Government, 2010) Finland 
aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 20% from the1990 level and become almost self-sufficient 
by 2020 by adding nuclear power and renewable energy production. The nuclear energy share should 
thus gradually increase even to 62% with the fifth nuclear power plant currently under construction and 
two or three more nuclear power plants being planned. The building of nuclear power plants 1-5 has 
been given to French and German companies, which have subcontracted work mostly to other foreign 
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companies with foreign workers. The share of renewables is planned to reach 38% of total energy pro-
duction by adding wood, biofuel, wind and geothermal energy (Finnish Government, 2010).  
Water: W5: Finland is totally self-sufficient in water supply: it has very good rainfall, groundwater all 
over its land area as well as 190,000 lakes and 209 rivers. The country borders to seas in the south and 
west, but seawater is not needed for households or agricultural irrigation. Algae overgrowth caused by 
eutrophia is an increasing problem in the surface waters of seas, lakes and rivers. 
Positive FEW interrelations: Algae collection for biofuels from lakes, rivers and seas could clean wa-
ters; algae could also be used for food, but that is not traditional in Finland. Climate change with a more 
temperate climate and increased precipitation may improve food and water security, unless heat waves 
make soil too hard to absorb the rainwater, turn into floods and lead to soil erosion. 
Negative FEW interrelations: A nuclear power plant disaster would lead to food, energy and water 
crises because of radiation and great dependence on nuclear. Big increase in wood-based energy may 
reduce forests, lead to soil erosion, and result in food and water crises. Biofuel production may mean 
sacrificing others’ forests for fuel (destroying rainforests for palm oil plantations) or own food for fuel 
(growing e.g. rape seed oil for biofuels rather than food oil). 
 
Bolivia 
Food: F2: In Bolivia food production is based on subsistence agriculture. The country produces a good 
variety of food because of various climates, but not sufficiently. Only 2% of land area is in arable farm-
ing. Bolivia suffers from extremely low productivity, poor distribution of the population in relation to 
productive land and lack of transportation facilities. Additionally, as poverty in remote areas amounts to 
83%, most of the citizens have difficult geographical and financial access to food (WFP, 2010a). Constant 
natural disasters, such as floods, mudslides, landslides and droughts, cause crop loss (FAO/WFP, 2008; 
WFP, 2010b). Malnutrition is common in rural areas (WFP, 2010a). Bolivia exports soya bean on the 
Andean Community market. The country develops food production through irrigated agriculture, which 
has malignant impacts on the environment. More environmentally benign ways of achieving food securi-
ty and diversification of crops would be crop rotation and planting of nitrogen fixing legumes, which im-
prove soil without irrigation or fertilizers. 
Energy: E3: In theory Bolivia has full self-sufficiency in energy supply. In gas production Bolivia 
ranks 29th) and in oil production 46th in the world (Wikipedia 2010ab). It exports oil and, particularly, 
gas to Brazil, which brings revenues for Bolivia’s development. Bolivia is a land-locked country and 
needs Brazil’s pipelines to export its hydrocarbons. Brazil plans to increase its own hydrocarbon produc-
tion so that it would not need any imports by 2011. Other export opportunities are dwarfed by the neigh-
bouring countries’ doubts of the ability of Bolivia’s national energy company, YPFB, to maintain contin-
uous energy supply and by Argentina’s and Chile’s own hydrocarbon development plans (Romero & 
Schipani 2010).  In electricity production Bolivia is 111% self-sufficient due to hydropower plants. How-
ever, many because of huge distances in varied terrains and poverty Bolivians have difficult geographical 
and financial access to energy, which means that the nation cannot supply energy to all its citizens. Gas 
and oil production was re-nationalized in 2006 by Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, and 
on Labour Day, 1 May 2010, he nationalized also four hydroelectric companies (Ore & Garcia, 2010). The 
long-term aim of nationalization is to provide all Bolivians with electricity. The re-nationalization of gas 
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and oil in 2006 did not much ease the fulfilment of energy needs of ordinary Bolivians although some of 
the revenues have been invested in the socio-economic development of the lives of indigenous peoples. 
Water: W2: The eastern tropical and subtropical areas of Bolivia and lake Titicaca basin are self-
sufficient in water supply, but western semiarid and arid areas are not. One third of the city dwellers 
have no access to water. In 2000 water supply was privatized in arid Cochabamba and La Paz, which led 
to triple prices and violent protests, resulting in re-nationalization (Hailu et al., 2010). Access and 
maintenance problems continue. Water quality is constantly decreasing because of the dumping of un-
treated effluents from industries, cities and irrigated agriculture into water sources. The Water Ministry 
of the current government has a water reform plan, which focuses on community decision-making, inte-
gration of traditional methods and new technology, water rights registration, water quality, and irriga-
tion infrastructure. Irrigation accounts for 94% of all water withdrawals. Melting of glaciers will make 
Bolivia more dependent on rainfall. 
Positive FEW interrelations: Substance farming has minor impact on water quantity and quality and 
it could be developed organic. There are solar, wind, wave and biomass energy potentials for food and 
water production. 
Negative FEW interrelations: Irrigated agriculture has led to soil erosion and loss of production ca-
pacity of 41% of land area. Agricultural runoff is one of the main contributors to water pollution. Slash-
and-burn farming reduces forests, leads to soil erosion and exhaustion of its nutrients, resulting in food 
and water crises. Amazon basin (66% of Bolivia) is prone to floods, causing crop loss. Constant natural 
disasters caused by El Niño and La Niña, accelerated by climate change, lead to food, energy and water 
crises. Major oil and gas production pollute soil and water and increase CO2 emissions. 
 
Bhutan 
Food: F2: Food production in Bhutan is based on subsistence farming and animal husbandry. One third 
of the Bhutanese suffer from food insecurity (WFP, 2010c). The country imports 34% of its cereal needs, 
e.g. 60% of the staple rice from India. In January 2010 the first ever rice mill started operating in Bhutan 
(Bhutan Today, 2010). Southern subtropical plains and temperate central highlands could become self-
sufficient in food production, northern polar-type Himalaya cannot. Natural disasters in rainy seasons 
cut off access to non-local food supplies and destroy local supplies. The government attempts to reverse 
the declining trend in cereal yield per hectare and per capita food production by education, zoning the 
country’s territory and delineating protected areas for agricultural production. Yet, instead of maximiz-
ing gross domestic product (GDP), Bhutan aims to maximize Gross National Happiness (GNH), an indi-
cator of the quality of life, which takes account of equitable and sustainable socio-economic develop-
ment, conservation of the natural environment, preservation and promotion of traditional culture, de-
velopment of good governance, and the satisfaction and spiritual growth derived from them (Ketola, 
2010). 
Energy: E4: Bhutan is a land-locked country with rugged terrains, which make energy production 
and supply to the citizens difficult. However, the country’s rapid altitudinal variations and swift flowing 
rivers make it perfect for hydropower (Tshering & Tamang, 2004). Bhutan is 845% self-sufficient in 
electricity due to the gigantic Tala Hydroelectricity dam project; all its electricity is exported to India. 
This brings good revenues to the country. There are more than 20 other hydro dams that supply electric-
ity to the Bhutanese. Further hydropower potential amounts to 30,000 MW. Yet 50% of Bhutanese (60% 
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of rural areas) have no access to electricity and use biomass, i.e. traditional methods: wood and animal 
dung. The Bhutanese government aims to expand domestic electricity network so that by 2020 the entire 
country would have access to electricity and the domestic tariff would be kept low enough for citizens to 
be able to afford to buy electricity (Tshering & Tamang, 2004). Hydropower should enhance Bhutan’s 
sustainable development in two ways: (a) it provides clean, renewable, safe, reliable, sufficient and af-
fordable electricity for domestic consumption and industrial use, and (b) it brings the much needed capi-
tal to finance social projects and achieve economic self reliance (Tshering & Tamang, 2004). The envi-
ronmental and social problems caused by water diversion and damming – e.g. population displacement, 
intrusion into protected areas, loss of primary forests, dewatering impacts, soil erosion and fish migra-
tion (Tshering & Tamang, 2004) – need to be addressed better than before. Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) index protects forests of central highlands from overuse for energy. Bhutan imports all the fuel it 
needs. There is great solar energy potential in Bhutan. 
Water: W3: The so far abundant water supply of the main rivers flowing through highlands, where 
most Bhutanese live, depend on Himalayan glaciers. Bhutan’s rural water supply scheme (RWSS) from 
1974 should provide 89% coverage of drinking water, but only about 36% work without problems due 
drying water sources, traditional water rights, damaged pipes and structures, lack of regular mainte-
nance, inadequate community maintenance and lack of trained water caretakers and tools (Lamsang & 
Wangdi, 2009). Moreover, differences in rainfall patterns and increasing fluctuation between lean sea-
son and monsoon season water flows cause localized and seasonal water shortages. 
Positive FEW interrelations: Vast river areas allow food, energy and water co-production. Small 
population helps to increase food, energy and water security at low cost. 
Negative FEW interrelations: Melting of Himalayan glaciers will make Bhutan more dependent on 
rainfall. Hydropower dams sink fields and cause water and soil pollution. Floods and landslides resulting 
from hydropower and increasingly heavy monsoons lead to soil erosion and loss of arable farmland. In-
creasingly drier lean seasons have the same effect. 
 
Botswana 
Food: F3->2: Botswana’s climate is arid and semiarid with low rainfall (Botswana, 2008). Kalahari De-
sert covers nearly 70% of the country. Increasing droughts cause water shortages and further desertifica-
tion, shrinking arable land further. Less than 5% of agricultural irrigation can come from rainfall (Dar-
koh, 2003), making agriculture unprofitable. Hence 50% of Batswana households raise cattle and live-
stock, needing grazing lands, which accelerates desertification (Darkoh, 2003). Domestic production can 
supply only 10 % of the cereal needs, and nearly all the annual cereal requirement is imported (Botswa-
na, 2008). About 25% of population is undernourished. Although this is less than in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in general, improvement of food security is one of the main objectives of the Botswana government (Bot-
swana, 2008). 
Energy: E2: Botswana is 38% self-sufficient in electricity, which comes from two coal power stations, 
and imports the rest. Electricity is available mostly only in urban areas, and the government supports 
rural electrification (Botswana, 2008). Botswana must import all the fuel it needs. The country has tiny 
oil reserves, which are not yet exploited. Botswana’s vast national parks and game reserves are protected 
from forest cutting e.g. for energy. The country has major solar and wind energy potential, which the 
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government programmes support (Botswana, 2008) and which could make Botswana self-sufficient in 
electricity production. 
Water: W1: Botswana’s water shortage is very serious and continues to get worse because of acceler-
ating droughts and desertification. The Okavango, Limpopo, Zambezi and Orange Rivers are shared by 
and get their waters from neighbouring countries, and are shrinking mainly due to droughts but also 
because of dams. This may cause water conflicts between the nations. Botswana does not produce hy-
dropower but suffers from effects of hydro-production of the neighbouring countries. The dams on rivers 
in Botswana have been constructed for livestock watering and urban water supply (Botswana, 2008). 
Lack of seasonal rainfall in Botswana results in 75% of humans and animals dependent on groundwater. 
Surface water is very scarce. 
Positive FEW interrelations: Botswana’s Department of Forestry and Range Resources reintroduces 
indigenous vegetation, which aims to mitigate land degradation, thereby helping food production and 
water conservation (Mogotsi et al., 2006). The HIV/AIDS has left the younger generation without 
knowledge and practises usually passed on from the older generation. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) works with Batswana communities, re-introducing indigenous knowledge and tra-
ditional land management systems (Afrol News, 2004). 
Negative FEW interrelations: Climate change accelerates droughts and desertification leading to 
food and water crises. Drilling deep boreholes for groundwater leads to soil erosion and consequently to 
even less arable land (Darkoh, 2003). The Okavango Delta is drying up because of overgrazing (Botswa-
na, 2008). 
Discussion: FEW security of the four nations 
The findings of these brief food, energy and water (FEW) security analyses of the four case countries, 
Finland, Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana, are illustrated by the FEW cube in figure 2. 
According to these concise analyses taking account of self-sufficiency as well as great strengths and 
potentials and great problems and threats, the food, energy and water (FEW) security findings are as 
follows. Finland’s (FEW) security is F4–E2->3–W5, meaning that food security is high, energy security 
is rising from low to moderate and water security is very high. Bolivia’s FEW security is F2–E3–W2, 
meaning that food security is low, energy security is moderate and water security is low. Bhutan’s FEW 
security is F2–E4–W3, meaning that food security is low, energy security is high and water security is 
moderate. Botswana’s FEW security is F3->2–E2–W1, meaning that food security is decreasing from 
moderate to low, energy security is low and water security is very low. 
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Figure 2. Four countries in the food, energy and water (FEW) security analysis cube. 
In food security Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana are weak and need considerable improvements. In 
energy security Botswana is weak but the others manage quite well. In water security Botswana is on 
the brink of disaster, and Bolivia is weak, needing major improvements. All in all, the most serious FEW 
problems lie in Botswana because of the downward spiral that anthropogenic climate change and its 
consequences are causing in the interrelations between food, energy and water.  
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) operates in the most food insecure countries, in-
cluding two of the case countries, Bolivia and Bhutan. Although Botswana has the worst prospects for 
food self-sufficiency, it is a middle-income country that can afford to buy all it needs to secure the food 
supply of its 1.99 million citizens. However, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helps 
Botswana in its severe water security problems, which are closely connected to food security problems. 
Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana are land-locked countries, which impedes their ability to be inde-
pendent in their energy sales and purchases. This problem should encourage them to distribute their 
existing energy domestically among their citizens and develop local renewable energy forms, such as so-
lar, wind and biomass production, which they do to some extent, but also crave for revenues from ex-
ports. Seafaring Finland still imports most of its energy in oil tankers and coal ships, but plans to in-
crease some renewable energy production in addition to building more nuclear plants. The governments 
of all four nations seem to ignore the most environmentally, socio-culturally and economically sustaina-
ble energy resource: organic waste. Human excrement, animal dung and organic waste streams from 
industry are infinite energy sources. Making bioenergy out of organic waste would additionally solve the 
over-fertilization of waterways causing sea, lake and river deaths.  
Wealthy Finland wastes some of its abundant food, energy and water resources; hence it could be 
called Binland. The other B-countries, Bolivia, Bhutan and Botswana, could not really afford to waste 
any of their resources.  
Conclusions 
This research paper developed a food, energy and water (FEW) security model, so that nations could 
evaluate their current state and future developmental needs of FEW security based on globally sustaina-
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ble development. The FEW model integrates quantitative data on self-sufficiency into qualitative infor-
mation about the great strengths and potentials and great problems and threats in each issue, and takes 
account of the interrelations between the food, energy and water issues.  
The four case studies show that analyses through the FEW model help to see the whole picture with-
out getting lost in the details. The model needs further refining in taking simultaneously the environ-
mental, socio-cultural and economic dimensions of sustainability into account, but seems to be practica-
ble as a simple tool to filter masses of quantitative and qualitative information into guiding food, energy 
and water security levels. 
This research paper studied only the first level of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: physiological needs. 
Meeting the basic food, energy and water needs of citizens is naturally crucial for all nations, but wellbe-
ing covers more than that. The subsequent papers will analyze the fulfilment of the other five Maslow’s 
needs groups – safety, social, esteem, self-actualization and self-transcendence needs – in Finland, Bo-
livia, Bhutan and Botswana, and make comparisons between the needs groups of the case countries.  
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ABSTRACT – Climate change is an emblematic example of how humankind is now influencing the 
workings and dynamics of the planetary machinery. 
While the study of such an ‘anthropogenic drift’ of Earth System is grounded in natural sciences, social 
sciences have highlighted critical issues regarding its human dimensions, including the broad implica-
tions for security. Yet I am not sure that the ‘intangible threats’ to human security are not underex-
plored when it comes to the dénouements of this drama. 
I shall first sketch the features of climate change as a security issue, and underline that without radical 
coordinated counteraction it will challenge many of our adaptive capacities. Climate change is likely to 
exacerbate conflict between and within countries over natural resources, migration, and the distribu-
tion of wealth. This could result in disorders and violence, jeopardizing human security to a new de-
gree. 
Yet there is no reason that the threats of climate change should amount to first-order (tangible) effects 
on the bio-physical world or the socio-economical system. Contrariwise, I shall argue that it will in-
volve second-order (intangible) dimensions related to our human condition and our relationship to the 
world. I shall suggest that the threats of climate change to human security will also be of the latter 
form, threatening more specifically logic, axiology, metaphysics, and politics. 
Introduction and Background 
Climate change is an emblematic example of how humankind is now influencing the workings and dy-
namics of the planetary machinery (Turner et al., 1990 ; Crutzen, 2002). 
While the study of such an ‘anthropogenic drift’ of Earth System is grounded in natural sciences, so-
cial sciences have highlighted critical issues regarding its human dimensions (Stern et al., 1992), includ-
ing the broad implications for human security, and drawing attention to the factors underlying vulnera-
bility to climate change (Matthew et al., 2009). 
Yet I am not sure that the ‘intangible threats’ to human security are not underexplored when it 
comes to the dénouements of this drama. 
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Climate change as a security issue 
Let me first sketch the features of climate change as a security issue. 
There are numerous connections between climate change and security, including national security, 
human security and military roles (Barnett, 2003). 
Following the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 2007): 
“Firstly, climate change could exacerbate existing environmental crises such as drought, water 
scarcity and soil degradation, intensify land-use conflicts and trigger further environmentally 
induced migration. Rising global temperatures will jeopardize the bases of many people’s live-
lihoods, especially in the developing regions, increase vulnerability to poverty and social dep-
rivation, and thus put human security at risk.(…)” 
“Secondly, new conflict constellations are likely to occur. Sea-level rise and storm and flood 
disasters could in future threaten cities and industrial regions along the coasts of China, India 
and the USA. (…)”. 
“Thirdly, unabated climate change could cause large-scale changes in the Earth System such as 
the dieback of the Amazon rainforest or the loss of the Asian monsoon, which could have incal-
culable consequences for the societies concerned.” 
Overall, if climate-induced interstate wars are hardly likely to occur, climate change could jeopardize 
human security to a new degree, triggering new conflicts between and within countries over natural re-
sources, migration, and the distribution of wealth and intensifying existing issues such as state failure, 
social disorders, and rising violence. 
With this in prospect, mitigation strategies and adaptation ways can be viewed as security policies to 
avoid security threats to nation-states, communities and individuals. 
Second-order (intangibles) dimensions 
Without radical coordinated counteraction climate change will challenge many of our adaptive capacities 
within the decades to come (Parry et al., 2007). 
Yet there is no reason that the threats of climate change should amount to first-order (tangible) ef-
fects on the bio-physical world  or the socio-economical system (Rockström et al., 2009). 
Contrariwise, I shall argue that it will involve second-order (intangible) dimensions related to our 
human condition, values and relationship to the world. 
I suggest that the threats of climate change to human security will also be of the latter form, threat-
ening more specifically logic, politics, axiology and even metaphysics. 
A first intangible threat of climate change is the one to the broad philosophical category known as 
logic that is a theory of knowledge, including reason, language, and reasoning. 
Climate change illustrates the intuition that the ultimate impacts of some contemporary risks are lit-
erally “untold”, for there is a crucial gap between their reality and the ways we have to quantify them or 
express them as “speakable” (e.g. numbers). 
To put it (excessively) shortly in two striking questions: 
 How could we express the threat of a large and irreversible recasting of human geography? 
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 How could we quantify the danger to get back in 2100 to the global climate of the Pliocene? 
 
A second intangible threat of climate change is the one to the broad philosophical category known as 
axiology that is a theory of value, including aesthetics and ethics. 
The issue of the impacts of climate change on world heritage properties, both natural and cultural, is 
of great interest (UNESCO, 2007) but let me focus on ethics, which is maybe more obvious. 
On the front line is of course environmental justice, in both space and time, updating the old con-
cepts of social justice, non-discriminating principle and moral virtue. 
But there is also much more, that is the brand new responsibility we hold toward the deep future 
(Jonas, 1984). 
History shows at least two instances of global environmental near-misses induced by human activity. 
Anthropogenic climate alteration is now on the list. 
A third intangible threat of climate change is the one to the broad philosophical category known as 
metaphysics that is an exploration of the ultimate nature of the world and ourselves, including ontology 
and theology. 
This threat is an extension of the former, for it may be that under a “rare Earth” hypothesis complex 
life be uncommon in the universe while simple, microbial animal or plant life could be widespread 
(Ward & Brownlee, 2000). 
If very few planets could indeed offer the long-term stability necessary to the emergence of complex 
life, it would give a “karma vertigo” (Brand, 1999) to our civilisation. 
This hyperbolic responsibility would, in turn, challenge the very sense of human action on Earth and 
beyond, something like a theodicy in the era of global environmental change. 
Maybe the future does not need us (Joy, 2000). But maybe it does, and our destiny has a “cosmic 
signification” (Rees, 2003) 
A fourth intangible threat of climate change is the one to the broad philosophical category known as 
politics that is the structure and the function of society, including in the liberal Western tradition free-
dom and democracy. 
The stumbling block is here that systematic environmental externalities have become incompatible 
with the foundations of our society inherited from Hobbes, where everyone is in capacity to choose the 
ends of his actions and to maximise his interests. 
It follows that the resolution of the ecological crisis could be “a tale of two possible threats to democ-
racy” (Guillaume, 2009). 
At the extreme, drastic wartime-style rationing could materialise a first authoritarian scenario, in-
volving an arbitrary delineation between (assumed legitimate) needs and (assumed illegitimate) desires, 
with a monstrous planetary dictatorship in charge of controlling citizens to preserve the weakening na-
ture. 
A second “eco-fundamentalist” scenario which could de facto rule out democracy and politics in 
fighting climate change exhibits unilateral geo-engineering initiatives or massive technological fixes un-
der radical technocracy. 
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Conclusion 
The unprecedented (both quantitatively and qualitatively) scale of our relationship to nature calls for a 
deep renewing of our ways of thought and action. 
We are now confronted with a global threat likely to recast the bio-physical abode of men, but also 
and more generally their cultural history and encompassing oecumene. 
The “intangible threats” of global environmental change are such threats to human civilisation, on 
this Earth and beyond. 
References 
Barnett, Jon (2003). Security and climate change. Global Environmental Change, 13, 7-17. 
Brand, S. (1999). The clock of the long now: Time and responsibility, New York, Basic Books. 
Crutzen, Paul J. (2002). Geology of mankind. Nature, 415(3), 23. 
Guillaume, Bertrand G. (2009). Avoiding a 4+°C world: A challenge for democracy, 4 degrees and be-
yond, University of Oxford. 
Joy, Bill. (2000). Why the future does not need us. Wired Magazine. 8.04. 
Jonas, Hans. (1984). The imperative of responsibility: In search of ethics for the technological age, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Parry, M.L.; Canziani, O.F., Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, P.J. and Hanson, C.E. (2007). Contribution 
of working group II to the Fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental panel on climate 
change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Matthew, Richard A., Barnett, Jon, McDonald Bryan and O’Brien Karen L. (2009). Global environmen-
tal change and human security, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Rees, Martin. (2003). Our final hour: A scientist's warning: how terror, error, and environmental dis-
aster threaten humankind's future in this century – On Earth and beyond, Basic Books, New 
York. 
Rockström, Johan; Steffen, Will; Noone, Kevin; Persson, Åsa; Chapin, Sturat; Lambin, Eric F.; Lenton, 
Timothy M.; Scheffer, Marten; Folke, Carl; Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim; Nykvist, Björn; de Wit, 
Cynthia A.; Hughes, Terry; van der Leeuw, Sander; Rodhe, Henning; Sörlin, Sverker; Snyder, Peter 
K.; Costanza, Robert; Svedin Uno; Falkenmark, Malin; Karlberg, Louise; Corell, Robert W.; Fabry, 
Victoria J.; Hansen, James;Walker, Brian; Liverman, Diana;Richardson, Katherine;Curtzen, Paul 
and Foley, Jonathan A. (2009). A safe operating space for humanity, Nature, 461(7263), 472-475. 
Stern, P. C., O. R. Young, and D. Druckman. (1992). Global environmental change: understanding the 
human dimensions, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 
Turner, B.L.; Clarck, William C.J.F.; Kates, Robert W.; Richards, J.F.; Mathews, Jessica T.; Meyer, Wil-
liam B. (1990). The Earth as transformed by human action: global and regional changes in the 
biosphere over past 300 years, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
UNESCO (2007). Case studies on climate change and world heritage, Paris, UNESCO World Heritage 
Centre. 
Ward Peter D. and Brownlee Donald. (2000). Rare Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Uni-
verse, Springer, New York. 
WBGU, German Advisory Council on Global Change. (2007). Climate change as a security risk, London, 
Earthscan. 
 304 
THE FUTURES OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN JOURNALISM 
Ville Kumpua & Sofi Kurkib 
aUniversity of Tampere, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication  
bUniversity of Turku, Finland Futures Research Centre 
 
ABSTRACT - Towards the end of the first decade of 21st century, climate change rose steadily on the 
news agenda, and during the fall 2009 Copenhagen climate summit made headlines in media all 
around the world. This study takes as a starting point the climate change journalism produced right 
before, during and after the summit in one Finnish and one US newspaper (Helsingin Sanomat and the 
New York Times). The study assesses the way journalism represents the future in the context of the 
climate summit: what kinds of images of the future are presented in the coverage, which aspects of the 
future implications are highlighted and what kinds of actors are allowed to comment on the future. 
The primary result of the study is that the summit was not used as a platform for discussion about the 
preferable and avoidable futures. Instead, the coverage concentrated mostly on the negotiation process 
leaving aside questions about the substance matter, climate change, in itself. 
 
Introduction and Background 
An image of the future is an imaginary mental construct that individuals hold about the future (cf. Rubin 
2000). Studying images of the future is an important topic of study within the futures research field as 
an effort to understand and explain human behavior. The importance of the images of the future is based 
on a notion that the beliefs individuals hold about the future in some way guides their actions in the pre-
sent. The study of images of the future includes also the process of image making (Bell 1998). Despite the 
recent changes in media industry, professional journalism is still the core of nationally constructed 
communication spaces. This is true especially when concerning large scale issues with vast political rele-
vance. Besides having political relevance climate change is definitely an issue that bears images, predic-
tions and scenarios about the future within itself. It could be argued that as an issue it tunes any discus-
sion towards the future and thus creates favorable conditions for journalism to discuss the future as well. 
In this study we have no intention to elaborate how the images of the future are communicated or creat-
ed. The details of interactions between journalism, its audiences and other institutions in creating imag-
es of the future in a personal or societal level should be a subject of another study. In this study, we are 
primarily interested in making a sort of an inventory:  what kind of images about the future were there to 
be found in journalism?  
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Material and Methods 
As the focus of our inventory we have selected the climate change journalism in two newspapers during 
the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (referred from here on as the Copenhagen Sum-
mit). Helsingin Sanomat and New York Times were selected as objects of the study in order to compare 
journalism that is situated somewhat similarly (though New York Times is insurmountable in terms of 
resources, in institutional terms it is situated quite similarly as Helsingin Sanomat) in settings that dif-
fer greatly in terms of climate politics. The newspaper material includes all stories (including news, col-
umns, comments, editorials, letters to the editors etc) mentioning either the Copenhagen summit or cli-
mate change published before, during and after the Copenhagen summit itself 97 F10.  Altogether 242 stories 
were collected, 167 from Helsingin Sanomat and 75 from New York Times. Of all the stories 42 % was 
news, 15 % letters to the editors and 12 % columns or comments by journalists.  
As a method, a combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis was used. The basic 
journalistic dimensions of all stories (size, section, front page connection and genre) were noted, all 
voices (people quoted directly or indirectly) appearing in the texts were coded in one of 28 classes in five 
principal groups (national political systems, transnational political system, civil society, business and 
scientist & experts) by the institution or group they were considered representing and finally the future 
orientation of the stories was investigated by estimating whether the story made some kind of a refer-
ence to future, and then whether this reference was made explicitly mentioning some future year. All the 
future years mentioned in the stories were noted.   
The qualitative analysis was conducted to find out what was the content of the references to the fu-
ture. The aim was to identify articulated images of the future from the material. References that were 
directly linked to the negotiated climate deal were excluded from the analysis. Such were for instance 
commitments to reduce emissions by x % by some future date. Also excluded were articles that did pre-
sent a state of the future (such as a difference in temperature in comparison to the present or a specific 
level of carbon dioxide in the air in the future) but did not elaborate upon the concrete effects of such 
states. 
Results 
As mentioned, the future orientation of the stories was at first studied in a relatively simple manner: by 
investigating whether the story made any textually explicit references to future. More than half of the 
stories made some kind of a reference (vague as it may be) to future (52 % of the stories in Helsingin 
Sanomat, 65 % of stories in New York Times). The act of mentioning a specific year in a news text can be 
considered as anchoring the discussion into a more specific future context. Of the 87 stories in Helsingin 
Sanomat with any kind of a future orientation, 48 explicitly mentioned some future year. That is 55 % of 
the stories with some kind of a reference to future and 29 % of all stories. In New York Times 34 stories 
mentioned some future year that being 71 % of stories with a future reference and 45 % of all stories. 
                                                             
 
10 The Copenhagen summit took place 7.–18.12.2009, stories for this study were collected between 1.–22.12.2009. 
Material was collected using electronic archives of Helsingin Sanomat (www.hs.fi/arkisto) and in the case of New 
York Times, Factiva (www.factiva.com). 
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Three years clearly dominate the discussions: 2012, 2020, 2050 (table 1). These are the years that were 
most debated in the negotiation tables as well: 2012 marks the end of the Kyoto protocol and 2020 and 
2050 were the years most often used as points of reference when discussing proposed actions. Looking 
at the mentioned years genre-wise few interesting observations can be made. In general, reporting gen-
res (news, reportage) make more references to future than opinionated stories (columns, comments, edi-
torials, letters to the editor). Opinionated stories focus more on the immediate near future of 2010 and 
less to 2012 and 2020. On the other hand 2050 is more prominent in opinionated stories. 
We may elaborate our answer on what kinds of futures were there to be found in journalism in quan-
titative terms by looking at what how the future orientation interacts with voices that get to speak. The 
question, simply put, would be who gets to speak about the future in the climate change coverage?  
 
Table 1. Years mentioned in the Copenhagen coverage of New York Times and Helsingin 
Sanomat 
 Reporting Opinionated All stories 
2010 7 6 % 5 13 % 12 7 % 
2011 2 2 % 1 3 % 3 2 % 
2012 26 21 % 3 8 % 29 18 % 
2013 2 2 % 0 0 % 2 1 % 
2015 4 3 % 3 8 % 7 4 % 
2016 2 2 % 2 5 % 4 2 % 
2020 45 37 % 11 28 % 56 35 % 
2025 3 2 % 1 3 % 4 2 % 
2030 12 10 % 2 5 % 14 9 % 
2050 16 13 % 9 23 % 25 16 % 
2055 1 1 % 0 0 % 1 1 % 
2100 2 2 % 1 3 % 3 2 % 
2109 0 0 % 1 3 % 1 1 % 
Total  122 100 % 39 100 % 161 100 % 
 
There are clearly two actor groups that dominate the Copenhagen coverage (table 2, far right col-
umn). The summit is mainly covered through political actors from different countries (national political 
system) but civil society (e.g. NGOs, demonstrators, men-on-the-street) is very prominent as well. Scien-
tists and experts are quoted as well but not as frequently as the two groups mentioned above.  The role of 
business actors in the stories is minimal. The quite small role of transnational political actors (UN, EU 
etc) is noteworthy. In these respects there are no notable differences in the voice groups between the two 
papers. 
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Table 2. Voice groups within different future orientations  
 
No future  
orientation 
Future  
orientation 
Specific year(s)  
Mentioned All stories 
National political 
system 29 18 % 158 48 % 111 53 % 187 38 % 
Transnational 
political system 8 5 % 33 10 % 21 10 % 41 8 % 
Civil society 63 39 % 65 20 % 35 17 % 128 26 % 
Business 6 4 % 19 6 % 12 6 % 25 5 % 
Science, experts 37 23 % 47 14 % 26 12 % 85 17 % 
Other 19 12 % 10 3 % 6 3 % 29 6 % 
Total 162 100 % 332 100 % 211 100 % 495 100 % 
 
There is an interesting shift between the two major actor groups when comparing stories with no fu-
ture orientation with stories having any kind of a future orientation or mentioning explicit years. It 
seems that the more explicit the future orientation of a story is, the more it is politicians who get to 
speak. Civil society voices on the other hand are most prominent when there is no future orientation at 
all and least visible when specific years are mentioned in the stories. It is also interesting to note that 
scientists and experts are most prominent when there is no future orientation at all.  This seems to hint 
that there are significant differences in different orientations and their respective actor-relations. Civil 
society is indeed a major part of the coverage of the summit but journalism seems to designate civil soci-
ety actors to a different time-zone than the actual political decision-makers. Partly this is of course due 
to the nature of a summit as a political event but there is no reason to underestimate the possibilities of 
journalism to deviate from this summit-logic. 
We can get a sense on how or why different time zones seem to be forming inside journalism by look-
ing at the way different time orientations vary by genre (table 3). Reporting genres are clearly dominat-
ing the most future oriented coverage, especially the stories mentioning explicit years. Reportage and 
feature are as genres clearly not designated for dealing with the future in journalistic imagination.  
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Table 3. The future orientation of different journalistic genres 
 No future  
orientation 
Future 
orientation 
Explicit year(s)  
mentioned 
News 43 41 % 58 43 % 42 51 % 
Reportage, feature 11 10 % 8 6 % 4 5 % 
Interview 2 2 % 4 3 % 2 2 % 
Other reporting 9 8 % 12 9 % 11 13 % 
Total reporting 65 61 % 82 60 % 59 72 % 
Editorial 4 4 % 6 4 % 3 4 % 
Column or comment by 
journalist 
14 13 % 16 12 % 9 11 % 
Column or comment by non-
journalist 
1 1 % 6 4 % 4 5 % 
Letters 13 12 % 23 17 % 6 7 % 
Other opinionated 7 7 % 3 2 % 1 1 % 
Total opinionated 39 37 % 54 40 % 23 28 % 
Unclear 2 2 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 
Total 106  136  82  
 
It seems that the explicit future talk in the context of the Copenhagen coverage was strongly driven 
by the logics of power politics. Journalism echoes the importance of those specific future years consid-
ered important in the negotiation tables. Going beyond the plain numbers one may argue that this di-
mension was broadly characteristic for the Copenhagen coverage. The negotiation process was on the 
centre stage of the coverage and the issue, climate change, as such was pushed aside. The same logic 
seems to be at play when looking at who gets to speak in the stories as well. Explicit years are mostly dis-
cussed by those inside the negotiations. Civil society voices are most prominent when the future is not 
discussed at all. Partly this of course reflects the nature of the summit as a political event but on the oth-
er hand it does reveal that journalism is eager to follow such logic.  
The qualitative analysis concentrated on the nature of the presented future references. The refer-
ences to the future (”future states 98F11” from here on) were categorized by their essential contents under 
four categories: 1) preferable states of the future, 2) probable states of the future 99F12, 3) avoidable states of 
the future 100F13, and 4) references to a possible black swan 101F14. In addition, we collected proposed actions to-
wards a preferred state of the future and criticism of the mainstream political solutions to combat cli-
mate change. This was included as, even though the stories did not present a straightforward description 
of the future, the underlying motivator for them was either reaching a preferred future or avoiding a dys-
topic one. As noted earlier, such references to the future that were made directly in the context of the 
summit were excluded from the analysis. These would include the majority of the futures references in 
the material, leaving for qualitative analysis only 30 (out of a total of 168 stories with a reference to the 
                                                             
 
11 A state of the future is a fragment of an image of the future, describing future from a specific angle. 
12 There was considerable overlap with the probable and avoidable categories. In these cases categorization was 
made according to the tone that seemed dominating in the context of the whole story. 
13 The division into preferable, probable, and avoidable futures is a common framework within futures research  
14 A black swan is a term for an occurrence of a high impact, low expectancy event (Taleb 2007). 
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future) articles from Helsingin Sanomat and  18 (out of a total of 75 future related stories) from the New 
York Times.   
In the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, the category with the most stories was 2) states of the 
future that were presented as probable. These included mostly articles that could be also categorized as 
avoidable. However, the way the probable states of the future were presented was different from the 
purely avoidable stories. The probable futures often relied on calculations projecting the present trends 
into the future, used analogies from the past or by the selected wording implicated that the future de-
picted was seen as likely to unfold. The category divided into sub-categories of 2a) economic descriptions 
of the future, 2b) natural hazards and 2c) threats to indigenous cultures / life in especially vulnerable 
areas. 
The subcategory of 2a) that described future on economic terms was the most prominent. Of all of 
the categories, it included some of the most detailed descriptions of the future. Under the category fell 
worries ranging from the financial burden brought about by the potential binding climate deal… 
 
The aid to the developing countries will in itself cost the Finnish people 66–225 million euros 
by the year 2020. There are also other costs, as listed by the Government Institute for Eco-
nomic Research: compared to a business as usual emission track the demand for consump-
tion will decrease, investments to renewable energy are costly, the gross domestic product 
will lower as will the employment rate. 
(A48, HS 9.12.2009, editorial) 
 
…to the consequences of extending the cap & trade system to include air traffic in the year 2012: 
 
The cap & trade system in air traffic is feared to lead to unnecessary intermediate landings. 
The industry fears that if the system remains enforced only within the European Union, it can 
bring about a chain of intermediate landing airports in the countries bordering the Union. 
[...] According to the designed system, for example a flight operated by a Japanese air carrier 
JAL flying directly from Helsinki to Tokyo will need to have carbon permits for every flown 
ton kilometer. If it were to make  stops in St. Petersburg, it would only be required permits 
for the flight from Helsinki to St. Petersburg, but not the leg of flight from St. Petersburg to 
Tokyo.  
(A19, HS 5.12.2009, news story) 
 
The subcategory 2a) had often a relatively short time span (up to 20 years into the future). Compared 
to the detailed calculations in the subcategory 2a), in the two other sub-categories (2b, 2c) references to 
natural catastrophes and threats to vulnerable cultures and areas were much less elaborated and more 
sketchy, often contending to list a number of calamities in a general and at times even routinely manner. 
Timescales were often ill-defined. Typically no specific years were mentioned. 
 
For instance the basis of the Inuit hunting culture is in danger of collapsing as the arctic ice 
melts. […] The Salomon Islands are drowning to the sea. The melting rate of glaciers and arc-
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tic ice is accelerating. The developing countries dependent on agriculture are already suffer-
ing from heat, drought and severe rains. Coastal floods have increased in Finland.  
(A52, HS 9.12. 2009, comment by a journalist) 
 
Warming of the Earth will in the future bring unprecedented pressure to every nation. The 
worst consequences will be suffered by the poor, the young, women, as well as habitants of 
coastal and dry areas, and small farmers 
(A49, HS 9.12.2009, column by non-journalist) 
 
Unlike the multifaceted avoidable future, there was little variance in the preferred future state (cate-
gory 1). In all the stories the good future was described as a low carbon society attained by new, green 
technology (in one case nuclear power).  
 
…What if the climate change was a false alarm, but we would make drastic cuts to the carbon 
dioxide emissions? We would be speeding up the transition to a greener energy and traffic 
that we needed to do in any case. We might be paying a bit more for the energy investments 
in the next decades but in return we would get cleaner and more self-sufficient electricity and 
heating and also our breathing air would be cleansed. We could stop worrying about the rise 
of the oil prices. 
(A6, HS 2.12.2009, letter) 
 
Resolutions or proposed actions towards a preferred state of the future as well as criticism of the 
mainstream political solutions to combat climate change were targeted at various different directions, 
from proposing geo-engineering, to embracing reforestation plans as a boost for the creative economy, to 
suggesting a global one child policy.  
 
Pentti Linkola was right on in his writing (HS letter to the editor 6.12.) demanding a one 
child policy to stop population growth. It is evident that three billion new people pursuing 
western living standards do not help stop climate change nor does it promote sustainable de-
velopment.  
(A63, HS 10.12.2009, letter) 
 
Avoidable futures were formulated as threats, repeating the un-specific but gloomy style used in sub-
categories 2b and 2c.  
 
[…] Pachauri warned that hundreds of millions of people would end up as climate refugees if 
the emissions would not be curbed 
(A40, HS 8.12.2009, news story) 
 
If the Copenhagen summit were to fail, the next top-level environmental meetings would have 
to concentrate on the costs inflicted by the failure, measured in loss of human lives. 
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(A49, HS 9.12.2009, column by non-journalist) 
 
 The Helsingin Sanomat material included also one reference to category 4, a possible black swan (a 
scenario where something rather unexpected but high in its impacts would occur):   
 
Only recently Richard Betts, a climate modeler at the British meteorological institute, with 
his group, anticipated that the Earth could heat up to four degrees already in 50 years. 
(A25, HS 6.12.2009, letter) 
 
In the New York Times the group with the most stories was resolutions or proposed actions towards 
a preferred state of the future. The group was dominated by different proposals as to how the market 
could be used to tackle the problem of climate change and the economic downturn 
 
Still, I am an Earth Race guy. I believe that averting catastrophic climate change is a huge 
scale issue. The only engine big enough to impact Mother Nature is Father Greed: the Mar-
ket. Only a market, shaped by regulations and incentives to stimulate massive innovation in 
clean, emission-free power sources can make a dent in global warming. And no market can 
do that better than America's. Therefore, the goal of Earth Racers is to focus on getting the 
U.S. Senate to pass an energy bill, with a long-term price on carbon that will really stimulate 
America to become the world leader in clean-tech. If we lead by example, more people will 
follow us by emulation than by compulsion of some U.N. treaty. 
(B58, NYT 20.12.2009, column by a journalist) 
 
Also the few preferable images of the future (category 1) included putting the market forces to use in 
combating climate change and other environmental problems   
 
Hence Coca-Cola's survival compels it to be deeply concerned with problems of water scarci-
ty, energy, climate change and agriculture. One company goal is to make its plants water-
neutral, returning to the environment water in quantities equal to the amount used in bever-
ages and their production. Another goal is to work on the conservation of seven of the world's 
river basins, including the Rio Grande, Yangtze, Mekong and Danube -- all of them sites of 
major environmental concerns besides supplying water for Coca-Cola. 
(B3, NYT 6.12.2009, column by non-journalist) 
 
The New York Times material did not contain direct black swans (category 4) but it did use the con-
cept in one story: 
 
Soon after Suskind's book came out, the legal scholar Cass Sunstein, who then was at the 
University of Chicago, pointed out that Mr. Cheney seemed to be endorsing the same ''precau-
tionary principle'' that also animated environmentalists. Sunstein wrote in his blog: ''Accord-
ing to the Precautionary Principle, it is appropriate to respond aggressively to low-
probability, high-impact events -- such as climate change. Indeed, another vice president -- Al 
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Gore -- can be understood to be arguing for a precautionary principle for climate change 
(though he believes that the chance of disaster is well over 1 percent). 
(B17, NYT 9.12., column by non-journalist) 
 
The avoidable futures followed usually the same lines that were detected also in the Helsingin 
Sanomat, slightly unspecific but very unattractive options in the future that were not specified by any 
years or dates:  
 
Politics, ideology and economic interests interlace the debate, and the stakes on both sides are 
high. If scientific predictions about global warming's effects are correct, inaction will lead at 
best to rising social, economic and environmental disruption, at worst to a calamity far more 
severe. If the forecasts are wrong, nations could divert hundreds of billions of dollars to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions at a time when they are struggling to recover from a global reces-
sion. 
(B65, NYT 7.12.2009, news story) 
 
At the same time, he made clear that the United States was prepared to join other industrial-
ized countries both in cutting their own greenhouse gas emissions and in giving aid to the 
poorest and most vulnerable countries to deal with rising seas, drought and other phenome-
na that are expected to worsen as the planet warms. 
(B21, NYT 10.12.2009, news story) 
 
The probable futures array was two-fold: there were the probable/avoidable stories…  
 
If the water problems are not solved, El Alto, a poor sister city of La Paz, could perhaps be the 
first large urban casualty of climate change. A World Bank report concluded last year that 
climate change would eliminate many glaciers in the Andes within 20 years, threatening the 
existence of nearly 100 million people. 
(B39, NYT 14.12.2009, reportage) 
 
…But unlike in the Helsingin Sanomat, NY Times found also probable and preferable futures availa-
ble: 
 
In human affairs politics will always trump science. Nothing significant will be done until 
conditions become much worse. Yet a nonbinding agreement on emissions may prove sur-
prisingly productive. If climate temperatures continue to rise, nations will see for themselves 
that more must be done, and may compete with one another to reduce emissions, going be-
yond what would have been mutually acceptable in 2009. The know nothings will evaporate. 
Genuine cooperation will grow from grim necessity. 
(B48, NYT 22.12.2009, letter) 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
From the perspective of this study, it seems that climate change summit is not the optimal context for 
journalism to discuss the preferable and avoidable futures. Instead of climate change as an issue, the 
summit in itself, as a political event and the negotiations as a process were at the focal point of journal-
ism. This might a reflection of the state of the climate change debate. It seems that in both papers, the 
premises of climate change are commonly accepted at least in the way that it is not considered necessary 
to repeat the basic facts about the issue itself in great detail. Considering the future it then follows that 
while both of the newspapers give a rather nuanced account of the different interests of and conflicts 
between the key negotiators, the future consequences of the deal are left to sketches that at times had a 
feel to them that they were used as mere rhetorical devices to emphasise the twists and turns of the ne-
gotiations. The question left to further study then is, whether the context of the summit is the crucial 
factor or if the nature of journalistic process is the main reason behind the result. There seems indeed to 
be a strong argument that a kind of a journalistic meta-language of summit journalism directed the cov-
erage. In this sense, the issue at stake is not a decisive factor. Same kinds of stories would be produces in 
all somewhat similar events, be it the Olympics, or the European song contest. 
However, the kind of summit we have investigated brings together an enormous amount of actors 
who would be able to provide journalists with knowledge, views, arguments and visions of those conse-
quences in the future. Based on our material, journalism did not make much out of these potential im-
pacts. In the case of Copenhagen this was underlined by the fact that both papers had several corre-
spondents present. By using so little of this potential amounts to making a conscious decision to ignore 
the future aspect of the topic. In this sense getting the deal now was the driving factor in narrating the 
coverage and not, for example what will happen if or how should we cope. 
Despite the generally bland orientation towards the future, there were still several references to the 
future among the stories. Looked at quantitatively it seems that the people that were trusted to provide 
their impression of the direction of the future came mostly from the political power elites. The future 
years most frequently referred to were the important dates on the agreement, 2012 and 2020. Also in the 
qualitative investigation, most images of the future reflected rather conventional wisdom about the con-
sequences of climate change. Failure in finding agreement on cutting emissions would result in all sorts 
of natural catastrophies, however the sufferers of these were depicted to be mostly in the developing 
world. Also, the specific nature of the natural hazards as well as the potential time when they were to be 
expected was not defined. Little reference to the consequences for the lives of the assumed readership 
was made except for in economic terms as income transfers to the developing countries.  
It is notable that the most detailed and also most common were the articles describing the economic 
burdens brought about either by the forged deal or the possible effects of climate change. The most often 
cited solution to reach temperature goals was by technology (Helsingin Sanomat) and by the cap & trade 
mechanism (New York Times).  Both the quantitative and the qualitative analysis point to the direction 
that journalism was quite willing to adopt the (quite one-sided) image of the future provided by the po-
litical elites, emphasizing the market mechanism and technological solutions. Neither of the papers, for 
example, delved very deep on the fundamental causes of the rising co2 –levels, for instance the economy 
based on the paradigm of continuous growth was not commented upon, despite numerous demonstra-
tors at the summit were addressing it as a major problem. The straightforward interpretation of the re-
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sults would be that the summit as a frame was somehow prohibitive to stories presenting different alter-
natives for the future. When the main story was about an inter-governmental solution to climate change, 
it proved too difficult to mix with competing approaches.  
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ABSTRACT – Critical Infrastructure Protection or CIP is a concept that relates to the preparedness 
and response to serious incidents that involve the critical infrastructure of a region or nation. Tradi-
tionally, mainly natural disaster or terrorism threats are discussed. Yet, CIP must be widened to cover 
also so-called normal circumstances, where especially visionary thinking and strategic decision-
making concerning the funding of rehabilitation, replacement, and operations and maintenance has 
become vital, in particular due to the longevity of most infrastructure assets.  
Introduction and Background 
Critical Infrastructure Protection or CIP is a concept that relates to the preparedness and response to 
serious incidents that involve the critical infrastructure of a region or nation. In May 1998, President Bill 
Clinton issued Presidential directive on CIP. This recognized certain parts of the national infrastructure 
as critical to the national and economic security of the United States and the well-being of its citizenry, 
and required steps to be taken to protect it.  
Yet, traditionally we have been thinking mainly natural disaster or terrorism threats, but the CIP 
concept should be widened to cover also the so-called normal circumstances, where especially strategic 
decision-making concerning the funding of rehabilitation, replacement, and operations and mainte-
nance of infrastructure has become vital. 
Contemporary, well-located and -functioning infrastructure is the backbone both of the sustained 
economic development and viable economic activities of any nation. Sometimes the word “economic in-
frastructure” is used, when energy, roads, railways, ports, airports, water resources management, water 
supply and sanitation, waste management and information and communication technology (ICT) are 
discussed. 
On the other hand, in order to safeguard the healthy living conditions and to protect the environ-
ment, properly built and operated water supply and sanitation (WSS), and waste management infra-
structure must be in place. In developing economies presently at any given time a half of the beds in the 
319 
hospital and health centers are occupied by the patients suffering from diseases caused by unsafe drink-
ing water and unhygienic living conditions. Every year the poor people are losing about 5 billion working 
days because of inadequate WSS infrastructure and services. In addition, countries with the greatest 
economic infrastructure needs are often the least attractive to investors. 
The healthy living conditions and the economic development supported by the adequate and func-
tioning infrastructure are essential form the point of view of individual, community, national, regional 
and global security.   
Africa has low access to basic water supply and sanitation services, i.e. 36% (341 million people) have 
no access to water supply and 62% (583 million people) have no access to sanitation. Africa is not on 
track to meet water services related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and it’s badly off-track in 
meeting sanitation services related MDGs (Jallow 2009). Figure 1 and 2 show the worldwide use of im-
proved sanitation and drinking-water sources in 2008 (World Health Organization and UNICEF 2010). 
 
  
Figure 1. Worldwide use of improved sanitation facilities in 2008. 
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Figure 2. Worldwide use of improved drinking-water sources in 2008 
A recent study (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009) in 24 African countries shows that the poor 
state of infrastructure in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) decreases national economic growth by two percent-
age points every year and reduces business productivity by as much as 40 percent. The study reveals that 
SSA has the weakest infrastructure in the world, but ironically Africans in some countries pay twice as 
much for basic services as people elsewhere.  
The report estimates that USD93 billion are needed every year over the next decade, more than twice 
what was previously figured out. The new estimate amounts to about 15 percent of the SSA’s gross do-
mestic product (GDP), comparable to what China invested in infrastructure over the last decade. The 
study found out that existing spending on African infrastructure is much higher than previously known, 
USD45 billion a year. Surprisingly, most of this is locally financed by the citizens in SSA. The study also 
found that there is also considerable wastage to address; a number of efficiency improvements could po-
tentially expand the available resources by a further USD17 billion.  
Yet, even if major efficiencies are gained there is still a funding gap of USD31 billion every year, 
much of it for power and water infrastructure in fragile states. The funding gap is daunting for the re-
gion’s low-income countries (who would need to spend an additional 9 percent of their GDP) and partic-
ularly for the region’s fragile states (who would need to spend an additional 25 percent of their GDP).  
In Africa, there is also low utilization of water resources, i.e. about 4% available water is used, about 
6% of cultivated area is irrigated, and less than 6% of hydropower potential developed.  Furthermore, 
there is only about 200 m3/capita storage compared to about 6 000m3/capita for USA (Jallow 2009). 
With more than 60 transboundary rivers in Africa, developing large-scale infrastructure to manage wa-
ter use and avoid conflicts is a huge challenge. Over the last 40 years, only 4 million hectares of new irri-
gation have been developed, compared to 25 and 32 million hectares for China and India respectively 
(Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009). 
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 Since the river basins in many regions in Africa are shared by two or more countries, the use and 
further development of water resources requires that adequate agreements based on the principles of 
international water law (Helsinki Rules 1966) as well as management practices on transboundary waters 
are in place. This is a necessity also to ensure peace and security among the riparian countries. If these 
mechanisms are not there, the potential investors might consider the situation too risky. This would 
mean that the investments are not made or they become more costly. 
Generally speaking, in the developed economies the infrastructure is still adequate to support the 
business activities and the well-being of the societies. Yet, for example in the United States and in Fin-
land we are not investing enough in rehabilitation and replacement of the aging infrastructure. This in-
dicates clearly, that not only in Africa, but also globally, decision-makers are not aware of the importance 
of the investments in infrastructure or they close their eyes in front of these absolute necessary invest-
ments. Furthermore, this indicates that the decision-makers in the developed world might not consider 
the increasing the support for the infrastructure investments in the developing economies, when they do 
not even see the need in their own better-off countries 
In US, according to Grigg (2006, 243), the approximately 0.6 million kilometers of US water distri-
bution systems will continue to age and at today’s renewal rate will certainly deteriorate in condition. 
Piped water systems are confronted by more risks, including intrinsic decay and failure, natural disas-
ters, accidents, malevolent threats from insiders or outsiders, and collateral damage when other infra-
structure systems go down. 
A study (Hukka and Katko 2007) shows that the funding gap in water and sanitation is EUR 1 000 
million, whereas the total value of the WSS and waste management infrastructure is estimated to be 
EUR 8 000 million. The conclusion is that we need to increase the investment level from the current an-
nual level of about EUR 250 million up to EUR 500 million for the next 15-20 years. Even this increase 
would mean that we would be only able to maintain the current status of our WSS infrastructure. 
In Finland, over 30% of water supply pipes and 37% of sewer pipes are already over 30 years old. 
The current rehabilitation and replacement level is inadequate. The level should be increased from the 
current annual level of EUR 120 million to about EUR 360 million (ROTI 2010).  
One of the reasons for the current low level of the rehabilitation and replacement in the biggest Finn-
ish water undertakings is that their owners, the municipalities, are withdrawing rather large amount of 
money from the undertakings as the rate of return. This “hidden tax” is used for financing other munici-
pal operations. Table 1 shows the rate of return calculations for the different utilities (Vinnari 2006a, 
163). 
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Table 1.  The average rates of return of the owner municipalities of 15 large water services un-
dertakings in Finland 1997-2003, calculated from the data provided by the utilities in 
their annual financial reports. 
Water undertaking Population 
served in 1999 
Compensation 
for owner’s basic 
capital, %1) 
Total owner's 
rate of return, 
% of turnover2) 
Helsinki Water 549 840 9.0 45.5 
Espoo Water 203 490 10.0 38.8 
Tampere Water 186 210 11.9 29.3 
Vantaa Water 165 850 8.23) 28.73) 
Turku Water Utility 165 220 7.8 27.8 
Oulu Water 117 314 18.0 23.7 
Kuopio Water 82 216 5.5 17.5 
Jyväskylä Water 77 530 13.2 27.1 
Pori Water Utility 73 934 4.5 18.7 
Vaasa Water 56 247 5.8 15.3 
Lappeenranta Water Utility 53 724 6.04) 14.94) 
Kotka Water  52 900 5.25) 21.05) 
Joensuu Water 50 815 12.0 31.5 
Porvoo Water 38 930 0.0 0.0 
Rauma Water 37 300 2.06) 8.06) 
AVERAGE 127 400 7.9 23.2 
 
1) Return on basic capital divided by basic capital 
2) Sum of return on basic capital, loan installments, loan interest payments, and other reg-
ular payments to  the municipality, divided by turnover 
3) Independent accounting only from 2002 onwards 
4) Independent accounting only from 2003 onwards 
5) Data available for years 1999-2003 
6) Data available for years 1998-2003. 
 
On the other hand, Seppälä, Rodiqi, Nyanchaga & Hukka (2004) argue that most water utilities have 
traditionally not been very futures oriented, and in practice not very interested in the ethical aspects of 
socially important decisions regarding water services provision and production. Utilities also do not ac-
tually manage their knowledge and information processes well, although these are the most central ele-
ments for their long-term performance and success.  
Water utilities and other water services organizations and their supervisory and management bodies 
are on average not well aware of the theoretical basis and concepts of visionary and knowledge manage-
ment, and do not commonly utilize established VM and KM methodologies and tools in their operations.   
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In SSA, but also to some extent in developed economies, there is capability and capacity to diagnose the 
existing situation, but we argue that what is missing by large is the lack of understanding among various 
stakeholders how to benefit from futures research. We highly recommend that the futures research ap-
proaches, methodologies and practices should be used to help the decision-makers on the way towards 
identifying sustainable development paths and security based inevitably on the critical infrastructure 
protection. 
Thus, an integrated framework consisting of visionary and knowledge management is needed to con-
ceptualize and improve water utility operations. Through visionary management the long-term devel-
opment of utilities can be ensured, and through knowledge management the utility’s human capital can 
be sustained – including critical knowledge and tacit knowledge. 
In the SSA context, the financing situation is somewhat more complex than in developed economies, 
since in addition to huge funding gap in greenfield investments, there is a large and rapidly increasing 
need for closing the funding gap for rehabilitation and replacement of existing infrastructure as well as 
the need for closing the efficiency gap. In practice, this means that in order to ensure sustained critical 
infrastructure in SSA the needs are relatively speaking greater than in developed economies. Particularly 
with the prevailing global financial crisis, investing in African infrastructure is critical for Africa’s future. 
In Finland, as well as in many other countries including the nations in the SSA, the properly ar-
ranged WSS asset management structures, policies, regulations, systems and practices would create the 
enabling environment for better strategic decision-making concerning both the investments and effi-
ciency improvements.   
Therefore the regulatory approaches adopted in some countries should be examined thoroughly and 
applied into WSS service production (Table 2, Vinnari & Hukka, 2009, 21).  
 
Table 2.  Comparison of international asset management policies. 
Country Fixed asset 
ownership  
Policy driver  Main organizations 
involved 
Asset management planning 
England 
and Wa-
les 
Private Water Industry Act 
1991 
National regulator  Required by regulator. Currently 
five-year plans, anticipated fu-
ture requirement 25 years. 
 
Australia Public Accounting Stan-
dard 27, CoAG prin-
ciples 
 
State regulators; pro-
fessional associations 
 
Required by some of the regula-
tors. Length varies according to 
state. 
New Zea-
land 
Public Local Government 
Act 1989; 2002 
 
Local governments, 
professional asso-
ciations 
 
Statutory minimum requirement 
10 years; in practice up to 40 
years. 
 
United 
States 
Mostly public GASB 34 EPA, professional as-
sociations 
Not specified. 
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The above recommended regulatory approaches and a practical asset management system defined in 
Table 3 (Vinnari 2006b, 34) should also be considered to be used, in addition to the WSS infrastructure 
management, in other water infrastructure, e.g. hydropower, irrigation systems management. This sys-
temic and systematic approach would give a practical tool for better asset management and performance 
improvements. 
 
Table 3. Components of Seattle Public Utilities (SPU) Asset Management System. 
Component Implementation Activity 
Define service levels Annual customer surveys, stakeholder interviews 
 
Learn about risks Tracking and tagging of most critical assets by probability of fail-
ure/consequence analysis; lower risks by rehabilitation, operations and 
maintenance 
 
Focus on life cycle costs Assess life-cycle costs and benefits of each planned project/investment 
 
Use triple bottom line Prioritize projects/investments based on societal, economic and environmen-
tal impacts 
 
Optimize data and data 
systems 
Inventory of technical characteristics, age, location, maintenance history, 
condition and current value of each asset component 
 
Create strategic asset man-
agement plans 
Description of current condition of asset components, and operations, 
maintenance and rehabilitation strategies; risk management plans for opera-
tional and economic risks 
 
Clarify roles and responsibi-
lities 
Define work team and individual responsibilities, responsibility areas and 
decision-making authorities 
 
Make large investment de-
cisions via asset manage-
ment committee 
Meet  once a week, analyses and finances large investments (> eur 200,000), 
ensures that decisions are based on life-cycle cost and trible bottom line 
principles, approves project plans, decides customer service and environmen-
tal standards 
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